1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 SHAHROKH SAADAT NEJAD, Case No. 24-cv-01519-BAS-KSC 11 Plaintiff, ORDER: 12 (1) GRANTING MOTION FOR 13 v.

LEAVE TO PROCEED IN

14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FORMA PAUPERIS et al., (ECF No. 2); 15 Defendants. (2) DISMISSING ACTION 16 UNDER 28 U.S.C. 17 § 1915(e)(2); AND

18 (3) TERMINATING AS MOOT

EX PARTE APPLICATIONS

19 (ECF Nos. 5, 6, 7)

20 21 Plaintiff Shahrokh Saadat Nejad is proceeding pro se—without an attorney. 22 He filed a complaint on August 27, 2024, against: (1) numerous state and federal 23 entities, including the United States of America, the State of California, the Central 24 Intelligence Agency, the Superior Court of California, the County of San Diego, and 25 the City of Saratoga; (2) several corporations including Walmart and AT&T; 26 (3) about a dozen named individuals; and (4) Does 1 through 50,000. (Compl. 1–2.) 27 Plaintiff filed a Motion Seeking Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 1 Plaintiff also filed three Ex Parte Applications. First, Plaintiff asks the Court to order 2 the Department of Justice to investigate his Complaint’s allegations. (ECF No. 5.) 3 Second, Plaintiff requests an order requiring the DOJ to document and preserve 4 evidence mentioned in the Complaint. (ECF No. 6.) Third, Plaintiff seeks service of 5 the Complaint by the U.S. Marshals. (ECF No. 7.) 6 For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed 7 IFP, DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE his Complaint, and TERMINATES AS 8 MOOT Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Applications. 9 I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IFP 10 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a litigant who because of indigency is unable to pay 11 the required fees or security to commence a legal action may petition the court to 12 proceed without making such payment. The determination of indigency falls within 13 the district court’s discretion. Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th 14 Cir. 1991) (holding that “Section 1915 typically requires the reviewing court to 15 exercise its sound discretion in determining whether the affiant has satisfied the 16 statute’s requirement of indigency”), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). 17 It is well-settled that a party need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP. Adkins 18 v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339–40 (1948). To satisfy the 19 requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), “an affidavit [of poverty] is sufficient which 20 states that one cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for costs . . . and 21 still be able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life.” Id. at 339. 22 At the same time, however, “the same even-handed care must be employed to assure 23 that federal funds are not squandered to underwrite, at public expense . . . the 24 remonstrances of a suitor who is financially able, in whole or in material part, to pull 25 his own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). 26 District courts, therefore, tend to reject IFP applications where the applicant 27 can pay the filing fee with acceptable sacrifice to other expenses. See, e.g., Stehouwer 1 did not abuse its discretion in requiring a partial fee payment from a prisoner who 2 had a $14.61 monthly salary and who received $110 per month from family), vacated 3 in part on other grounds by Olivares v. Marshall, 59 F.3d 109 (9th Cir. 1995). 4 Moreover, “in forma pauperis status may be acquired and lost during the course of 5 litigation.” Wilson v. Dir. of Div. of Adult Insts., No. CIV S-06-0791, 2009 WL 6 311150, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2009) (citing Stehouwer, 841 F. Supp. at 321); see 7 also Allen v. Kelly, 1995 WL 396860, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 1995) (holding that 8 a plaintiff who was initially permitted to proceed in forma pauperis should be 9 required to pay his $120 filing fee out of a $900 settlement). Finally, the facts as to 10 the affiant’s poverty must be stated “with some particularity, definiteness, and 11 certainty.” United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981). 12 Having read and considered Plaintiff’s application, the Court finds that 13 Plaintiff meets the requirements in 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for IFP status. Plaintiff is 14 unemployed and relies on support from others to survive. (IFP Mot. ¶¶ 1–2.) He 15 lists no employment history for the past two years and identifies only $300.00 in his 16 financial accounts. (Id. ¶ 4.) His expenses approximate or exceed his minimal 17 income. (Id. ¶ 8.) Under these circumstances, the Court finds that requiring Plaintiff 18 to pay the court filing fee would impair his ability to obtain the necessities of life. 19 See Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339. 20 In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to 21 Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2). 22 II. SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 23 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), the court must dismiss an action where 24 the plaintiff is proceeding IFP if the court determines that the action “is frivolous or 25 malicious.” An IFP complaint “is frivolous if it has ‘no arguable basis in fact or 26 law.’” O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Franklin v. 27 Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984)). This standard grants the court “the 1 those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 2 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Consequently, “a court is not bound, as it usually is when 3 making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the 4 truth of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). 5 Clearly baseless factual allegations include those “that are ‘fanciful,’ 6 ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional.’” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32–33 (quoting Neitzke v. 7 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327, 328 (1989)). Accordingly, “a finding of factual 8 frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational 9 or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available 10 to contradict them.” Id. at 33. These outlandish claims are those “with which federal 11 district judges are all too familiar.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328. Thus, district courts 12 have dismissed as frivolous an assortment of complaints containing clearly baseless 13 factual allegations. See, e.g., Frost v. Vasan, No. 16-cv-05883 NC, 2017 WL 14 2081094, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2017) (secret conspiracy involving a U.S. Senator, 15 a university, and the CIA); Suess v. Obama, No. CV 17-01184-JAK (DTB), 2017 16 WL 1371289, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2017) (conspiracy involving former President 17 Barack Obama, the CIA, and the FBI); Demos v. United States, 2010 WL 4007527, 18 at *2 (D. Ore. Oct. 8, 2010) (kidnapping involving law enforcement officers 19 disguised as pirates). 20 Here, Plaintiff’s 164-page Complaint seeks redress against the CIA, state and 21 local governments, several major corporations, and about a dozen individual 22 defendants. Among other things, Plaintiff alleges the neighborhood surrounding his 23 residence “is part of a secret U.S. government and/or a U.S. military program.” 24 (Compl. ¶ 64.) Plaintiff has allegedly been subjected to various instances of nudity 25 and indecent exposure in the vicinity. (Id.) His residence is also allegedly besieged 26 by sound equipment that is “used to, but not limited to, harass, annoy, threaten, 27 manipulate, intimidate, inflict sleep deprivation, and incite violence.” (Id. ¶ 73.) In 1 ||misused equipment “and/or gadgets to penetrate, but not limited to, Plaintiff's smart 2 ||devices, phones and/or Plaintiff's laptop computers.” (/d. 9 79.) 3 Having reviewed the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint and its attached 4 ||exhibits, the Court concludes they are fantastical and clearly baseless. See Neitzke, 5 {1490 US. at 325; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)G); DeRock v. Sprint-Nextel, 603 6 ||F. App’x 556, 558 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of nine actions as either 7 frivolous or failing to state a claim because the plaintiff alleged “unsupported legal 8 |/conclusions and fanciful factual allegations”). In addition, because the Complaint is 9 || frivolous, the Court does not grant Plaintiff leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 10 |/F.3d 1122, 1127 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (“When a case may be classified as frivolous or 11 ||malicious, there 1s, by definition, no merit to the underlying action and so no reason 12 |/to grant leave to amend.”). 13 ||. CONCLUSION 14 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed 15 ||In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2). Further, the Court DISMISSES WITH 16 || PREJUDICE Plaintiff's Complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 17 ||Finally, because the Court dismisses Plaintiffs Complaint, the Court also 18 || TERMINATES AS MOOT Plaintiff's three pending Ex Parte Applications (ECF 19 ||Nos. 5, 6, 7). The Court of Court shall enter judgment and close this case. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 22 || DATED: September 25, 2024 ( pict Ayphorrs °3 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28