2 4 6 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 || TODD HALL and GEORGE Case No. 3:19-cv/01715-JO-AHG ABDELSAYED individually and on 12 || behalf of all others similarly situated, RO ORDER GRANTING 13 Plaintiffs, FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS 15 PREJUDICE 16 || MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Delaware corporation, The Honorable Jinsook Ohta 17 18 Defendant. 19 20 Plaintiffs Todd Hall and George Abdelsayed, (“Plaintiffs”), individually anc 21 j/on behalf of the Class defined below, move this Court for final approval of th 22 ||settlement reached with Defendant Marriott International, Inc. (“Marriott”) in the 23 || above-captioned action. Plaintiffs also move for partial reimbursement of litigatior 24 ||costs and service awards. Neither motion is opposed. A final approval hearing wa 25 || held July 10, 2024, with counsel for Plaintiffs and Marriott appearing remotely. Nc 26 ||class members appeared. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Fina 27 || Approval of Class Action Settlement is GRANTED. The Motion for Partia 28 ||Reimbursement of Litigation Costs and Service Awards is also GRANTED. Hall y. Marriott International, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-01715-JO-AH¢

1 WI. BACKGROUND 2 On September 9, 2019, Plaintiff Todd Hall initiated a putative class action 3 |jagainst Marriott alleging it intentionally deceived consumers about the 4 |/characteristics and total cost of a stay at its Marriott Hotels. ECF No. 1. In response 5 |{to Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 11), Plaintiffs filed a first amended 6 ||complaint adding claims for negligent misrepresentation, concealment, and 7 ||intentional misrepresentation. ECF No. 15. Marriott again moved to dismiss. 8 |}ECF No. 18. After full briefing, the Court denied Marriott’s motion. ECF No. 31. 9 || Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint adding plaintiffs Julie Drassinower, 10 ||Kevin Branca, and Jesse Heineken. ECF No. 54. On March 23, 2021, Plaintiffs 11 ||moved to consolidate with related Case No. 3:21-cv-00402-BEN-JLB. ECF No. 72. 12 |}On April 27, 2021 the Court granted the motion to consolidate. ECF No. 78. 13 On May 27, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the operative consolidated third amended 14 |}complaint, which added Plaintiff Abdelsayed, alleging claims under the CLRA, 15 FAL, UCL, unjust enrichment, negligent misrepresentation, concealment, and 16 || intentional misrepresentation. ECF No. 82. 17 Extensive discovery ensued, including the exchange of multiple sets of written 18 interrogatories and requests for admission, the production of hundreds of thousands 19 || of pages of documents, and the issuance of third-party discovery. The parties filed 20 ||several motions to resolve discovery disputes that arose over the course of the 21 || Action. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 84, 93, 101, 106, 107, 116, 122, 126, and 164. 22 Marriott moved for summary judgment on April 8, 2022. ECF No. 140. 23 || Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment (ECF No. 143) and class certification 24 || (ECF No. 144) on April 15, 2022. Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion asked the 25 || Court to hold that Marriott’s business practices violated the CLRA, FAL, and UCL 26 ||and that several of Marriott’s affirmative defenses failed as a matter of law or for 27 || lack of evidence. ECF No. 143. The certification motion sought to certify Fed. R. 28 □ Hall v. Marriott International, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-0171 5-JO-AHG

