DISCUSSION

Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1) provides, “A person who has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this section.” The statute defines harassment as not just unlawful violence, or a credible threat of violence, but also “a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) The statute defines a “ ‘[c]ourse of conduct’ ” as “a pattern of conduct composed of

3 This court by separate order granted Myrick’s request for judicial notice of the video recordings introduced into evidence. In one recording, Myrick walked on Frank’s driveway and shouted at her the expletives set forth above. Frank spoke politely to Myrick during the recorded interactions. 3 a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) “The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) “Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.’ ” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) At the hearing on a petition for a civil harassment restraining order, the court “shall receive any testimony that is relevant, and may make an independent inquiry.” (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) The trial court may issue a restraining order only after finding “by clear and convincing evidence” that unlawful harassment exists. (Ibid.) We review a trial court’s denial of a restraining order request under section 527.6 for abuse of discretion, and the court’s factual findings (express and implied) for substantial evidence. (Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1226, disapproved on other grounds in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7; Salazar v. Eastin (1995) 9 Cal.4th 836, 849-850.) It is a fundamental principle of appellate review that this court will presume the trial court’s order is correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; In re Marriage of Khera & Sameer (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1484.) Additionally, as the appealing party, it is Myrick’s burden to affirmatively show error. (Denham, at p. 566.) In doing so, she must provide an adequate record to establish that error. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295; LNSU #1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection

4 Community Association (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1070.) “We cannot presume error from an incomplete record.” (Christie v. Kimball (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1412.) Appellants typically provide a reporter’s transcript of oral proceedings on appeal, but if they do not or cannot, they may submit an agreed or settled statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.134, 8.137; see Leslie v. Roe (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 104.) While a reporter’s transcript “may not be necessary if the appeal involves legal issues requiring de novo review,” when a case involves substantial evidence or abuse of discretion, “a reporter’s transcript or an agreed or settled statement of the proceedings will be indispensable.” (Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 476, 483.) And an appellant bears the burden to provide such a record if he or she “ ‘ “intends to raise any issue that requires consideration of the oral proceedings in the superior court . . . .” ’ ” (Ibid.; Sanowicz v. Bacal (2015)

234 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1034, fn. 5, citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.120(b) 4.) Myrick’s three contentions require us to review the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial to support the court’s grant of the restraining order. However, based on the above review standards, Myrick has not met her burden to demonstrate error with an adequate record. We have reviewed the video recordings, including one that captures Myrick walking on Frank’s driveway and shouting obscenities at her, while Frank responded politely to Myrick. Even Myrick concedes in her opening brief that the language she used was possibly “unladylike . . . crude, embarrassing, and annoying,” while

4 California Rules of Court, rule 8.120(b) provides: “If an appellant intends to raise any issue that requires consideration of the oral proceedings in the superior court, the record on appeal must include a record of these oral proceedings in the form of one of the following: [¶] (1) A reporter’s transcript under rule 8.130; [¶] (2) An agreed statement under rule 8.134; or [¶] (3) A settled statement under rule 8.137.” 5 insisting she was exercising her First Amendment rights. She also adds, “Further, it was her constitutional right to express her opinion on . . . Frank’s immigration status or to express her anger by using the F[-]word as she did.” (Some capitalization omitted.) But we recognize the videos are only one part of the total evidence presented at trial. Absent a reporter’s transcript or suitable alternative documenting the various witnesses’ testimony, we cannot review Myrick’s claims of error and must presume the court’s order is correct.

DISPOSITION

The civil harassment restraining order is affirmed. No costs are awarded on appeal.

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

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