1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHRISTOPHER MEZA, ) Case No. EDCV 23-01379 DDP (SHKx) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER DENYING OFFICER DEFENDANTS’ 13 v. ) MOTION TO DISMISS ) 14 DANIEL QUIDORT, ) ) 15 Defendants. ) ___________________________ ) 16 17 Presently before the court is Defendants Daniel Quidort and 18 Trent Tunstall (collectively, the “Officer Defendants”)’s Motion to 19 Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. Having considered the submissions 20 of the parties and heard oral argument, the court denies the motion 21 and adopts the following Order. 22 I.Background 23 In 2016, Plaintiff Christopher Meza and the mother of his 24 child, Defendant Tanya Karakesisoglu (“Karakesisoglu”), were 25 engaged in a custody dispute. (Complaint ¶¶ 1, 18.) During the 26 course of that dispute, Meza alleges that Karakesisoglu threatened 27 to accuse him of rape if he did not agree to her custody demands. 28 (Id.) On September 20, 2016, Karakesisoglu suggested that Meza 1 meet with her late at night at her office to discuss a matter 2 pertaining to their son. (Id. ¶ 2.) Meza alleges that 3 Karakesisoglu “pretended to be scared” for video cameras, then went 4 to Meza’s house with him and had consensual sex. (Id. ¶ 3.) 5 Karakesisoglu then sent Meza text messages stating that she wanted 6 to resume a romantic relationship with him. (Id. ¶ 4.) When Meza 7 declined, Karakesisoglu reported to the Huntington Beach Police 8 Department that Meza had kidnaped and raped her. (Id.) Meza was 9 arrested shortly thereafter and charged with several felonies, 10 including kidnaping, forcible oral copulation, and making criminal 11 threats. (Id. ¶ 18; Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 12 A.) 13 The Officer Defendants investigated Karakesisoglu’s 14 allegations against Meza. (Compl. ¶ 20.) Meza alleges that the 15 Officer Defendants examined Karakesisoglu’s phone and discovered 16 exculpatory evidence, including search results and text messages 17 about rape and kidnaping from September 19, the day before Meza met 18 with Karakesisoglu. (Id.) Karakesisoglu allegedly also asked the 19 Officer Defendants what effect the criminal charges against Meza 20 would have on the custody dispute. (Id.) Nevertheless, Meza 21 alleges, the Officer Defendants did not share any of this 22 information with prosecutors, and prevented Meza from obtaining 23 information from Karakesisoglu’s phone. (Id. ¶ 21.) 24 Meza filed a motion in Orange County Superior Court seeking, 25 among other things, all data gleaned from Karakesisoglu’s phone. 26 (RJN, Ex. B.) Meza argued that he was entitled to the phone 27 information under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1973). (RJN, Ex. 28 C). On December 8, 2017, the court denied Meza’s motion, finding 1 “a limitation of consent on behalf of the victim,” and that 2 “disclosure of anything beyond that is a violation of her right to 3 privacy.” (RJN, Ex. D at 11.) 4 On August 24, 2021, Meza was convicted of misdemeanor false 5 imprisonment pursuant to California Penal Code § 237 after entering 6 a People v. West plea.1 (Compl. ¶ 8; RJN, Ex. D.) As part of 7 that plea, Meza admitted that he “willfully and unlawfully and 8 knowingly violated the personal liberty” of a person with whom he 9 was in a dating relationship. (RJD, Ex. D at 3.) All other 10 charges against Meza were dismissed. (Compl. ¶ 8.) 11 On July 23, 2023, Meza filed his Complaint in this Court, 12 alleging a cause of action against Karakesisoglu for malicious 13 prosecution and against the Officer Defendants for “Deliberate or 14 Reckless Suppression of Evidence in Violation of the Fourteenth 15 Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” The Officer Defendants now move 16 to dismiss the Section 1983 claim against them. 17 II. Legal Standard 18 A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it 19 “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 20 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 21 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 22 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a 23 court must “accept as true all allegations of material fact and 24 must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the 25 plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). 26 1 The California Supreme Court has described a plea purusant 27 to People v. West 3 Cal.3d 595 (1970) as “a plea of nolo contendere, not admitting a factual basis for the plea.” 28 In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th 924, 932 (1992). 1 Although a complaint need not include “detailed factual 2 allegations,” it must offer “more than an unadorned, 3 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 4 678. Conclusory allegations or allegations that are no more than a 5 statement of a legal conclusion “are not entitled to the assumption 6 of truth.” Id. at 679. In other words, a pleading that merely 7 offers “labels and conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the 8 elements,” or “naked assertions” will not be sufficient to state a 9 claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 678 (citations and 10 internal quotation marks omitted). 