facts sufficient to establish [that] UCSD . . . violated the EMTALA.” Because we

affirm the district court’s dismissal of Dalavai’s claims against the Regents for

failure to state a claim, we need not assess his other argument that the district court

improperly dismissed his EMTALA claim based on expiration of the statutory

limitations period.

2. Because Dalavai did not contest the district court’s dismissal of his claim

against the Hospice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in his counseled opening

brief, he has forfeited any challenge to that decision. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS,

94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (“It is well established in this circuit that [t]he

general rule is that appellants cannot raise a new issue for the first time in their

reply briefs.” (quoting Eberle v. City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir.

1990))). But, even assuming Dalavai had not forfeited such a challenge, the

district court properly dismissed that claim because Dalavai, a California resident,

alleged only state law violations against the Hospice, also a California resident.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.

3. Dalavai’s counseled opening brief also failed to contest the district

court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.

3 Dalavai therefore forfeited review of that decision. See Martinez-Serrano, 94 F.3d

at 1259. But, even if he had raised it, the district court was within its discretion to

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims after it had

dismissed all federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

AFFIRMED.

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