facts, although it may have been possible for the IJ to conclude that the threats . . .

[rose] to the level of persecution, we cannot say the evidence compels the

conclusion” that they did). Nor does the allegation that gang members mocked

Rodriguez Hernandez on the way to church compel a conclusion of past

persecution. Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding

substantial evidence supported the finding of no past persecution where petitioner

was “teased, bothered, discriminated against and harassed” on account of their

religion).

Second, the evidence also supports the finding that Rodriguez Hernandez’s

fears of future persecution were not well-founded. He could not explain why gang

members would still want to harm him after he sold his motorcycle, the primary

reason why they targeted him. Because Petitioners did not show persecution for

asylum purposes, Rodriguez Hernandez “necessarily fails to satisfy the more

demanding standard for withholding of removal, which involves showing by a

‘clear probability’ that the petitioner’s life or freedom would be threatened in the

proposed country of removal.” Davila, 968 F.3d at 1142; see also 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3)(A).

3 Third, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that gang members did

not target Rodriguez Hernandez because of a protected ground. Petitioners

asserted harm because of their membership in the particular social groups (“PSG”)

of (1) “Christian[s]”; (2) “small farm worker[s]”; (3) “immediate family” for

Medrano Llanos and their children; and (4) “individuals who refuse to participate

in gang activities because of their religious beliefs and their family members.” But

Rodriguez Hernandez’s declaration and testimony support the conclusion that gang

members threatened him because he had a motorcycle. While Rodriguez

Hernandez also testified about his belief that gang members recruited him because

of his religion, his testimony on this point is unclear and inconsistent. The BIA

considered this evidence but nevertheless concluded that it was insufficient to

establish that his religion was “one central reason” for the asserted persecution. 8

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (requiring a protected ground to be “at least one central

reason for persecuting the applicant”). The evidence before us does not compel the

opposite conclusion. Nor does the evidence compel a conclusion that Rodriguez

Hernandez was targeted because of his membership in any of the other claimed

PSGs.

We also deny the petition as to Rodriguez Hernandez’s CAT claim. Torture

under CAT is “more severe than persecution,” Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208,

4 1217 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1224 (9th Cir.

2005)), and the evidence supports a finding of no persecution. Rodriguez

Hernandez also did not establish that the government would consent or acquiesce

to the harm. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). “[G]eneral ineffectiveness on the

government’s part to investigate and prevent crime” by itself is insufficient “to

show acquiescence.” Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016).

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

The motion for a stay of removal is otherwise denied.

PETITION DENIED.

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