1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 AUSTIN DE TAGLE, Case No. 24-cv-00556-PCP

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT IN

PART, GRANTING MOTION TO

9 v. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS,

RECLASSING NATURE OF SUIT, AND

10 SANTA CLARA COUNTY SHERIFF, RELATING CASES Defendant. Re: Dkt. No. 3 11

12 13 Austin de Tagle, formerly an inmate at Santa Clara County Jail, filed this pro se civil rights 14 action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act concerning events that 15 occurred during his incarceration. 16 For the reasons stated below, the Complaint is dismissed in part. 17 As explained below, the Court concludes two of Mr. de Tagle’s other matters are related to 18 this lawsuit. Mr. de Tagle shall file a single consolidated amended complaint in this lawsuit setting 19 forth the claims from all three suits. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 On November 13, 2023, Mr. de Tagle was arrested and placed in Santa Clara County Jail. 22 Compl. at 2. Mr. de Tagle purportedly informed an unidentified member of jail staff (“Officer 23 Doe”) that he suffered from psychiatric ailments, that he took medication for these ailments, and 24 that he needed this medication. See id. Officer Doe, however, allegedly denied Mr. de Tagle his 25 medication. See id. Mr. de Tagle alleges he “should have been placed in the mental health unit,” 26 but instead was “placed into the wrong unit.” Id. Mr. de Tagle contends these actions violated the 27 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq., and his constitutional right to have 1 On November 13 or November 14, 2023,1 Officer Hernandez allegedly pushed Mr. de 2 Tagle against a wall and handcuffed him extremely tightly. See id. at 3. Mr. de Tagle claims that 3 he lost circulation to his right wrist, and his shoulders went numb. See id. He states that he was left 4 in that position for three hours. See id. When Officer Hernandez released Mr. de Tagle from that 5 position, he allegedly “caused pain on [Mr. de Tagle’s] right wrist by twisting [his] arm up 6 causing damage to [his] wrist by bending it very aggressively.” Id. Officer Hernandez then 7 purportedly applied handcuffs to Mr. de Tagle a second time, again applying them too tightly. See 8 id. According to Mr. de Tagle, Officer Hernandez’s actions left marks on Mr. de Tagle’s wrists, 9 which took a week to go away. See id. Mr. de Tagle contends that Officer Hernandez’s actions 10 violated his constitutional right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. See id. 11 Following his release from custody, Mr. de Tagle alleges that he went to the emergency 12 room for x-rays of his wrist. See id. He states that he was given pain medication. See id. Mr. de 13 Tagle contends he has “been left scar[r]ed on [his] left side of face, hand, and left shoulder hurts 14 constantly.” Id. He seeks $400 million in damages. See id. at 4. 15 II. Legal Standard 16 Federal courts “may authorize” litigants to file a lawsuit “without prepayment of fees” 17 when “the person is unable to pay such fees.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Before granting such an 18 authorization, the court must ensure the action is not frivolous or malicious, states a claim upon 19 which relief may be granted, and does not seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 20 from providing such relief. See id. at § 1915(e)(2) (listing circumstances under which a court must 21 dismiss an action in which in forma pauperis status has been sought). 22 Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 23 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 24 25

