I. BACKGROUND

22 Plaintiff filed this action on August 12, 2020, seeking review of the denial of his 23 application for Disability Insurance Benefits. See Compl., ECF 1. The Court granted in part and 24 denied in part Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, denied Defendant’s cross-motion for 25 summary judgment, reversed the denial of benefits, and remanded for further administrative 26 27 1 proceedings. See Order, ECF 24. Plaintiff obtained a favorable result on remand, obtaining an 2 award of past-due benefits in the amount of $138,772. See Notice of Award, ECF 28-3. 3 Counsel represented Plaintiff pursuant to a written contingent-fee agreement, under which 4 Counsel is entitled to attorneys’ fees in an amount not greater than 25% of any past-due benefits 5 awarded to Plaintiff. See Attorney’s Fee Contract, ECF 28-4. As is standard, the Social Security 6 Administration withheld 25% of the $138,772 past-due benefits award, or $34,693, to pay any 7 attorneys’ fees that might be owed. See Notice of Award at 3. Counsel does not seek the full 8 amount of attorneys’ fees withheld by the Social Security Administration; he seeks $23,000, 9 which is approximately 16.5% of the $138,772 benefits award. 10 II. LEGAL STANDARD 11 Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), a court entering judgment in favor of a Social Security claimant 12 who was represented by an attorney “may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable 13 fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to 14 which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). “[T]he fee 15 is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing party is not responsible for 16 payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009). 17 Attorneys specializing in social security work “routinely enter into contingent-fee 18 agreements specifying that the fee will be 25% of any past-due benefits recovered, thus providing 19 the attorney the statutory maximum of fees if the representation is successful.” Crawford, 586 20 F.3d at 1147. The district court must conduct a “review of such arrangements as an independent 21 check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 22 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). “The court may properly reduce the fee for substandard performance, delay, 23 or benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. 24 The district court does not apply the lodestar method, but may consider a lodestar calculation as an 25 aid in assessing the reasonableness of the requested attorneys’ fees. See id. 26 Where attorneys’ fees have been paid by the Government under the Equal Access to 27 Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the EAJA fees must be offset against any fees awarded 1 United States in court, including a successful Social Security benefits claimant, may be awarded 2 || fees payable by the United States if the Government’s position in the litigation was not 3 ‘substantially justified.’” Jd. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412). Fee awards may be made under both 4 EAJA and § 406(b), but the claimant’s attorney must refund to the claimant the amount of the 5 smaller fee award. See id. 6 || IN. DISCUSSION 7 This Court has no difficulty concluding that Counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees in the 8 amount of $23,000 is reasonable. The requested fees, which are approximately 16.5% of the past- 9 due benefits recovered by Plaintiff, are significantly lower than the 25% of the past-due benefits 10 || bargained for in the contingent-fee agreement. Counsel obtained a favorable benefits award, 11 resulting in Plaintiff's recovery of past-due benefits in the amount of $138,772. Nothing in the 12 || record suggests that Counsel’s performance was substandard. Counsel represents that he spent 13 20.85 hours on the case. An award of $23,000 would result in an effective hourly rate of $1,103. 14 || Other district courts in the Ninth Circuit have approved attorneys’ fees awards resulting in similar 3 15 or higher effective hourly rates. See Brazile v. Comm of Soc. Sec., No. C18-5914JLR, 2022 WL a 16 || 503779, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 18, 2022) (“[F]lee awards with hourly rates exceeding $1,000 3 17 || have been approved by courts in this district on numerous occasions.”); Harrell v. Berryhill, No. 18 16-CV-02428-TSH, 2018 WL 4616735, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2018) (‘[T]he Court finds the 19 de facto hourly rate of $1,213.83 is reasonable under Gisbrecht.’’). 20 Counsel previously was awarded EAJA fees in the amount of $4,241.23. See Stip. and 21 Order, ECF 27. Counsel acknowledges that the EAJA fees must be offset against the award of fees 22 under § 406(b), and represents that he will refund that amount to Plaintiff. 23 || IV. ORDER 24 (1) Counsel’s motion for $23,000 in attorneys’ fees under § 406(b) is GRANTED; and 25 (2) Counsel SHALL refund to Plaintiff $4,241.23 in EAJA fees previously awarded.

Dated: September 6, 2024 27 BETH LABSON FREEMAN 38 United States District Judge