1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KEITH CANDLER, No. 2:17-cv-02436-DJC-CKD 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER

14 J. LEBECK, et al.,

15 Defendants. 16

17 Plaintiff Keith Candler is a state inmate proceeding pro se and in forma 18 pauperis. This case previously proceeded to a jury trial on Plaintiff’s Eighth 19 Amendment claims against Defendants J. Lebeck and A. Huynh. After deliberation, 20 the jury found for Defendants. Plaintiff has now filed a Motion for Judgment as a 21 Matter of Law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50.1 (Mot. (ECF No. 142).) 22 For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motion is denied. 23 I. Background 24 By this stage of the proceedings, the parties are all familiar with the facts and 25 history of this case. In short, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants had failed to properly 26 decontaminate him following his exposure to pepper spray. Plaintiff sued Defendants 27 1 Plaintiff states that his Motion is made pursuant to subsection (a)(1) of Rule 50. Plaintiff’s Motion is 28 properly brought under subsection (b), as a renewal of the motion he brought at trial. 1 Lebeck and Huynh under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deliberate indifference to 2 Plaintiff’s serious medical needs and substantial risk of serious harm in violation of 3 Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. 4 At the close of Plaintiff’s case in chief, Plaintiff and Defendants both moved for 5 judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The Court 6 deferred ruling on both motions. Plaintiff has now renewed his Motion and briefing is 7 complete. (See Opp’n (ECF No. 149); Reply (ECF No. 150).) 8 II. Plaintiff’s Motion 9 In his motion, Plaintiff contends that the evidence at trial showed that 10 Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs as Plaintiff 11 presented evidence that “defendants did nothing to help” with the pain he was 12 suffering, and Defendants evidence did not “establish a defense even if it was true.” 13 (Mot. at 1.) Plaintiff argues that Defendants “had a duty to get Plaintiff treatment for 14 the exposure to prolong [sic] dangerous chemical agents sooner rather than later to 15 prevent the unnecessary pain and suffering.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff also asserts 16 Defendants “knew their conduct was illegal by the CDCR ban on corporal punishment 17 and prison rules requiring prisoners to be decontaminated as soon as practicle [sic].” 18 (Id.) In response to Defendants’ contention at trial that Defendants needed to gather 19 evidence, Plaintiff argues the law required that Defendants’ priority be “human pain 20 and suffering[,]” and that Defendants still failed to decontaminate Plaintiff after they 21 had collected all the evidence. (Id. at 1.) 22 III. Legal Standard 23 The standard to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 24 50(b) is “very high.” Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 859 (9th Cir. 2002). To 25 overturn a jury’s verdict by granting such a motion request there be “no legally 26 sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.” Id. (internal 27 citations and quotations omitted) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 28 U.S. 133, 149 (2000)). The Court may not substitute its view of the evidence for the 1 jury’s, make credibility determinations, or weigh the evidence and must draw all 2 inferences for the non-moving party. Costa, 299 F.3d at 859; Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443 3 F.3d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006). Evidence for the moving party that the jury need not 4 believe should be disregarded. Costa, 299 F.3d at 859 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 5 151). “The test applied is whether the evidence permits only one reasonable 6 conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury's verdict.” EEOC v. Go Daddy 7 Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009). 8 A renewed motion under Rule 50(b) must be preceded by a Rule 50(a) motion 9 made before the case was submitted to the jury. Id. “If the judge denies or defers 10 ruling on the [Rule 50(a)] motion, and if the jury then returns a verdict against the 11 moving party, the party may renew its motion under Rule 50(b).” Id. As a renewed 12 motion, the grounds for judgment made in a Rule 50(b) motion are “limited to the 13 grounds asserted in the pre-deliberation Rule 50(a) motion.” Id. 14 IV. Discussion 15 Plaintiff has not shown that the evidence presented at trial permitted only one 16 reasonable conclusion that is contrary to the jury’s verdict. Defendants presented 17 evidence that they decontaminated Plaintiff by exposing him to fresh air as permitted 18 by CDCR policy. (1/23/24 Tr. (ECF No. 146) at 55:16–22 (Defendant Huynh’s 19 testimony on Plaintiff’s decontamination via exposure to fresh air); see Joint Ex. 8.) 20 Testimony from Defendants’ Associate Warden Daniel Ross supported that this was an 21 appropriate form of decontamination under the policy. (Id. at 186:5–10.) This 22 evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to believe that Defendants were using an 23 approved technique, on which they had been trained, to decontaminate Plaintiff. 24 Thus, it would be reasonable for the jury to find that Defendants did not, in fact, act 25 with deliberate indifference as they were already treating him for his exposure to 26 pepper spray by placing him in a location that would expose Plaintiff to fresh air. 27 In his motion, Plaintiff cites Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 1995) for 28 the proposition that Defendants had a duty to get Plaintiff treatment for his exposure 1 to pepper spray to prevent further pain and suffering. But while Wallis, a case which 2 concerned exposure to asbestos, does not have any bearing on the appropriate 3 means of decontamination from exposure to pepper spray. The evidence at trial 4 would permit a reasonable jury to find that Defendants had provided and continued 5 to provide Plaintiff with treatment to prevent further pain and suffering by 6 decontaminating him via exposure to fresh air. 7 Plaintiff’s argument that a reasonable jury must find Defendants were 8 deliberately indifferent as there was a period after they had completed their collection 9 of evidence where they still did not provide Plaintiff a shower fails for the same reason. 10 The evidence presented at trial would permit a reasonable fact finder to determine 11 that Plaintiff was already receiving a permissible method of decontamination at this 12 point and that a shower was simply a different — and not necessarily superior — 13 method of decontamination. 14 Plaintiff also cites Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 n.8 (1994) and an 15 Eleventh Circuit case, Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2007), for the 16 proposition that “avoiding knowledge may also amount to deliberate indifference.” 17 (Mot. at 2.) It is not clear that the evidence presented could have even supported a 18 jury finding that Defendants had purposely avoided knowledge of a serious medical 19 need or risk of harm; besides Plaintiff’s own testimony, there was little to no evidence 20 or testimony that suggested Defendants willfully avoided such knowledge. Even if 21 there were adequate evidence of this, a Rule 50 motion is only granted where there is 22 “no legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue[,]” 23 Costa, 299 F.3d at 859, not when it is simply possible that a reasonable jury could find 24 in the other parties favor. 25 The evidence presented at trial is clearly sufficient to for a reasonable jury to 26 find Defendants’ did not willfully avoid knowledge of a serious medical need or risk of 27 harm. Defendants presented the jury with testimony from Defendants and medical 28 professionals that Plaintiff did not appear to have difficulty breathing or any other 1 indication that would suggest he was experiencing something beyond the standard 2 effects of pepper spray. (See id. at 24:8–12 (Defendant Huynh testifying that if he 3 believed Plaintiff was having trouble breathing, he would have requested medical 4 assistance), 91:9–92:4 (testimony of Nurse Karla Peterson on the recorded effects of 5 pepper spray on Plaintiff), 161:17–25 (stating that Plaintiff was not experiencing 6 serious symptoms of pepper spray exposure).) This evidence is sufficient for a jury to 7 find that Plaintiff did not have a serious medical need beyond a standard reaction to 8 pepper spray for which Plaintiff was already receiving an approved treatment. Thus, 9 from this a reasonable jury could find that Defendants did not have knowledge that 10 Plaintiff had a serious medical need or substantial risk of serious harm.2 11 In Plaintiff’s reply, he argues that “[D]efendants and their witnesses presented 12 false and contradictory statements during trial and they also mispresented the facts 13 during the incident at matter [sic] and during trial.” (Reply at 1.) Plaintiff does not 14 identify any specific instances where this occurred making it impossible to assess 15 these claims. Even if Plaintiff had identified specific statements he believed to be false 16 or contradictory, it would be solely for the jury to decide whether those statements 17 were, in fact, false or contradictory and what weight to give the witness’s testimony as 18 a result. “It is the jury, not the judge, which weighs the contradictory evidence and 19 inferences, judges the credibility of witnesses, receives expert instructions, and draws 20 the ultimate conclusion as to the facts. Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence 21 and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different 22 inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more 23 reasonable.” Cockrum v. Whitney, 479 F.2d 84, 86 (9th Cir. 1973) (cleaned up) 24 (quoting Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944)). Thus, the jury’s 25

