DISCUSSION

Sisounthone contends this court must clarify the judgment to reflect that his eventual parole period may be two years, not three, pursuant to section 3000.01. The People agree the parole term must be modified. Because the trial court did not set the parole term, but instead merely advised Sisounthone of a possible parole term, we do not find that the judgment must be either modified or “clarified.” Section 3000.01 governs periods of parole for individuals released from prison on or after July 1, 2020, and who are subject to parole supervision by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation under section 3000.08. (§ 3000.01, subd. (a), added by Stats. 2020, ch. 29, § 18, eff. Aug. 6, 2020.) It limits, with exceptions not applicable here, the period of parole for an inmate serving a determinate term to two years. (§ 3000.01, subd. (b)(1).) Although the Legislature added section 3000.01, “[it] did not amend the relevant provisions of sections 3000 and 3000.08, which still provide the inmate shall be released on parole for a period of three years. (§ 3000, subd. (b)(2)(B).)” (People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 779-780 (Tilley).) When, as here, “the trial court imposes a determinate term under section 1170, it is required to inform the defendant at sentencing that, after the expiration of their prison term, they may be on parole for a period as provided by section 3000 or 3000.08.” (Tilley, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 779, fn. omitted.) “Although the trial court is required to advise the defendant of the parole period, the duration and conditions of parole are established by the Legislature and the parole authority or Department of

3 Corrections and Rehabilitation. [Citations.] The sentencing court does not have authority to set or alter the applicable term of parole so established.” (Ibid.) As a general rule, “ ‘a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.’ ” (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.) Nothing in the record reflects that the trial court was not aware it lacked authority to set the term of parole. Accordingly, we presume the trial court knew it lacked authority to set the term of parole and also knew it had an obligation to advise Sisounthone he was subject to a term of parole following the expiration of his term of imprisonment. We construe the trial court’s statement about the parole term as a mere advisement of the length of the parole term, rather than an attempt to impose a specific parole term. Since the parole term was merely an advisement, and will be determined by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation or the parole authority, we need not modify the judgment. (Tilley, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 780.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

/s/

BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

/s/

EARL, P. J.

/s/

RENNER, J.

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