DISCUSSION

Because the underlying mandamus action seeks judicial review of an administrative decision pursuant to section 1094.5, venue is governed by section 393. (Sutter Union High School Dist. v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 795, 797; Lynch, supra, 7 Cal.App.3d at pp. 930-931; Duval v. Contractors State License Board (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 532, 535.) Section 393 states in pertinent part that “the county in which the cause, or some part of the cause, arose, is the proper county for the trial.” The “cause” is the employee’s cause against the discharging agency. (Lynch, supra, 7 Cal.App.3d at pp. 931-932.) Concomitantly, the critical locus is the employee’s

3 place of employment when he or she was dismissed—not the agency’s location where it made the determination to dismiss him or her—as explained in Lynch. (Ibid.) Lynch involved a former Department of Justice employee who brought a petition for writ of mandate in Santa Cruz County Superior Court, challenging the Board’s affirmance of his dismissal. (Lynch, supra, 7 Cal.App.3d at p. 930.) After a motion to transfer venue to San Francisco County was denied, a petition for writ of mandate was filed in the Court of Appeal. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal granted the writ, concluding San Francisco was the proper venue. (Id. at pp. 932-933.) The Lynch court explained that “venue is determined by [the employee’s] place of employment or center of operation at the time of his [or her] dismissal since that is where the state’s action interfered with his [or her] activities.” (Lynch, supra, 7 Cal.App.3d at p. 932.) It reasoned that in mandate proceedings involving a challenge to an administrative agency’s action interfering with a petitioner’s ability to conduct business, venue is determined by the affected person’s business address: “the county in which . . . he [or she] would be hurt by the enforcement of the order.” (Ibid., citing Cecil v. Superior Court (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 793, 799 [venue for action challenging revocation of a milk distributor license was in the county where the milk distributor carried out its business and not where the licensing department was located]; Duval v. Contractors State License Board, supra, 125 Cal.App.2d at pp. 532, 535-536 [same for challenge to revocation of contractor’s license].) “ ‘It is where the shaft strikes him [or her], not where it is drawn, that counts.’ ” (Lynch, at p. 932, quoting Cecil, at p. 799.) So too, where the cause of the complaint is the department’s removal of the employee, venue is determined by the employee’s place of employment when dismissed. (Lynch, at p. 932.) As applied here, Los Angeles County is the proper venue. Sencion was stationed in Los Angeles when CHP dismissed him. While respondent superior court found no evidence that Sencion worked in Los Angeles, Sencion’s petition, filed in the superior court, incorporates by reference the Board’s decision upholding dismissal, which in turn

4 found that “[a]t all times relevant” Sencion was assigned to the East Los Angeles area office. Sencion never challenged that finding. (See Mission Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 921, 929, fn. 7 [if not controverted, verified complaint may be considered for factual content in ruling on motion to change venue].) Respondent court also wrote that CHP had failed to discuss the different context in which Lynch was decided and provided no evidence as to where the decision to dismiss Sencion was made. But as Lynch makes clear, venue lies where the employee worked, and neither the location of the employer’s headquarters nor where the decision to discharge was made have any bearing on venue. (Lynch, supra, 7 Cal.App.3d at pp. 931- 932.) For these reasons respondent court erred in refusing to transfer venue. We will issue a peremptory writ.

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DISPOSITION

Having complied with the procedural requirements for issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance, we are authorized to issue the writ forthwith and without oral argument. (See Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1243-1244; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc., supra, 36 Cal.3d 171.) Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent superior court to vacate its February 2, 2024 order denying the motion to transfer venue, and to enter a new order granting the motion. Upon finality of this opinion, the stay issued by this court on April 5, 2024, shall be vacated. The parties shall bear their own costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(B).)

/s/ ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/

KRAUSE, J.

/s/

MESIWALA, J.

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