BACKGROUND

20 Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II and Title XVI of the Social 21 Security Act. Her application was denied, and Plaintiff subsequently challenged the denial. ECF 22 Nos. 1, 14 at 5. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Administrative 23 Law Judge (ALJ) erred in considering two medical opinions, in “discrediting [M.D.]’s statements 24 about her symptoms,” and in rejecting a “third-party witness statement,” which resulted in an 25 26 1 Because opinions by the Court are more widely available than other filings, and this Order 27 contains potentially sensitive medical information, this Order refers to the Plaintiff only by her 1 erroneous finding. ECF No. 14 at 16. Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, 2 which Plaintiff opposed. ECF Nos. 16, 18. Finding that the ALJ erred in weighing medical 3 opinions, in rejecting M.D.’s testimony about her symptoms, and in discounting the testimony of a 4 third party, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the matter 5 for further proceedings. See ECF No. 19 at 8, 15, 21, 23. Judgment was entered on August 2, 6 2024. ECF No. 20. 7 ANALYSIS 8 In an action by or against the United States, “including proceedings for judicial review of 9 agency action” as is the case here, courts must award reasonable fees and expenses to the 10 prevailing party “unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially 11 justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28. U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 12 I. SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION 13 Plaintiff argues that neither the underlying ALJ decision denying Plaintiff’s application for 14 social security disability benefits nor Defendant’s decision to defend the instant action were 15 substantially justified. The Court agrees. 16 “It is the government's burden to show that its position was substantially justified or that 17 special circumstances exist to make an award unjust,” where “substantial justification” means 18 “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person” with a “reasonable basis both in law 19 and fact.” Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). The 20 “position of the United States” encompasses both its position in the “original action”—in this case, 21 the ALJ’s denial of Plaintiff’s application—and its decision in “defending the validity of the 22 [original] action in court.” Id. at 1258 (quotations omitted). 23 In ruling on the motion and cross-motion for summary judgment, the Court found that the 24 ALJ erred at multiple points in its decision denying Plaintiff’s application for social security 25 benefits. ECF No. 19. Specifically, the Court found that the ALJ committed “reversible legal 26 error” in not considering the appropriate factors when weighing the medical opinion of Plaintiff’s 27 treating physician and Plaintiff’s impartial medical expert, failed to provide “specific and 1 discounted Plaintiff’s symptoms testimony and lay witness testimony without substantial evidence 2 for doing so. ECF No. 19 at 9, 10, 14, 17-18, 21-22. As the ALJ’s decision was unsupported by 3 substantial evidence and based on legal error, the Court finds that the decision did not have a 4 “reasonable basis […] in law and fact.” Gutierrez, 274, F.3d at 1258. “Given the serious flaws in 5 the ALJ’s analysis,” the Court finds that Defendant’s decision to “defend the ALJ’s decision in 6 this action” was not substantially justified either. Meier v. Colvin, 2013, 727 F.3d 867, 873 (9th 7 Cir. 2013); see Sampson v. Chater, 103 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1996) (“It is difficult to imagine 8 circumstance in which the government’s decision to defend its actions in court would be 9 substantially justified, but the underlying administrative decision would not.”). Furthermore, in not 10 opposing the instant motion, Defendant has not put forth any counterargument that its position was 11 substantially justified. 12 Accordingly, the Court finds that the government’s position was without substantial 13 justification. 14 II. PREVAILING AND ELIGIBLE PARTY 15 “An applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for the purposes of the 16 EAJA if the denial of her benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of whether disability 17 benefits ultimately are awarded.” Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1257; see Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 18 292, 302 (1993) (“A sentence-four remand, of course, is a judgment for the plaintiff”). The Court 19 entered a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and remanded the case for further proceedings pursuant to 20 sentence four of 42 U.S. Code section 405(g). Plaintiff is accordingly the prevailing party. As 21 Plaintiff’s net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 when this action was filed, she is otherwise 22 eligible for fees and costs pursuant to the EAJA. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B); see ECF No. 2 at 1-3. 23 III. TIMELINESS 24 Plaintiff’s application for attorney’s fees is timely. “A party seeking an award of fees and 25 other expenses” under the EAJA has thirty days “after the time for appeal has ended” to submit 26 their request for fees and expenses. