DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s petition because

the jurors were instructed with the bracketed language in CALCRIM No. 400, which

reads, “Under some specific circumstances, if the evidence establishes aiding and

abetting of one crime, a person may also be found guilty of other crimes that occurred

3 during the commission of the first crime.” Defendant claims this constituted “an explicit

instruction on the natural and probable consequences doctrine” and in the alternative, “it

nevertheless constituted an instruction on a form of imputed malice murder.” We

disagree.

Section 1172.6 reads: “A person convicted of felony murder or murder under the

natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is

imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime . . . may file a

petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder,

attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced.” (§ 1172.6,

subd. (a).) A section 1172.6 denial “ ‘at the first stage of prima facie review . . . is

appropriate only if the record of conviction demonstrates that “the petitioner is ineligible

for relief as a matter of law.” [Citations.] This is a purely legal conclusion, which we

review de novo.’ ” (People v. Evrin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.)

Defendant’s claim, that the reading of the bracketed language is “an explicit

instruction on the natural and probable consequences doctrine,” was specifically rejected

in People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941 (Estrada).

In an earlier appeal by the Estrada defendant, he claimed the trial court erred by

instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 400. (People v. Estrada (November 28, 2011),

B226963) 2011 WL 5995909 [nonpub. opn.].) Citing People v. Samaniego (2009) 172

Cal.App.4th 1148, the court found the error harmless because “the trial court gave other

instructions that required the jury to determine whether [the defendant] had the mental

4 state necessary to find him guilty of first degree murder.” (Estrada, at *10) Those other

instructions included CALCRIM Nos. 401, 520, and 521. (Id. at *10-*11)

The defendant then appealed from an order denying his petition for resentencing

under section 1170.95. (Estrada, supra, Cal.App.5th a p. 943.) The Estrada court found

that “the bracketed language alone [was not] sufficient to find that the jury was instructed

on a natural and probable consequences theory” because of the court’s prior holding that

“the jury instructions, taken as a whole, required the jury to find that [the defendant]

acted with intent to kill in order to find him guilty of first degree murder, even under an

aider and abettor theory.” (Id. at p. 947.)

The fact that the jury was instructed with the bracketed language should not be

viewed in isolation; the jury instructions must be taken as a whole. In Estrada, just as in

this case, the jury was not only instructed with CALCRIM No. 400, but also CALCRIM

Nos. 401, 520 and 521. (People v. Estrada (November 28, 2011), B226963) [nonpub.

opn.].); CT 163-164, 119, 224.) CALCRIM No. 401 explains to the jury that to find a

defendant guilty of a crime as an aider and abettor, the People have to prove that the

defendant “knew the perpetrator intended to commit the crime” and that “[b]efore or

during the commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the

perpetrator in committing the crime.” The instruction also informs the jury that

“[s]omeone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful

purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote,

encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.” CALCRIM No. 520

explains to the jury that to prove the defendant guilty of murder the People must prove

5 that the defendant committed an act that caused the death of another person and acted

with malice aforethought. CALCRIM No. 521 states that the defendant is guilty of first

degree murder, “if the People have proved that he acted willfully, deliberately, and with

premeditation.” We agree with the Second District that these instructions, when given in

addition to CALCRIM No. 400, “ensured that the jury would only find [defendant] guilty

of first degree murder, even as an aider and abettor, if it concluded he acted willfully and

with intent to kill.” (Estrada, supra, Cal.App.5th a p. 945.)

Our colleagues in the Second District further explained their reasoning in light of

People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600 (Johnson), stating, “Our Supreme Court’s

analysis regarding a prior version of CALCRIM No. 400 and its interplay with

CALCRIM No. 401 is determinative here. In . . . Johnson, . . . , the jury was instructed

on an old version of CALCRIM No. 400 providing that: ‘ “A person may be guilty of a

crime in two ways. One, he may have directly committed the crime. I will call that

person the perpetrator. Two, he may have aided and abetted the perpetrator, who directly

committed the crime. A person is equally guilty of the crime whether he committed it

personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator who committed it.” ’ [Citation.] The

court held that where CALCRIM No. 401 is also provided, ‘there was no reasonable

likelihood the jurors would have understood the “equally guilty” language in former

CALCRIM No. 400 to allow them to base defendant’s liability for first degree murder

from the mental state of the actual shooter, rather than on defendant’s own mental state in

aiding and abetting the killing.’ [Citation.] Here, where the ‘equally guilty’ language

was no longer present in the version of CALCRIM No. 400 provided to the jury, there is

6 even less of a possibility that the jury could have imputed [defendant’s] liability for first

degree murder from the mental state of the actual shooter. Applying Johnson,

[defendant] is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because the jury was

instructed on CALCRIM No. 401.” (Estrada, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 947-948.)

Defendant’s attempt to undercut Estrada, supra, is unpersuasive. He reads

Estrada as standing for the proposition that “an intent to kill finding categorically

precludes relief under Penal Code section 1172.6” and argues that People v. Curiel (2023)

15 Cal.5th 974 overrides this proposition. Estrada, however, does not merely stand for

the proposition that “an intent to kill finding categorically precludes relief.” When read

in full, it is clear that Estrada’s focus on the intent to kill finding is simply a focus on the

fact that malice was not imputed to the defendant, thereby making him ineligible for

1172.6 relief. This is a correct statement of law. Furthermore, though Curiel does hold

that a finding of intent to kill does not categorically preclude 1172.6 relief, in direct

contrast to this appeal, the Curiel jury was instructed as to the natural and probable

consequences doctrine, and therefore, defendant’s reliance on Curiel is unwarranted.

Defendant’s second argument, that the jurors were instructed on a form of imputed

malice aiding and abetting, would render him ineligible for section 1172.6 resentencing

even if true. This was thoroughly explained in People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97

Cal.App.5th 921, 947-948: “As we noted in Flores[2], the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision

in McCoy made ‘clear . . . that “when guilt does not depend on the natural and probable

2 People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164.

7 consequences doctrine, . . . the aider and abettor must know and share the murderous

intent of the actual perpetrator.” ’ [Citations.] After the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision

in McCoy, it was unmistakable that a direct aider and abettor’s ‘mental state is her own;

she is liable for her mens rea, not the other person’s.’ [Citation.] [¶] By arguing that the

jury instructions allowed the jury to convict him as a direct aider and abettor of murder

on an imputed malice theory, [defendant] is necessarily asserting that they were

erroneous under the law in effect at the time of his 2010 trial and subsequent direct

appeal. Under Burns[3] and Flores, however, a section 1172.6 petitioner cannot establish

a prima facie case for relief by asserting that the jury instructions permitted conviction on

a theory of imputed malice that was already prohibited even before the enactment of

Senate Bill no. 1437. This amounts to ‘a routine claim of instructional error’ that ‘could

have been raised on appeal from the judgment of conviction.’ [Citation.] ‘Section 1172.6

does not create a right to a second appeal, and [the defendant] cannot use it to resurrect a

claim that should have been raised in his [direct] appeal.’ ”

Defendant’s record of conviction demonstrates that he was not convicted of felony

murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other

theory under which malice was imputed solely by his participation in a crime. As such,

defendant is ineligible for 1172.6 relief as a matter of law.

3 People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862.

8

DISPOSITION

The order denying defendant’s petition is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MILLER

J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

CODRINGTON

J.

9