1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ROBERT F. KENNEDY, et al., Case No. 3:24-cv-02869-WHO

8 Plaintiffs,

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

9 v. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

10 META PLATFORMS, INC., et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 29, 40 Defendants. 11

12 13 Former presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy Jr., a political action committee 14 supporting his campaign called American Values 2024 (“AV24”), and individual Jessica Reed 15 Kraus (collectively, the “plaintiffs”) filed this action against Meta Platforms, Inc., Facebook 16 Operations, LLC, Instagram, LCC, and Mark Zuckerberg (collectively, the “defendants”), alleging 17 violations of their rights under the First Amendment, the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), and the Ku 18 Klux Klan Act. In brief, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants have conspired with the federal 19 government to remove and block from the defendants’ social media platforms the content and 20 users that express support for Kennedy’s campaign. The plaintiffs move for a preliminary 21 injunction, requesting “immediate” relief to stop the alleged censorship. Because the plaintiffs fail 22 to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of any of their claims, and for the following 23 reasons, the motion is denied. 24 BACKGROUND 25 Kennedy is a presidential candidate during the 2024 election cycle, ending his campaign 26 shortly before this motion was heard but remaining on the ballot in non-swing states. See 27 Amended Complaint (“AC”) [Dkt. No. 28] ¶¶ 2, 87. AC24 is a political action committee 1 “invested significant time and resources following both former President Trump and Mr. Kennedy 2 on the campaign trail.” Id. ¶¶ 70, 72, 89. 3 AC24 has an account on Facebook, and Reed Kraus has an account on Instagram. See id. 4 ¶¶ 28, 72. Facebook and Instagram, two of the defendants here, are owned by defendant Meta, 5 and Zuckerberg is Meta’s Chief Executive Officer. Id. ¶¶ 90–93. 6 In May 2024, AC24 produced and released a thirty-minute “documentary film” about 7 Kennedy called “Who Is Bobby Kennedy?” that “invit[ed] voters to make up their own minds 8 about Mr. Kennedy, rather than accepting falsehoods about him repeatedly asserted by major news 9 outlets and social media platforms.” AC ¶¶ 23–24. The plaintiffs allege that they posted links to 10 the video on Facebook and Instagram, which were blocked or removed within ten minutes so that 11 users could watch, share, or post links to the video. Id. ¶¶ 31–35. 12 The plaintiffs allege that users who tried to share the video received a variety of messages 13 from the defendants about why the video was banned, including for violating community 14 standards, being spam, promoting crime or hate groups, soliciting sexual services and firearms, 15 being malicious, or containing banned COVID-19 misinformation content. Id. ¶¶ 37, 40. The 16 plaintiffs deny that any of these reasons are an accurate portrayal of the video. Id. ¶¶ 38–39, 41, 17 51. They say that this censorship prevented millions of people from seeing the film, like the one 18 hundred million views the video received on X (formerly Twitter). Id. ¶¶ 42, 72–73. The 19 plaintiffs allege that the suppression of this video has caused and is causing: “substantial donation 20 losses” to Kennedy and AV24; “substantial injury” to Kennedy’s candidacy, to his and AV24’s 21 free speech rights, and to AV24’s property rights; and “substantial injury to the rights of citizens 22 and voters who sought to express their support” to Kennedy. Id. ¶ 57. 23 The defendants submitted declarations of Meta employees who work in content 24 moderation and enforcement divisions of the company. See Declaration of Sonal Mehta (“Mehta 25 Decl.”) [Dkt. No. 35-1] Exs. A, B. One employee explained that Meta did prevent the video from 26 being posted on May 4 because of a “mistaken[] determin[ation] that it violated Meta’s policies.” 27 Id. Ex. A ¶ 6. The employee said this happens when the automated content moderation system 1 The employee explained that this can happen with new links that are posted to the platforms for 2 the first time or when the poster tags multiple users in posts containing the link. Id. Access was 3 restored within thirty minutes of Meta being alerted to the problem. Id. ¶ 8. The post remains 4 available on AV24’s Facebook page. Mehta Decl. Ex. N. 5 The plaintiffs also assert that Reed Kraus’ content about Kennedy has “been widely 6 censored and demoted,” though her content about Donald Trump has not. AC ¶ 72. When she 7 wrote a pro-Kennedy post in October 2023, she lost 40,000 followers overnight and says “[t]here 8 is no explanation for this unprecedent phenomenon other than” the defendants’ “surreptitious 9 ‘demoting’ or ‘de-boosting’ of her Instagram account.” Id. ¶¶ 73–74. The following month, she 10 says fewer people viewed her Instagram story, which she attributes to the defendants’ “shadow- 11 banning” of her content. Id. ¶ 75. After posting the Who Is Bobby Kennedy video, she was locked 12 out of her account and the account was precluded from being shown to new followers. Id. ¶ 80. 13 Instagram allegedly also blocked a poll she posted about Kennedy debating as violative of 14 community standards. Id. ¶ 84. 15 The defendants’ declaration states that “no enforcement actions” were taken against any of 16 Reed Kraus’ posts about Kennedy or “RFK.” Mehta Decl. Ex. B ¶ 5. The Meta employee says 17 that Reed Kraus’ suspension was due to violation of Meta’s policies about physical harm. Id. ¶ 7. 18 A post was removed and Reed Kraus was suspended for less than 13 minutes because she wrote, 19 “[I]f I show up on campus and see my kid in a facemask spray painting the school I broke my back 20 to send him to, demanding vegan food and denouncing bagels, I’m spanking him in front of the 21 whole student body, telling him to ‘stop being an idiot.’” Id. ¶¶ 6–10. 22 Finally, the plaintiffs provide screenshots of third parties that apparently show censorship 23 of pro-Kennedy content on their Facebook and Instagram pages. See [Dkt. No. 29-1] Exs. A, B; 24 AC ¶¶ 61–64 (making general assertions that third parties’ posts and content were censored, 25 without identifying the third parties, posts, or content). In response, the defendants submitted an 26 administrative motion for leave to file supplemental evidence, asserting that looking into every 27 screenshot was time- and resource-intensive, and that they were only recently able to confirm the 1 The plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, asserting they are likely to 2 succeed on the merits of their First Amendment, Voting Rights Act, and Ku Klux Klan Act claims. 3 (“Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 29]. The defendants opposed. (“Oppo.”) [Dkt. No. 35]. The plaintiffs replied. 4 (“Repl.”) [Dkt. No. 39]. I held a hearing at which counsel for both parties appeared. 5 LEGAL STANDARD 6 “[A] party is entitled to a preliminary injunction if it demonstrates (1) ‘that [it] is likely to 7 succeed on the merits,’ (2) ‘that [it] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 8 preliminary relief,’ (3) ‘that the balance of equities tips in [its] favor,’ and (4) ‘that an injunction is 9 in the public interest.’” Flathead-Lolo-Bitterroot Citizen Task Force v. Montana, 98 F.4th 1180, 10 1190 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 11 2011)); see also Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The Ninth Circuit 12 also uses a “‘sliding scale’ variant of the Winter test.” Flathead-Lolo-Bitterroot, 98 F.4th at 1190. 13 That scale allows the plaintiff to show entitlement to a preliminary injunction by making a “lesser 14 showing” of “serious questions going to the merits,” so long as the plaintiff shows that the 15 “balance of hardships . . . tips sharply towards the plaintiff,” and the other two factors are met. Id. 16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 17 DISCUSSION 18 I. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS OR SERIOUS QUESTIONS 19 GOING TO THE MERITS OF EACH CLAIM 20 A. First Amendment Claim 21 The plaintiffs assert that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment 22 claim, which is that Meta violated their rights to free speech by censoring their posts and accounts 23 on Meta’s platforms. But the First Amendment “‘prohibits only governmental abridgment of 24 speech’ and ‘does not prohibit private abridgment of speech.’” Children’s Health Def. v. Meta 25 Platforms, Inc., ---F. 4th---, No. 21-16210, 2024 WL 3734422, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2024) (first 26 quoting Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 802, 808 (2019); and then citing 27 Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2020)). Because there is no apparent 1 “To begin by stating the obvious, Meta, the owner of Facebook [and Instagram], is a 2 private corporation, not a government agency.” Id. “[I]n certain ‘exceptional cases,’ a private 3 party ‘will be treated as a state actor for constitutional purposes.’” Id. (quoting O’Handley v. 4 Weber, 62 F.4th 1145, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 2023)). “The private party must meet two distinct 5 requirements: (1) the ‘state policy’ requirement and (2) the ‘state actor’ requirement.’” Id. (first 6 quoting Wright v. Service Emps. Int’l Union Loc. 503, 48 F.4th 1112, 1121 (9th Cir. 2022); then 7 citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); and then citing O’Handley, 62 8 F.4th at 1156). 9 The plaintiffs argue that the defendants meet both requirements. I address them in turn. 10 1. State Policy 11 “To satisfy the state policy requirement, the alleged constitutional deprivation must result 12 from ‘the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State’ or ‘a rule of conduct imposed by 13 the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible.’” Children’s Health, 2024 WL 14 3734422, at *4 (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937). First, courts “look to whether the source of the 15 alleged constitutional harm is a state statute or policy.” Id. (quoting Belgau v. Inslee, 975 F.3d 16 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2020)) (quotation marks omitted). “This requirement is satisfied when a private 17 institution ‘enforce[s] a state-imposed rule’ instead of ‘the terms of its own rules.’” Id. (quoting 18 O’Handley, 62 F.4th at 1156). The analysis begins with “identifying the ‘specific conduct of 19 which the plaintiff complains,’” which requires determining the “source” of any alleged harm. Id. 20 at *6 (first quoting Wright, 48 F.4th at 1122; and then quoting Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 994 21 (9th Cir. 2013)). 22 The Ninth Circuit recently has twice affirmed dismissal of claims filed by plaintiffs 23 alleging that social media platforms violated the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by flagging, 24 removing, or otherwise “censoring” the plaintiffs’ content shared on those platforms. See 25 Children’s Health, 2024 WL 3734422 at *2–4; O’Handley, 62 F.4th at 1153–55. In both cases, 26 the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ claims failed at the first step of the state action 27 framework because of “the simple fact” that the defendants “acted in accordance with [their] own 1 see also Children’s Health, 2024 WL 3734422 at *5–6. 2 The only difference between those cases and this one is that here, the plaintiffs seem to 3 allege that the “specific” harmful conduct is Meta’s censorship itself, rather than its policy of 4 censoring. Based on the documents submitted and allegations made, that is a distinction without a 5 difference. Meta shows that it removed plaintiff Reed Kraus’ posts and suspended her account for 6 less than 13 minutes because she violated its terms and conditions related to her threats of physical 7 violence. Mehta Decl. Ex. B ¶¶ 6–10. Meta’s right to take these actions “derive[s]”—as in 8 O’Handley and Children’s Health—“from its user agreement[s],” not from any state-imposed rule. 9 O’Handley, 62 F.4th at 1126. To the extent that the plaintiffs allege Meta censored pro-Kennedy 10 content posted by nonparties, see Mot. 1:9–2:6, AC ¶ 8, [Dkt. No. 29-1] Exs. A, B—and setting 11 aside the standing issues unaddressed by the plaintiffs about their ability to assert that their First 12 Amendment rights were violated by Meta’s censorship of others’ accounts—they fail to plead 13 facts or provide evidence showing that these actions were taken in accordance with a state- 14 imposed rule. 15 At bottom, the plaintiffs fail to point to any governmental “statute or policy” as the source 16 of their harm. Children’s Health, 2024 WL 3734422 at *4. To support their theory, they rely on 17 two district court orders from Louisiana and an “Interim Staff Report” for House of 18 Representatives’ Committee on the Judiciary.1 See Mot. 21:8–16; Repl. 11:7–13:7; AC ¶¶ 158– 19 62; Missouri v. Biden, 680 F. Supp. 3d 630 (W.D. La.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 80 F.4th 641 20 (5th Cir. 2023), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g, 83 F.4th 350 (5th Cir. 2023), rev’d 21 and remanded sub nom. Murthy v. Missouri, 144 S. Ct. 1972 (2024); Kennedy v. Biden, No. 3:23- 22 CV-00381, 2024 WL 625327 at *10 (W.D. La. Feb. 14, 2024) (appeal pending). These orders and 23 interim report discussed actions taken by social media companies and various federal government 24 officials and agencies in 2020 through 2021 with respect to removing COVID-19 misinformation 25