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(D). Defendant had until September 27 30, 2024, sixty days after the entry of judgment—entered on August 2, 2024, at ECF No. 20—to 1 file her motion for attorney’s fees. The instant motion was filed well within this timeframe. 2 IV. REASONABLENESS OF ATTORNEY’S FEES 3 The Court must also assess if Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees is “reasonable.” 28 4 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(D). This analysis necessarily comprises two elements: if Plaintiff’s attorney’s 5 hourly fee is reasonable and if she expended a reasonable number of hours litigating this action. 6 See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 7 The EAJA specifies that attorney fees “shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour 8 unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor […] justifies a 9 higher fee.” Id. 2412(d)(1)(A)(ii). The Ninth Circuit has increased the statutory maximum rate to 10 adjust for the increased cost of living. Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876-77 (9th Cir. 11 2005). The adjusted statutory maximum rate under the EAJA in the Ninth Circuit was $244.62 for 12 2023 and 2024. See https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum-rates/ (Ninth 13 Circuit Statutory Maximum Rates under the EAJA) (citing 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A)(ii) (last 14 viewed on 10/23/2024). Plaintiff’s attorney requests this rate for her work, which the Court finds 15 is reasonable. See ECF No. 21-2 (Invoice Attached to Siegfried Decl.). 16 The Court next assesses if the time Plaintiff’s counsel spent litigating this case was 17 reasonable. Determining if the amount of time an attorney spent working on a case is reasonable 18 “will always depend on case-specific factors including, among others, the complexity of the legal 19 issues, the procedural history, the size of the record, and when counsel was retained.” Costa v. 20 Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012). Although the party requesting 21 the award must demonstrate “the appropriate hours expended in the litigation by submitting 22 evidence in support of those hours worked,” in EAJA cases, courts should generally “defer to the 23 winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time [they were] required to spend on the 24 case.” Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397; Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 25 2008). 26 Plaintiff submits a declaration from her attorney, Katherine Siegfried, attesting that she 27 spent at least thirty-eight hours litigating this case. ECF No. 21-1 (Siegfried Decl.) ¶ 3. Plaintiff’s 1 the motion for summary judgment and responding to Defendant’s cross-motion, and attached to 2 her declaration an invoice detailing the time spent on the case. Id. ¶ 4-5; ECF No. 21-2. Having 3 reviewed the Siegfried Declaration and attached invoice, the Court finds that it was reasonable for 4 Plaintiff’s counsel to expend thirty-eight hours working on this case. The administrative record in 5 this action is voluminous; Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, which contains three distinct 6 arguments, two of which have detailed subparts, is thorough and each argument formed the basis 7 for the Court’s order remanding the matter; and there is no indication that counsel billed for “any 8 redundant or unnecessary hours” or clerical tasks. P.W. v. Saul, 19-cv-01132, WL 3488041, at *1 9 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2020) (finding that plaintiff’s “expenditure of 50.4 hours” on the social 10 security appeals case was reasonable); see ECF Nos. 11, 14, 21-1 ¶ 3, 21-2. Deferring to counsel’s 11 professional judgment, the Court accepts her attestation that the amount of time she spent on this 12 case, including over twenty hours reviewing the record and drafting the motion for summary 13 judgment, was “necessary” for her to succeed. ECF No. 21-1 ¶ 9; see Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112; 14 Gregy S. v. Saul, 2, 2021 WL 1668059, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2021) (finding, where plaintiff 15 was represented by Katherine Siegfried, that spending 50.4 hours on the case including 20.2 hours 16 on the opening brief was reasonable). The Court finds that the time Plaintiff’s counsel spent 17 litigating this case was reasonable. 18 As the Court has found that Plaintiff’s counsel requested hourly rate and amount of time 19 spent on the case was reasonable, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s overall request for attorney’s fees 20 in the amount of $9,075.38 is reasonable. The Court recognizes that Plaintiff is not requesting fees 21 for the full 38.1 hours listed in her counsel’s invoice but rather for approximately 37.1 hours. 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's application for attorney fees 3 || under the EAJA. Plaintiff is awarded $9,075.38 in attorney’s fees. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 Dated: November 21, 2024 6 7 Lbs._|_ herr

LISA J. QISMEROS

8 fited States Magistrate Judge 9 10 11 12

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