1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KHALIFAH ED SAIF’ULLAH, Case No. 2:22-cv-04521-MEMF (E)

12 Petitioner, ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS 13 v. AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

14 RON BROOMFIELD, Warden,

JUDGE

15 Respondent. 16 17 18 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the Petition, the records 19 on file, and the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge. 20 Further, the Court has engaged in a de novo review of those portions of the Report 21 to which objections have been made. 22 The Report and Recommendation (“Report”) recommends denial of the 23 Petition and dismissal of this action with prejudice. (ECF No. 12.) As explained 24 below, Petitioner’s objections to the Report (ECF No. 13) do not warrant a change 25 to the Magistrate Judge’s findings or recommendation. 26 Petitioner objects that the Report “erroneously limits federal review of cases 27 on habeas corpus to those for which the Supreme Court has already confronted the 28 specific question presented by the case.” (ECF No. 13 at 1-3.) The Report found 1 that no clearly established federal law supported the proposition, asserted here, that 2 a habeas petitioner, who is serving a lawful indeterminate life sentence, has an 3 Eighth Amendment claim due to a denial of parole. (ECF No. 12 at 16.) Petitioner 4 disagrees by arguing that this Court does not have “to wait for the Supreme Court 5 to apply the principle established in the long line of Eighth Amendment precedent 6 . . . to a fact pattern identical to the one set forth by [Petitioner.]” (ECF No. 13 at 7 3.) But contrary to Petitioner’s objection, “[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly 8 reminded lower courts applying AEDPA not to ‘frame[e] [Supreme Court] 9 precedents at a high level of generality.” Fauber v. Davis, 43 F.4th 987, 1007 (9th 10 Cir. 2022) (alterations on original, citing Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 512 11 (2013) (per curiam)). Petitioner’s proposed framing of the Supreme Court’s Eighth 12 Amendment jurisprudence to extend to a denial of parole, when the sentence itself 13 was lawfully imposed, requires viewing that jurisprudence with a high level of 14 generality. Indeed, as the Report recognized, “[t]here is no constitutional or 15 inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the 16 expiration of a valid sentence.” (ECF No. 12 at 13 (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates 17 of Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)). Thus, Petitioner’s 18 proposed framing “would defeat the substantial deference that AEDPA requires.” 19 Fauber, 43 F.4th at 1008 (quoting Jackson, 569 U.S. at 512). 20 Petitioner objects that the Report, “[i]n assessing [Petitioner’s] Eighth 21 Amendment claim de novo, . . . inappropriately analyzed the proportionality of his 22 punishment based on the crime in the abstract rather than the specific facts of the 23 case and the actual 43 years he has been incarcerated.” (ECF No. 13 at 3-7.) To 24 the contrary, in reviewing the Eighth Amendment claim de novo, the Report 25 considered the specific facts of Petitioner’s case. (ECF No. 12 at 17-22.) But even 26 if the Report had not done so, no legal authority requires an individualized review 27 of mitigating circumstances in cases, such as this case, challenging a non-capital 28 sentence. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995-96 (1991) (for non-capital 1 sentences, review under the Eighth Amendment does not require individualized 2 considerations of mitigation). 3 Petitioner objects that the Report “erroneously concludes that [Petitioner] 4 only alleged a violation of state law based on a mischaracterization of the analysis 5 in [In re Palmer, 10 Cal. 5th 959 (2021)].” (ECF No. 13 at 7-9.) In Palmer, as the 6 Report noted, the California Supreme Court “held that, under California law, a 7 prisoner may seek habeas relief following a parole denial on the ground that, after 8 parole was denied, the prisoner’s sentence assertedly became cruel and unusual in 9 violation of California law.” (ECF No. 12 at 4.) Petitioner argues that he “relies on 10 In re Palmer to illustrate how his federal constitutional rights were violated, not just 11 his state rights under the California Constitution.” (ECF No. 13 at 8.) But this 12 objection does not persuasively explain how In re Palmer could change the 13 Report’s analysis of Petitioner’s federal claim. A state court decision such as In re 14 Palmer cannot be clearly established federal law. See Kernan v. Cuero, 583 U.S. 1, 15 8 (2017) (per curiam) (state-court decisions, treatises, or law review articles are not 16 clearly established federal law). Nor can a state court’s interpretation of the Eighth 17 Amendment, in the abstract or in an unrelated case, be binding on a federal court. 18 See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983) (state court’s interpretations of 19 state law are binding on a federal court, but its conclusions under the United States 20 Constitution are not). 21 Petitioner objects that the Report “wrongfully ignored the impact of recent 22 case law that creates a heightened liberty interest in parole for those who committed 23 crimes in their youth.” (ECF No. 13 at 9-10.) Specifically, Petitioner relies on the 24 Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for juvenile offenders to argue 25 that their parole hearings “demand more procedural protections.” (Id. at 9.) This 26 objection fails to overcome the Report’s finding that Petitioner, who was 23 years 27 old at the time of the crime, was not a juvenile within the meaning of the Supreme 28 Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. (ECF No. 12 at 21-22.) It also fails to 1 || overcome the Report’s conclusion that, even if it were assumed that Petitioner was 2 || ajuvenile, he did not receive the “functional equivalent of life without the 3 || possibility of parole” within the meaning of the Supreme Court’s Eighth 4 || Amendment jurisprudence for juveniles. (/d. at 22.) 5 In sum, Petitioner’s objections are overruled. 6 7 ORDER 8 It is ordered that (1) the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge 9 || is accepted and adopted; and (2) Judgment shall be entered denying the Petition and 10 || dismissing this action with prejudice. 11 The Court is in receipt of Petitioner’s request for a final decision. ECF No. 12 || 14. This Order represents the Court’s final decision. The Court also notes that 13 || Petitioner advises that he has not been in contact with counsel. Out of an abundance 14 || of caution, the Court will order that the Clerk serve this Order both on counsel of 15 || record as well as on Petitioner at the address he used in his request for a final 16 || decision. 17 18 | DATED: June 11, 2024

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MARME EWUSI-MENSAH ERIMPONG

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