1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 EFREN RAMOS, Case No. 23-cv-04715-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS

9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 16 10 THE GAP, INC., 11 Defendant.

12 13 Pending before the Court is Defendant The Gap Inc.’s motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 16. 14 The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the matter is 15 deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons detailed below, the Court GRANTS the 16 motion. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiff Efren Ramos filed this putative class action against Defendant The Gap, Inc. for 19 allegedly invading customers’ privacy through the use of marketing emails and tracking software. 20 See generally Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”). Defendant is a clothing retailer, which as relevant to this 21 lawsuit, operates an email domain and website.1 Defendant sends its customers periodic 22 marketing emails, which direct them to Defendant’s website. See id. at ¶¶ 5, 16. According to the 23 complaint, Defendant contracts with a third party, Bluecore, Inc., to provide software that runs on 24 the emails to help Defendant optimize its marketing campaigns. See id. at ¶¶ 1–2, 9–14. The 25 complaint alleges that Bluecore’s software embeds unique and trackable URL links into the words 26 and images in Defendant’s marketing emails so that Defendant can assess customers’ email 27 1 behavior. See id. at ¶¶ 2, 10–14. When a customer clicks on one of these links, Bluecore is able 2 to capture customer data, such as the “the email address of the subscriber as well as his or her 3 device type, geolocation, IP address and the part of the email he or she clicked on,” before 4 directing them to the retail website. See id. Once on Defendant’s website, Bluecore further uses 5 JavaScript and cookies to monitor customers’ behavior there too. See id. at ¶¶ 13–14. With all 6 this information Bluecore can create a personal profile for each customer and Defendant can in 7 turn send personalized emails to them, such as an email when a customer places a product in a cart 8 but does not purchase the item. See id. The complaint alleges that Defendant and Bluecore 9 tracked consumers in this way without their consent. See id. at ¶ 39. 10 Based on these allegations Plaintiff brings causes of action against Defendant for 11 (1) violations of the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), Cal Penal Code §§ 631(a) and 12 635; (2) statutory larceny, Cal. Penal Code §§ 486 and 496; and (3) violations of the California 13 Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. Defendant has 14 moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. Dkt. No. 16. 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain 17 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A 18 defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be 19 granted under Rule 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the 20 complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 21 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 22 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 23 on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible 24 when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 25 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 26 Rule 9(b) imposes a heightened pleading standard where fraud is an essential element of a 27 claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity 1 F.3d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003). A plaintiff must identify “the who, what, when, where, and how” 2 of the alleged conduct, so as to provide defendants with sufficient information to defend against 3 the charge. Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997). However, “[m]alice, intent, 4 knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 Rule 9(b). 6 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the 7 complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 8 Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, 9 courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 10 fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 11 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 A. CIPA § 631(a) 14 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s conduct constitutes an illegal wiretap under CIPA 15 § 631(a). See Compl. at ¶¶ 30–40. Section 631(a) contains four distinct clauses, imposing 16 liability on “any person” who: 17 (i) “by means of any machine, instrument, or contrivance, or in any other manner, 18 intentionally taps . . . any telegraph or telephone wire, line, cable, or instrument”; 19 (ii) “willfully reads, or attempts to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any 20 message, report, or communication while the same is in transit”; 21 (iii) “uses, or attempts to use, in any manner, or for any purpose, or to communicate in 22 any way, any information so obtained”; and 23 (iv) “aids, agrees with, employs, or conspires with any person or persons to unlawfully 24 do, or permit, or cause to be done any of the acts or things mentioned above.” 