NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 26 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANDRES FERNANDO CABEZAS, No. 23-15369

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:21-cv-06513-RS

v.

MEMORANDUM*

CRAIGSLIST, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Richard Seeborg, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 20, 2024**

Before: CANBY, TALLMAN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

Andres Fernando Cabezas appeals pro se from the district court’s summary

judgment in his action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Med. Lab’y Mgmt. Consultants v.

Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). The district court properly granted summary judgment because Cabezas

failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant knowingly

divulged a record or other information pertaining Cabezas to any governmental

entity, or whether defendant intruded into a private place, conversation, or matter.

See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (setting forth conduct prohibited under the Stored

Communications Act); In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589,

601 (9th Cir. 2020) (setting forth the requirements of a claim for intrusion upon

seclusion); Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998) (“To

prove actionable intrusion, the plaintiff must show the defendant penetrated some

zone of physical or sensory privacy surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to

data about, the plaintiff.”); see also Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll., 83 F.3d 1075,

1081-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that “mere allegation and speculation do not

create a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Cabezas’s

evidentiary objections, denying Cabeza’s motion to compel discovery, or declining

to require defendant to file a responsive pleading. See Tritchler v. County of Lake,

358 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth standard of review for a district

court’s evidentiary rulings); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)

(setting forth standard of review for a district court’s discovery rulings); see also

United States v. W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 509 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that

2 23-15369 “[d]istrict courts have inherent power to control their dockets” (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)). Because defendant was not required to file a

responsive pleading, the district court did not abuse its discretion by not

considering the complaint’s allegations as admitted.

We reject as without merit Cabezas’s contention that the district court was

biased against him or that defense counsel engaged in misconduct.

We do not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett

v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 23-15369