facts that [a] reasonable accommodation was offered and refused.” Jensen v. Wells

Fargo Bank, 85 Cal. App. 4th 245, 263 (2000).

2 The parties agree that FEHA covers Walker’s fibromyalgia disability.1 The

record reflects that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Sandia reasonably

accommodated Walker’s disability. Based on undisputed facts, the district court

found that Sandia granted all of Walker’s requests for time off and medical leave

due to her fibromyalgia. It was also undisputed that Sandia offered Walker the

accommodation of reassignment to non-classified tasks that could be performed

from home, and that Walker refused this reassignment. Because those facts were

undisputed, summary judgment for Sandia was proper on Walker’s claim for failure

to accommodate her disability. See Watkins v. Ameripride Servs., 375 F.3d 821, 829

(9th Cir. 2004). Walker’s two requests that Sandia denied—to be escorted into

Sandia’s sensitive compartmentalized information facility (“SCIF”) and to be

allowed to work on classified material from her home—were unreasonable as a

matter of law because they would violate national security protocols, as the district

court correctly concluded. And Sandia was “not required to choose the best

accommodation or the specific accommodation” Walker requested. Wilson v. Cnty.

1 Sandia argues that Walker was not qualified to perform her essential functions because she lacked an SCI security clearance. This argument is misplaced. Sandia is focused on the position for which Walker was initially hired rather than the modified duties she temporarily held while awaiting an upgrade in her security clearance. Sandia does not dispute that Walker was qualified to perform the essential functions of the position she actually occupied, which is the relevant consideration.

3 of Orange, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1185, 1194 (2009).2

2. The district court also correctly granted summary judgment for Sandia on

Walker’s claim for wrongful termination and constructive discharge. To prevail on

a claim for constructive discharge under California law, Walker must prove that she

resigned from Sandia due to “intolerable or aggravated”

working conditions intentionally caused or knowingly permitted by Sandia, such

that a reasonable person in her position would be compelled to resign. King v. AC

& R Advert., 65 F.3d 764, 767 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Turner v. Anheuser-Busch,

Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1029 (Cal. 1994)). Again based on undisputed facts, the district

court was correct to grant summary judgment to Walker because she did not put

forth any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the kind of

“extraordinary and egregious” working conditions that a constructive discharge

claim requires based on King and Turner, both of which bind us here. Walker’s

claim that her disability rendered her unable to tolerate working at Sandia any

further, standing alone, does not clear the generally high bar for a constructive

discharge claim.

3. Lastly, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for Sandia on

2 Because the undisputed evidence establishes that Sandia reasonably accommodated Walker’s disability, her claim that Sandia failed to engage in the FEHA’s required “interactive process” to accommodate her disability also fails. Watkins, 375 F.3d at 829 n.5; accord Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 74 Cal. App. 4th 215, 229 (1999).

4 Walker’s claim that Sandia discriminated against her based on her sexual orientation.

To prove her claim for sexual-orientation discrimination, Walker must show that

Sandia took adverse employment action against her based on her sexual orientation,

and, critically, she “must establish a causal nexus between the adverse employment

action and” her sexual orientation. See Martin v. Bd. of Trs. Of Cal. State Univ., 97

Cal. App. 5th 149, 161–62 (2023). The only “adverse employment action” that

Walker points to is Sandia’s denial of two of her requests for accommodation

described above (to enter the SCIF and to work on classified material from home).

Walker did not present any evidence to support an inference that Sandia denied those

requests because of her sexual orientation, as the district court correctly concluded.

And even if she could do so, the burden would shift to Sandia to “put[] forth a

legitimate basis for the adverse employment action,” at which point “the burden of

production shifts to [Walker] to present evidence creating a triable issue of fact

showing [Sandia’s] stated reason was pretextual.” Id. at 162. Sandia has put forward

a legitimate justification for denying Walker’s requests, namely, that national

security restrictions precluded Sandia from agreeing to them. Walker has presented

no evidence that Sandia’s legitimate justification was pretextual, and summary

judgment for Sandia was therefore proper.

AFFIRMED.

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