26 1Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. H.R. Interim Staff Rep., The Censorship-Industrial Complex: How Top Biden White House Officials Coerced Big Tech to Censor Americans, True Information, and 27 Critics of the Biden Administration (May 1, 2024), https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo- 1 from social media platforms. See Missouri, 680 F. Supp. 3d at 642–89; Kennedy, 2024 WL 2 625327, at *10 (“Kennedy Plaintiffs rely on the same evidence presented in Missouri v. Biden.”). 3 Missouri was ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court, which held that the plaintiffs lacked 4 standing to pursue their claims. Murthy, 144 S. Ct. at 1981. 5 In Murthy, the Supreme Court analyzed Missouri, where the plaintiffs were “two states and 6 five social-media users” who sued “dozens” of federal government officials and agencies for 7 allegedly pressuring social media platforms to suppress speech protected by the First Amendment. 8 Id. The allegedly censored speech was flagged and removed as misinformation concerning the 9 COVID-19 pandemic. See id. at 1982–85. The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish 10 standing because the evidence showed that the social media platforms made and enforced the 11 content moderations decisions, and no findings of fact were made showing “specific causation” 12 between the government actions and the content moderation. Id. at 1987. The Fifth Circuit had 13 determined that the alleged censorship was “likely attributable at least in part” to the actions of the 14 government defendants, which the Supreme Court held was an “overly broad assertion” because 15 the evidence actually showed that the defendants both made similar decisions before any 16 government actors were involved and also declined to follow the government’s alleged requests 17 for censorship on multiple occasions. Id. The Supreme Court added that the Fifth Circuit 18 “glossed over complexities in the evidence” in part because it “relied on the District Court’s 19 factual findings, many of which unfortunately appear to be clearly erroneous.” Id. at 1987 & n.4. 20 The Court then reviewed and cited the record to show how the district court’s findings were 21 incorrect. Id. at 1987 n.4. 22 The Murthy opinion makes my decision here straightforward. Murthy rejected Missouri’s 23 factual findings and specifically explained that the Missouri evidence did not show that the federal 24 government caused the content moderation decisions. Yet here, the plaintiffs rely on Missouri as 25 their evidence that a state rule caused the defendants’ alleged censorship actions. Even if I 26 accepted the vacated district court order as evidence here—which I do not—the Supreme Court 27 has plainly explained why it does not support the plaintiffs’ argument. 1 government had a policy in 2020 and 2021 related to COVID-19 misinformation. They say 2 nothing about whether any government had a policy in 2024 related to Kennedy’s campaign. The 3 plaintiffs are therefore without evidence of any government policy, which means they cannot show 4 their harm is derived from such a policy. See Children’s Health, 2024 WL 3734422 at *4; see 5 also Kennedy v. Google LLC, 688 F. Supp. 3d 951, 958 (N.D. Cal. 2023), affirmed, No. 23-3411, 6 2024 WL 3934326, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 2024) (declining to use Missouri factual findings as 7 evidence, in a similar case brought by plaintiff Kennedy against another social media company for 8 content moderation decisions). 9 Accordingly, as in Children’s Health and O’Handley, the plaintiffs’ First Amendment 10 claim “fails at this threshold step.” Children’s Health, 2024 WL 3734422 at *6. And because this 11 is “fatal” to the plaintiffs’ state action claim, id. (citing Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 198 12 (2024)), the plaintiffs fail to show likelihood of success on the merits or serious questions going to 13 the merits of their First Amendment claims, see Flathead-Lolo-Bitterroot, 98 F.4th at 1190. 14 2. State Actor 15 Though I need not address the second prong of the test, see Children’s Health, 2024 WL 16 3734422 at *6, I follow the direction of the Ninth Circuit in Children’s Health and explain why 17 the plaintiffs’ claims fail to satisfy the second part of the state action test as well. 18 “[T]he Supreme Court has identified four tests for when a private party ‘may fairly be said 19 to be a state actor’: (1) the public function test, (2) the joint action test, (3) the state compulsion 20 test, and (4) the nexus test.” Id. (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 939). 21 Here, the AC does not clarify which test or tests that the plaintiffs rely upon, and the 22 plaintiffs’ briefing fails to discuss this second prong at all. The plaintiffs clearly do not argue that 23 Meta “performs a traditionally public function.” Id. at *5 (quoting Manhattan Cmty. Access, 587 24 U.S. at 804). They do seem to allege that Meta “is a ‘willful participant in joint activity’ with the 25 government” under the joint action test. Children’s Health, 2024 WL 3734422, at *5 (quoting 26 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941); see AC ¶ 164 (citing Justice Alito’s dissent in Murthy, in which he said 27 that “the platforms have complied” with the government’s requests), ¶ 165 (describing how social 1 177, 181, 184 (describing “collusion” and “work[ing] jointly”). And the plaintiffs also seem to 2 allege the state compulsion test, that “the government compels or encourages [Meta] to take a 3 particular action.” Children’s Health, 2024 WL 3734422, at *5 (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 4 991, 1004 (1982)); see AC ¶ 158, 179–80, 184 (describing the Louisiana district court’s findings 5 that the government’s actions constituted “coercion, significant encouragement, and collusion” 6 and noting “federal pressure”). It also seems possible that the plaintiffs allege that “there is a 7 ‘sufficiently close nexus’ between the government and the challenged action” for the nexus text. 8 Children’s Health, 2024 WL 3734422, at *5 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 9 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). 10 The plaintiffs’ theory is that Meta and the government colluded or acted jointly, or the 11 government coerced Meta, to remove content related to Kennedy’s 2024 presidential campaign 12 from Meta’s platforms. The problem with that theory is again the lack of evidence. The Missouri 13 and Kennedy findings were rejected by the Supreme Court, as explained above. And they—and 14 the interim report—suggest at most a relationship or communications between Meta and the 15 government about removal of COVID-19 misinformation in 2020 and 2021. Even if the plaintiffs 16 proved that Meta and the government acted jointly, or colluded, or that Meta was coerced by the 17 government to remove and flag COVID-19 misinformation three years ago, that says nothing 18 about Meta’s relationship and communications with the government in 2024. Nor does it suggest 19 that Meta and the government worked together to remove pro-Kennedy content from Meta’s 20 platforms. 21 Because of this, the plaintiffs fail to show likelihood of success on the merits—or serious 22 questions going to the merits—for any of the three possible state action prongs. They do not 23 provide evidence or allegations of a “specific[]” agreement between Meta and the government to 24 specifically accomplish the goal of removing Kennedy content from Meta platforms. See 25 Children’s Health, 2024 WL 3734422, at *5 (describing joint action test and collecting cases). 26 Nor do they show that the government exercised coercive power or “significant encouragement” 27 for Meta to remove Kennedy-related content in 2024. Id. at *9–10 (describing coercion test and 1 on social media sites was insufficient to show government coerced platforms to remove it). And 2 for similar reasons, the plaintiffs do not establish a “sufficiently close nexus” between the 3 government and the removal of Kennedy-related content from Meta’s platforms. Id. at *5. Their 4 First Amendment claim accordingly fails at step two of the state action inquiry. It is far from 5 likely to succeed on the merits. 6 B. Statutory Claims 7 The plaintiffs assert that they are likely to succeed on the merits of two of their statutory 8 claims, for violation of §11(b) Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b), and for 9 violation of the Support or Advocacy Clause of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1870, now codified at 42 10 U.S.C. § 1985(3). I address these claims in turn, and then briefly discuss the defendants’ 11 argument that they are immunized under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act. 12 1. Voting Rights Act 13 In relevant part, § 11(b) of the VRA provides, “No person, whether acting under color of 14 law or otherwise, shall . . . intimidate, threaten, or coerce . . . any person for urging or aiding any 15 person to vote . . . .” 52 U.S.C.A. § 10307(b). 16 The statute is broad and protects both the right to vote and the right to urge others to vote. 17 See id.; Allen v. City of Graham, No. 1:20-CV-997, 2021 WL 2223772, at *8 (M.D.N.C. June 2, 18 2021). It is well established that § 11(b) “reaches beyond government actors, affording a private 19 right of action,” and reaching private conduct. Nat’l Coal. on Black Civic Participation v. Wohl, 20 661 F. Supp. 3d 78, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (“Wohl III”) (collecting cases). 21 A district court in New York recently “examined at length the conduct encompassed by the 22 terms ‘intimidate,’ ‘threaten,’ and ‘coerce’ under the statute.” Id. at 113 (explaining, in its order 23 on summary judgment, the court’s prior analyses in orders addressing motions for a temporary 24 restraining order and to dismiss). I am persuaded by that court’s extensive, thorough analysis and 25 agree with its definition of these terms. See also Fair Fight Inc. v. True the Vote, No. 2:20-CV- 26 00302-SCJ, 2024 WL 24524, at *37–38 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 2, 2024) (citing and accepting this 27 definition from Wohl II); Ariz. All. for Retired Americans v. Clean Elections USA, 638 F. Supp. 3d 1 (9th Cir. Jan. 26, 2023) (same, in a now-vacated order). 2 “[I]ntimidation includes messages that a reasonable recipient, familiar with the context of 3 the communication, would view as a threat of injury to deter individuals from exercising their 4 right to vote.” Wohl III, 661 F. Supp. 3d at 113. “[U]nlawful threats or intimidation . . . need not 5 be violent or physical, and may include communications inspiring fear of legal consequences, 6 economic harm, dissemination of personal information, and surveillance.”2 Id. (first citing Nat’l 7 Coal. on Black Civic Participation v. Wohl, 498 F. Supp. 3d 457, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“Wohl I”); 8 and then citing Nat’l Coalition on Black Civic Participation v. Wohl, 512 F. Supp. 3d 500, 509 9 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“Wohl II”)). 10 Examples of threatened “legal consequences” that a reasonable person, familiar with 11 context, would view as a threat of injury to deter her from voting include: threats that police will 12 use voter information to find and enforce old warrants3; a pattern of baseless arrests at a voter 13 registration event4; threats of deportation against lawful citizens who are immigrants and their 14 family members5; and threats of filing a lawsuit against someone or suspending them without 15 pay.6 See Wohl III, 661 F. Supp. 3d at 113–14. 16 Examples of threatened “economic harm” that a reasonable person, familiar with context, 17 would view as a threat of injury to deter her from voting include threats of “adverse economic 18 consequences,” such as: threatening to personal information to debt collectors to collect 19 outstanding debt7; evicting or threatening to evict sharecroppers from their land or otherwise 20 2 Though of course, “[t]he use of physical violence” such as beatings or pepper spray “to deter an 21 individual from voting or engaging in a voting-related activity” also gives rise to a claim under § 11(b). Allen, 2021 WL 2223772, at *7 (citing Katzenbach v. Original Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 22 250 F. Supp. 330, 341 (E.D. La. 1965)).