26 1 Mr. de Tagle has filed a separate civil rights action regarding other events which occurred in Santa Clara County Jail. See Dkt. No. 1, de Tagle v. Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Department, 27 Case No. 24-cv-3481-NC (N.D. Cal. filed June 10, 2024). In that action, Mr. de Tagle stated he 1 III. Analysis 2 Mr. de Tagle contends that his rights under the ADA were violated, his right to have his 3 serious medical needs addressed was violated, and he was subjected to excessive force. 4 A. Medical needs claim against Officer Doe 5 Mr. de Tagle appears to have been an arrestee during the time in question. See Compl. 6 If Mr. de Tagle were a pretrial detainee, his medical needs claim would be analyzed under 7 the Fourteenth Amendment, but it is unsettled whether the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment 8 applies to an arrestee’s medical needs claim. See J. K. J. v. City of San Diego, 17 F.4th 1247, 1257 9 (9th Cir. 2021) (“For purposes of this appeal, we need not decide whether the Fourth Amendment 10 also governs J.K.J.’s claim for denial of medical care, because, under both [the Fourteenth and 11 Fourth Amendment] standards, dismissal was warranted . . . .”), amended and superseded on 12 reh’g, 42 F.4th 990 (9th Cir. 2021), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 59 F.4th 1327 (9th 13 Cir. 2023). 14 Although it is unclear whether the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment applies to Mr. de 15 Tagle’s claim, it is clear that officials’ knowing failure to provide prescription medication states a 16 claim. Under the Eighth Amendment, denial of prescription medication has been held to violate a 17 prisoner’s constitutional rights. See Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988) 18 (concluding that prison officials violate a prisoner’s right to medical care under the Eighth 19 Amendment when they “deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment”); see also 20 Bowden v. Rowland, 967 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished) (reversing and remanding 21 dismissal because “the defendants deliberately failed to provide [the plaintiff] with treatment and 22 medication that had been prescribed by physicians” and these allegations stated a valid Eighth 23 Amendment claim); cf. Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 663 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming class 24 certification where prisoners complained, inter alia, that officials “fail[ed] to stock and provide 25 critical medication”). A pre-trial detainee proceeding under the Fourteenth Amendment faces a 26 lesser standard than a convicted prisoner proceeding under the Eighth Amendment. A pre-trial 27 detainee must prove “more than negligence but less than subjective intent – something akin to 1 (explaining the standard in a failure-to-protect case and contrasting it with the subjective mental 2 state required for an Eighth Amendment medical needs claim); see also Gordon v. County of 3 Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the same objective standard of 4 deliberate indifference applicable to a failure-to-protect claim also applies to a medical care claim 5 brought by a pretrial detainee). Thus, if an official’s knowing failure to provide prescription 6 medication violates the Eighth Amendment, it must also violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s 7 more relaxed requirements. 8 Here, Mr. de Tagle complains that he informed Officer Doe he needed psychiatric 9 medication and that this medication was denied. Compl. at 2. It is well-established that prison 10 officials must provide care in response to mental health needs as they would any other medical 11 need. See Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a mentally 12 ill prisoner may establish unconstitutional treatment on behalf of prison officials by showing that 13 officials have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs); see also Hoptowit v. Ray, 14 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) (mental health care requirements analyzed as part of general 15 health care requirements). Liberally construed, Mr. de Tagle has alleged enough to suggest he was 16 deprived of his constitutional right to medical care, whether that right is derived from the Fourth 17 or the Fourteenth Amendment. 18 B. ADA claim against Officer Doe 19 Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), 20 provides “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded 21 from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public 22 entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To state an ADA 23 claim, the plaintiff must show “(1) the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; (2) the plaintiff is 24 otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, 25 programs, or activities; (3) the plaintiff was either excluded from participation in or denied the 26 benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated 27 against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by 1 Mr. de Tagle has not stated an ADA claim because he has not identified anything of which 2 he was deprived “by reason of [his] disability.” He claims he should have been placed in a mental 3 health unit and given psychiatric medication, see Compl. at 2, but does not allege that medication 4 was withheld because of a disability or that he was “placed into the wrong unit” because of a 5 disability. Without that element of causation, Mr. de Tagle failed to state an ADA claim. See Del 6 Conte v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, No. 14-CV-05334-WHO (PR), 2016 WL 3916315, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 7 July 20, 2016) (“The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act require a showing of causation, a link 8 between the fact of his disability and the act of excluding him from the program. No claim is 9 pleaded by alleging simply that because he was denied medication it must have been because of 10 his disability.”).2 11 Because Mr. de Tagle has not shown he was denied medication or placed in the wrong unit 12 because of his disability, he has failed to state an ADA claim. This claim is DISMISSED. 13 C. Excessive Force claim against Officer Hernandez 14 The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain on a prisoner amounts to cruel and unusual 15 punishment prohibited by the Eight Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). 16 Because Mr. de Tagle appears to have been an arrestee rather than a convicted prisoner, see 17 Compl. at 2–3, he is protected from the use of excessive force by the Fourth Amendment. See 18 Pierce v. Multnomah County, Oregon, 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996) (Fourth Amendment 19 reasonableness standard applies to allegations of excessive force against arrestee).3 In evaluating 20

