NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 16 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RANDAL JEROME DALAVAI, No. 23-55411

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:22-cv-01471-CAB-WVG v.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN MEMORANDUM*

DIEGO HEALTH, AKA UC San Diego Health, Hospital entity unknown; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Cathy Ann Bencivengo, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 14, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: OWENS, BADE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

Randal Jerome Dalavai appeals from the district court’s sua sponte dismissal

with prejudice, for lack of standing, of his pro se suit as an individual under the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C.

§ 1395dd. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate and remand.

We review de novo a district court’s standing determination. McGee v. S-L

Snacks Nat’l, 982 F.3d 700, 705 (9th Cir. 2020). We construe pro se complaints

liberally. Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017).

The district court dismissed Dalavai’s complaint for lack of Article III

standing—specifically because Dalavai had not alleged an injury to himself as an

individual—and denied his request for leave to amend to cure the standing issue.

Although Dalavai did not allege an injury to himself as an individual in his original

complaint, he filed a response to the district court’s order to show cause alleging

over $35,000 in burial costs, which is sufficient to constitute injury for Article III

purposes. See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. 451, 464 (2017) (“For

standing purposes, a loss of even a small amount of money is ordinarily an

‘injury.’” (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430–31 (1961))).

In still dismissing Dalavai’s claim, the district court apparently confused a

cause-of-action problem for a standing problem. See Chaudhry v. City of Los

Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1109 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Article III ‘standing in no way

depends on the merits of the plaintiff’s contention that particular conduct is

illegal.’” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975))); Lexmark Int’l, Inc.

2 v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 & n.4 (2014) (distinguishing

standing from cause-of-action issues because “the absence of a valid . . . cause of

action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction” (citations omitted)). The

question of whether Dalavai has a cause of action as a nonpatient under EMTALA

is distinct from whether he has Article III standing.

Moreover, no defendant appeared in the district court to answer Dalavai’s

complaint. Dalavai sued University of California San Diego Health instead of the

Regents of the University of California (its governing body), which would have

been the proper defendant. See Univ. of Cal. Off. of the President, Service of

Process on the Regents, https://www.ucop.edu/uc-legal/guidance/index.html (last

visited July 10, 2024). Although Dalavai also named Inland Valley Medical

Center (“IVMC”) as a defendant in this case, during the district court proceedings

in a related appeal, Dalavai v. The Regents (No. 23-55412), he conceded that

IVMC did not violate EMTALA. As a result, we vacate and remand to the district

court to determine in the first instance whether Dalavai properly sued any

defendants and, if so, whether he sufficiently alleged standing under the correct

analysis.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

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