1 ||Civ. Proc. 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) classes as well as an issues class under Rul 2 |) 23(c)(4). ECF No. 144. 3 On March 30, 2023, the Court resolved both motions granting in part an 4 || denying in part the Parties’ motions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 180 and 188 5 |The Court granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification by certifying ai 6 |lissues-only Class as to liability under Rule 23(c)(4) for Plaintiffs’ CLRA an 7 ||concealment claims. ECF No. 180, 42:15-17 and ECF 188, 6:12-14. The Cour 8 || denied class certification for Plaintiffs’ damages claims. ECF No. 180, 42:9-13. Th 9 Court appointed Plaintiffs as Class Representatives and Bursor & Fisher, P.A., th 10 □□ □□□ Offices of Ronald A. Marron, APLC, and the Law Office of Robert L. Teel a 11 ||Class Counsel. ECF No. 180, 43:3-4. 12 The Court further held (1) Plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief 13 (2) the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ equitable claims for restitution 1 14 }}connection with their CLRA, FAL, UCL, and unjust enrichment causes of action 15 |] ECF No. 180, 9:7-11. As a result of the foregoing, only the Class claims seekin; 16 || liability, and not damages, under the CLRA and for concealment were allowed t 17 || proceed. 18 After a status hearing with the Court on October 4, 2023, the Parties agreed t 19 |/conduct a full day of mediation before the Hon. Peter D. Lichtman (Ret.) in Lo 20 || Angeles, California. On November 14, 2023, the Parties participated in a nearly all 21 ||day mediation with the Judge Lichtman to attempt to resolve the litigation. Th 22 || essential terms and conditions for a global resolution of the litigation in □□□□□□□□□□ 23 || with the mediator’s proposal were accepted by all parties on November 17, 2023. 24 Thereafter, the parties filed a joint motion (ECF No. 207) and supplementa 25 || briefing (ECF Nos. 214, 217, and 218) seeking Court approval of the mediate 26 || settlement proposal. On February 21, 2024, the Court denied the motion to approv: 27 ||the settlement and vacate the issues-only class certification order. ECF No. 220 28 || The Parties held two more settlement conference with Magistrate Judge Goddard o1 □ Fall v. Marriott International, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-01715-JO-AH¢

1 || February 26, 2024 (ECF No. 227) and March 1, 2024 (ECF No. 229), but the case 2 || did not settle and the parties prepared for a jury trial scheduled for April 22, 2024. 3 On April 19, 2024 the parties agreed to essential binding settlement terms 4 || which were filed with the Court. ECF Nos. 273 and 275. The terms of the settlement 5 ||have been further memorialized in a written and executed Settlement Agreement 6 |{dated May 10, 2024. On May 17, 2024, the Court issued its Order granting 7 || preliminary approval of the proposed Settlement Agreement. ECF No. 282. 8 In its Order preliminarily approving the Settlement Agreement the Court 9 || defined the Class as follows: 10 All persons in California—except for persons who enrolled in 11 Marriott’s “Bonvoy” rewards program on or after April 24, 2015—-who reserved or booked a Marriott managed or franchised hotel room online 12 through the Marriott.com website or Marriott mobile app and who paid 13 a resort fee, destination fee, amenity fee, or destination amenity fee on 4 or after September 9, 2015 and until the Class was certified on March 30, 2023 excluding Defendant and Defendant’s officers, 15 directors, employees, agents and affiliates, the Court and its staff, and 16 attorneys appearing in this action. 17 || Excluded from the Class are the Judges to whom the Action has been assigned and 1g || any member of the Judges’ staffs and immediate families. 19 The Court reserved on the issue of service awards to the Class representatives 20 ||and partial reimbursement of litigation costs, but otherwise found the settlement 21 ||appeared fair, reasonable and adequate, and within the range of reasonableness for 22 preliminary approval. ECF No. 282, 2:3-12. 23 HII = SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT TERMS 24 In the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiffs release their individual claims and 25 ||their claims for monetary damages and waive their rights under Cal. Civ. 26 || Code § 1542. ECF No. 279-3 at 7 | IV.A-B. In exchange, Marriott agrees that 97 || within six months after final approval it will: (1) modify and change the calendar 28 || view on its Marriott US Websites so the cost identified for each calendar day is at

Hall v. Marriott International, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-01715-JO-AHG