25 26 Cal. Penal Code § 631(a); see also Tavernetti v. Superior Ct., 22 Cal. 3d 187, 192 (Cal. 1978) (en 27 banc) (clarifying that § 631(a) imposes liability for “distinct and mutually independent patterns of 1 communication in transit over a wire, and attempting to use or communicate information obtained 2 as a result of engaging in either of the previous two activities.”). Plaintiff appears to contend that 3 Defendant is liable under all four clauses. See Compl. at ¶¶ 41–46; Dkt. No. 20 at 4–6. 4 In response to Plaintiff’s cause of action under § 631(a) Defendant contends that (1) it is 5 exempt from direct liability under the CIPA as a party to the communications; (2) the first clause 6 of § 631(a) does not apply to internet wiretaps; and (3) Plaintiff has not pled that Bluecore 7 intercepted the protected “contents” of challenged communications. See Dkt. No. 16 at 5–9. 8 i. Direct Liability 9 As an initial matter, Defendant urges that it cannot be held directly liable under § 631(a) 10 because it was a party to the challenged communications at issue here. See Dkt. No. 16 at 6. 11 Plaintiff acknowledges that a party to the communication is not liable under § 631(a). See Dkt. 12 No. 20 at 5; see also In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 607 (9th Cir. 13 2020) (citing Warden v. Kahn, 99 Cal. App. 3d 805, 811 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)). Nevertheless, 14 Plaintiff urges that Defendant was not necessarily a party to all the communications challenged in 15 the complaint. See Dkt. No. 20 at 5–6. 16 Plaintiff suggests that Bluecore’s tracking software allows Defendant to track consumers 17 outside the context of Defendant’s marketing emails and website. See id. at 6. Plaintiff points to a 18 single sentence in the complaint, which asserts: “Bluecore’s tracking software and contractual 19 arrangements also permitted Defendant to track its known, and unknown, userbase after they 20 logged off the Website while those users browsed their emails.” Compl. at ¶ 37. The complaint 21 also obliquely references collecting information about “email open rates.” See id. at ¶¶ 11, 19. 22 Relying on these allegations, Plaintiff appears to suggest that Bluecore’s software allows 23 Defendant to view information about third-party emails in Plaintiff’s inbox, and not just those 24 from Defendant. See Dkt. No. 20 at 5–6. If Plaintiff could sufficiently allege this, it might 25 plausibly give rise to liability under § 631(a). But that is not alleged in the operative complaint. 26 The complaint specifically defines emails as those “electronic communications between 27 Defendant and its clients via emails sent from Defendant’s email domain.” See Compl. at ¶ 1. 1 campaigns by providing them “with a detailed view of how customers are engaging with [their] 2 email templates . . . to improve email performance going forward.” See id. at ¶¶ 9–10. The only 3 plausible reading of the complaint as drafted is that “email open rates” refers to the rate at which 4 consumers open emails from Defendant. In short, there are no allegations to support Plaintiff’s 5 suggestion that Defendant somehow monitors the content of or Plaintiff’s engagement with emails 6 in Plaintiff’s inbox other than those sent by Defendant. 7 Therefore, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss to the extent Plaintiff attempts to 8 hold Defendant directly liable under § 631(a). Because Plaintiff has also alleged that Defendant is 9 liable as an “aider and abettor” under clause four, see Dkt. No. 20 at 4, the Court addresses 10 Defendant’s remaining arguments as to § 631(a). 11 ii. Communications over the Internet: Clause One 12 The first clause of § 631(a) provides that it is punishable by fine or imprisonment for “any 13 person who by means of any machine, instrument, or contrivance, or in any other manner, 14 intentionally taps, or makes any unauthorized connection, whether physically, electrically, 15 acoustically, inductively, or otherwise, with any telegraph or telephone wire, line, cable, or 16 instrument, including the wire, line, cable, or instrument of any internal telephonic communication 17 system.” Cal. Penal Code § 631(a) (emphasis added). Defendant states that by referencing 18 “telegraph or telephone” lines, this first clause does not apply to communications over the internet. 