I. BACKGROUND

20 Although Mr. Chan named West Publishing Company as a defendant, see Compl. at 1, his 21 Complaint centers on an alleged failure to respect his Miranda rights, see id. at 3. As relief, Mr. 22 Chan asks the Court to rule that his Miranda rights were violated. See id. Although Mr. Chan does 23 not clearly state the relief sought, see generally Compl. & Dkt. No. 8, his request for this Court to 24 rule on his Miranda claim suggests that he intends to seek release. 25 Mr. Chan subsequently filed with the Court a copy of a state-court habeas petition, listing 26 four state criminal proceedings he intended to challenge. See Dkt. No. 8, at 2. The state-court 27 1 See id. at 3. Mr. Chan states in the state-court habeas petition that he represented himself in the 2 challenged proceeding. See Dkt. No. 8 at 6. In his sole ongoing state criminal proceeding, 3 however, he is represented by counsel. Because the state-court habeas petition and the instant 4 federal Complaint both challenge an alleged Miranda violation, and the state-court habeas petition 5 challenges a closed proceeding, it appears that in the instant federal civil rights action Mr. Chan 6 intends to challenge one of his concluded criminal proceedings. 7 The Court reviewed Mr. Chan’s litigation history in San Mateo County Court.1 It appears 8 Mr. Chan has been a defendant in seven criminal cases. One is ongoing and the other six were 9 resolved against him. See Case No. 22-SM-008782-A (active criminal action) (San Mateo Cty. 10 Super. Ct. filed July 14, 2022); see also Case Nos. 23-NF-001681-A, 22-NM-008495-A, 21-NF- 11 009535-A, 20-NM-007132-A, 20-NM-002474-A, 19-NM-014783-A (San Mateo Cty. Super. Ct.) 12 (resolved adversely to Mr. Chan via a guilty plea or a plea of nolo contendere). The Court also 13 searched the dockets of the First District Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. Mr. 14 Chan has not appealed any criminal case to either court. See “Chan, Simon,” Appellate Courts 15 Case Information: Search, https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search.cfm?dist=0 (last visited 16 September 19, 2024). 17 II. ANALYSIS 18 A. LEGAL STANDARD 19 Federal courts must screen any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental 20 entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must 21 identify cognizable claims and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 22 upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant immune from such 23 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. 24