11 “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 12 should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 13 plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 14 at 679. Plaintiffs must allege “plausible grounds to infer” that 15 their claims rise “above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 16 at 555-56. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 17 claim for relief” is “a context-specific task that requires the 18 reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 19 sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 20 III. Discussion 21 A. Heck bar 22 As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim does not 23 appear to be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See 24 Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Under Heck 25 v. Humphrey, a [plaintiff] cannot recover damages in a § 1983 suit 26 if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff ‘would necessarily imply 27 the invalidity of his conviction or sentence . . . unless the 28 plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has 1 already been invalidated.’”) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.); see 2 also Hunter v. Idaho, No. 1:19-CV-00113-DCN, 2020 WL 4340525, at *7 3 (D. Idaho July 28, 2020) (discussing applicability of Heck bar to 4 non-prisoners). The crux of Plaintiff’s claim against the Officer 5 Defendants here is that they withheld exculpatory evidence from 6 prosecutors and from Plaintiff, including statements Karakesisoglu 7 made to the Officer Defendants and, in particular, “exculpatory 8 evidence that was on Ms. Karakesisoglu’s phone,” including text 9 messages from Karakesisoglu to Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶¶ 21, 23.) In 10 essence, Plaintiff contends that the Officer Defendants withheld 11 Brady material. See United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1459 12 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Brady material is any evidence material either to 13 guilt or punishment which is favorable to the accused, irrespective 14 of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. . . . The 15 Brady rule encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory 16 evidence.” (internal citations omitted)); see also United States v. 17 Lucas, 841 F.3d 796, 807 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Under Brady, the 18 government must disclose information favorable to the accused that 19 is material either to guilt or to punishment.”) (internal quotation 20 marks omitted)). 21 Generally, “a Brady claim, when successful postconviction, 22 necessarily yields evidence undermining a conviction: Brady 23 evidence is, by definition, always favorable to the defendant and 24 material to his guilt or punishment.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 25 521, 536 (2011). Although Plaintiff was never convicted of any 26 felony charges, all of which were dismissed, he was convicted of 27 misdemeanor false imprisonment after pleading no contest. The 28 question, then, is whether Plaintiff’s Brady claim here “would 1 necessarily imply the invalidity of [that] conviction.” Lemos v. 2 Cnty. of Sonoma, 40 F.4th 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc) 3 (emphasis original). That question requires an analysis of “which 4 acts formed the basis for the conviction.” Id. And where, as 5 here, “the conviction is based on a guilty plea, we look at the 6 record to see which acts form the basis for the plea.” Id. At 7 this stage of proceedings, the record of the state court criminal 8 proceedings is sparse. Plaintiff has represented to the court, 9 however, and Defendants do not appear to dispute, that the knowing 10 violation of Karakesisoglu’s personal liberty underlying the false 11 imprisonment conviction involved an interaction between Plaintiff 12 and Karakesisoglu in an elevator at her office, before 13 Karakesisoglu went to Plaintiff’s house. (Compl. ¶ 3.) Any Brady 14 violations regarding Karakesisoglu’s consent, or lack thereof, to 15 sex that took place at Plaintiff’s house would therefore be 16 immaterial to the elevator interaction, which appears to have been 17 videotaped, that took place at a different location earlier in the 18 evening. Accordingly, a successful Brady claim here would not 19 necessarily imply that Plaintiff’s false imprisonment conviction is 20 invalid, and thus the Heck bar does not apply. 21 B. Statute of Limitations 22 The Officer Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s suppression of 23 evidence claim should be dismissed on statute of limitations 24 grounds. Generally, the statute of limitations for § 1983 cases 25 brought in this district is two years. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 26 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). And, in general, a claim accrues “when 27 the plaintiff knows, or should know, of the injury which is the 28 basis of the cause of action.” Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 1 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Officer Defendants contend, 2 Meza’s suppression of evidence claim began to accrue in 2017 when 3 he brought his Brady motion in state court, and therefore fell 4 several years outside the statute of limitations when it was filed 5 in 2023. 