19 See Dkt. No. 16 at 6–7. Plaintiff concedes that he received and accessed Defendant’s emails 20 “from his computer,” Compl. at ¶ 4, and that Bluecore tapped “the lines of internet 21 communication” between Plaintiff and Defendant, id. at ¶ 34. But Plaintiff disagrees that this 22 clause does not apply to the internet. See Dkt. No. 20 at 6–7. 23 Despite Plaintiff’s urging, however, courts have consistently interpreted this first clause as 24 applying only to tapping communications over telephones and not through the internet. See, e.g., 25 Cody v. Ring LLC, No. 23-CV-00562-AMO, 2024 WL 735667, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2024) 26 (collecting cases); Valenzuela v. Keurig Green Mountain, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 3d 751, 755–56 (N.D. 27 Cal. 2023); Licea v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1079 (C.D. Cal. 2023); 1 Dec. 22, 2022). The Court finds the reasoning of these cases persuasive on this point and adopts it 2 here. 3 The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary. Plaintiff points to a single district 4 court case, Kauffman v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., No. 22-CV-1492-L-MSB, 2024 WL 171363, at *8 5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2024), that applied the first clause of § 631(a) to internet communications. See 6 Dkt. No. 20 at 6–7. In Kauffman, the court acknowledged that the plain language of the first 7 clause requires the plaintiff to “allege facts plausibly showing that [the defendant] or its vendor 8 made an unauthorized connection with a ‘telegraph or telephone wire, line, cable, or instrument.’” 9 Id. (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 631(a)). However, the court reasoned that the statute could—and 10 should—be extended to new technologies, including the internet. Id. The Court respectfully 11 disagrees with Kauffman’s brief analysis. 12 The California Supreme Court has recognized that courts are not precluded from applying 13 statutes to technologies that did not yet exist at the time a statute was written. See Apple Inc. v. 14 Superior Ct., 56 Cal. 4th 128, 137 (Cal. 2013) (“Fidelity to legislative intent does not make it 15 impossible to apply a legal text to technologies that did not exist when the text was created . . . .”) 16 (quotation omitted). As the court explained, “[d]rafters of every era know that technological 17 advances will proceed apace and that the rules they create will one day apply to all sorts of 18 circumstances they could not possibly envision.” Id. (quotation omitted). But the court provided 19 an important caveat: such an expansion is only appropriate if doing so does not conflict with the 20 plain language and the statutory scheme. See id. at 137–39. Here, the first clause is not simply 21 silent about what forms of technology and types of communications it applies to. Rather, it is 22 specifically limited to “telegraph or telephone” communications, such that an expansion to other 23 technologies would be inappropriate. See Cal. Penal Code § 631(a). The Court cannot ignore this 24 language and rewrite the statute to apply more broadly. 25 The cases on which Kauffman relied also explicitly address the second clause of § 631(a), 26 which unlike the first imposes liability for intercepting communications passing over “any wire, 27 line, or cable.” Cal. Penal Code § 631(a) (emphasis added); see also Javier v. Assurance IQ, LLC, 1 second clause when stating that “[t]hough written in terms of wiretapping, Section 631(a) applies 2 to Internet communications”); Matera v. Google Inc., No. 15-CV-04062-LHK, 2016 WL 3 8200619, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016) (“[T]he second clause of section 631, as opposed to the 4 first clause, is not limited to communications passing over ‘telegraph or telephone’ wires, lines, or 5 cables.”); In re Google Inc., No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918, at *20–21 (N.D. Cal. 6 Sept. 26, 2013) (same). Because the language of the two clauses differs, the reasoning of these 7 cases does not apply with equal force to expanding the scope of the first clause. The Court finds 8 the first clause does not apply to internet communications, and GRANTS the motion to dismiss on 9 this basis. 10 iii. Protected Content: Clauses Two through Four 11 Clauses two and three of § 631(a) prohibit the unauthorized access to and use of the 12 “contents” of any communications, and clause four prohibits aiding and abetting such conduct. 