NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 18 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHRISTINA KAY STANTON, No. 23-35474

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:22-cv-05858-BAT

v.

MEMORANDUM*

MARTIN J. O'MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Brian Tsuchida, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 13, 2024** Seattle, Washington

Before: W. FLETCHER and SUNG, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,*** District Judge.

Claimant Christina Stanton appeals the district court’s decision affirming the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of claimant’s application for disability

insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Title II and XVI of the

Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the

district court’s order de novo. We will not reverse the ALJ’s decision “unless it is

either not supported by substantial evidence or is based upon legal error.” Luther v.

Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm.

1. Stanton argues that the ALJ erroneously discounted the opinions of her

treating physicians, Doctors Budwey, Wheeler, Petaja, and Faber. An ALJ must

assess the persuasiveness of the relevant medical opinions and explain how she

considered the supportability and consistency factors. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a)–(b)

(effective Mar. 27, 2017). As to all four physicians, the ALJ sufficiently explained

her analysis, and her conclusions are supported by substantial evidence in the

record. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2022).

The ALJ appropriately discounted Dr. Budwey’s opinion that Stanton has

marked limitations in mental functioning because it was inconsistent with the

medical evidence in the record, including specific treatment notes and objective

findings indicating that Stanton’s “mental health conditions are stable and

managed effectively despite inconsistent engagement in treatment.” See id. at 792–

93 (affirming the ALJ’s rejection of a medical opinion that was inconsistent with

treatment notes and objective findings); Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1162

2 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing medical opinions that are based on self-reports).

The ALJ discounted Dr. Petaja’s opinion affirming Dr. Budwey’s opinion

for the same reasons that she discounted Dr. Budwey’s opinion. Because we

conclude that the ALJ’s conclusion as to Dr. Budwey’s opinion was supported by

substantial evidence, we reach the same conclusion for Dr. Petaja.

The ALJ appropriately found unpersuasive the portion of Dr. Wheeler’s

opinion about marked limitations in mental functioning because it conflicted with

evidence that Stanton inconsistently sought treatment for her mental health and

treatment notes indicating “intact memory and concentration.”

The ALJ appropriately discounted Dr. Faber’s opinion regarding Stanton’s

mental health functioning after he stopped treating her in 2019. Additionally, the

ALJ did not err in finding that Dr. Faber’s opinion was inconsistent with specific

treatment notes and other evidence regarding Stanton’s ability to babysit her

grandchildren, manage her activities of daily living independently, and engage in

various social activities with family and friends.

2. Stanton also argues that the ALJ erred by discounting her symptom

testimony. Under the circumstances, the ALJ was required to give “specific, clear

and convincing reasons” for discounting Stanton’s testimony about the severity of

her symptoms. Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014)). Here, the ALJ explained

3 that Stanton’s symptom testimony was inconsistent with the objective medical

evidence. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th

Cir. 2008) (“Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting

the claimant’s subjective testimony.”). The ALJ described how Stanton’s claimed

limitations were inconsistent with her various activities, such as babysitting her

grandchildren, performing household chores, and undertaking tasks in public. In

addition, the ALJ reasonably concluded that Stanton’s mental health symptoms

flare with situational stressors, but that her “mental health conditions are otherwise

stable and managed effectively with inconsistent mental health treatment.” We

conclude that the ALJ gave sufficient reasons supported by substantial evidence to

discount Stanton’s subjective symptom testimony.

AFFIRMED.

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