1 ||least the lowest Total Room Price and not just the lowest available room rate; (2 2 |lmodify and fix such instances of which Plaintiffs notify it of a Marriott Hote 3 advertising an amenity as complimentary, free, or otherwise without charge that 1 4 |/also included as a Resort Fee; (3) notify and remind its Marriott Hotels that charg 5 ||a Resort Fee that under Marriott’s resort fee policy no amenity offered a 6 ||complimentary, free, or otherwise without charge may be included as a Resort Fe 7 ||amenity; and (4) and instruct its Marriott Hotels that charge a Resort Fee to take suc! 8 || action as may be reasonably necessary to ensure they are not presently offering am 9 |}complimentary or free amenity as a Resort Fee amenity. Additionally, within 1 10 ||days after the anniversary of the date the Court enters judgment granting fine 11 ||approval of the settlement Effective Date, Marriott will serve on Class Counsel 12 || declaration confirming and describing Marriott’s compliance with the requirement 13 || of the terms of the settlement. Finally, Marriott agrees to pay each Plaintiff a servic 14 ||award of up to $5,000 ($10,000 in total), as well as to partially reimburse Clas 15 ||Counsel for their litigation costs up to $65,000, both subject to Court approval 16 |\/d., 9§ UI-E-F. Marriott also agrees not to oppose Plaintiffs’ motion for partia 17 ||reimbursement of the litigation costs and service awards. Jd. The settlemen 18 ||agreement provides no monetary relief for class members, but class members do no 19 || release or waive their right to seek monetary damages. 20 ||. DISCUSSION 21 A. Rule 23(a) Requirements 22 Before approving a class action settlement, the court’s “threshold task is t 23 || ascertain whether the proposed settlement class satisfies the requirements of Rul 24 ||23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to class actions, namely 25 ||(1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy of representation. 26 || Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). In the settlemen 27 |lcontext, the court “must pay undiluted, even heightened, attention to clas 28 || certification requirements.” Jd. In addition, the court must determine whether clas _ «Hall v. Marriott International, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-01715-JO-AH(

1 || counsel is adequate under Rule 23(g). In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d |]454, 462 (9th Cir. 2000). 3 1. Numerosity 4 The numerosity requirement is satisfied if the class is “so numerous that 5 || joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “A class greater 6 ||than forty members often satisfies this requirement[.]” Walker v. Hewlett-Packard 7 ||Co., 295 F.R.D. 472, 482 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (citation omitted). Additionally, in cases 8 |/involving injunctive or behavioral relief only, the numerosity requirement may be 9 || relaxed. See Reynoso v. RBC Bearings, Inc., Case No. SACV 16-01037 JVS (JCGx), 10 |}2017 WL 6888305, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2017), decertified on other grounds by 11 || Reynoso v. All Power Mfg. Co., No. SACV 16-01037 JVS (JCGx), 2018 WL 12 || 5906645, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2018). Here, the court previously found that 13 || joinder of the potential class members would be impracticable. ECF No. 180, 30:2-3. 14 ||The class size here likely encompasses hundreds of thousands of consumers. 15 || ECF No.180, 33:1-2. Accordingly, the numerosity requirement is satisfied. 16 2. Commonality 17 The commonality requirement is satisfied if “there are questions of law or 18 || fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “To satisfy this commonality 19 ||requirement, plaintiffs need only point to a single issue common to the class.” 20 || Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 114, 1121 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 21 ||Here, as the Court previously found, common questions susceptible to common 22 || proof abound under Plaintiffs’ CLRA and common law fraud claims. ECF No. 180, 23 ||36:22-25 and Section V.C.3. Accordingly, the commonality requirement is satisfied. 24 3. Typicality . 25 The typicality requirement is satisfied if “the claims or defenses of the 26 || representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. 27 ||P. 23(a)(3). “The test of typicality is whether other members have the same or similar 28 ||injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named