23 3 Wohl III, 661 F. Supp. 3d at 113–14. 25 5 United States v. Tan Duc Nguyen, 673 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2012) (analyzing threats under California election law). 26

6 Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 222–23 (2d Cir. 2001) (addressing 27 threats and intimidation in the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act). 1 interfering with their sharecropping contracts8; inducing local merchants to boycott and refuse to 2 provide necessities to anyone who helps register voters9; and prohibiting an insurance broker from 3 accessing land to talk to his clients, and therefore preventing him from carrying out his profession, 4 because of the broker’s voter registration efforts.10 Wohl III, 661 F. Supp. 3d at 114. 5 Additionally, publishing names, addresses, and phone numbers of registered voters in a 6 report accusing them of committing various felonies also constitutes threats and intimidation 7 under § 11(b), both because of the “clear effort to subject the named individuals to public 8 opprobrium” and the “fear of harassment and interference with their right to vote” that the named 9 individuals experienced. League of United Latin Am. Citizens - Richmond Region Council 4614 v. 10 Pub. Int. Legal Found., No. 1:18-CV-00423, 2018 WL 3848404, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 13, 2018) 11 (“LULAC”).11 12 Though I do not doubt that it is theoretically possible for someone to show they were 13 intimidated, threatened, or coerced by a social media site for urging people not to vote, in violation 14 of § 11(b), and in a way that parallels any of the above cases, the plaintiffs have not shown that is 15 what happened here. 16 First, with respect to blocking links to the Who Is Bobby Kennedy video, the parties 17

18

8 United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653, 656–58 (6th Cir. 1961) (per curiam). 19

9 Beaty, 288 F.2d at 654; see also Katzenbach, 250 F. Supp. at 348 (citing “United States v. Deal, 20 W.D. La. 1961, 6 Race Rel. L. Rep. 474”). 22 11 The plaintiffs argue that “disseminating ‘false utterances’ intended to chill, or having the effect of chilling, individuals from engaging in the protected activity” constitutes intimidation. Mot. 23 14:8–16. What they cite, though, is a pretrial decision about a criminal charge for 18 U.S.C. § 241, where the court held “that prosecutions of § 241 for ‘conspiracies to make verifiably false 24 utterances about the time, place, or manner of elections that would injure the right to vote [are] unlikely to encourage selective prosecutions or chill broad categories of constitutional speech,’” a 25 decision that was upheld after trial. United States v. Mackey, No. 21-CR-80 (AMD) (SB), 2023 WL 6879613, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2023) (emphasis added). That case does not stand for 26 what the plaintiffs claim. At any rate, it is not clear what false utterances the plaintiffs challenge. They said that the defendants “disseminated wild falsehoods about Who Is Bobby Kennedy” but 27 again, the evidence at this point shows that it was mistakenly and briefly blocked, and is now 1 submitted contested evidence about why the links were blocked. The defendants point to 2 compelling evidence that the video links were incorrectly automatically flagged as a phishing 3 attack, a “not uncommon” response by its automated software to newly created links with high 4 traffic flow. Oppo. 5–6 (citing Mehta Decl. Ex. A ¶ 7). The defendants’ evidence shows that once 5 the defendants were alerted to the problem, through channels set up specifically for that purpose, 6 the links were restored, and the video was made (and is currently still) available on its platform. 7 Mehta Decl. Ex. A. ¶¶ 4–8, Exs. M–Q. Though the plaintiffs say the removal of the video was an 8 effort to coerce them to not urge people to vote for Kennedy, the defendants’ competing evidence 9 shows that it was a technological glitch and that the plaintiffs were aware of this glitch because 10 they reported the problem in the first place. And if the plaintiffs were aware that a tech issue 11 caused the removal of the videos, with that “context” it would probably not be reasonable for them 12 to believe the video links were removed in an effort to coerce or intimidate them. See Wohl III, 13 661 F. Supp. 3d at 113. Though the evidence may play out differently at a later stage in litigation, 14 at this point I cannot say that this argument or evidence shows serious questions or that the 15 plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim. 16 Second, with respect to the warnings received by Reed Kraus and the thirteen-minute 17 suspension of her account, the parties again put forward contested evidence about why the 18 warnings were issued and the account was briefly suspended. The defendants submit evidence 19 from their records showing that Reed Kraus made threats of violence on Meta platforms, entirely 20 unrelated to Kennedy, and that caused her suspension. Mehta Decl. Ex. B ¶¶ 5–10. Their 21 evidence also shows that Reed Kraus’ posts related to Kennedy (and “RFK”) were not affected by 22 any of the defendants’ actions. Id. The plaintiffs tellingly do not contest that Reed Kraus made 23 the threats of violence, instead asserting that the defendants selectively chose to say that 24 “Kennedy” and “RFK” posts were not removed or flagged. See Repl. 10 n.7. But Reed Kraus’ 25 whole theory is that she was targeted for urging people to vote for Kennedy (whose initials, it 26 hardly need be stated, are “RFK”). If her posts relating to Kennedy and RFK were not affected by 27 enforcement, and her suspension arose from her (uncontested) threats of violence—which is what 1 convince a jury that “a reasonable recipient” of Meta’s warnings and suspension would view those 2 communications as any sort of threat to deter her from urging others to vote. See Wohl III, 661 F. 3 Supp. 3d at 113. At this point, with this evidence, the plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed with that 4 argument. 5 Third, the plaintiffs submit evidence that other peoples’ accounts were censored, removed, 6 or threatened with removal when they posted any sort of support for Kennedy and his candidacy. 7 See, e.g., Repl. 1:13–24; [Dkt No. 29-1] Exs. A, B. The defendants fail to respond to these 8 allegations in their opposition, but the reason for this failure seems obvious. Section 11(b) 9 provides a private right of action for Person A where Person B has intimidated, threatened, or 10 coerced Person A “for urging or aiding any person to vote.” 52 U.S.C.A. § 10307(b). It does not 11 on its face, or in any case law I found or the parties cite, provide a private right of action for 12 Person C to sue Person B for intimidating, threatening, or coercing Person A “for urging or aiding 13 any person to vote.” Id. Using that example, the three plaintiffs would be “Person C.” Their 14 evidence very well might suggest that Meta is censoring other users’ pro-Kennedy content.12 But 15 those users are not plaintiffs in this case and are not before me now. 16 Importantly, the plaintiffs had plenty of time and opportunity to add any of those affected 17 users as new plaintiffs in this case, as they added Reed Kraus between filing the initial complaint 18 and filing the AC and current motion. But they did not do so. Nor do they allege or argue that 19 AV24 has some sort of organizational or third-party standing to assert the claims of those affected 20 users.13 And while they seem to say that Kennedy himself is affected because that evidence shows 21

22 12 But see [Dkt. No. 40].