26 2 This is not to say that Plaintiff did, in fact, have a serious medical need or risk of harm for which he was not already receiving treatment. At trial, Plaintiff claimed that the pepper spray caused him difficulty 27 breathing and thus presented a greater serious medical need. Based on the evidence and testimony presented, a reasonable jury could also find that Plaintiff was only suffering from the standard effects of 28 pepper spray. ee III I IE IEE RII ERIE NE OED EE

1 | determination is dispositive on this point and the Court will not reweigh the evidence 2 | or override the jury’s decisions about witness credibility and truthfulness as well as the 3 | appropriate weight given to each witness’s testimony.? 4 V. Conclusion 5 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment as a 6 | Matter of Law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) (ECF No. 142) is DENIED. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 | Dated: _ September 23, 2024 “Dinel ° CoO □□□□ Hon. Daniel alabretta 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 12 13 | Dsct - candler17ev02436.50 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 3 In Plaintiff's Reply, he also requests that the Court order Defendant to “present the full trial transcripts” before it rules on Plaintiff's motion. (Reply at 1.) Defendants attached relevant excerpts of the trial 27 transcript to their opposition, but they requested the full transcripts from trial. (ECF No. 141.) The Court reporter provided the complete transcripts requested, and they are available to the Court, in full, 28 | at ECF Nos. 145-148. The Court has reviewed those transcripts in preparing this order.