1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 WILLIAM FURMAN, Individually and Case No.: 23-cv-01777-AJB-DEB for Others Similarly Situated, 14

ORDER GRANTING JOINT

Plaintiff, 15 MOTION FOR SETTLEMENT v. APPROVAL 16

ZEMPLEO, INC.,

17 (Doc. No. 32) Defendant. 18 19 20 Before the Court is a joint motion to approval the parties’ settlement of Plaintiffs’ 21 claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).1 (Doc. No. 32.) Pursuant to Civil 22 Local Rule 7.1.d.1, the Court finds the matter suitable for determination on the papers. For 23 the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the parties’ joint motion. 24

25 26 1 “Plaintiffs” refers to Mr. William Furman (“Mr. Furman”), who initially filed the Complaint, and the twelve individuals who filed written consent forms to opt-in. (See Doc. Nos. 1 (Complaint); 3 (consent 27 of James M. Bass, David Bean, Patsy J. Earnhardt, Scott Hicks, Thomas M. Lassiter, Frank Meyer, Phung Nguyuen, David Bryant Puckett, and Richard Washburn); 5 (consent of Jefferey Bliss and Darren OHare); 28 1 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 The underlying action involves allegations that Defendant Zempleo, Inc. 3 (“Defendant”) misclassified Plaintiffs as exempt from overtime and paid them the same 4 hourly rate for all hours worked, even those over forty hours a week, in violation of 5 § 207(a) and (e) of the FLSA. (Doc. No. 1.) Mr. Furman filed the complaint on September 6 27, 2023 (id.), and twelve additional Plaintiffs subsequently filed written consents opting 7 in (Doc. Nos. 3; 5; 16). 8 After independently engaging in “heated,” “extensive” and “protracted” settlement 9 negotiations, the parties attended an in-person Early Neutral Evaluation (“ENE”) mediated 10 by Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Butcher on June 25, 2024, where at the parties reached a 11 settlement in principle. (Doc. Nos. 31; 32-1 at 13.) The Settlement Agreement was 12 executed on September 5, 2024. (Doc. No. 32-2 at 8.) The next day, the parties filed the 13 instant motion. 14 II. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 15 The Settlement Agreement before the Court includes the following provisions: 16 1. Defendant will pay $150,000.00 to Plaintiffs in exchange for dismissal 17 of their claims. (Doc. No. 32-2 ¶ 12.) 18 2. From the gross settlement amount, $50,000.00 is allocated to Plaintiffs’ 19 Counsel for fees, $2,754.87 is allocated to Plaintiffs’ Counsel for litigation costs, 20 and $7,500.00 is allocated to Mr. Furman as a service award. (Id. ¶¶ 14–15.) 21 3. The net settlement amount is divided amongst Plaintiffs based on their 22 pro rata share, the exact amounts of which are reflected in Exhibit A of the 23 Settlement Agreement. (See Doc. No. 32-2 at 9–10, Exhibit A (“Ex. A”).) Pursuant 24 to the Notice, each Plaintiff’s pro rata share was formulated based on: (1) the date 25 that individual’s opt-in form was filed, (2) the amount of unpaid wages the individual 26 is allegedly owed based on Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s analysis of applicable pay and 27 timekeeping records, and (3) a comparison of the individual’s estimated unpaid 28 1 wages with other Plaintiffs to determine each individual’s share of the net settlement 2 amount. (Doc. No. 32-2 at 11–14, Exhibit B (“Ex. B”), at 12.) 3 4. For tax purposes, the Settlement Agreement classifies 50% of each 4 Plaintiff’s recovery as unpaid wages, subject to withholding, and 50% as liquidated 5 damages, not subject to withholding. (Doc. No. 32-2 ¶ 14.) 6 5. Plaintiffs agree to release “all wage and hour claims, causes of action, 7 rights, and demands, including any claims for wages, overtime, distributions, 8 compensation, expenses, interest, actual or compensatory damages, liquidated 9 damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and costs against [Defendant] arising 10 from September 27, 2020” through the date of court approval. (Id. ¶ 17.) The release 11 includes “any claims that could have been asserted based on the facts alleged in the 12 Lawsuit whether known of unknown.” (Id.) 13 6. In addition to the above and in consideration for the $7,500.00 service 14 award, Mr. Furman additionally releases “any and all claims, whether known or 15 unknown, that he may legally release/waive to the greatest extent possible arising 16 from the beginning of his employment through the date the Court approves this 17 agreement.” (Id.) 18 7. The parties will attempt to informally resolve any dispute that may arise 19 with regard to interpretation or performance of the agreement prior to seeking court 20 intervention. (Id. ¶ 29.) If those efforts are unsuccessful, the parties agree to request 21 an informal conference with Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Butcher. (Id.) 22 III. LEGAL STANDARD 23 “The Ninth Circuit has not established criteria for district courts to consider in 24 determining whether an FLSA settlement should be approved.”2 Kerzich v. Cnty. of 25