23 13 At least one court reasoned that “the harm protected by Section 11(b) does not readily apply to an organization.” Fair Fight, 2024 WL 24524, at *40. For AV24 to show that it has 24 organizational standing under this statute, it probably must show that the defendants’ actions “have caused it to divert resources” to counteract the defendants’ allegedly unlawful actions. Id. 25 The defendants made several arguments about standing in their papers, which they may reraise in subsequent motions, though for this motion it is enough that Reed Kraus has standing to assert her 26 claims. See Save Bull Trout v. Williams, 51 F.4th 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[I]n an injunctive case,” the court “need not address standing of each plaintiff if it concludes that one plaintiff has 27 standing.” (citation omitted)); see also LULAC, 2018 WL 3848404, at *2 (discussing the “One 1 Meta users are being coerced or threatened for urging people to vote for him, the effect on the 2 candidate is not what § 11(b) protects. Accordingly, this evidence does not support the plaintiffs’ 3 assertions. The plaintiffs, therefore, fail to counter the compelling evidence and reasons that the 4 defendants identify in explanation for the alleged censorship. 5 More critically, the plaintiffs do not deny the defendants’ portrayal of and reasons for the 6 defendants’ actions. The plaintiffs fail to incorporate those reasons into their assessment of how a 7 “reasonable” recipient of Meta’s communications would interpret the communications in 8 “context.” See Wohl III, 661 F. Supp. 3d at 113. Based on the evidence provided so far, a 9 reasonable recipient of Meta’s communications would be unlikely to view them as even related to 10 voting, let alone as coercing, threatening, or intimidating the recipient with respect to urging 11 others to vote. 12 The plaintiffs fail to draw any parallels with what courts have previously found constituted 13 threats of legal consequences or economic repercussions. The closest allegation is that Reed 14 Kraus lost followers and money when she posted Kennedy-related content.14 Setting aside the 15 above issues with Reed Kraus’ assertions, these alleged impacts share no similarities with those in 16 any other court. They do not have parallel legal consequences (like threats of arrest, deportation, 17 and being sued) or economic consequences (like sending personal information to debt collectors, 18 being evicted, or inducing merchants to refuse to provide necessities). And even if Reed Kraus 19 could show that she lost money or sponsorships after the warnings or suspension, under § 11(b) 20 she would have to show that the losses were due to the warnings or suspension, and not simply 21 due to followers or sponsors opting to leave her page when she posted political content. Cf. Hill v. 22 Williams, No. 16-CV-02627-CMA, 2016 WL 8667798, at *5 (D. Colo. Nov. 4, 2016) (finding 23 plaintiffs had standing to challenge constitutionality of law prohibiting “ballot selfies” in part 24 because some plaintiffs alleged the possibility of social media account termination). Indeed, the 25 plaintiffs do not allege that Meta forced third parties to unfollow Reed Kraus, so her allegation 26 that Meta’s actions somehow led to her loss of 40,000 followers after posting pro-Kennedy 27 1 content are implausible at best. The far more—perhaps only—reasonable interpretation is that 2 those accounts did not want to see that political content. 3 Accordingly, the plaintiffs fail to show that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their 4 § 11(b) claim because they fail to show that a reasonable recipient of Meta’s communications 5 would view them as coercive, threatening, or intimidating in response to urging others to vote. 6 Because they cannot show this, I need not and do not address the parties’ conflicting arguments 7 about whether the plaintiffs must show the defendants had the specific intent to interfere with their 8 voting rights. 9 2. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1870, Support or Advocacy Clause, 42 10 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 11 The plaintiffs assert that the defendants are also violating their rights under the Support or 12 Advocacy Clause of the KKK Act.15 That clause provides in relevant part: 13 [I]f two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy 14 in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President . . . ; or to injure any citizen in person or 15 property on account of such support or advocacy . . . whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or 16 privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may 17 have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators. 18 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (emphasis added). 19 a. Relevant Law 20 The parties discuss the Support or Advocacy Clause without alluding to the complicated 21 and somewhat disparate ways in which cases brought under this clause are treated by courts. Over 22 the last 50 years or so, courts have often conflated the Support or Advocacy Clause with the 23 immediately preceding statutory language of § 1985(3), the Equal Protection Clause.16 These 24

25 15 The AC contains a cause of action for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986, and the plaintiffs mention 26 it in passing, Mot. 16:4–7, but their motion is not based on that claim.

27 16 The Equal Protection Clause provides: 1 clauses are distinct, protect different rights, and have separate requirements to establish violations. 2 See, e.g., Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 720–26 (1983) (articulating some differences between 3 the different clauses). Some of the opinions that confuse or conflate the clauses were cited by the 4 parties here in their papers. To clarify the law regarding the Support or Advocacy Clause, and to 5 properly determine whether the plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on or serious 6 questions going to the merits, I start with an overview of the law. 7 Three central questions arise from the opinions and orders addressing the Support or 8 Advocacy Clause: first, whether “racial animus” is required for a claim under this clause, as it is 9 for the preceding Equal Protection Clause; second, whether the clause protects against private 10 action or only state action; and third, whether the clause itself confers a substantive right or if it is 11 instead a remedial clause that provides a remedy for a separate statutory or constitutional 12 violation. 13 First, racial animus is not a required element of a cause of action under the Support or 14 Advocacy Clause. In Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1971), the Supreme Court 15 held that a cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause in § 1985(3) required showing “some 16 racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the 17 conspirators’ action.” The Court based this decision on the statutory language of the Equal 18 Protection Clause that “require[es] intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and 19 immunities.” Id. at 102. Subsequently, in Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 720–26 (1983), the 20 Supreme Court explained that the Griffin holding was limited to the Equal Protection Clause. The 21

