discussion about a proposed ballot signing meeting. Because “a clear

preponderance of all the relevant evidence” does not convince us that the Hearing

Officer’s credibility determinations were incorrect, we refuse to disturb them. Bell

Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 827 F.2d 1340, 1343 (9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, contrary to Audi Concord’s allegations, Hudec did not directly

3 attribute her apprehension “about how to vote” to the proposed restaurant meeting.

Instead, she explained that it would be “obvious who votes which way” because

there were “only so many people here.” The Hearing Officer reasonably inferred

that Hudec’s concerns were “based primarily on the fact that because it was a small

unit, most other members of the unit would know from the results how she voted.”

Because substantial evidence supports the Hearing Officer’s findings, the Board

properly rejected Audi Concord’s allegations of objectionable ballot solicitation.

2. The Board also correctly rejected Audi Concord’s claim that the video call

constituted unlawful electioneering under Milchem, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362 (1968).

In Milchem, the Board established a “strict rule” against “prolonged conversations

between representatives of any party to the election and voters waiting to cast

ballots.” Id. at 362. “Subsequent Board decisions have emphasized that the

Milchem strict rule against electioneering applies only where . . . the conversations

occurred at the polling place itself or while the employees were waiting in line.”

Bos. Insulated Wire & Cable Sys. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 876, 881 (5th Cir. 1983)

(citations omitted); see also NLRB v. Hudson Oxygen Therapy Sales Co., 764 F.2d

729, 732 (9th Cir. 1985) (describing “the general rule against electioneering at the

polling place” (emphasis added)).

The Hearing Officer correctly concluded that, under existing precedent, a

Union is free to engage in lawful electioneering during the pendency of a mail-

4 ballot election. Audi Concord’s reliance on Milchem is misplaced. The Milchem

rule applies only to in-person elections, where the prolonged conversation occurs

at the polling place or while the employees are standing in line. See Bos. Insulated

Wire, 703 F.2d at 881. The Board properly declined to extend this rule to bar

campaign communications during the voting period of a mail-ballot election,

where employees neither visit a polling place nor wait in line.

Audi Concord asserts that this case is differentiable because the “video call

attended by a Union representative went beyond mere advocacy for the Union.”

But this argument turns on the content rather than the circumstances of the video

call, and Milchem does not consider the subject matter of a voting-line discussion

in determining whether unlawful electioneering has occurred. See Milchem, 170

N.L.R.B. at 362–63. Moreover, Audi Concord’s argument merely repackages its

allegations of ballot solicitation, and as explained above, substantial evidence in

the record supports the Hearing Officer determination that there was no

objectionable conduct. The Board accordingly acted within its discretion in

certifying the Union over Audi Concord’s claim of unlawful electioneering.

3. Because we conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in

overruling Audi Concord’s objection and certifying the election, substantial

evidence supports the Board’s determination that Audi Concord violated Section

5 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the Union. See 29 U.S.C.

§ 158(a)(1), (5).

PETITION DENIED and ORDER ENFORCED.

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