26 2 In fact, the Court notes it is an open question in this Circuit whether court approval of FLSA 27 collective action settlements is required at all. See, e.g., Evans v. Centurion Managed Care of Arizona LLC, 686 F. Supp. 3d 880, 883–84 (D. Ariz. 2023) (collecting cases); Rainford v. Freedom Fin. Network 28 1 Tuolumne, 335 F. Supp. 3d 1179, 1184 (E.D. Cal. 2018). District courts in this Circuit 2 frequently apply the Eleventh Circuit’s standard, which looks to whether the settlement is 3 “a fair and reasonable res[o]lution of a bona fide dispute over FLSA provisions.” Lynn’s 4 Food Stores, Inc. v. U.S. By & Through U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Emp. Standards Admin., Wage 5 & Hour Div., 679 F.2d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Kerzich, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 6 1184 (collecting cases applying Lynn’s Food Stores). 7 IV. DISCUSSION 8 A. Bona Fide Dispute 9 “A bona fide dispute exists when there are legitimate questions about the existence 10 and extent of the defendant’s FLSA liability.” Medina v. Evolve Mortg. Servs., LLC, 718 11 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (quoting Jennings v. Open Door Mktg., LLC, 12 2018 WL 4773057, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018)). “If there is no question that the FLSA 13 entitles plaintiffs to the compensation they seek, then a court will not approve a settlement 14 because to do so would allow the employer to avoid the full cost of complying with the 15 statute.” Selk v. Pioneers Mem’l Healthcare Dist., 159 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1172 (S.D. Cal. 16 2016). 17 Here, the parties dispute (1) whether Plaintiffs were properly classified as exempt 18 from overtime pay, (2) whether Plaintiffs were required to pursue their claims in individual 19 arbitration, (3) whether Defendant acted in good faith or with reckless disregard, (4) the 20 number of hours Plaintiffs worked, and (5) whether Plaintiffs were similarly situated. (Doc. 21 No. 32-1 at 9; Doc. No. 32-3, Declaration of William Hogg (“Hogg Decl.”), at ¶¶ 9, 14.) 22 23 24 Employees’ Ret. Sys., 716 F. Supp. 3d 1006, 1010 (D. Nev. 2024) (“As it stands today, the Court concludes 25 that Rule 41(a)(1)(A) and FLSA’s text do not require judicial approval of individual FLSA settlements, and in doing so, it joins the growing number of courts which hold the same.”); Kennedy v. El Centro Reg’l 26 Med. Ctr., No. 22-CV-01522-JLS-LR, 2024 WL 1361838, at *2–*4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2024) (holding that the FLSA is not “an applicable federal statute” under Rule 41(a)(1)(A), so judicial approval of the 27 settlement is not required before the parties move to dismiss the case). However, recognizing that court approval may not be required, the Court proceeds with analyzing the instant settlement agreement at the 28 1 The parties investigated Plaintiffs’ claims through informal discovery of Plaintiffs’ payroll 2 data, timekeeping data, and other documents. (Hogg Decl. ¶ 15.) Defendant continues to 3 deny any wrongdoing. (Doc. No. 32-1 at 6–7.) Accordingly, the Court finds a bona fide 4 dispute exists. 5 B. Reasonableness and Fairness of Settlement 6 “After a district court is satisfied that a bona fide dispute exists, it must then 7 determine whether the settlement is fair and reasonable.” Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1172. In 8 light of both the similarities and differences between FLSA collective actions and Rule 23 9 class actions, “many courts have adopted a totality of circumstances approach” that 10 considers “(1) the plaintiff’s range of possible recovery; (2) the stage of proceedings and 11 amount of discovery completed; (3) the seriousness of the litigation risks faced by the 12 parties; (4) the scope of any release provision in the settlement agreement; (5) the 13 experience and views of counsel and the opinion of participating plaintiffs; and (6) the 14 possibility of fraud or collusion.” Id at 1173 (collecting cases). 