22 or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing 23 or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the 24 laws; . . . in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons 25 engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of 26 having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages 27 occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the 1 Court articulated the differences between the various provisions and clauses of § 1985, noting the 2 Griffin opinion relied on the “equal protection” statutory language in the Equal Protection Clause. 3 Id. The Court explicitly held that a showing of racial animus was not required for a claim under 4 § 1985(2) and strongly implied that it would not be required for a claim under the Support or 5 Advocacy Clause or any other clause in § 1985 that did not have the “equal protection” language. 6 See id.; see also United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 834–39 7 (1983); Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 267–68 (1993) (confirming 8 proof of racial or class-based animus is required for proving “a private conspiracy in violation of 9 the first clause of § 1985(3)” (emphasis added)); Wohl III, 661 F. Supp. 3d at 124 (noting the 10 defendants were “arguing about the wrong clause of the KKK Act in all their submissions” and the 11 Court in Bray “was specifically referring to and analyzing . . . ‘the Equal Protection Clause’”). 12 Because the Support or Advocacy Clause, like § 1985(2), does not have the “equal 13 protection of the law” language, it makes sense that racial animus is not a required element for a 14 cause of action brought under this clause. Cf. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102; see also LULAC, 2018 WL 15 3848404, at *5 (reaching same conclusion). Many courts are in accord with this finding. See, 16 e.g., id. at *5–6 (finding the plaintiffs stated a claim under the Support or Advocacy Clause, 17 “which unlike the equal protection part of Section 1985(3) does not require allegations of” racial 18 animus); Wohl III, 661 F. Supp. 3d at 124–25 (“[T]he second clause of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985 19 (3)—the Support or Advocacy Clause—. . . does not require a showing of racial animus.” 20 (footnote omitted)); Federer v. Gephardt, 363 F.3d 754, 760 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[Plaintiff] is not 21 required to show class-based animus as part of [a] support and advocacy claim.”); Andrews v. 22 D’Souza, 696 F. Supp. 3d 1332, 1345–46 (N.D. Ga. 2023). 23 Second, state action is not a required element for a claim under the Support or Advocacy 24 Clause. In Griffin, 403 U.S. at 96–101, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause 25 of § 1985(3) was not limited to state action but also encompassed private conduct. See also Bray, 26 506 U.S. at 267–68 (providing that “the first clause of § 1985(3)” extends “against private, as well 27 as official” conduct). Subsequently, in United Brotherhood, the Court clarified that the Equal 1 definition a right only against state inference.” 463 U.S. at 833. In that case, the alleged 2 conspiracy was aimed at a violation of the First Amendment, which—as addressed at length 3 above—protects against state abridgment of free speech, not private conduct. It makes sense that, 4 where a plaintiff alleges a conspiracy to deprive her of a right guaranteed by the state, she must 5 allege that the state—the only actor against whom the right applies—was involved in the 6 conspiracy. See also The Support or Advocacy Clause of § 1985(3), 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1382, 1398 7 (2020) (similar analysis). 8 Recently, the Ninth Circuit cited United Brotherhood for the proposition that “§ 1985(3) 9 requires at least one of the wrongdoers in the alleged conspiracy to be a state actor,” but in that 10 case, as in United Brotherhood, the underlying claim was for violation of the Equal Protection 11 Clause of § 1985(3) based on depriving the plaintiff of their First Amendment rights. Pasadena 12 Republican Club v. W. Just. Ctr., 985 F.3d 1161, 1171 (9th Cir. 2021). In other words, though the 13 Ninth Circuit’s statement appears on its face to apply to all parts of § 1985(3), it is limited to the 14 same boundaries as United Brotherhood; violations of the Equal Protection Clause require at least 15 one conspirator to be a state actor where a First Amendment violation is the underlying right. 16 The Ninth Circuit has not held that the Support or Advocacy Clause of § 1985(3) requires 17 state action, and many district courts have found it does not, allowing cases to proceed against 18 private actors. See, e.g., LULAC, 2018 WL 3848404, at *4–6 (declining to find a state action 19 requirement); Wohl III, 661 F. Supp. 3d at 124–26 (no allegations of state action and no discussion 20 of this being a requirement); Andrews, 696 F. Supp. 3d at 1345–50 (same). I agree with their 21 reasoning for many reasons, including that this clause was part of the KKK Act, which itself was 22 enacted in response at least in part to the threats of the private organization, the KKK, against 23 lawful voters. See, e.g., Support or Advocacy Clause, 133 Harv. L. Rev. at 1389–92 (exploring 24 the history of the act and collecting citations). The court in Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for 25 President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652, 660–65 (E.D. Va. 2019), held otherwise, reasoning that a 26 plaintiff’s claim under the Support or Advocacy Clause failed in the absence of state action. But 27 the court relied entirely on United Brotherhood and Great American Federal Savings & Loan 1 Advocacy Clause, and both of which specifically discussed Griffin, which the Court held in Kush 2 was limited to the Equal Protection Clause. Cockrum, therefore, is unpersuasive. 3 Third, and closely related to the second issue, the Support or Advocacy Clause confers a 4 substantive right. In United Brotherhood, where the Supreme Court addressed only the Equal 5 Protection Clause, it held that “§ 1985(3) . . . ‘provides no substantive rights itself’ to the class 6 conspired against. The rights, privileges, and immunities that § 1985(3) vindicates must be found 7 elsewhere, and here the right claimed to have been infringed has its source in the First 8 Amendment.” United Bhd., 463 U.S. at 833 (quoting Great American, 442 U.S. at 372). The 9 Court did not purport to apply its reasoning to any other clauses in § 1985. Indeed, the opinion 10 consistently reflects and responds to the Court’s prior analysis in Griffin, which explicitly applied 11 only to the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., id. at 834 (discussing “the section” of § 1985 12 addressed in Griffin); Griffin, 403 U.S. at 99, 102 nn.9–10 (repeatedly referring to “the portion of 13 § 1985(3) [now] before us”); id. at 102–03 (discussing the elements of the Equal Protection 14 Clause). 15 Other courts are in accord. See, e.g., LULAC, 2018 WL 3848404, at *5–6 (finding the 16 plaintiffs stated a claim under the Support or Advocacy Clause, “which unlike the equal protection 17 part of Section 1985(3) does not require allegations of . . . violation of a separate substantive 18 right”); Allen, 2021 WL 2223772, at *8 (finding the Support or Advocacy Clause creates a private 19 cause of action (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)); Wohl I, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 486–87); Ariz. 20 Democratic Party v. Ariz. Republican Party, No. CV-16-03752-PHX-JJT, 2016 WL 8669978, at 21 *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2016) (noting the Support or Advocacy Clause provides the injured party “a 22 right of action for recovery of damages”). 23 Again the court in Cockrum, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 661, held otherwise, reasoning that 24 Supreme Court precedent has said that the Support or Advocacy Clause of § 1985(3) “provides no 25 substantive rights itself” and “must be tied to the violation of a substantive constitutional right.” 26 Id. (first citing United Brotherhood, 463 U.S. at 833, 837; and then citing Great American, 442 27 U.S. at 372). But once again, the two cases upon which the Cockrum court relied concerned the 1 Advocacy Clause. 2 Accordingly, the plaintiffs can establish a violation of their rights under § 1985(3)’s 3 Support or Advocacy Clause without allegations of racial animus, against solely private conduct, 4 and as a standalone violation of their rights. I next address whether they have established a claim. 5 b. The Claim in This Case 6 There are two subsections to the Support or Advocacy Clause. The first looks to whether 7 “two or more persons conspire[d] to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is 8 lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor 9 of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President . . .” 