1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FRANCISCO HURTADO, No. 2:19-cv-02343-DAD-AC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR SUBSTITUTION

14 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., (Doc. No. 174) 15 Defendants.

16 17 This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s motion to substitute plaintiff’s minor children 18 I.H., E.H., F.H., and A.H., through their mother and guardian Priscilla Macias, as successors in 19 interest to plaintiff in this action pursuant to Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in 20 light of plaintiff’s recent death on June 28, 2024. (Doc. No. 174.) 21 “In deciding a motion to substitute under Rule 25(a)(1), the court must consider whether: 22 (1) the motion is timely, (2) the claims pled are extinguished, and (3) the person being substituted 23 is a proper party. If the requirements of Rule 25(a) (1) are met, ‘[t]he substituted party steps into 24 the same position as [the] original party.’” Maseda v. Saul, No. 1:20-cv-01657-JLT, 2021 WL 25 2268871, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 3, 2021) (quoting Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 762, 766 26 (9th Cir. 1996)). 27 In their opposition to the pending motion, defendants do not argue that plaintiff has failed 28 to satisfy the Rule 25(a)(1) requirements to substitute plaintiff’s minor children I.H., E.H., F.H., 1 and A.H for him in this action. Indeed, the court finds that plaintiff has shown that his motion is 2 timely, the claims pled have not been extinguished, and his minor children I.H., E.H., F.H., and 3 A.H. are proper parties. Rather, defendants oppose the pending motion on the grounds that Ms. 4 Macias has not been appointed by the court as guardian ad litem for the minor children and the 5 motion fails to include plaintiff’s fifth child, D.J., a purportedly indispensable party. (Doc. No. 6 179.) 7 In advancing their first argument, defendants do not cite any authority for its position that 8 Ms. Macias must be appointed as a guardian ad litem for her minor children in order for the 9 motion to substitute to be granted. (See Doc. No. 170 at 2.) In contrast, plaintiff’s reply cites 10 several decisions from this district in which a parent’s request to be appointed guardian ad litem 11 for their children was denied as unnecessary or moot because a parent is a guardian who may sue 12 on behalf of a minor child and need not be appointed as a guardian ad litem. (Doc. No. 187 at 2– 13 3); see also Trujillo v. Ametek, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-01394-GPC-AGS, 2021 WL 406225, at *1 (S.D. 14 Cal. Feb. 5, 2021) (explaining that “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)(1) permits a ‘general 15 guardian,’ like a custodial parent, to prosecute a case on behalf of the parent’s own minor child,” 16 and therefore, a motion to appoint a mother as a guardian ad litem is likely unnecessary). 17 Accordingly, defendants’ unsupported argument that Ms. Macias must first be appointed guardian 18 ad litem for her minor children fails. 19 Defendants’ second argument also fails because, as plaintiff emphasizes in his reply brief 20 (see Doc. No. 187 at 5–9), Rule 25 requires that notice be provided to all interested persons but 21 does not require that all of the decedent’s successors in interest be joined in substitution in order 22 for a motion to substitute to be granted. See Estate of Mendez v. City of Ceres, 390 F. Supp. 3d 23 1189, 1201 (E.D. Cal. 2019) (“The Court notes that Defendants do not cite any authority 24 suggesting that all successors-in-interest must be party to § 1983 claims, and the Court has found 25 nothing to support that proposition. Indeed, as to the first claim for unreasonable force under 26 § 1983 and the fifth claim for unreasonable force under California’s Bane Act (the only claims 27 brought on behalf of Carmen’s estate by a successor-in-interest), should Carmen’s father recover 28 on behalf of the estate, Carmen’s mother in turn may recover from the estate as an additional 1 | successor-in-interest. The simple reason that Carmen’s mother is a successor-in-interest does not 2 | require her joinder.”); Raymond v. Martin, No. 1:18-cv-00307-DAD-JLT, 2018 WL 4560686, at 3 | *2 (ED. Cal. Sept. 20, 2018) (“As conceded by defense counsel at the hearing on the pending 4 | motion, plaintiff is not proceeding on a state law wrongful death claim, but rather on three 5 || separate causes of action under § 1983. Defendant has located no authority—and this court has 6 | found none—establishing that all potential heirs must be joined to a § 1983 suit alleging 7 || excessive force and failure to provide medical care.”). Here, plaintiff has filed proofs of service 8 | reflecting that the fifth child D.J. was served as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(g) 9 | and California Code of Civil Procedure § 416.60. (Doc. Nos. 187 at 5) (citing Doc. Nos. □□□□ 10 | 178). 11 Accordingly, 12 1. Plaintiffs motion to substitute (Doc. No. 174) is granted; 13 2. Minors I.H., E.H., F.H., and A.H., through their mother and guardian Priscilla 14 Macias, are substituted as successors in interest for plaintiff Francisco Hurtado; 15 and 16 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to update the docket to reflect the substitution of 17 1.H., E.H., F.H., and A.H., through their mother and guardian Priscilla Macias, as 18 successors in interest for plaintiff Francisco Hurtado. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. | Dated: _ September 17, 2024 □□□ A. 2, □□ 21 DALE A. DROZD 0 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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