15 1. Range of Possible Recovery 16 “A district court evaluates the plaintiff’s range of potential recovery to ensure that 17 the settlement amount agreed to bears some reasonable relationship to the true settlement 18 value of the claims.” Medina, 718 F. Supp. 3d at 1172 (quoting Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 19 1174). 20 Here, Plaintiffs’ Counsel estimates that Plaintiffs’ maximum possible recovery at 21 trial would likely be $392,534.77 in unpaid wages and $392,534.77 in liquidated damages. 22 (Doc. No. 32-1 at 10.) Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiffs will receive 23 $89,745.12, which is approximately 23% of Plaintiffs’ maximum potential unpaid wages 24 and “over 11% of that best-possible-day-at-trial result.” (Id.) 25 In light of the extent the parties dispute Plaintiffs’ claims and the uncertainty of 26 recovery if litigation were to continue, the Court finds that the settlement amount reflects 27 a reasonable compromise over issues that are actually in dispute. See, e.g., Wonderly v. 28 Youngblood, No. 116CV01621BAKSKO, 2022 WL 378262, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2022) 1 (finding “approximately 22% of Plaintiff’s maximum damages analysis” to be “a 2 reasonable compromise and within the range of reasonableness for wage and hour 3 actions”); Jennings, 2018 WL 4773057, at *5 (finding 16% recovery reasonable stating 4 that “the significant discount that the settlement represents compared to the full verdict 5 value of the case is justified by the significant risks at issue, which could preclude all 6 liability”); Saleh v. Valbin Corp., No. 17-CV-00593-LHK, 2018 WL 6002320, at *3 (N.D. 7 Cal. Nov. 15, 2018) (finding reasonable a settlement where the range of recovery was 8 between 18.87% and 37.74%). Thus, this factor weighs in favor of approval. 9 2. Stage of Proceedings and Amount of Discovery Completed 10 “The Court assesses the stage of proceedings and the amount of discovery completed 11 to ensure the parties have an adequate appreciation of the merits of the case before reaching 12 a settlement.” Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1177; see also Grady v. RCM Techs., Inc., 671 F. 13 Supp. 3d 1065, 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (“A plaintiff will not be able to broker a fair 14 settlement without having been armed with sufficient information about the case to have 15 been able to reasonably assess its strengths and value.”) (citation omitted). 16 Here, although the parties reached settlement early in the proceedings, the parties 17 argue that the negotiations themselves “spann[ed] nearly a full year.” (Doc. No. 32-1 at 18 13.) Additionally, to evaluate Plaintiffs’ claims and facilitate settlement, the parties 19 exchanged “comprehensive information and data through informal discovery,” including 20 the payroll and timekeeping records for Plaintiffs. (Id. at 8, 13; Hogg Decl. ¶¶ 9, 15.) 21 Finally, the parties assert that both Plaintiffs’ Counsel and Defense Counsel “have 22 extensive knowledge of the alleged violative pay practice at issue here from previous 23 litigation involving Zempleo, as they underwent a similar data exchange and settlement 24 discussion for a previous case.” (Doc. No. 32-1 at 13.) 25 Based on the parties’ assertions regarding the discovery conducted in the instant and 26 prior litigation regarding Defendant’s alleged wage-and-hour violations, the Court finds 27 the parties have sufficient information to reasonably assess the strengths and weaknesses 28 of Plaintiffs’ claims. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of approval. 1 3. Seriousness of Litigation Risks 2 “In most situations, unless the settlement is clearly inadequate, its acceptance and 3 approval are preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with uncertain results.” Medina, 4 718 F. Supp. 3d at 1173 (quoting Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 5 F.R.D. 523, 526 (C.D. Cal. 2004)). 6 As discussed supra §§ IV.A and IV.B.1, the parties dispute a number of issues, 7 resolution of which would require the parties to incur “substantial attorneys’ fees and costs 8 in conducting formal discovery, motion practice (including hotly contested motions over 9 whether to send court-authorized FLSA notice to additional potential opt-in plaintiffs, 10 motion(s) to compel arbitration, and dispositive motions), trial preparation, and potential 11 appeals.” (Doc. No. 32-1 at 11–12.) By settling now, the parties cap the cost of litigation 12 and Plaintiffs receive a sum-certain recovery immediately. (See Doc. No. 32-2 ¶ 13 13 (stipulating that Defendant will deliver checks to Plaintiffs’ Counsel within 10 days of 14 court approval and Plaintiffs’ Counsel will mail said checks within 7 days of receipt).) 