STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In pretrial proceedings on September 25, 2023, the trial court found good cause to

continue the trial based on “what I would say is [a] joint 1050. Each party has filed a

1050.” (See § 1050, subd. (e) [providing for continuation of trial date “upon a showing

of good cause”].) Defense counsel requested the continuance a week earlier based on a

medical procedure scheduled for the trial date, with a two-week recovery period, and the

prosecutor joined in the request. Defendant objected, “Today’s supposed to be my last

day,” but the court explained “your attorney just had surgery, she’s unavailable” and

found good cause for a continuance.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 Defendant testified at trial, as did his girlfriend (Jane Doe) and a third party

witness who was exercising at the park in Temecula where defendant and his girlfriend

had an altercation. The responding police officer also testified. The jury’s verdict

reflects that it credited the witness’s testimony that he heard defendant physically attack

Doe after a heated argument in the park bathroom, saw her “very injured” face when they

exited, and saw defendant drag her “like a rag doll” to his car. Doe confirmed defendant

hit her, but said it was in the stomach; she also testified he struck her in the face with a

water bottle.2 The jury did not believe defendant’s account that it was the witness who

struck Doe in the face, swinging his jump rope as they tried to pass by.

Following the jury’s verdict, the court found in bifurcated proceedings five

aggravating factors (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.421(a)(1), 4.421(a)(3), 4.421(b)(1)-(3))

to be true, as well as a prior strike allegation (§ 667, subd. (c), (e)(1)). The court denied

defendant’s motion to strike the strike. (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)

13 Cal.4th 497.) The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of seven years four

months in prison.

DISCUSSION

In filing his appellate opening brief, counsel set forth a detailed statement of the

case and the facts and requested our independent review under Wende and Anders.

Counsel listed as possible issues for our consideration: (1) Did the trial court violate

defendant’s right to a speedy trial when it found good cause to continue the trial beyond

2 Doe gave birth to defendant’s child a month prior to the incident.

3 the last day under section 1382? (2) Was there sufficient evidence to sustain the corporal

injury to a spouse or cohabitant conviction? (3) Did the sentencing court abuse its

discretion when it denied defendant’s Romero motion? (4) Did the court err when giving

CALCRIM No. 3500 rather than CALCRIM No. 3502, as requested by defendant? If so,

was the error prejudicial?

For his part, defendant contends that when his trial attorney told him about her

upcoming surgery, “I told her I wanted to go propur [sic] . . . or have a different public

defender because it was violating my constitutional rights.” The record does not indicate

defendant sought a Marsden hearing or otherwise made the trial court aware of his

position. (See People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.) Thus, defendant’s claim

furnishes no basis for reversal because it is unsupported by the record on appeal;

furthermore, belated claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not suitable for review

on direct appeal. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.)

Defendant’s remaining contentions are similarly unavailing. These include his

assessment of the relevance that “the victim in this case was not pressing charges” and his

assertions that the third-party witness “lied” in his testimony and was actually the one

who caused Doe’s “bleeding because he was swinging his jump[]rope.” These attempts

to relitigate the trial do not aid defendant because of the bedrock principle of appellate

review: “All of the evidence most favorable to the respondent must be accepted as true,

and that unfavorable discarded as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier

of fact.” (In re Teel’s Estate (1944) 25 Cal.2d 520, 527.) reviewed the record for potential error. We are satisfied that defendant’s attorney has

fully complied with the responsibilities of counsel and no arguable issue exists. (Id. at

p. 126; Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441-442.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MILLER

J.

We concur:

McKINSTER Acting P. J.

FIELDS

J.

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