42 U.S.C. 10 § 1985(3). The second looks to whether “two or more persons conspire[d] . . . to injure any citizen 11 in person or property on account of such support or advocacy.” Id. 12 “[T]he elements of a Section 1985(3) claim brought for violations of the Support or 13 Advocacy Clause” under the first subsection are: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) the purpose of which is to 14 force, intimidate, or threaten; (3) an individual legally entitled to vote who is engaging in lawful 15 activity related to voting in federal elections.” Wohl I, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 486–87. The elements 16 of a claim under the second subjection are (1) a conspiracy, and (2) “injuring someone for” 17 advocating for a federal candidate for office. See Andrews, 696 F. Supp. 3d at 1347 (citing 42 18 U.S.C. § 1985(3)). 19 The plaintiffs fail to show a violation of the first subsection. See Mot. 19:12–20:7; Repl. 20 8:15–10:12. The definition of “force, intimidation, or threat” is the same in § 11(b) of the VRA as 21 it is in the Support or Advocacy Clause. See Wohl I, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 487; see also Gaetz v. City 22 of Riverside, No. 5:23-CV-01368-HDV-SHKX, 2024 WL 1269311, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 23 2024) (“‘Viewed in the light of its origin as a reaction against the “murders, whippings, and 24 beatings committed by rogues in white sheets in the postbellum South,” [Section 1985(3) of] the 25 Ku Klux Klan Act obviously meant to its framers, when it spoke of “force, intimidation, or threat” 26 something much more serious and terrifying’ than tweets and public statements.” (quoting Gill v. 27 Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. of Mo., 906 F.2d 1265, 1269 (8th Cir. 1990))). As discussed at length 1 Without pointing to that evidence, they do not show likelihood of success on or serious questions 2 going to the merits of the issue. 3 The claim for violation of second subsection also fails, though for different reasons. Under 4 the plain text of the statute, the plaintiffs need not prove that they were forced, intimidated, or 5 threatened by the defendants, but rather that the defendants conspired to injure the plaintiffs or 6 their property, again on account of their advocacy. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); see also Repl. 11:2– 7 6. The plaintiffs’ motion asserts that they were injured economically when the defendants 8 suspended their accounts because that constituted harm to their property. Mot. 18:22–19:7. But 9 the only plaintiff with a suspended account is Reed Kraus, and the plaintiffs do not contest that her 10 13-minute suspension was due to her threats of violence rather than her “support or advocacy” for 11 Kennedy. The plaintiffs also do not show economic harm to Reed Kraus or her property based on 12 this suspension. That lack of harm also plagues AV24’s alleged injury—economic and 13 reputational injury from removing links to Who Is Bobby Kennedy—because the record shows that 14 the video was later posted across the defendants’ platforms and separately was seen by millions of 15 people on other platforms. Though it seems possible for the plaintiffs to clarify these injuries to 16 survive a motion to dismiss, the current papers and record have not come close to the required 17 showing of likelihood of success for this motion. 18 The plaintiffs’ final argument under the second subsection of the Support or Advocacy 19 Clause is that Kennedy himself suffered reputational harm and economic injury as a result of the 20 defendants’ censorship, Mot. 20:19–21:3, but this is not quite what the statute protects. To 21 establish a claim, Kennedy must show that the defendants conspired to injure him, and that injury 22 was on account of his advocacy. See Andrews, 696 F. Supp. 3d at 1347 (citing 42 U.S.C. 23 § 1985(3)). The evidence, motions, and AC point only to alleged injury to Kennedy on account of 24 others’ advocacy for him, or injury to others on account of their advocacy. But the statute does 25 not protect a presidential candidate’s right to be supported; it protects the rights of the electorate to 26 support a presidential candidate. Because Kennedy’s asserted injury does not appear to fall within 27 the scope of the statute, the claim is likely to fail on the merits. 1 unlikely to succeed because they do not show they were injured on account of their advocacy. 2 See, e.g., Andrews, 696 F. Supp. 3d at 1347 (noting § 1985(3) prevents conspiracies to prevent 3 someone from “injuring someone for such advocacy”). Once again, the plaintiffs do not contest 4 the evidence that shows Reed Kraus’ suspension was due to threats of violence. The allegations 5 about censoring third parties can only support § 1985(3) claims for those third parties. And 6 though it seems theoretically possible for the plaintiffs to meet this required element of their 7 § 1985(3) claims, at this point they have not shown that they are likely to succeed on—or even 8 that there are serious questions going to the merits of—this question. 9 Because the plaintiffs fail to show a likelihood of success for the above reasons, I need not 10 address their arguments about the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine at this time. 11 3. The Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 12 Finally, the defendants assert that they are immunized against these statutory claims for 13 their editorial decisions to not post the plaintiffs’ content under the Communications Decency Act 14 (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230. See Oppo. 23:21–25:26. 15 Section 230 of the CDA “protects apps and websites which receive content posted by 16 third-party users (i.e., Facebook, Instagram, . . . etc.) from liability for any of the content posted on 17 their services, even if they take it upon themselves to establish a moderation or filtering system, 18 however imperfect it proves to be.” Est. of Bride by & through Bride v. Yolo Techs., Inc., ---F. 19 4th---, No. 23-55134, 2024 WL 3894341, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2024). The immunity applies to 20 the decision of “whether to publish . . . third-party content” and whether “to withdraw from 21 publication” such content. Sikhs for Just. “SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 22 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 697 F. App’x 526 (9th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added) (quoting Barnes 23 v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended). “This immunity persists unless 24 the service is itself responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of the 25 offending content.” Bride, 2024 WL 3894341, at *4 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fair 26 Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 27 2008)). 1 asserted by the defendants. Decisions by the defendants to not publish the plaintiffs’ desired 2 content is probably covered by the CDA. See, e.g., Sikhs for Just., 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1094. The 3 plaintiffs seem to assert that the CDA does not apply because they seek to hold the defendants 4 liable for their own speech—their own threats to ban, block, or censor users—not for the speech of 5 others. See Repl. 13:15–14:10. If the plaintiffs could show that the defendants made affirmative 6 “threats” to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs may be correct that the statements are not covered by the 7 CDA. See Bride, 2024 WL 3894341, at *4. But they have not shown threats, as discussed above. 8 And, this theory of injury seems to contradict other arguments made by the plaintiffs, including 9 that they were injured by the defendants’ refusal to post pro-Kennedy content created by the 10 plaintiffs and third parties. 11 Because this argument is not well fleshed out by the parties, and because it is not 12 dispositive of my findings on this preliminary injunction motion, I decline to address the CDA 13 immunity arguments further in this Order. Should the parties reassert these arguments in future 14 motions, they should clarify the basis for the immunity and the injuries. 15 * * * 16 For those reasons, the plaintiffs fail to establish likelihood of success or serious questions 17 going to the merits of any of their claims.17 18 II. REMAINING WINTERS FACTORS 19 The only argument that the plaintiffs make about the remaining Winters factors is that they 20 established all three as a matter of law because they are likely to succeed on the merits of the First 21 Amendment claim. See Mot. 22:24–23:12; Repl. 4:5–12. They make essentially the same 22 argument about their statutory claims, though only in reply. Repl. 4:12–5:9. But they have not 23 shown a likelihood of success or serious questions going to the merits, so their argument fails. I 24 decline to grant the motion on this basis alone. See Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 966 (9th 25 Cir. 2011) (noting “a certain threshold showing [must be] made on each factor” to be granted a 26