21 2 See also Estrada v. Rowe, No. C 08-2801 MMC (PR), 2010 WL 957120, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2010) (“Here, plaintiff alleges that his disability is his deteriorating health, which has resulted 22 in his inability to stand or walk for more than thirty minutes, and that defendants Dr. Adam and Dr. Sayre have denied him the reasonable accommodations of proper medication for his chronic 23 pain, an MRI, and referral to an orthopaedic specialist. Such allegations, however, do not support a claim that plaintiff has been discriminated against in the provision of services “by reason,” i.e., 24 because, of his disability. Rather, the essence of plaintiff’s claim is that he is not being provided adequate medical treatment for his disability because defendants are acting with deliberate 25 indifference to his serious medical needs. Consequently, the Court finds plaintiff’s allegations do not state a claim for relief under the ADA.”). 26 3 If the facts later reveal that Mr. de Tagle was a pre-trial detainee, then the Fourteenth Amendment would govern his excessive force claim. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 27 (1979) (explaining that, when a pretrial detainee challenges conditions of his confinement, the 1 such claims, courts ask whether the officers’ actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts 2 and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation, and 3 without the “20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). 4 “It is well-established that overly tight handcuffing can constitute excessive force.” Wall v. 5 County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004); see also LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 6 204 F.3d 947, 960 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that a “series of Ninth Circuit cases has held that tight 7 handcuffing can constitute excessive force” and the issue is “usually fact-specific”); Bibbs v. 8 Meiser, No. 22-55743, 2022 WL 17815131, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 15, 2022) (concluding plaintiff 9 had stated a claim where cuffs were so tight they cut off circulation and were left on for two 10 hours). 11 Here, Mr. de Tagle alleges that handcuffs were applied so tightly that he lost feeling in his 12 limbs, suffered pain, and the handcuffs left marks on his person. See Compl. at 3. Liberally 13 construed, Mr. de Tagle’s allegations are sufficient to suggest Officer Hernandez subjected him to 14 excessive force. 15 D. Defendants 16 Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the 17 plaintiff can show the defendant’s actions both actually and proximately caused the deprivation of 18 a federally protected right. Lemire v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 19 1085 (9th Cir. 2013); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). A person deprives 20 another of a constitutional right within the meaning of section 1983 if he does an affirmative act, 21 participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to 22 do, that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. See Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. 23 Here, Mr. de Tagle alleges that Officer Hernandez performed an affirmative act – applying 24 handcuffs too tightly – which deprived Mr. de Tagle of his constitutional right to be free of 25 excessive force. This is sufficient to state a claim against Officer Hernandez. 26 Mr. de Tagle also has shown that Officer Doe omitted to perform an act – providing 27 prescription medication – which he was legally required to do. Suing a Doe defendant is 1 (explaining that suing a Doe defendant is not favored in the Ninth Circuit but may be necessary 2 where the plaintiff is unable to discover the defendant’s identity without discovery). The Court 3 cannot serve a claim upon a party whose identity is unknown. The Court therefore encourages Mr. 4 de Tagle to do his utmost to discover the name of Officer Doe prior to filing the consolidated 5 amended complaint.4 6 Mr. de Tagle also names the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Department as a defendant. To 7 impose liability upon that agency on the legal theories asserted in the complaint, Mr. de Tagle was 8 required to establish: “(1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he [] was deprived; 9 (2) that the [entity] had a policy; (3) that this policy amount[ed] to deliberate indifference to the 10 plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy [was] the moving force behind the 11 constitutional violation.” Oviatt By and Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 12 1992) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (explaining how a government agency may be held 13 liable under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). If a plaintiff 14 cannot identify an unconstitutional policy of the government agency, the plaintiff must “produce 15 evidence creating a triable issue of fact regarding the existence of an unconstitutional practice or 16 custom.” Gordon v. Orange County, 6 F.4th 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2021) (concluding that no custom 17 or practice was shown where the record lacked evidence of any other event involving similar 18 conduct or constitutional violations). “[A] single incident of unconstitutional activity is not 19 sufficient to impose liability under Monell.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823– 20 24 (1985). 