_____ Hall v. Marriott International, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-01715-JO-AHG

1 |] plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course 0 2 || conduct.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (interna 3 quotation and citation omitted). Here, as the Court previously found, “[l]ea 4 |\\Plaintiffs and the purported class allege the same losses caused by the sam 5 ||inadequate resort fee disclosures,” (ECF No. 33:11-12), which is the basis fo 6 || Plaintiffs’ and class members’ claims. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of th 7 Class. 8 4, Adequacy 9 The final Rule 23(a) requirement is that “the representative parties will fairl 10 ||and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Thi 11 ||requires the Court to address two questions: “(a) do the named plaintiffs and thei 12 ||}counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (b) will th 13 ||named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of th 14 || class.” Mego, 213 F.3d at 462. A court certifying a class must consider: “(i) the wor 15 ||counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; (11 16 |/counsel’s experience in handling class actions; (iii) counsel’s knowledge of th 17 || applicable law; and (iv) the resources that counsel will commit to representing th 18 || class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A). The court may also consider “any other matte 19 || pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of th 20 || class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B). 21 Here, there is no indication of a conflict of interest between Plaintiffs or thei 22 attorneys and absent class members. ECF 180, 33:2-16. Although Plaintiffs seel 23 ||service awards, they waive their claims for monetary damages and give Marriott. 24 || general release, whereas class members do not. Plaintiffs declare they kep 25 ||themselves informed about the status of proceedings, participated in lengthy 26 || mediations, and suffered the same injury as the absent class members. With respec 27 || to Plaintiffs’ counsel, the record is clear that the settlement was negotiated by counse 28 || with extensive experience in consumer class action litigation, and that Plaintiffs

Hall. v. Marriott International, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-01715-JO-AH¢

1 |}counsel engaged in substantial motion practice, made extensive discovery 2 ||requests, and obtained sufficient information and documents to evaluate the 3 ||strengths and weaknesses of the case. Accordingly, the adequacy requirement is 4 || satisfied. 5 B. —_ Rule 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4) 6 The Class meets the requirements of Rule 23(a), Rule 23(c)(4), and as it 7 ||applies to the certified issues-only Class, Rule 23(b)(3). “Under what is known as 8 || the broad view, courts apply the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance and superiority prongs 9 || after common issues have been identified for class treatment under Rule 23(c)(4). 10 || The broad view permits utilizing Rule 23(c)(4) even where predominance has not 11 || been satisfied for the cause of action as a whole. See In re Nassau Cty. Strip Search 12 || Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (permitting issue certification “regardless 13 |}of whether the claim as a whole satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance 14 ||requirement”); Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996) 15 (‘Even if the common questions do not predominate over the individual questions 16 ||so that class certification of the entire action is warranted, Rule 23 authorizes the 17 || district court in appropriate cases to isolate the common issues under Rule 23(c)(4) 18 ||[ ] and proceed with class treatment of these particular issues.”) Martin v. Behr 19 || Dayton Thermal Prods. LLC, 896 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2018). See also Gunnells v. 20 || Healthplan Servs.,Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 439-45 (4th Cir. 2003) (courts may employ 21 ||Rule 23(c)(4) to certify a class as to one claim even though all of the □□□□□□□□□□□ 22 || claims, taken together, do not satisfy the predominance requirement). 23 Rule 23(c)(4) provides that, “when appropriate, an action may be brought or 24 ||maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 ||23(c)(4). “[E]ven if the common questions do not predominate over the individual 26 || questions so that class certification of the entire action is warranted, Rule 23[(c)(4)] 27 |\authorizes the district court in appropriate cases to isolate the common issues .. . 28 ||and proceed with class treatment of these particular issues.” Valentino y. Carter- □ □□□ Hall v. Marriott International, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-01715-JO-AHG

1 || Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996). Certification under Rule 23(c)(4 2 ||is appropriate where the issues to be certified meet all of Rule 23’s requirements o 3 || numerosity, typicality, adequacy, and commonality. Tasion Communications, Inc. \ 4 || Ubiquiti Networks, Inc., 308 F.R.D. 630, 633 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 5 In determining whether certification of an issues class is appropriate, court 6 also consider “whether the adjudication of the certified issues would significantl 7 \|advance the resolution of the underlying case, thereby achieving judicial □□□□□□□ 8 |/and efficiency.” Valentino, 97 F.3d at 1229; see also Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co. 9 1765 F. 3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding certification of an issues class wa 10 ||appropriate to “accurately and efficiently resolve the question of liability, whil 11 |)leaving the potentially difficult issue of individualized damage assessments for | 12 || later day.”). “The question of whether partial certification is appropriate under Rul 13 |} 23(c)(4)(A) is closely linked to the question of whether a class action is superior t 14 || other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 15 ||Jn re Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Overtime Pay Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 107! 16 ||(N.D. Cal. 2007). The Court finds that the requirements for predominance an 17 ||superiority are met for the common liability issues identified for class treatmen 18 || under Rule 23(c)(4) and that certification of the Class is appropriate. 19 C. Rule 23(e)(2) Requirements 20 Rule 23(e)(2) provides that the court may approve a class action settlemen 21 ||“only after a hearing and only on a finding that it is fair, reasonable, an 22 ||adequate after considering whether: (a) the class representatives and clas 23 |}counsel have adequately represented the class; (b) the proposal was negotiated a 24 || arm’s length; (c) the relief provided for the class is adequate; [and] (d) the proposa 25 || treats class members equitably relative to each other.” In making this determinatior 26 || the court is required to “evaluate the fairness of a settlement as a whole, rather tha 27 || assessing its individual components.” Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 818-1! 28 || (9th Cir. 2012). □ ___—- Hall v. Marriott International, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-01715-JO-AH¢