6 There are, however, exceptions to the general rule of claim 7 accrual. In Heck, for example, the Supreme Court held that a §1983 8 claim based upon “an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does 9 not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.” 10 512 U.S. 477, 490 (1994); see also Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 11 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995). More recently, the Supreme Court 12 has clarified that, in situations analogous to malicious 13 prosecution, similar principles apply even where a plaintiff has 14 been acquitted. McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 119 (2019). In 15 McDonough, the Court applied the “favorable termination” accrual 16 rule to a plaintiff who, after being acquitted of a criminal 17 charge, brought a §1983 claim based upon alleged fabrication of 18 evidence. Id. at 113. Analogizing to common-law malicious 19 prosecution claims, the Court explained that the delayed accrual 20 rule “is rooted in pragmatic concerns with avoiding parallel 21 criminal and civil litigation over the same subject matter and the 22 related possibility of conflicting civil and criminal judgments.” 23 Id. at 116-18. 24 Here, the Officer Defendants assert that the standard two-year 25 statute of limitations, and not the “favorable termination” accrual 26 rule, applies because this is a suppression of evidence case rather 27 than a fabrication of evidence case, and therefore McDonough is 28 inapt. (Reply at 9.) This is a distinction without a difference. 1 As the Court explained in McDonough, the “accrual analysis begins 2 with identifying the specific constitutional right alleged to have 3 been infringed.” Id. at 115. Although the Court assumed without 4 deciding that a fabrication of evidence claim arises under the Due 5 Process Clause, so too would a suppression of evidence claim. 6 Comparing fabrication of evidence claims to malicious prosecution 7 claims, the Supreme Court observed that “[a]t bottom, both claims 8 challenge the integrity of criminal prosecutions undertaken 9 ‘pursuant to legal process.’” McDonough, 588 U.S. at 117 (quoting 10 Heck, 512 U.S. at 484). The same is equally true of a suppression 11 of evidence claim, and indeed, Plaintiff has also alleged a 12 malicious prosecution claim against Karakesisoglu. Accordingly, 13 the favorable termination rule, and not the more generally 14 applicable two-year statute of limitations, applies to Plaintiff’s 15 § 1983 claim. Because that claim did not accrue until the felony 16 charges against Plaintiff were dismissed in 2021, the claim was 17 timely filed. 18 C. Collateral Estoppel 19 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the Officer Defendants 20 obtained exculpatory information from Karakesisoglu’s phone and 21 then recklessly failed to turn that information over to 22 prosecutors. (Compl. ¶¶ 22, 37.) In the underlying criminal 23 proceeding, Plaintiff sought all data obtained from Karakesisoglu’s 24 phone, pursuant to Brady. (Request for Judicial Notice at 14.) 25 The state court denied the motion. The minutes of the motion 26 hearing state only that the “Court finds that a limitation of 27 consent on behalf of the victim [sic]. Consent to disclosure of 28 anything beyond that is a violation of her right to privacy.” RJN 1 at 36. Here, the Officer Defendants contend that this denial of 2 Plaintiff’s Brady motion bars his current suppression of evidence 3 claim under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. (Mot. at 10-11). 4 The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars re-litigation of an 5 identical issue in a subsequent action when the issue was (1) 6 actually litigated, (2) to a final judgment on the merits, (3) by 7 or against the same party or its privies, after (4) a full and fair 8 opportunity to litigate. Kendall v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 9 1042, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 10 204 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2000). Of these, only the identity of 11 issues is in dispute here. The Officer Defendants argue that the 12 issues presented in the Brady motion and here are identical: 13 whether the Officer Defendants were constitutionally obligated to 14 turn over the data obtained from Karakesisoglu’s phone. 15 Plaintiff’s opposition is largely unresponsive to this 16 argument, focusing instead on the nature of the relief sought 17 rather than the issue being litigated. (Opp. at 14.) 18 Nevertheless, on the current record, this Court cannot conclude 19 that the issue actually decided by the state trial court was 20 identical to that here. Although the state court ultimately did 21 conclude that the prosecution was not obligated to produce the 22 phone information to Meza, the court’s sparse minutes provide 23 little detail into its reasoning, particularly with respect to any 24 Brady issues. The minutes, for example, give no indication whether 25 the court ever decided whether the information sought qualified as 26 Brady material in the first instance, whether or how the court 27 balanced any Brady concerns against other interests weighing for or 28 against production, or whether the court addressed the Officer 1 Defendants’ roles in obtaining and sharing, or withholding, the 2 phone data.2 Plaintiff is, therefore, not collaterally estopped 3 from bring the suppression of evidence claim alleged here against 4 the Officer Defendants. 