1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 MAGDALENA SOLIS, Case No.: 24-cv-1441-MMA (LR) 11

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

12 Plaintiff, v. REMAND 13 NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, et al., [Doc. No. 2] 14 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Magdalena Solis’s (“Plaintiff”) motion to 19 remand this action to state court. Doc. No. 2. Defendants NationStar Mortgage LLC and 20 U.S. Bank National Association1 (“Defendants”) filed an opposition, Doc. No. 5, and 21 Plaintiff replied, Doc. No. 6. The Court found the matter suitable for determination on 22 the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) 23 and Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. See Doc. No. 7. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 24 DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to remand. 25

26 27 1 Defendants note that Plaintiff has erroneously sued “U.S. Bancorp d/b/a U.S. Bank National Association,” and that U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”) is the proper defendant in this 28 1 I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Imperial, 2 on July 15, 2024, for claims surrounding a modification agreement to Plaintiff’s second 3 mortgage and foreclosure on her primary residence. Doc. No. 1-2 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff 4 asserts six causes of action against Defendants in her Complaint for: (1) breach of 5 contract; (2) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) negligent 6 misrepresentation; (4) intentional misrepresentation; (5) violation of California’s Unfair 7 8 Competition Law (“UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.; and (6) declaratory 9 relief. Compl. ¶¶ 62–230. Plaintiff requests damages and injunctive relief. Id. at pp. 29– 10 30, ¶¶ 1–8. 11 Defendants removed the case to this Court on August 14, 2024, on the basis of 12 diversity jurisdiction. Doc. No. 1 at 2. In her motion to remand, Plaintiff argues that this 13 case should be remanded because this case “does not involve a federal question” and that 14 this Court should refrain from exercising any jurisdiction it does have under any of the 15 doctrines of abstention. Doc. No. 2 at 2–3. Plaintiff does not challenge Defendants’ 16 compliance with removal requirements. 17 II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 18 “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject 19 matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “The party 20 invoking the removal statute bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.” 21 Ethridge v. Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988). The two 22 primary sources of subject matter jurisdiction are diversity jurisdiction and federal 23 question jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires complete 24 diversity, meaning that all persons or associations on one side of the controversy (i.e., all 25 plaintiffs) are citizens of different states from all persons or associations on the other side 26 (i.e., all defendants). Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806). A corporation is a 27 citizen of both the state in which it is incorporated and the state in which it has its 28 principal place of business—the corporation's “nerve center.” See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 1 559 U.S. 77, 81 (2010). To establish diversity jurisdiction, the amount in controversy must also exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Federal question jurisdiction 2 permits a claim to proceed in federal court if it arises “under the Constitution, laws, or 3 treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 4 In their opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to remand, Defendants argue that 5 “Plaintiff’s [m]otion seems to completely ignore the actual basis of removal detailed in 6 the Notice of Removal: diversity jurisdiction.” Doc. No. 5 at 2. Upon review of 7 8 Plaintiff’s Complaint and Defendants’ Notice of Removal, the Court agrees. First, 9 complete diversity is met: Plaintiff does not dispute that she is a citizen of California and 10 that Defendants are citizens of Texas, Delaware, and Minnesota. Compl. ¶¶ 1–3; Doc. 11 No. 1 at 3–5. Second, as Defendants note, and Plaintiff again does not dispute, the 12 amount in controversy in this case is greater than $75,000 and no less than $417,000—the 13 value of Plaintiff’s property. Doc. No. 2 at 2. In addition, in her reply, Plaintiff no 14 longer challenges whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction, stating that 15 Defendants “clarified in their [o]pposition that jurisdiction is being claimed on a diversity 16 basis.” Doc. No. 6 at 2. Therefore, the Court finds it has subject matter jurisdiction over 17 this case. 18 III. ABSTENTION 19 In her reply, Plaintiff doubles-down on her request for the Court to refrain from 20 exercising its jurisdiction under federal abstention doctrines. Doc. No. 6 at 2–3. 21 District courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction 22 given to them.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 23 800, 817 (1976). Federal courts have jurisdiction over diversity cases in order to ensure 24 that citizens of different states can adjudicate their disputes in a neutral forum. See Bank 25 of United States v. Devaux, 9 U.S. 61 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.). 26 In general, there are three reasons for a federal district court to abstain from 27 deciding a case over which it properly has jurisdiction, all of which are based in 28 principles of comity: (1) to avoid ruling on unclear state law, (2) to avoid interfering with 1 pending state proceedings, and (3) to avoid duplicative litigation. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction chs. 12–14. The second and third rationales apply 2 only when there is pending litigation in both state and federal court; here, there is only 3 one action, and the question is where it should proceed—in state or federal court. 4 Abstention because of unclear state law, which Plaintiff seems to rest her argument 5 on, see Doc. No. 6 at 2–3, is appropriate in a few separate circumstances. Under 6 Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., a federal court must not decide a 7 8 constitutional issue when a clarification of state law might obviate the resolution of the 9 constitutional question. Federal courts also refrain from interpreting complex state 10 administrative or regulatory schemes. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 11 Finally, abstention is sometimes proper in a diversity case that both involves uncertain 12 state law and implicates an important state interest that is intimately involved with the 13 government’s sovereign prerogative.4 La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 14 U.S. 25 (1959); Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, § 12.2.2. 15 Here, Plaintiff’s arguments as to abstention are conclusory and seem to 16 misunderstand the above-cited doctrines. Plaintiff’s Complaint raises no constitutional 17 questions, and there is no extraordinary state administrative scheme governing the claims. 18 Plaintiff seems to primarily argue that the Court should abstain from deciding this case 19 because the case presents only issues of state law. However, the fact that the Complaint 20 raises no federal issues does not support abstention, either. Indeed, Congress’s grant of 21 diversity jurisdiction is directed at cases involving only state law claims. After all, if a 22 23 24 2 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger and its progeny outline when it is appropriate for 25 federal courts to enjoin separate state proceedings. 3 See Colorado River, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). Colorado River and subsequent cases concern what federal 26 courts should do when an action in state court duplicates the federal case. 4 One or the other is not enough. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943) (holding that 27 “uncertain or difficult” state law is not sufficient to justify abstention); Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959) (no abstention where state law is clear). 28 1 || Complaint raises issues of federal law, a district court has federal question jurisdiction 7 the federal claims and supplemental jurisdiction over any related state law claims. 3 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. To the extent Plaintiff argues the Court should abstain from 4 || hearing this case because “application of [the] UCL in particular has been an area of 5 || sufficient jurisdictional ambiguity,” she cites no authority for this proposition. Moreover, 6 || although not specifically mentioned by Plaintiff, the Court also finds that it has equitable 7 ||jurisdiction over Plaintiff's UCL claim because Plaintiff pleads that she lacks an adequate g ||remedy at law.” Compl. {| 228. 9 Accordingly, there is no basis for the Court to decline to invoke the jurisdiction 10 conferred upon it by Congress. 11 IV. CONCLUSION 12 Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to remand. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 || Dated: September 19, 2024 MW A Ou / Lp fy 15 HON. MICHAEL M. ELLO 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 > Even if the Court lacked equitable jurisdiction over Plaintiff's UCL claim, it would still deny her 27 || motion to remand because her Complaint contains both legal and equitable claims. See Lee v. American Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting lack of equitable jurisdiction over some 28 claims cannot serve as a basis for remanding a case in its entirety).