1 Because a “settlement arises from a compromise, the question [to be] address[ed] 2 |{is not whether the final product could be prettier, smarter or snazzier, but whether it is 3 || fair, adequate and free from collusion.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027; see also United States 4 || v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971) (Naturally, the agreement reached normally 5 ||embodies a compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the 6 || parties each give up something they might have won had they proceeded with 7 |{ litigation.”) The court’s primary concern “is the protection of those class members, 8 || including the named [p]laintiffs, whose rights may not have been given due regard by 9 |) the negotiating parties.” Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City & Cnty. of 10 || SF., 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). Furthermore, there is a strong 11 || judicial policy in favor of settlement. Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 12 || 576 (9th Cir. 2004). “In most situations, unless the settlement is clearly inadequate, its 13 |;acceptance and approval are preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with 14 || uncertain results.” Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 15 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 16 1. Notice 17 Class members are entitled to receive the best notice practicable about the 18 settlement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). “Adequate notice is required for court approval of 19 class settlement under Rule 23(e).” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1025. Notice should be 20 || “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 21 || pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” 22 || Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 23 As supported by the declaration of Class Counsel, on May 17, 2024 the 24 || previously approved notice (ECF No. 279-3, pgs. 18-19 and ECF No. 282) was 25 || posted on the internet. The notice webpage was maintained by Class Counsel, Bursor 26 || & Fisher, P.A., and includes the notice, the settlement agreement, the operative class 27 ||action complaint, the motion for preliminary approval and related papers, and the 28 || preliminary approval order. The notice also includes the date and time of the final 10 _——- Hall v. Marriott International, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-01715-JO-AHG

1 |\approval hearing, how to object to the settlement, and information about importar 2 || dates and deadlines associated with the settlement. 3 The Settlement is not binding on any class members other than Plaintiffs and 1 4 || not a “proposed settlement” under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711(6 5 ||No written notice of the proposed Settlement on the U.S. Attorney General or an 6 || California state official is required under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1715. 7 Class Counsel declares that no objections were received. No objections hav 8 || been filed with the Court. Based on the above, the notice provided to class member 9 ||is adequate for court approval of a settlement under Rule 23(e). 10 2. Arm’s Length Negotiations 11 In Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 966 (9th Cir. 2009), the Nint 12 || Circuit stated, “[w]e put a good deal of stock in the product of an arms-lengtl 13 ||non-collusive, negotiated resolution.” Plaintiffs argue that the proposed settlemer 14 |lis the product of informed arms-length negotiations because: (1) it was preceded b 15 || four years of adversarial litigation involving substantial discovery, including th 16 ||exchange of multiple sets of written discovery and hundreds of thousands of page 17 □□ □□ documents; (2) there was extensive motion practice, including various discover 18 ||motions, dueling motions for summary judgment, and a motion for clas 19 || certification; (3) at the time of settlement, Plaintiffs and their counsel had a fu! 20 || understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and Marriott’ 21 ||defenses, and were able to assess whether the change in business practices an 22 || behavioral relief would adequately benefit the Class when weighed against the risk 23 || of continuing litigation; (4) the settlement was reached after the parties participate 24 ||in an in-person mediation session before an experienced mediator, and □□□□□□ 25 ||months of continued settlement negotiations supervised by Magistrate Goddard; an 26 || (5) Plaintiffs’ counsel are experienced in class action matters. Additionally, Plaintiff 27 ||submit that the $75,000 in requested partial reimbursement of litigation cost 28 || and service awards was negotiated separately and only after the parties had reache 1] Hall v. Marriott International, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-01 715-JO-AH(