15 The Court is satisfied that “there is a significant risk that litigation might result in a 16 lesser recovery for the class or no recovery at all.” Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1175–76 17 (internal punctuation and citation omitted). Thus, this factor weighs in favor of settlement. 18 4. Scope of Release Provisions 19 “Courts review the scope of any release provision in a FLSA settlement to ensure 20 that class members are not pressured into forfeiting claims, or waiving rights, unrelated to 21 the litigation.” Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1178. Generally, “[a] settlement agreement may 22 preclude a party from bringing a related claim in the future ‘even though the claim was not 23 presented and might not have been presentable in the class action,’ but only where the 24 released claim is ‘based on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the claims in 25 the settled class action.’” Hesse v. Sprint Corp., 598 F.3d 581, 590 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 26 Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120, 1133 (9th Cir. 2008)). 27 Though broad in scope, Plaintiffs’ release is limited to those claims based upon the 28 facts set forth in the Complaint. (Doc. No. 32-2 ¶ 17.) Because the release grounds itself in 1 the factual allegations of the Complaint, the Court is satisfied that the release does not force 2 Plaintiffs to forfeit unrelated claims. See, e.g., Nen Thio v. Genji, LLC, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1324, 3 1334 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (approving a similar release and collecting cases); Selk, 159 F. Supp. 4 3d at 1178–79 (approving a similar release). 5 In exchange for $7,500.00, Mr. Furman additionally agrees to release any claims 6 against Defendant “arising from the beginning of his employment through the date the 7 Court approves th[e Settlement A]greement.” (Doc. No. 32-2 ¶ 17.) Although this release 8 extends beyond the FLSA claims at issue, the separate payment Mr. Furman is to receive 9 in addition to his pro-rata share of the settlement fund justifies the broad release. See Selk, 10 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1179 (approving a similar release where the plaintiff received an 11 additional $5,500.00). 12 Although this factor does not weigh heavily in favor of approval, the Court does not 13 find that the release provisions in the Settlement Agreement make the agreement as a whole 14 unreasonable. 15 5. Opinion of Counsel and Participating Plaintiffs 16 “Parties represented by competent counsel are better positioned than courts to 17 produce a settlement that fairly reflects each party’s expected outcome in the litigation.” In 18 re Pac. Enter. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1995). As such, “the opinions of 19 counsel should be given considerable weight both because of counsel’s familiarity with the 20 litigation and previous experience with cases.” Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1176 (internal 21 punctuation and citation omitted). 22 Here, Plaintiffs are represented by Josephson Dunlap LLP, which Plaintiffs’ Counsel 23 asserts is “regarded as a leading private plaintiff’s firm in employment class and collective 24 actions.” (Hogg Decl. ¶ 6.) Specifically, the lead attorney for Plaintiffs—Mr. William 25 Hogg—is a senior attorney with 10 years of experience, specializing in wage-and-hour 26 litigation pursuant to the FLSA and similar state laws. (Id. ¶ 5.) In light of his significant 27 experience with wage-and-hour claims generally and with claims against Defendant in 28 1 particular, Plaintiffs’ Counsel views this settlement as “an excellent result for the Plaintiffs 2 given the risks and costs associated with continued litigation.” (Id. ¶ 10.) 3 Additionally, none of the twelve opt-in Plaintiffs have filed objections. 4 Considering both Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s support of the settlement and the lack of any 5 objections by Plaintiffs, this factor weighs in favor of approval. 6 6. Possibility of Fraud or Collusion 7 In determining reasonableness, courts scrutinize for “explicit collusion” and “more 8 subtle signs that class counsel have allowed pursuit of their own self-interests and that of 9 certain [plaintiffs] to infect the negotiations.” In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 10 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011). 