FACTS

Salazar is an employee of SunLine. Garcia is a former SunLine employee.

Garcia posted videos on social media with fake images of violence against current and

former SunLine employees. One video showed SunLine employees “being punched in

the face by the [‘B]reaking [B]ad[’] character Walter White.” Garcia also posted a

video of a SunLine employee being followed on his/her commute home.

1 The record does not include a reporter’s transcript from the evidentiary hearing. Therefore, on our own motion, we augment the record with the reporter’s transcript of the evidentiary hearing in the related case of SunLine Transit Agency v. Raeck, Court of Appeal case No. E081735, which was heard in the trial court at the same time as the instant case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(B).)

2 At the start of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court announced that SunLine

would present its evidence, and after SunLine “presented [its] side of the case,” then

Garcia could “address the Court.” As SunLine finished its direct examinations of its

first, second, and fourth witnesses, each time the trial court said, “Next witness, please.”

The trial court never invited Garcia to cross-examine SunLine’s witnesses. When

SunLine rested, Garcia asked, “Your Honor, are we allowed to cross-examine?” The

trial court responded, “You’ll address the Court.” Garcia presented argument and

documents to the court; he did not call witnesses.

DISCUSSION

A. CROSS-EXAMINATION

Garcia contends the trial court erred by not permitting him to cross-examine

SunLine’s witnesses.

“Courts have long recognized the importance of cross-examination and its crucial

relationship to the ability to defend against accusations, deeming it a due process right

that is fundamental to a fair proceeding. [Citations.] ‘Because it relates to the

fundamental fairness of the proceedings, cross-examination is said to represent an

“absolute right” not merely a privilege.’ [Citations.] Where, as here, a petitioner

seeking a workplace violence restraining order has offered testimony as to threats of

violence, the respondent has a due process right to cross-examine the witness with

respect to those allegations.” (CSV Hospitality Management LLC v. Lucas (2022) 84

Cal.App.5th 117, 125 (CSV).)

3 Garcia asked if he could cross-examine SunLine’s witnesses, and the trial court

denied him the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. The trial court erred.

SunLine contends Garcia forfeited the cross-examination issue due to a lack of

record citations, relevant legal authority, and legal analysis in his appellant’s opening

brief. Garcia cited to the reporter’s transcript index, which lists only the direct

examination of witnesses—no cross-examination is listed. Garcia cited to

Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. County of San Luis Obispo (2008) 167

Cal.App.4th 705, 711, which provides, “In ‘almost every setting where important

decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and

cross-examine adverse witnesses.’ ” Lastly, Garcia contended, “[T]he lower court’s

egregious refusal to permit me to cross-examine the petitioner during the evidentiary

hearing egregiously violated [due process]. By constraining my ability to challenge the

petitioner’s assertions and scrutinize the veracity of their [witnesses’] testimony, the

court effectively deprived me of a critical mechanism for defending myself against

baseless accusations . . . .” In sum, Garcia provided the basic information needed for an

appellate argument. Therefore, we reject SunLine’s assertion that Garcia forfeited the

contention.

“ ‘Not every instance in which a cross-examiner’s question is disallowed will

[the] defendant’s right to a fair hearing be abridged, since the matter may be too

unimportant [citations], or there may be no prejudice [citation], or the question may

involve issues which can be brought up at a more appropriate time [citation]. However,

where the subject of cross-examination concerns the matter at issue there can be no

4 doubt that the refusal to permit such question[ing] results in a denial of a fair hearing.’ ”

(McCarthy v. Mobile Cranes, Inc. (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 500, 507.)

When arguing in the trial court, Garcia asserted that SunLine sought the

restraining order as “a form of retaliation” for past workplace disagreements, such as

Garcia advocating for better working conditions. Raeck joined in Garcia’s arguments.

If cross-examination had been permitted, Garcia and/or Raeck could have asked

SunLine’s witnesses if they had motives to lie when testifying, e.g., retaliatory motives.

Thus, cross-examination would have concerned the matter at issue. As a result, the

error requires reversal. (CSV, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th 125 [“Because we cannot know

what [the witnesses] would have said on cross-examination, or the effect such testimony

might have had on the trial court’s decision, [so] the error requires reversal.”].)

SunLine contends the error was harmless because Garcia “was provided ample

opportunity to be heard by the court and present contradictory evidence at the hearing.”

Contrary to SunLine’s position, opportunities to provide direct evidence and argument

are not substitutes for cross-examination. Indeed, “[t]he importance of cross-

examination cannot be doubted: ‘Cross-examination is the principal means by which

the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.’ ” (In re Brenda

M. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 772, 777.) For example, “ ‘the cross-examiner has

traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.’ ” (Ibid.) We have no

means of knowing what relevant information, if any, Garcia would have produced if

given the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. Therefore, the error is prejudicial.

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B. REMAINING ISSUES

Because we are reversing and ordering a new hearing, Garcia’s remaining

contentions have been rendered moot. (Schoshinski v. City of Los Angeles (2017) 9

Cal.App.5th 780, 791 [issue is moot when no further relief can be provided].)

Therefore, we will not address the merits of whether the trial court erred by admitting

hearsay and proceeding without the former general manager’s testimony.

DISPOSITION

The restraining order is reversed. The trial court is directed to hold a new

evidentiary hearing within 30 days of the issuance of the remittitur. (Hall v. Superior

Court (1955) 45 Cal.2d 377, 381 [“ ‘[A]n unqualified reversal remands the cause for a

new trial . . . and places the parties in the trial court in the same position as if the cause

had never been tried, with the exception that the opinion of the court on appeal must be

followed so far as applicable.’ ”]; Heinfelt v. Arth (1935) 4 Cal.App.2d 381, 383 [same

rule].) The trial court shall notify the parties of the scheduled hearing. The restraining

order shall remain effective until the conclusion of the new hearing or 30 days after

issuance of the remittitur if no hearing takes place.2 If a hearing occurs, and the trial

court again grants the restraining order, it may issue a permanent restraining order

through June 7, 2026, or for a lesser period. (In re Marriage of D.S. and A.S. (2023) 87

Cal.App.5th 926, 937-938.) If the trial court denies the petition for a restraining order,

2 The trial court previously denied SunLine’s request for a temporary restraining order, so we cannot order that the temporary restraining order be reinstated pending a new hearing.

6 or if no hearing takes place, then the trial court shall issue an order terminating the

three-year restraining order. Garcia is awarded his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of

Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MILLER

J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

FIELDS

J.

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