27 17 The plaintiffs’ motion to file supplemental evidence in support of their opposition, [Dkt. No. 1 preliminary injunction (citing Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1131–32)). 2 Additionally, the plaintiffs’ requested injunction seems to be a mandatory injunction, and 3 they do not meet the “high” standard for issuing one. See Doe v. Snyder, 28 F.4th 103, 111 (9th 4 Cir. 2022). “[A] mandatory injunction [is] one that goes beyond simply maintaining the status quo 5 and orders the responsible party to take action pending the determination of the case on its merits.” 6 Id. The plaintiffs request a court “order enjoining Defendants to cease and desist their censorship 7 of speech supporting, advocating for, or urging people to vote for[] Mr. Kennedy.” Repl. 15:7–9. 8 They frame this as a prohibitory injunction to stop censorship, but it seems to be a mandatory 9 injunction to order the defendants to publish the plaintiffs’ posts, videos, speech, and other content 10 about Kennedy. 11 Generally, “mandatory injunctions ‘are not granted unless extreme or very serious damage 12 will result and are not issued in doubtful cases or where the injury complained of is capable of 13 compensation in damages.’” Doe, 28 F.4th at 111 (quoting Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos 14 Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2009)). The Ninth Circuit has also implied that 15 the “serious questions” sliding scale inquiry for preliminary injunctions does not apply to 16 mandatory injunctions. See id. at 111 n.4. As discussed at length above, the plaintiffs’ case is 17 certainly “doubtful” here. They have not met the likelihood of success or even the serious 18 questions standard. That they request a mandatory injunction to alter the status quo pending 19 litigation of the suit on the merits is all the more reason to deny their request now. I can and will 20 deny it on this basis alone. 21 For the sake of argument and to guide the parties moving forward in this case, below I 22 address why the plaintiffs fail to meet the remaining three Winter factors. 23 A. Irreparable Harm 24 It is not clear from the papers what alleged harm the plaintiffs believe is “irreparable,” in 25 part to their failure to discuss this factor. The Who Is Bobby Kennedy video is available on the 26 defendants’ platforms, and the plaintiffs say that the video has been seen millions of times on 27 other social media platforms. AC ¶ 52. While that does not inherently mean that there is no 1 contrary finding. 2 Reed Kraus’ account is also now active after the 13-minute suspension. To the extent that 3 she asserts permanent damage and irreparable harm going forward based on losing followers after 4 posting pro-Kennedy content, her theory of injury is unreasonable. She says that Meta removed 5 her content and blocked access to her posts; she does not say that Meta removed third party 6 followers from her accounts. As noted, the far more reasonable explanation for losing thousands 7 of followers after posting political content to social media—and only plausible explanation based 8 on the evidence—is that those followers did not want to see that political content. This does not 9 show irreparable harm for the purposes of this motion.18 10 B. Balance of Equities 11 The balance of equities tips towards the defendants, not the plaintiffs. The defendants’ 12 main argument in their opposition is that the plaintiffs’ requested injunction is barred by the First 13 Amendment. See Oppo. 8:20–10:23. Because violating the defendants’ constitutional rights 14 would be an obvious hardship, I consider this argument under the “balance of equities” analysis of 15 the Winter test.19 16 Court-ordered injunctions, like all government action, are subject to First Amendment 17 limits. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Morales, 556 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Madsen v. 18 Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 n.2, 764–65 (1994)). A “content-neutral 19 injunction” does not violate the First Amendment so long as the injunction “burden[s] no more 20 speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.” Id. (quoting Madsen, 512 U.S. 21 at 765). It is hard to see how the plaintiffs’ requested mandatory injunction would be content- 22 18 Kennedy also ended his presidential campaign and removed his name from the ballots in swing 23 states, after this motion was fully briefed and before the hearing. Elizabeth Findell, Natalie 24 Andrews, Robert F. Kennedy Jr. Drops Out of Presidential Race, Endorses Donald Trump, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 23, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/politics/elections/robert-f-kennedy-jr- drops-out-of-presidential-race-endorses-trump-f043e9b9, last accessed 8/23/24, 3:15 p.m. 25 Though it does not moot the case, it makes showing irreparable harm harder.