1 ||agreement on the behavioral relief. ECF No. 279-1, 26:28 and 27:1-4. For these 2 ||reasons, the Court finds the settlement to be the product of arm’s length negotiations. 3 ||See Mauss v. NuVasive, Inc., Case No. 13cv2005 JM (JLB), 2018 WL 6421623, at 41/*4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2018) (finding no collusion based on extensive litigation, 5 || counsel’s experience, and participation in mediation). 6 3. Adequacy of Relief 7 In deciding whether the relief provided for the class is adequate, the court takes 8 || into account: “(i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the effectiveness 9 ||of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the method 10 jjof processing class-member claims; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of 11 || attorney’s fees, including timing of payment; and (iv) any agreement required to be 12 || identified under Rule 23(e)(3).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C); see also Rodriguez, 563 13 ||F.3d at 966 (risk, expense, complexity and duration of litigation supports the 14 adequacy of relief). Plaintiffs argue the costs, risks, and delays associated with a 15 | trial are significant because: (1) Marriott has vigorously and continuously denied 16 || any wrongdoing, and absent settlement, Marriott would continue to defend this action 17 aggressively; (2) the Ninth Circuit could reverse the court’s order granting class 18 || certification; (3) because a number of Plaintiffs’ theories of liability were rejected on 19 ||summary judgment and proving scienter and liability at trial would be difficult; and 20 || (4) if Plaintiffs prevailed, an appeal would likely follow. 21 Additionally, because the Settlement Agreement provides only behavioral 22 ||relief that applies generally and to all class members equally there is no need for a 23 ||method of distribution. Also, Plaintiffs filed a detailed motion in support of the 24 Settlement Agreement’s terms regarding the partial reimbursement of litigation 25 ||costs and service awards which is discussed below. For these reasons, the relief 26 || appears adequate. 27 4. Equitable Treatment 28 Plaintiffs argue the behavioral relief in the settlement will benefit each class 12 Hall Y. Marriott International, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-01715-JO-AHG

1 ||member equally. Here, there may be some variation as to whether class member 2 enjoy the benefit of the behavioral relief because arguably some class members ma’ 3 ||not need to use Marriott’s website to book a room again at a Marriott Hotel. Bu 4 |\the relief benefits each class member relatively equally should they ever us 5 || Marriott’s services in the future. Additionally, no objections to the settlement wer 6 || filed. See DIRECTV, 221 F.R.D. at 528-29 (“It is established that the absence of | 7 ||large number of objections to a proposed class action settlement raises a stron; 8 || presumption that the terms of a proposed class settlement action are favorable to th 9 ||class members.”). Also, although the Settlement Agreement authorizes □ □□□□□□□ 10 ||award for the named Plaintiffs, “the Ninth Circuit has recognized that servic 11 ||}awards to named plaintiffs in a class action are permissible and do not rende 12 ||a settlement unfair or unreasonable.” Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp., No. C-08 13 ||5198 EMC, 2011 WL 1627973, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2011) (citing Stanton \ 14 || Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 977 (9th Cir. 2003)). Accordingly, the relief appears t 15 || benefit each class member relatively equally. 16 D. ‘Partial Reimbursement of Litigation Costs and Service Awards 17 Plaintiffs seek approval of $65,000 in partial reimbursement of litigation cost 18 || and up to $5,000 for each Plaintiff as a service award. “While attorneys’ fees an 19 ||costs may be awarded in a certified class action where so authorized by law or th 20 || parties’ agreement, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h), courts have an independent obligation t 21 ||ensure that the award, like the settlement itself, is reasonable, even if the partie 22 ||have already agreed to an amount.” Jn re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 65: 23 || F.3d 935, 941 (9" Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). 24 1. The Work Performed Was Adequate 25 Class Counsel declares that reasonable and necessary litigation costs incurre 26 ||in this action have been paid in an amount of $254,799.48. Plaintiffs argue tha 27 || because the $65,000 payment is less than 26 percent of the total litigation cost 28 ||incurred and paid by Class Counsel, none of the payment is for attorneys’ fees anc 13 ______-Hall v. Marriott International, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-01715-JO-AH¢