11 Here, the parties were engaged in “heated settlement negotiations for the better part 12 of a full year,” and the eventual settlement was only reached with the help of Magistrate 13 Judge Daniel E. Butcher. (Doc. No. 32-1 at 15.) Reaching settlement through court- 14 facilitated mediation supports the conclusion that the process was not collusive. Cf. Millan 15 v. Cascade Water Servs., Inc., 310 F.R.D. 593, 613 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (“Participation in 16 mediation prior to a settlement tends to support the conclusion that the settlement process 17 was not collusive.”). Additionally, the damages calculations, settlement amount, and 18 allocation plan were derived from Plaintiffs’ individual pay and timekeeping records. (Doc. 19 No. 32-1 at 15.) The grounding of each Plaintiffs’ recovery in analysis of this data “guards 20 against the arbitrariness that might suggest collusion.” Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1179. 21 Having found no indications, either explicit or implicit, of collusion or fraud, this 22 factor weighs in favor of approval. 23 7. Conclusion 24 Having considered the relevant factors, the representations of the parties, and the 25 docket as a whole, the Court concludes that the Settlement Agreement is a fair and 26 reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute over FLSA coverage. 27 /// 28 /// 1 C. Reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Requested Fees & Costs 2 The FLSA contemplates an award of “reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the 3 defendant, and costs of the action.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Here, the Settlement Agreement 4 allocates $50,000.00 for Plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees and $2.754.87 for litigation costs. (Doc. 5 Nos. 32-1 at 7, 15–19; 32-2 ¶ 15; Hogg Decl. ¶ 12.) 6 “In a common fund case, such as this, the district court has the discretion to choose 7 between either the lodestar or the percentage-of-fund methods when calculating fees.” 8 Stanger v. China Elec. Motor, Inc., 812 F.3d 734, 738 (9th Cir. 2016). “Under the 9 percentage-of-recovery method, the attorneys’ fees equal some percentage of the common 10 settlement fund; in this circuit, the benchmark percentage is 25%.” In re Online DVD- 11 Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934, 949 (9th Cir. 2015). However, “the benchmark 12 percentage ‘can be adjusted upward or downward, depending on the circumstances.’” In re 13 Apple Inc. Device Performance Litig., 50 F.4th 769, 784 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Kim, 8 14 F.4th at 1181); see also In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d at 954–55 15 (listing factors courts may consider). “Whichever method is chosen, courts often employ 16 the other method as a cross-check that the award is reasonable.” In re Apple Inc. Device 17 Performance Litig., 50 F.4th 769, 784 (9th Cir. 2022). 18 In light of the risks associated with continued litigation and the recovery obtained 19 for Plaintiffs, both discussed supra §§ IV.A, IV.B.1 and IV.B.3, and considering the 20 contingency basis of Plaintiffs’ representation, the Court finds $50,000.00 attorney’s fee 21 award a reasonable percent of the fund. Although above the benchmark, district courts in 22 this Circuit have consistently approved similar awards in FLSA collective actions. See, 23 e.g., Anspach v. 68-444 Perez, Inc., No. EDCV192184JGBSPX, 2022 WL , at *6 (C.D. 24 Cal. Apr. 21, 2022) (45%); Shafer v. Red Tie, LLC, No. CV 20-5726 PSG (PVCX), 2022 25 WL 22879648, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2022) (45%); McKinnon v. City of Merced, No. 26 118CV01124NONESAB, 2020 WL 4813206, at *15 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2020), report and 27 recommendation adopted, No. 118CV01124NONESAB, 2020 WL 5658363 (E.D. Cal. 28 Sept. 23, 2020) (42.85%); Kerzich v. Cnty. of Tuolumne, No. 116CV01116DADSAB, 2019 1 WL 1755496, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2019) (28%); Madrid v. teleNetwork Partners, 2 LTD., No. 5:17-CV-04519-BLF, 2019 WL 3302812, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2019) (30%). 