26 19 In Children’s Defense, 2024 WL 3734422, at *9, the Ninth Circuit briefly discussed Meta’s First Amendment rights in the analysis of the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, under the second 27 prong of the state action test. Here, the plaintiffs failed to make any argument about the second 1 neutral; they specifically ask me to order the defendants to publish pro-Kennedy campaign 2 content. But the defendants did not brief the issue and so I will apply the less strict standard for 3 content-neutral injunctions to show that even under this lower bar, the plaintiffs fail to meet the 4 standard. 5 The Supreme Court recently held that social media platforms’ decisions and actions to 6 enforce their content moderation policies are protected by the First Amendment. See Moody v. 7 NetChoice, LLC, 144 S. Ct. 2383 (2024). The Court analogized these decisions to editorial and 8 compilation decisions made by newspapers to decide what information to publish and made by 9 parades to decide what floats to allow. See id. at 2399–2403. The Court reasoned that content 10 moderation decisions, including deciding what posts to display and how to order or organize the 11 posts, constituted “expressive activity” akin to the compilation and curation of speech made by 12 these other institutions, and so was protected under the First Amendment—including decisions to 13 exclude speech. Id. at 2401, 2407. Government regulations requiring the publication of other 14 speech in order to “balance” perspectives shared on the platforms, such as the statutes at issue in 15 Moody requiring the social media platforms to allow content that it wanted to exclude, violated the 16 First Amendment rights of the social media companies. See id. at 2407–08.20 17 Meta’s content moderation decisions to “deprioritize[]” political content are protected by 18 the First Amendment. See id. at 2401. That is true even if it allows supportive speech for all other 19 candidates but Kennedy—“that kind of focused editorial choice packs a peculiarly powerful 20 expressive punch.” Id. at 2402. If I issue an order compelling the defendants here to publish pro- 21 Kennedy content that they have allegedly declined to publish on their platforms, that order will 22 infringe on the defendants’ First Amendment rights. See id.; see also Maldonado, 556 F.3d at 23 1047. Such an order is constitutionally permissible only if it “burden[s] no more speech than 24 necessary to serve a significant government interest.” Maldonado, 556. F.3d at 1047 (citation 25 20 The Supreme Court explained that the social media companies brought a facial challenge to the 26 statutes at issue, but the lower courts had analyzed it as an as-applied challenge, so the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the decisions for the lower courts to apply the correct analysis. 27 Moody, 144 S. Ct. at 2397–99, 2409. The Court therefore did not hold these statutes were facially 1 omitted). It is not clear what government interest is served by infringing on Meta’s constitutional 2 || rights—the plaintiffs did not brief this, and I can only speculate. A speculative interest, however, 3 is not enough to justify infringement on Meta’s First Amendment rights. And while the plaintiffs 4 || argue that threats and intimidation in violation of the VRA § 11(b) are not protected by the First 5 || Amendment, as discussed at length above, they fail to establish any of the defendants’ 6 |} communication were threats or intimidation. Supra Part 1.B.1. Accordingly, the balance of 7 equities regarding the requested injunction therefore tips sharply in Meta’s favor. 8 C. Public Interest 9 The plaintiffs seem to assert that the public has an interest in hearing from all presidential 10 || candidates. But the plaintiffs’ pro-Kennedy content is available on the defendants’ platforms, the 11 content has been widely viewed on other social media platforms, Kennedy is no longer an active 12 || candidate, and the public has an interest in ensuring the defendants’ constitutional rights are not 13 || violated. It is not clear that this factor favors the plaintiffs. 14 □ □ □ 15 Accordingly, the plaintiffs fail to establish any of the Winter factors favor the entry of a 16 || preliminary injunction.

CONCLUSION

18 For those reasons, the motion is DENIED. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 Dated: September 3, 2024 21 . 22 liam H. Orrick 23 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28