13 Cal. Penal Code § 631(a). Defendant urges that Plaintiff’s § 631(a) claim also fails because none 14 of the information allegedly intercepted constitutes protected “contents” under the statute. See 15 Dkt. No. 16 at 7–9. The definition of “contents” under CIPA is the same as under the Electronic 16 Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”). See, e.g., In re Google RTB Consumer Priv. Litig., 606 17 F. Supp. 3d 935, 949 (N.D. Cal. 2022). The Ninth Circuit has held that under the ECPA 18 “‘contents’ refers to the intended message conveyed by the communication, and does not include 19 record information regarding the characteristics of the message that is generated in the course of 20 the communication.” In re Zynga Priv. Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014)). In other 21 words, courts must consider whether the intercepted information is “information about a user’s 22 communication, or “the communication itself.” Id. at 1107 (emphasis added). Only the latter is 23 protected under CIPA. 24 Defendant argues that the complaint alleges that Bluecore’s software only captured record 25 information about Defendant’s emails but not the “contents” of Defendant’s emails. See Dkt. No. 26 16 at 7–9. Specifically, the complaint alleges that when Plaintiff opened an email from Defendant, 27 Bluecore intercepted “the time, date, device type, geolocation (and other information attributed to 1 clicks on URL links embedded within the Emails’ Content.” See Compl. at ¶ 4. In opposition, 2 Plaintiff appears to concede that such information would not constitute protected “contents” under 3 the statute. See Dkt. No. 20 at 7 (arguing that Defendant has created a “strawman argument” by 4 “cherry-pick[ing]” allegations about other information that Bluecore collects, such as “the time, 5 place, device, geolocation, email address, and length of time spent”). However, Plaintiff suggests 6 that there are other allegations in the complaint that Defendant ignores. See id. 7 Critically, however, Plaintiff does not identify this protected content with any level of 8 specificity, and instead just gestures generally toward the complaint. For example, Plaintiff urges 9 that “Defendant ignores Plaintiff’s allegations (including images) that show how Bluecore’s 10 wiretaps capture the ‘contents’ of Defendant’s Emails.” See Dkt. No. 20 at 7 (citing Compl. at 11 ¶¶ 10–14, 17–19). Although these paragraphs in the complaint explain how the Bluecore software 12 allegedly works, they do not clearly identify the protected content of the communications at issue 13 in this case. Elsewhere in his opposition, Plaintiff suggests that Bluecore receives “the entire 14 contents of the Emails.” See id. at 3 (citing Compl. at ¶¶ 4, 10, 14, 17–19). But again, Plaintiff 15 does not explain how this occurs. Later in his brief, Plaintiff contends that “Bluecore intercepted 16 the URLS contained in the Emails without Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ consent.” Id. at 5 17 (citing Compl. at ¶¶ 1–2, 4, 10–14, 17–19, 35–36). Although perhaps more specific, Plaintiff still 18 does not explain how the software intercepted any URLs. And in yet another part of his brief, 19 Plaintiff states that “Defendant is directly liable under CIPA § 631(a) for monitoring the Email’s 20 ‘open rates.’” Id. at 6. These conclusory assertions are not enough. Neither Defendant nor the 21 Court should have to guess about such a fundamental piece of Plaintiff’s case. 22 As best as the Court can discern, Plaintiff appears to argue that the Bluecore software 23 actually read the entire email from Defendant, including (1) undefined “email open rates” and 24 (2) URLs linking to Defendant’s products on its website. See id. at 3, 5–9. Neither theory is 25 sufficiently alleged, and in his opposition, Plaintiff mischaracterizes the allegations in the 26 complaint in an effort to support these theories. This post hoc shapeshifting is clearly improper. 27 First, “email open rates” in this context are not content. Although Plaintiff does not define 1 a datapoint about how many of Defendant’s emails a consumer has opened. Such a data point is 2 thus equivalent to a “read receipt,” indicating that a consumer received and opened a message. As 3 such, it falls squarely within the definition of “record information” because it is not about the 4 content of the emails at all. 5 Second, the complaint does not allege that the Bluecore software actually read the contents 6 of Defendant’s emails at all. Plaintiff’s suggestion otherwise is simply wrong and raises serious 7 credibility issues. The complaint alleges in relevant part: 8 • “Plaintiff received and interacted with Defendant’s Emails on multiples 9 occasions . . . .” Compl. at ¶ 4. 