1 || that the lawyers will remain completely uncompensated for their time. Nonetheless, 2 ||Class Counsel informs the Court the amount of their combined “lodestar” for the 3 || work they have performed in this action is at least $2,501,839.50. “The ‘lodestar 4 ||method’ is appropriate in class actions brought under fee-shifting statutes where the 5 ||relief sought — and obtained — is often primarily injunctive in nature and thus not 6 |/easily monetized, but where the legislature has authorized the award of fees to 7 j}ensure compensation for counsel undertaking socially beneficial litigation.” 8 || Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941. Class Counsel also declares recommending the 9 || Settlement Agreement despite the negative multiplier of 100 percent on Class 10 || Counsel’s lodestar because it is in the best interests of the Class. 11 Based on the evidence available in the record, the quality of the representation 12 ||appears adequate, if not more than adequate. Plaintiffs’ attorneys were at least 13 ||partially successful in avoiding or defending against motions to dismiss and for 14 |}summary judgment. ECF No. 180. They also engaged in substantial discovery and 15 ||defended multiple motions in support of their discovery requests. /d., 33:17-22. 16 || Plaintiffs’ attorneys also successfully obtained certification of an issues-only class. 17 |{/d. at 42. Finally, Plaintiffs’ attorneys participated in multiple lengthy settlement 18 || discussions that were ultimately successful. 19 2. The Litigation Costs Were Reasonable and Necessary 20 As noted above, Plaintiffs argue Class Counsel is entitled to reimbursement of 21 ||reasonable and necessary out-of-pocket expenses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h); see Harris 22 ||v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that attorneys may recover 23 ||reasonable expenses that would typically be billed to paying clients in non- 24 ||contingency matters.); Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co., 901 F. Supp. 294, 299 25 |{(N.D. Cal. 1995) (approving reasonable costs in class action settlement). Costs 26 || compensable under Rule 23(h) include “nontaxable costs that are authorized by law 27 || or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). Taylor v. Shutterfly, Inc., 5:18- 28 ||cv-00266-BLF, at *24 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2021). Counsel for the class may also move aN _——-Hall v. Marriott International, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-01715-JO-AHG

1 || for costs if they are a prevailing party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1); Cal Code Civ 2 Proc. §§ 1032, 1033.5. 3 Plaintiffs request $65,000 in partial reimbursement of the litigation cost 4 |lincurred and paid by Class Counsel ($254,799.48) which includes $88,599.66 5 ||costs for the Marron Firm, $2,689.15 in costs for the Law Office of Robert L. Tee! 6 || and $163,510.69 in costs for Bursor & Fisher, P.A. Class Counsel declares that a! 7 ||of Counsel’s expenses were reasonable and necessary for the successful prosecutio: 8 □□□ this case. The Marron Firm’s biggest expenses were expert witness fee 9 ||($55,153.75) and deposition transcript costs ($17,908.44). Mr. Teel’s bigges 10 |}expense was for travel ($1,550.39). Bursor & Fisher’s biggest expenses were fo 11 ||expert witness fees ($115,599.50) and deposition transcript costs ($28,716.70 12 || These expenses, plus any expenses for filing fees, other transcripts, computerize 13 ||research, supplies, and postage detailed in Class Counsels’ bills are reasonabl 14 recoverable. 15 3. Service Awards 16 In class actions, service awards are fairly typical, discretionary, and “ar 17 || intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the clas: 18 ||to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the actior 19 ||}and, sometimes to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general. 20 || Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 958-59. In deciding whether to approve incentive awards 21 ||courts consider: (1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, bot 22 || financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered b 23 || the class representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by th 24 || class representative; (4) the duration of the litigation and; and (5) the personal benef 25 || (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class representative as a result of the litigation. See 26 ||e.g., Moreno v. Beacon Roofing Supply, Inc., No. Case No.: 19cv185-GPC (LL), 202 27 || WL 3960481, at *5-6 (S.D. Cal. July 13, 2020) (quoting Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfiel 28 || Co., 901 F. Supp. 294, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1995)). 15 ____ Hall v. Marriott International, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-01715-JO-AHt