21 Here, Mr. de Tagle has not alleged that any Sheriff’s Department policy was the moving 22 force behind the failure to provide his prescription medication, the failure to place him in the 23 4 If Mr. de Tagle is unable to discover Officer Doe’s identity prior to filing the consolidated 24 amended complaint, the Court will allow Mr. de Tagle the opportunity to identify this unknown defendant through the discovery process. See Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642 (advising that “where the 25 identity of alleged defendants will not be known prior to the filing of a complaint,” courts should allow the plaintiff “an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants”); see 26 also Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that failure to afford the plaintiff such an opportunity is error); Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 978 (9th Cir. 2013) 27 (finding that it is an abuse of discretion to deny a plaintiff an opportunity to amend to name the 1 mental health unit, or the excessive force applied to his person. See generally Compl. Indeed, the 2 fact that a designated mental health unit exists suggests that Mr. de Tagle’s “place[ment] into the 3 wrong unit” was against Sheriff’s Department policy. This defendant therefore is DISMISSED 4 with leave to amend. Should Mr. de Tagle believe that he can amend his complaint to assert a 5 proper claim against the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Department, he may add such allegations in 6 his consolidated complaint. 7 IV. RELATED CASES 8 In addition to this lawsuit, Mr. de Tagle has filed two additional lawsuits that involve 9 events or defendants that overlap with the events or defendants here. See de Tagle v. Santa Clara 10 County Sheriff’s Department, Case No. 24-cv-3481-NC (N.D. Cal. filed June 10, 2024); de Tagle 11 v. Santa Clara County, Case No. 24-cv-4115-NC (N.D. Cal. filed July 8, 2024). The judge 12 assigned to those matters has issued sua sponte referrals for the Court to evaluate whether those 13 lawsuits are related to this matter. Having considered the issue, the Court concludes that both 14 lawsuits are related to this matter within the meaning of Local Rule 3-12. See Dkt. Nos. 9, 10. 15 Both lawsuits will be reassigned accordingly. 16 For the sake of efficiency, the Court orders Mr. de Tagle to file a single consolidated 17 amended complaint that includes all of the claims set forth in the related lawsuits except those that 18 have been dismissed by this Order. The Court will refrain from ordering service of Mr. de Tagle’s 19 complaint until after he has filed a consolidated amended complaint and the Court has had an 20 opportunity to screen his remaining claims. 21 V. CONCLUSION 22 1. Mr. de Tagle’s motion to proceed IFP is GRANTED. See Dkt. No. 3. 23 2. The Complaint does not state any claim against the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s 24 Department. This Defendant is DISMISSED with leave to amend. The Complaint does not state 25 an ADA claim. This claim is DISMISSED. 26 3. Liberally construed, the Complaint states an excessive force claim against Officer 27 Hernandez and a medical needs claim against Officer Doe. 1 4. The cases numbered 24-cv-3481-NC and 24-cv-4115-NC are deemed related to this 2 matter and will be consolidated with this matter under the case number 24-cv-00556-PCP. Mr. de 3 Tagle shall prepare a consolidated amended complaint that includes the claims addressed in 4 paragraph 3, any amended claim against the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Department, and the 5 claims set forth in the related cases numbered 24-cv-3481-NC and 24-cv-4115-NC. 6 5. The CONSOLIDATED AMENDED COMPLAINT shall be filed within thirty- 7 five days from the date this order is filed. The consolidated amended complaint must include the 8 caption and civil case number used in this order (24-cv-00556-PCP) and the words 9 CONSOLIDATED AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. In the consolidated amended 10 complaint, Mr. de Tagle must allege facts that demonstrate he is entitled to relief on every claim. 11 An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 12 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[A] plaintiff waives all causes of action alleged in the original 13 complaint which are not alleged in the amended complaint.”); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 14 1262–63 (9th Cir. 1992) (where an amended complaint did not name all the defendants to an 15 action, they were no longer defendants). 16 6. It is Mr. de Tagle’s responsibility to prosecute this case. He must keep the Court 17 informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the Clerk headed “Notice of 18 Change of Address.” He also must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to 19 do so will result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of 20 Civil Procedure 41(b). 21 7. Mr. de Tagle is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for 22 this case on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case. 23 8. Upon filing, this lawsuit was categorized as “550 – Prisoner Civil Rights.” See 24 Docket. Mr. de Tagle’s other lawsuits against the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Department have 25 been categorized as “446 – American with Disabilities.” See Docket, de Tagle v. Santa Clara 26 County Sheriff’s Department, Case No. 24-3481-NC (N.D. Cal. filed June 10, 2024); see Docket, 27 de Tagle v. Santa Clara County, Case No. 24-4115-NC (N.D. Cal. filed July 8, 2024). The Clerk 1 shall correct the Nature of Suit of the instant matter to “446 — American with Disabilities” to 2 || match the Nature of Suit assigned to Mr. de Tagle’s other actions. 3 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 6 || Dated: July 23, 2024 May be~ 8

P. CASEY PITTS

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