10 • When Plaintiff opened an email, the software intercepted “the time, date, device 11 type, geolocation (and other information attributed to Mr. Ramos’s online activity) 12 as well as his engagement with the Email’s content—including his clicks on URL 13 links embedded within the Emails’ Content.” Id. 14 • The software “embeds an invisible URL link within the clickable images and words 15 included in the body of the email.” See id. at ¶ 11. Plaintiff elsewhere refers to the 16 email’s “clickable images and words” as the email’s content. Id. at ¶ 14. When a 17 customer “clicks on a trackable URL link, the customers are directed to Bluecore’s 18 servers, permitting Bluecore to capture a large amount of data, such as the 19 recipient’s email address as well as email open rates and content click rates.” Id. at 20 ¶ 11; see also id. at ¶ 14. 21 • “Through its Email and Website wiretaps, Bluecore intercepts, at a minimum . . . 22 Emails,” specifically “the time, place, device geolocation, email address, and open 23 rates and click rates of Emails (including what part of the Email’s Content was 24 clicked on).” Id. at ¶ 19. 25 26 The complaint therefore refers to capturing information about the emails, such as “email open 27 rates” and “click rates.” But Plaintiff does not explain how such information constitutes protected 1 clickable images and words included in the body of the email,” which the complaint refers to as 2 the actual email content. See id. at ¶ 14. 3 In his opposition brief, Plaintiff attempts to argue that URLs are content. See Dkt. No. 20 4 at 8 (citing Campbell v. Facebook Inc., 315 F.R.D. 250, 265 (N.D. Cal. 2016)). While that may be 5 true in some circumstances, the complaint does not plausibly allege so here. To the extent the 6 complaint references URLs at all, it does not allege that the software reads these URLs. 7 According to the complaint, the software creates its own “invisible URL link.” Compl. at ¶ 11. 8 This link appears to belong to Bluecore. See id. (“Bluecore embeds an invisible URL link within 9 the clickable images and words included in the body of an email.”). And rather than convey any 10 intended message, Plaintiff’s allegations indicate that these URLs are “hidden” and serve a 11 tracking or routing function. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 11 (“When the recipient of an email clicks on a 12 trackable URL link, the customers are directed to Bluecore’s servers, permitting Bluecore to 13 capture a large amount of data, such as the recipient’s email address as well as email open rates, 14 and content click rates.”); id. at ¶ 14 (“When a user clicks on the content of the email to be 15 directed to a particular webpage within a website (e.g., a specific shirt showcased in the email), 16 Bluecore immediately intercepts the communication and gathers valuable data (including the 17 email address of the subscriber as well as his or her device type, geolocation, IP address and the 18 part of the email he or she clicked on).”). Nothing in the complaint suggests that these URLs are 19 related to the “substance, purport, or meaning” of Defendant’s emails. Zynga, 750 F.3d at 1104. 20 In support of his argument, Plaintiff points to a single allegation in the complaint, which 21 concludes that “the Bluecore tracking software read with specificity the Emails sent by Defendant 22 which Plaintiff and the Class members read and replied to by clicking on the URL link embedded 23 within the content of the Emails.” See Dkt. No. 20 at 7 (citing Compl. at ¶ 36) (emphasis added). 24 In other words, Plaintiff suggests that the tracking software can read the content of the emails that 25 Defendant sends to its customers. But this allegation is in tension with the earlier allegations in 26 the complaint in which Plaintiff describes only discrete parts of the emails that Bluecore 27 intercepts, such as “what part of the Email’s Content was clicked on.” See Dkt. No. 23 at 8 (citing 1 this stage, the complaint simply offers no support for the conclusory statement that the software 2 “reads with specificity” Defendant’s emails. 3 Additionally, Plaintiff asks the Court to consider the information that the Bluecore 4 software collects on Defendant’s website. See Dkt. No. 20 at 8. For example, Plaintiff states that 5 the software collects information such as “email capture . . . when an email address is entered [into 6 a ‘popup’].” See id. (citing Compl. at ¶¶ 14, 19). Even assuming this constitutes protected 7 content, however, Plaintiff does not allege that he ever entered any information into a popup on 8 Defendant’s website. Plaintiff offers no detail about his use of Defendant’s website. He only 9 broadly states that he was directed to web pages on Defendant’s website, and was unaware that 10 “his engagement with . . . the Website” was being intercepted. See Compl. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff has 11 failed to allege that the Bluecore software intercepted any protected content for purposes of CIPA, 12 and the Court therefore GRANTS the motion to dismiss on this basis. 13 B. Remaining Causes of Action 14 Defendant urges that because Plaintiff’s claim under § 631(a) fails, his claim under CIPA 15 § 635, statutory larceny, and the UCL necessarily fail too. See Dkt. No. 16 at 9–15. Plaintiff 16 appears to agree that these claims rise and fall together because they are based on wiretapping 17 protected “content.” See Dkt. No. 20 at 9–12, 16–18. Because the Court agrees with Defendant 18 that Plaintiff has failed to plead the interception of such protected content, the Court GRANTS the 19 motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action as well. 20 C. UCL 21 Lastly, Defendant raises several procedural problems with Plaintiff’s UCL claim. He 22 argues that Plaintiff cannot seek injunctive relief under the UCL because he has failed to allege 23 that he lacks an adequate remedy at law. See Dkt. No. 16 at 12–13. Defendant also urges that 24 Plaintiff failed to allege that he lost money or property sufficient to satisfy the UCL’s statutory 25 standing requirements. See id. at 13–15. To enable Plaintiff to effectively amend the complaint, 26 the Court briefly addresses these two arguments. 27 i. Equitable Relief 1 jurisdiction, which can only exist under federal common law if the plaintiff has no adequate legal 2 remedy.” Guzman v. Polaris Indus., 49 F.4th 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 2022). Although this Court 3 has, in the past, noted Sonner’s odd procedural posture, the Ninth Circuit in Guzman has indicated 4 that Sonner’s holding was not limited to its posture. See id. Here, Plaintiff urges that he is 5 pleading in the alternative. See Dkt. No. 20 at 12. But even so, he admits that he does not allege 6 that he lacks an adequate remedy at law. See id. Plaintiff states that such an argument is “highly 7 formalistic” and “easily fixable.” See id. at 12–13. But Plaintiff’s own authorities indicate that 8 this is nevertheless a pleading requirement. See Mikulsky v. Bloomingdale’s, LLC, No. 3:23-CV- 9 00425-L-VET, 2024 WL 337180, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2024). Because Plaintiff has failed to 10 plead that a remedy at law is inadequate, he cannot seek equitable relief. Id. 11 ii. Statutory Standing 12 In addition to the requirements of Article III standing, the UCL has additional standing 13 requirements that require plaintiffs to (1) plead an economic injury and (2) show that the injury 14 was caused by the challenged conduct. See Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 322 15 (Cal. 2011). Plaintiff responds that he adequately alleged that he lost money as a result of 16 Defendant’s conduct because he “has suffered harm in the form of diminution of the value of his 17 private and personally identifiable data and online activities.” See Dkt. No. 20 at 14 (citing 18 Compl. ¶ 69). But as already discussed, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged exactly what data 19 was intercepted here. Plaintiff contends that it was “private and personally identifiable data and 20 online activities,” id., and that this data was “extensive,” id. at 15. But such conclusory 21 allegations are obviously insufficient. 22 IV. CONCLUSION 23 The Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 16. At this stage in the litigation, 24 the Court cannot say that amendment would be futile. Plaintiff may therefore file an amended 25 complaint within 21 days of the date of this order provided counsel can do so consistent with their 26 Rule 11 obligations. Plaintiff’s counsel is further warned that they need to fully plead their best 27 case in any amended complaint: it is an inefficient use of everyone’s resources to dribble out the 1 will grant further leave to amend. 2 The Court further SETS case a case management conference on November 19, 2024, at 3 || 2:00 p.m. The hearing will be held by Public Zoom Webinar. All counsel, members of the public, 4 || and media may access the webinar information at https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/hsg. The parties 5 are further DIRECTED to file a joint case management statement by November 12, 2024. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 || Dated: 9/30/2024 8 . hE S. GILLIAM, JR. if 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12

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