5 D. Plaintiff’s entitlement to Brady material 6 Lastly, the Officer Defendants, citing United States v. 7 Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), contend that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 8 claim fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff was not entitled 9 to Brady material unless and until he went to trial, and therefore 10 the Officer Defendants were not required to disclose Brady material 11 prior to Plaintiff entering his plea. It is well-established in 12 this circuit, however, that Brady applies even prior to the entry 13 of a guilty plea.3 See, e.g., United States v. Gamez-Orduno, 235 14 F.3d 453, 461 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The suppression of material 15 evidence helpful to the accused, whether at trial or on a motion to 16 suppress, violates due process.”); United States v. Lucas, 841 F.3d 17 796, 807 (9th Cir. 2016) (Evidence qualifies as Brady material if 18 its production would “undermine confidence in the outcome of either 19 the defendant’s guily plea or trial.” (internal quotation marks 20 omitted)(emphasis added)); see also Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 21 1127, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Overton, 24 F.4th 870, 22 878 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 155, 214 L. Ed. 2d 51 23 (2022). Indeed, otherwise, “prosecutors may be tempted to 24 25 2 Although Plaintiff’s Complaint here alleges that the Officer Defendants shared only limited data with prosecutors (Compl. ¶ 6), 26 his Brady motion sought, and suggested that prosecutors were in possession of, “the fully imaged phone.” RJN at 11. 27 3 For this reason, the Officer Defendants are not entitled to 28 qualified immunity. 1 deliberately withhold exculpatory information as part of an attempt 2 to elicit guilty pleas.” Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 3 1453 (9th Cir. 1995). 4 Courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have hewed to this 5 principle even post-Ruiz.4 See, e.g., Parker v. Cnty. of 6 Riverside, 78 F.4th 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 2023); United States v. 7 Delemus, 828 F. App’x 380, 381 (9th Cir. 2020) (unpublished 8 disposition); Overton, 24 F.4th at 878; United States v. Sheikh, 9 No. 2:18-CR-00119-WBS, 2020 WL 2940868, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 3, 10 2020). The Officer Defendants were not free to ignore their Brady 11 obligations simply because Plaintiff had not yet gone to trial. 12 See Tennison v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 570 F.3d 1078, 1087 13 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Brady suppression occurs when the government 14 fails to turn over even evidence that is ‘known only to police 15 investigators and not to the prosecutor.’”) (quoting Youngblood v. 16 West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869–70, 126 S.Ct. 2188, 165 L.Ed.2d 17 269 (2006) (per curiam))); Gantt v. City of Los Angeles, 717 F.3d 18 702, 709 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We have held in no uncertain terms that 19 Brady’s requirement to disclose material exculpatory and 20 impeachment evidence to the defense applies equally to prosecutors 21 and police officers.”); Poulos, 2022 WL 17072884, at *9 (“The duty 22 4 Not all courts have followed this approach. See Poulos v. 23 City of Los Angeles, No. CV 19-496-MWF (AFMX), 2022 WL 17072884, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2022) (collecting cases). But, as the 24 Poulos court explained, “a rule disclaiming any duty of investigators to disclose exculpatory information already in their 25 possession prior to a plea deal would pose far too great a risk that investigators might withhold exculpatory information from 26 prosecutors as part of an attempt to elicit guilty pleas from potentially innocent individuals.” Id. At *9. The idea that, 27 consistent with such a rule, a defendant could be forced to go to trial on the basis of evidence that investigators knew to be 28 fabricated would eviscerate Brady. to disclose exculpatory evidence to prosecutors is not only 2} inherent in any investigator’s job responsibilities, but it is central to achieving the very objective of the Due Process Clause, which seeks to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur 5]/— a risk that this case demonstrates exists not just for trial convictions but also for guilty pleas.”) (internal quotation marks 7H omitted).

IV. Conclusion

9 For the reasons stated above, the Officer Defendants’ Motion 10} to Dismiss is DENIED. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: September 10, 2024 13 SS

DEAN D. PREGERSON

14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12