25 1 The Court properly may consider the state court records. See U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria 26 Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that federal courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those 27 proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Court orders and other court documents are proper subjects of judicial notice, see id., as are records of 1 Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 2 B. RELEASE 3 If Mr. Chan asks this Court to grant him release following a conviction, then this action is 4 the wrong procedural vehicle. Mr. Chan must seek release via a habeas action. “Federal law opens 5 two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 6 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 7 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004). “Habeas is the ‘exclusive 8 remedy’ ... for the prisoner who seeks ‘immediate or speedier release’ from confinement.” Skinner 9 v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 533–34 (2011). 10 A district court is not permitted to convert a civil rights action to a habeas petition. Rather, 11 the Ninth Circuit has instructed that a civil rights complaint seeking habeas relief should be 12 dismissed without prejudice to bringing it as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Trimble v. 13 City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, the Court must dismiss any request for 14 release.2 15 C. ABSTENTION 16 As noted above, the copy of Mr. Chan’s state-court habeas petition suggests he intends to 17 challenge a concluded criminal proceeding in this federal civil rights action. Such a challenge is 18 barred by Heck v. Humphrey. Even if Mr. Chan intends to challenge an ongoing criminal 19 proceeding, this would be barred by Younger v. Harris. 20 1. Heck v. Humphrey 21 In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, 22 or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence 23 invalid, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed 24 on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 25 26 2 Although the Court must dismiss any request for release, this dismissal is without prejudice to Mr. Chan filing a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus asserting his claims after he exhausts any direct 27 appeal of his conviction. Because there is a one-year statute of limitations for the filing of a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), Mr. Chan is cautioned to act swiftly to 1 make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas 2 corpus. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–487 (announcing this rule). Mr. Chan’s claim is inextricably 3 intertwined with the validity of any conviction. Success on Mr. Chan’s claim would imply that his 4 conviction was invalid; therefore, Heck requires that his action be dismissed. Id. at 487. See also 5 Trimble, 49 F.3d at 585 (holding plaintiff’s damages suit over Miranda violation was Heck-barred 6 where conviction had not been vacated). 7 2. Younger v. Harris 8 If Mr. Chan intends to challenge his ongoing criminal proceeding, Younger requires the 9 Court to abstain from considering Mr. Chan’s claim. 10 Under principles of comity and federalism, a federal court should not interfere with 11 ongoing state criminal proceedings by granting injunctive or declaratory relief absent 12 extraordinary circumstances. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–54. The rationale of Younger applies 13 throughout appellate proceedings, requiring that state appellate review of a state court judgment be 14 exhausted before federal court intervention is permitted. See Dubinka v. Judges of the Superior 15 Court, 23 F.3d 218, 223 (9th Cir. 1994) (even if criminal trials were completed at time of 16 abstention decision, state court proceedings still considered pending). The Ninth Circuit also has 17 required Younger abstention where “the retrial of [the petitioner’s sentence] is proceeding in the 18 state court,” although the guilt phase has concluded. Edelbacher v. Calderon, 160 F.3d 582, 583– 19 84, 585 (9th Cir. 1998). Absent extraordinary circumstances, abstention under the Younger 20 principle is required when: (1) state judicial proceedings are ongoing; (2) the state proceedings 21 implicate important state interests; (3) the federal plaintiff is not barred from litigating federal 22 constitutional issues in the state proceeding; and (4) the federal court action would enjoin the 23 proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so. San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce 24 Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008). 25 Here, if Mr. Chan intends to attack his ongoing state criminal proceedings, all the Younger 26 criteria are satisfied. First, state proceedings appear to be pending. See supra. Second, state 27 criminal proceedings involve important state interests. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 1 administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most 2 powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of 3 relief.”). Third, Mr. Chan is not barred from litigating his federal constitutional issues in state 4 court. Indeed, the state court records indicate that Mr. Jones is represented by defense counsel who 5 can raise this issue. Fourth, the instant federal action threatens to interfere with the state criminal 6 proceedings in a manner that Younger disapproves by inserting federal court oversight into an 7 ongoing state criminal proceeding. Mr. Chan’s Miranda rights are inextricably intertwined with 8 the validity of any future criminal conviction, and the Court cannot consider the propriety of the 9 requested relief without interfering with state proceedings. See, e.g., Floyd v. San Jose Police 10 Dep’t, No. 22-CV-00751-WHO, 2022 WL 2915704, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2022) (holding 11 that Younger abstention was required where a prisoner complained of Miranda violations), aff’d, 12 No. 22-16243, 2023 WL 4743272 (9th Cir. July 25, 2023); Lacy v. Miyamoto, No. 20-CV-03036- 13 HSG, 2021 WL 23300, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2021) (same). 14 Accordingly, if Mr. Chan intended to challenge Miranda violations connected to his 15 ongoing criminal case, abstention is appropriate here. 16 D. FUTILITY OF AMENDMENT 17 The Complaint’s defects cannot be cured on amendment. Amendment would not change 18 the fact that release must be sought in a federal habeas action. Likewise, whether this action is 19 barred by Heck or Younger depends upon external circumstances and cannot be cured by 20 amendment. The Court therefore concludes that amendment would be futile and dismisses this 21 action without leave to amend. Dismissal, however, is without prejudice to Mr. Chan seeking 22 release via a separate habeas action after state proceedings have concluded or seeking damages for 23 his unlawful incarceration if his conviction later is invalidated. 24 III. CONCLUSION 25 This action is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 26 Because amendment would be futile, dismissal is without leave to amend. Dismissal is without 27 prejudice to pursuing claims for injunctive relief after all state proceedings have concluded and ] Although it is incomplete, Mr. Chan’s in forma pauperis application is GRANTED. Dkt. 2 || No. 4. The initial partial filing fee is $0.01. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (requiring a court to assess 3 an initial filing fee of 20 percent of a prisoner’s average monthly deposits or monthly balance, 4 || whichever is greater). A copy of this order and the attached instructions will be sent to Mr. Chan 5 and the institution’s trust account office. 6 The Court certifies that any appeal of this order is not taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. 7 || § 1915(a)(3). 8 The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions and close the file. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 || Dated: September 23, 2024 1] Ze. L L Coy 5 P. Casey Pit 13 United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR PAYMENT OF PRISONER’S FILING FEE

3 The prisoner shown as the plaintiff or petitioner on the attached order has filed a civil 4 action in forma pauperis in this court and owes to the court a filing fee. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the fee is to be paid as follows: 5

6 The initial partial filing fee listed on the attached order should be deducted by the prison trust account office from the prisoner’s trust account and forwarded to the clerk of the court as the 7 first installment payment on the filing fee. This amount is twenty percent of the greater of (a) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding 8 the filing of the complaint/petition or (b) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint/petition. 9

10 Thereafter, on a monthly basis, 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s trust account should be deducted and forwarded to the court each time the amount in the 11 account exceeds ten dollars ($10.00). The prison trust account office should continue to do this until the filing fee has been paid in full. 12 If the prisoner does not have sufficient funds in his/her account to pay the initial partial 13 filing fee, the prison trust account office should forward the available funds, and carry the balance 14 forward each month until the amount is fully paid.

15 If the prisoner has filed more than one complaint, (s)he is required to pay a filing fee for each case. The trust account office should make the monthly calculations and payments for each 16 case in which it receives an order granting in forma pauperis and these instructions.

17 The prisoner’s name and case number must be noted on each remittance. The initial 18 partial filing fee is due within thirty days of the date of the attached order. Checks should be made payable to Clerk, U.S. District Court and sent to Prisoner Accounts Receivable, U.S. District 19 Court, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36060, San Francisco, CA 94102.

20 cc: Plaintiff/Petitioner 21

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