1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 San Francisco Division 11 J.Z., Case No. 20-cv-00154-LB

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING THE

13 v. PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL'S MOTION

FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Re: ECF No. 39 15 Defendant. 16 17 INTRODUCTION 18 The court previously granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the 19 action to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings.1 On remand, the plaintiff 20 received a past-due benefits award.2 Pursuant to the representation agreement with her client, the 21 plaintiff’s counsel now seeks fees of $74,500.00, which is twenty-five percent of past-due benefits 22 received and within the limit according to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).3 The court can decide this matter 23 without oral argument. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). The court grants the motion. 24

25 1 See Order – ECF No. 34. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (ECF); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents. Plaintiff’s counsel also 26 represented the plaintiff in an earlier action before this court. See J.Z. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:17-cv-02715-LB. 27 2 Notice of Award – ECF No. 36 at 1–4. 1 2 STATEMENT 3 The Commissioner awarded the plaintiff $298,188.92.4 The court previously awarded 4 $4,520.00 in attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) in this case as well as 5 $4,799.00 in attorney’s fees under the EAJA in the plaintiff’s 2017 case against the Commissioner 6 of Social Security.5 7 The plaintiff has a fee agreement with his lawyer that provides for a twenty-five percent 8 contingency fee award as of the final decision, which makes $298,188.92 the relevant amount.6 9 The plaintiff’s attorney seeks $74,500.00 in fees, which is within twenty-five percent of 10 $298,188.92. The Commissioner filed a response to the plaintiff’s counsel’s motion asking the 11 court to consider the reasonableness of the fee award and order the plaintiff’s counsel to refund the 12 EAJA fees to the plaintiff.7 The plaintiff’s counsel agreed that she will refund the EAJA fees.8 13 14 ANALYSIS 15 Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a [social 16 security] claimant . . . , the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable 17 fee” for the claimant’s counsel, which can be no more than 25% of the total of past-due benefits 18 awarded to the claimant. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). A court may award such a fee even if the 19 court’s judgment did not immediately result in an award of past-due benefits; where the court has 20 rendered a judgment favorable to a claimant by reversing an earlier determination by an ALJ and 21 remanding for further consideration, the court may calculate the 25-percent fee based upon any 22 23 24 4 Mot. – ECF No. 39 at 7; Notice of Award – ECF No. 39-3; Comm’r.’s Response to Mot. – ECF No. 25 42. 26 5 Order – ECF No. 38; J.Z. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:17-cv-02715-LB, Order – ECF No. 38. 6 Representation Agreement – ECF No. 39-1. 27 7 Comm’r.’s Response to Mot. – ECF No. 42 at 2–3. 1 past-due benefits awarded on remand. See, e.g., Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2009) 2 (en banc). 3 In considering a motion for attorney’s fees under § 406(b), the court must review counsel’s 4 request “as an independent check” to ensure that the contingency fee agreement “yield[s] 5 reasonable results.” See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). Section 406(b) “does 6 not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs 7 courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements.” Id. at 808–09. To evaluate 8 the reasonableness of a fee request under § 406(b), the court considers the character of the 9 representation and the results achieved. Id. at 808; see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. This 10 includes analyzing whether substandard representation justifies awarding less than twenty-five 11 percent in fees; any delay in the proceedings attributable to the attorney requesting the fee; 12 whether the benefits of the representation are out of proportion to time spent on the case; and the 13 risk counsel assumed by accepting the case. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151–52 (citing Gisbrecht, 14 535 U.S. at 808). If an attorney “is responsible for delay. . . a reduction [of fees] is in order so that 15 the attorney will not profit from the accumulation of benefits during the pendency of the case in 16 court.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808 (cleaned up); see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. 17 The court must offset an award of § 406(b) attorney’s fees by any award of fees granted under 18 the EAJA. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796; Parrish v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 698 F.3d 1215, 1218 (9th 19 Cir. 2012). 20 The twenty-five percent contingency-fee agreement is within 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A)’s 21 statutory ceiling, and the amount is reasonable. Counsel’s work on the plaintiff’s cases before this 22 court was not substandard; in fact, the plaintiff’s counsel succeeded in having both cases 23 remanded to the Social Security Administration.9 She has not caused any delay in the proceedings. 24 In addition, the time spent on work before this court — 44 attorney-hours and 6.3 paralegal-hours 25 on both cases before this court — is not out of proportion to the fee award. See Crawford, 586 26 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 15 Dated: August 16, 2024 LAE

LAUREL BEELER

17 United States Magistrate Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28