DISCUSSION

A. “Related to” Jurisdiction District courts (and bankruptcy courts by reference) have “original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11,” the Bankruptcy Code, “or arising in or related to cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b); see also Stern v. Marshall, 564 US. 462, 473 (2011). A case is “related to” title 11 for this purpose if its outcome could have any convincible effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy. McGuire v. United States, 550 F.3d 903, 911-12 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added) (citing Jn re Fietz, 852 F.2d 455, 457 (9th Cir. 1988)). This basis of jurisdiction is “very broad, including nearly every matter directly or indirectly related to the bankruptcy.” Jn re Wilshire Courtyard, 729 F.3d 1279, 1287 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Sasson v. Sokoloff (In re Sasson), 424 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 447 B.R. 302, 308 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“In Jn re Fietz, the Ninth Circuit made clear it was adopting an expansive view of relatedness; even a remote relationship confers ‘related to’ jurisdiction.”). The Court likely has “related to” jurisdiction over Yamout’s claims because the outcome of the case could potentially alter the Debtor MDRCA’s liabilities to its creditors. Scapa lent MDRCA a principal amount of $3.8 million, with an annual interest rate of 10%, and is claiming a debt of $2,824,044.16. See Compl. f§ 13, 22. If Yamout were successful in his lawsuit, the result will be, at minimum, a reduction in the amount MDRCA owes and therefore, by extension, in the administration of his estate. See MTR Opp. at 9-10; OSC Resp. at 2—7. On this basis, the Court DISCHARGES the OSC and DENIES Yamout’s MTR.* The Court concludes that “related to” jurisdiction exists over Yamout’s claims, and the OSC is hereby DISCHARGED. Yamout’s MTR is DENIED.

* Of course, the Court’s conclusion that Yamout lacks standing, see infra, means that the lawsuit will not, practically speaking, alter MDRCA’s liabilities. But the test for “related to” jurisdiction makes clear that it need not be guaranteed to establish jurisdiction—“even a remote relationship” confers it. See Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP, 447 B.R. at 308. CV-90 CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL Initials of Deputy Clerk KD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JS-6

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. _CV 24-2955-DMG (JCx) Date August 28, 2024 Title Adel Yamout v. Jeffry Scapa, et al. Page 3o0f4 B. Standing Another issue exists concerning the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this action. In its Order Dissolving Yamout’s Temporary Restraining Order (“Ord Dissolving TRO”), the Court expressed its “serious doubts as to Yamout’s standing, and therefore its own subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.” See Ord. Dissolving TRO at 3 (citing Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 641 (9th Cir. 1988)). Yamout—as opposed to his LLC, MDRCA—does not have an interest in the loan at issue in his Complaint. See Banc of America Leasing & Capital, LLC v. 3 Arch Trustee Servs., Inc., 180 Cal. App. 4th 1090, 1103 (2009) (“As a general rule only parties with an interest in the secured loan or in the real property security itself have standing to challenge or attempt to set aside a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.”). As the Court previously stated, “there is no evidence that Yamout will suffer any irreparable non-economic harm independent of harm suffered by MDRCA properties. He is merely the guarantor on the loan, and there is no indication that Scapa has sued him or intends to somehow hold him personally liable for the debt.” See Ord. Dissolving TRO at 3. While “irreparable non-economic harm” is not required for Article III standing, the point is that there is not a showing of injury-in-fact. See Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 967 (9th Cir. 2018); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 55, 560-61 (1992). Yamout nearly concedes this point in his MTR Reply as he tries to argue that the MDRCA bankruptcy has no bearing on this case. See MTR Reply at 5 — 6 (“Here, the claim at issue is not made by a participant in the bankruptcy case or against the debtor or trustee. Rather, Yamout signed a completely separate document... .”). Even after an opportunity to supplement the record and develop his arguments, Yamout has not assuaged the Court’s concerns. As also noted in the Court’s Order Dissolving the TRO, the Guaranty Agreement states that Yamout does not personally have “any right, title, interest or claim in” the Property in the case of a nonjudicial foreclosure. See Ord. Dissolving TRO at 2 (citing Decl. of Andrew Mase ISO TRO Opp., Ex. 1 (Guaranty Agreement) at 25 [Doc. # 13-1]). In his briefing, Yamout cites a case in which the /ender has standing to pursue a guarantor, but none in which the gwarantor can pursue a lender as he does in his Complaint. See MTR Reply at 9 (citing Roes v. Wong, 69 Cal. App. 4th 375, 380 n.5 (1999)). Similarly, the treatise he cites states that a guarantor may raise the defense of usury, but says nothing (nor cites any caselaw) that even implies that a guarantor may bring this type of claim affirmatively without the debtor’s involvement in the lawsuit. Jd. (citing Who can raise the defense of usury—Guarantors and sureties, Miller and Star, 11 Cal. Real Estate (4th) § 37:37). CV-90 CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL Initials of Deputy Clerk KD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JS-6

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. _CV 24-2955-DMG (JCx) Date August 28, 2024 Title Adel Yamout v. Jeffry Scapa, et al. Page 4o0f4 Il.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Scapa’s MTD and DISMISSES this case without prejudice, for lack of standing. Yamout’s MTR is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

CV-90 CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL Initials of Deputy Clerk KD