1 Plaintiffs argue they are each entitled to a service award because: (1) each 2 || Plaintiff devoted between 11 and 52.7 hours to this case; (2) Plaintiffs were faced 3 || with personal liability for “irreparable harm” Marriott purportedly claimed it could 4 ||suffer as a result of their actions in this case, (3) Plaintiffs had a right to seek and 5 |}obtain compensatory and punitive damages under state law which they released; 6 |{and (4) Plaintiffs are the only members of the class that executed a release for 7 ||monetary damages. 8 The Settlement Agreement provides that Marriott will pay up to $5,000 to each 9 || Plaintiff as a service award subject to Court approval. ECF No. 279-3, pg. 8. Here, 10 || Plaintiffs waived their right to seek monetary and statutory damages whereas class 11 ||members have not, and they acted as private attorneys general in protecting the 12 ||public’s interest in the transparency of hotel room pricing. Plaintiffs declare, and 13 ||the Court has no reason to disbelieve, that Plaintiffs would not have agreed to the 14 || settlement if the rest of the class members had been required to release their claims, 15 || and that Plaintiffs felt obligated to protect the rights of the Class members. Plaintiff 16 || Hall also provides evidence showing that because of his involvement in this case, his 17 employer was displeased and upset with him. 18 In addition, Plaintiffs argue the California Attorney General has not taken any 19 ||enforcement action to hold Marriott accountable for its allegedly fraudulent 20 ||advertising practices unlike the Attorneys’ General of Texas, Colorado, 21 ||Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia. Therefore, they argue private 22 |!enforcement and the resulting financial burden were necessary to prevent further 23 |\injury to members of the Class and the public at large. Plaintiffs argue they have 24 || acted as true attorneys general. Because of the foregoing, the Court finds Plaintiffs are 25 | entitled to a service award of $5,000 each. 27 The Parties are hereby directed to implement the Settlement Agreement 28 ||according to its terms and conditions. Nothing in this final approval order shall 16 Hall v. Marriott International, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-01715-JO-AHG PD en Dn a Da pe A ey Coen oh pon

1 || preclude any action to enforce or interpret the terms of the Settlement Agreement 2 || Any action to enforce or interpret the terms of the Settlement Agreement shall be 3 || brought solely in this Court. 4 The Court expressly retains continuing jurisdiction over the action to conside 5 |/all further matters arising out of or connected with the settlement and this Order 6 ||including the administration, implementation, and enforcement of the Settlemen 7 || Agreement, and for any other necessary and appropriate purpose. Further, the Cour 8 || retains continuing jurisdiction to enter any other necessary or appropriate orders tc 9 || protect and effectuate the Court’s retention of continuing jurisdiction provided tha 10 ||nothing in this paragraph is intended to restrict the ability of the parties to exercis« 11 |/ their rights under the Settlement Agreement. 12 The individual claims of the Class Representatives, but not the other clas: 13 ||members, against Defendant Marriott International, Inc. in this action shall b 14 || dismissed on the merits and with prejudice as to the Class Representatives only. 15 || V. CONCLUSION 16 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Class Actiot 17 || Settlement is GRANTED. Additionally, Plaintiffs’ motion for partial reambursemen 18 || of $65,000 in litigation costs is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ motion for a service awarc 19 || of $5,000 each (a total of $10,000) is GRANTED. 20 The Court retains jurisdiction over this action for purposes of enforcing th 21 || parties’ Settlement Agreement, but not for the purpose of hearing related individua 22 || claims by class members against Marriott for monetary damages, violation of state law 23 || or otherwise. The case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and judgment is hereby 24 || entered on the terms set forth above. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case 25 || IT ISSO ORDERED. Toaby Gop >7 || DATED: yy ee 3g I =e OHTA Unitéd States District Court 17 ____ Hall v. Marriott International, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-01715-JO-AHC