3 Moreover, the lodestar analysis supports the reasonableness of these fees. Josephson 4 Dunlap LLP attorneys and staff billed 74.2 hours at locality-adjusted rates for this District.3 5 (Hogg Decl. ¶¶ 13, 18–22.) Specifically, Mr. Hogg billed $40,731.97 (68.1 hours at an 6 adjusted hourly rate of $575) and three paralegals billed $1,122.28 (6.1 hours at an adjusted 7 hourly rate of $183.98), for a combined total of $41,854.25. (Id.) Mr. Hogg additionally 8 avers that he exercised “billing judgment to reduce time entries that might be viewed by 9 the Court as excessive or duplicative, or that were billed by attorneys who intended to but 10 ultimately did not apply for admission pro hac vice in this matter.” (Hogg Decl. ¶ 13.) The 11 resulting lodestar multiplier is approximately 1.19, which is an upward adjustment of less 12 than the percentage-of-fund adjustment reflected by the one-third request. 13 Thus, the Court finds the stipulated one-third percent of the recovery reasonable and 14 APPROVES the Settlement Agreement with regard to attorneys’ fees. 15 D. Litigation Costs 16 “Attorneys may recover their reasonable expenses that would typically be billed to 17 paying clients in non-contingency matters.” Medina, 718 F. Supp. 3d at 1177 (awarding 18 $9,500 in costs for an FLSA collective action). The Settlement Agreement allocates 19 $2,754.87 to reimburse Plaintiffs’ Counsel for litigation costs incurred in attending the 20 ENE ($2,629.77), PACER search costs ($0.10), and anticipated mailing costs to send 21 settlement checks to Plaintiffs via Priority Mail ($125.00). (Doc. Nos. 32-1 at 7; 32-2 ¶ 15; 22 Hogg Decl. ¶ 17.) The Court finds these expenses reasonable and of the nature typically 23 billed to paying clients, particularly considering that the expenses center on Mr. Furman 24 25

26 3 From the Court’s analysis, the values and calculations provided in the instant motion and 27 supporting declaration have slight errors, which result in a multiplier five-hundredths larger than that the Court calculates. For accuracy, the Court relies upon the data provided in the billing records rather than 28 1 and Mr. Hogg’s attendance at the ENE, which resulted in settlement. Accordingly, the 2 Court APPROVES the requested $2,754.87 in litigation costs. 3 E. Mr. Furman’s Service Award 4 “At its discretion, a district court may award an incentive payment to the named 5 plaintiffs in a FLSA collective action to compensate them for work done on behalf of the 6 class.” Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1181. 7 Here, the Settlement Agreement allocates $7,500.00 to Mr. Furman, in addition to 8 his pro rata share of the settlement, as a service award. (Doc. No. 32-2 ¶ 14.) The parties 9 argue that the award is reasonable to compensate Mr. Furman for his efforts advancing the 10 litigation, for “taking on significant risk in suing his employer,” and for executing a wider 11 release of claims. (Doc. No. 32-1 at 20.) Although the parties did not provide 12 documentation of the precise amount of time and effort Mr. Furman expended, it is clear 13 that all Plaintiffs benefitted from Mr. Furman’s decision to file suit and his participation in 14 the action, including his participation in a 6.5-hour ENE that resulted in this settlement. 15 Additionally, Mr. Furman assumed the risk of being publicly identified as having sued his 16 employer. See Millan, 310 F.R.D. at 613 (quoting Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 17 F.3d 948, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2009)) (“Incentive awards for class representatives ‘are fairly 18 typical in class action cases’ and appropriate in wage-and-hour actions where plaintiffs 19 undertake a significant ‘reputational risk.’”). Finally, the award is similar to those approved 20 in other FLSA collective actions. See Medina v. Evolve Mortg. Servs., LLC, 718 F. Supp. 21 3d 1162, 1178 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (collecting cases where $7,000.00 to $7,500.00 was 22 awarded as reasonable). 23 Accordingly, the Court APPROVES the requested $7,500.00 incentive award for 24 Plaintiff William Furman. 25 IV. CONCLUSION 26 For the reasons stated above, the Court APPROVES the instant settlement 27 agreement and GRANTS the parties joint motion (Doc. No. 32). The parties are 28 DIRECTED to file a Joint Motion for Dismissal of the action no later than one week from | docketing of this Order. If the parties intend Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Butcher to 2 ||retain jurisdiction over enforcement of the Settlement Agreement, the parties are advised 3 || to fully execute the requisite Consent form and lodge it with the Clerk’s Office pursuant to 4 || Civil Local Rule 73.1 in advance of filing the Joint Motion for Dismissal. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: December 9, 2024

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