1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TANESE HAWKINS, Case No. 8:24-cv-00049-JWH-KES 12 Plaintiff,

ORDER REGARDING

13 v. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF No. 17] AND 14 THE ELEVANCE HEALTH PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPANIES, INC., REMAND [ECF No. 20] 15 CARELON BEHAVIORAL HEALTH OF CALIFORNIA, INC., formerly 16 known as Beacon Health Options of California, Inc., and 17 DOES 1-10, inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 Before the Court are (1) the motion of Defendants The Elevance Health 2 Companies, Inc. and Carelon Behavioral Health of California, Inc. to dismiss the 3 Complaint of Plaintiff Tanese Hawkins;1 and (2) Hawkins’s Motion to Remand 4 this action to Orange County Superior Court.2 Each Motion is fully briefed.3 5 The Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without a hearing. See 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS 7 the Motion to Remand, and therefore DECLINES to rule upon the Motion to 8 Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 9 I. BACKGROUND 10 Hawkins originally filed her Complaint in state court in November 2023,4 11 and Defendants removed the action to this Court in January 2024 pursuant to 28 12 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446.5 In her Complaint, Hawkins asserts four claims 13 for relief under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”)—a 14 state law.6 Specifically, she alleges disability discrimination, failure to 15 accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, and retaliation in 16 violation of FEHA in connection with Defendants’ alleged action in firing her 17 after she suffered a miscarriage.7 18 19

20 1 Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (the “Motion to Dismiss”) [ECF No. 17]. 21 2 Pl.’s Mot. to Remand (the “Motion to Remand”) [ECF No. 20]. 22 3 See Opp’n to Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 22]; Reply in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 26]; Opp’n to Motion to Remand (the “Opposition”) 23 [ECF No. 21]; Reply in Supp. of Motion to Remand (the “Reply”) [ECF 24 No. 27]. 25 4 Notice of Removal, Ex. 2 (the “Complaint”) [ECF No. 1-2]. 26 5 Notice of Removal (the “Notice of Removal”) [ECF No. 1]. 27 6 See generally Complaint. 1 For the purpose of the instant Motion to Remand, Hawkins states that 2 “[i]n or around September of 2021, [Hawkins] suffered a miscarriage” and 3 thereafter “informed her supervisor, Hughra Wright . . . and requested a few 4 days off to recover.”8 Hawkins’s doctor placed her on medical leave, and 5 although Hawkins shared with Wright the doctor’s note ordering medical leave, 6 Wright sent Hawkins an email informing her that she was fired.9 Wright’s email 7 came from an address with Beacon Health Options, and the signature line read 8 “Manager-in Training, Beacon Health Options.”10 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Accordingly, “[t]hey 11 possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. 12 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). In every federal case, the 13 basis for federal jurisdiction must appear affirmatively from the record. See 14 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006). “The right of 15 removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court 16 must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of 17 Congress.” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (internal 18 quotation marks omitted). When Congress has acted to create a right of 19 removal, those statutes, unless otherwise stated, are strictly construed against 20 removal jurisdiction. See id. 21 To remove an action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the 22 removing defendant “must demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction 23 lies in the federal courts.” Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 33. As such, a defendant may 24 remove civil actions in which either (1) a federal question exists; or (2) complete 25

26 8 Id. at ¶ 11. 27 9 Id. at ¶¶ 13-18. 1 diversity of citizenship between the parties exists and the amount in controversy 2 exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332. “Complete diversity” means 3 that “each defendant must be a citizen of a different state from each plaintiff.” 4 In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litigation, 549 F.3d 1223, 1234 (9th Cir. 2008). 5 When the litigants are entities, diversity jurisdiction depends on the form of the 6 entity. See, e.g., Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195–96 (1990) (holding 7 that an unincorporated association such as a partnership has “the citizenships of 8 all of its members”). Similarly, a limited liability company is a “citizen of every 9 state of which its owners/members are citizens.” Johnson v. Columbia Properties 10 Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). In contrast, a corporation is a 11 citizen of only (1) the state where its principal place of business is located; and 12 (2) the state in which it is incorporated. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). 13 The right to remove is not absolute, even when original jurisdiction exists. 14 The removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. 15 See Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) 16 (noting the “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on removal rests 17 with the removing defendant”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 18 1992) (“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the 19 defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”) 20 (quotation marks omitted). Any doubts regarding the existence of subject 21 matter jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remand. See id. at 566 (“Federal 22 jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the 23 first instance.”). 24 III. ANALYSIS 25 Defendants oppose Hawkins’s Motion to Remand, arguing that Hawkins 26 was an employee of Elevance Health and that Carelon is a sham defendant such 27 1|| that Carelon’s California citizenship should not defeat diversity jurisdiction.” 2|| But Defendants bear the burden of proving removal is proper, and doubts with |) respect to removal jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remand. See zd. 4|| Here, Hawkins reasonably believed, and has plausibly alleged, that Wright—on 5|| behalf Beacon Health Options, a California corporate citizen—terminated 6|| Hawkins in violation of FEHA. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (1998) (“Apparent authority exists only to the extent it is 8 || reasonable for the third person dealing with the agent to believe that the agent is 9|| authorized.”). Carelon—formerly known as Beacon Health Options—is thus 10 || not a sham defendant, and removal pursuant to diversity jurisdiction was 11|| improper. 12 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Hawkins’s Motion to Remand and || DECLINES to rule upon the Motion to Dismiss because it lacks jurisdiction to 14|| doso. 15 IV. DISPOSITION 16 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 17 1. Hawkins’s Motion to Remand is GRANTED. 18 2. This action is remanded to Orange County Superior Court. 19 3. The Court DECLINES to rule on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, 20 || in view of its conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction over this action. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 23\| Dated: July 1, 2024 LY , 24 NITED OTR TES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 27 © See generally Opposition.