1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 San Francisco Division 11 DIGITAL REVOLUTION MEDIA Case No. 24-cv-06234-LB

CENTER, LLC,

12 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO Plaintiff, REMAND CASE 13 v. Re: ECF No. 11 14

SENTINEL INSURANCE COMPANY,

15 LTD., 16 Defendant.

17 18 INTRODUCTION 19 This case is about a disputed insurance claim. Digital Revolution Media Center, LLC, bought a 20 policy from Sentinel Insurance Company, Ltd., that covered certain losses of its business property. 21 While Digital Revolution was moving to a new office, someone stole a U-Haul truck containing its 22 equipment, including equipment for digitizing and duplicating analog media. Digital submitted a 23 claim to Sentinel for $69,309.12, the replacement value of the equipment. Sentinel paid $9,654.50, 24 calculating a different replacement value and depreciating the property.1 Digital sued Sentinel in 25 26

27 1 First Am. Compl. (FAC), Ex. 2 to Notice of Removal – ECF No. 1-2 at 3–5 (¶¶ 7–12). Citations refer 1 state court, and Sentinel removed the case to federal court, asserting diversity jurisdiction.2 Digital 2 moved to remand on the ground that the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000.3 Because 3 Sentinel has proven the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence, the court denies 4 the motion. 5 STATEMENT 6 Digital Revolution duplicates and digitizes analog media, like films and magnetic tapes. This 7 requires machines capable of playing dozens of formats.4 In June 2023, Digital purchased an 8 insurance policy for its equipment from Sentinel.5 In September 2023, while Digital was moving 9 to a new office in San Francisco, someone stole a U-Haul with its equipment.6 It submitted a claim 10 to Sentinel for $69,309.12, the replacement value of the equipment, and submitted photographs 11 and a sales quote to support the claim.7 Sentinel paid $9,654.80 based on a $250 deductible, a 12 replacement value of $37,585.17 (by pricing the equipment at “basic” versions, not the 13 professional-level equipment that Digital actually used), and depreciating the property by 14 $27,680.67 based on the age of the equipment.8 The difference between the amount claimed and 15 the amount paid thus is $59,404. 16 Digital contacted Sentinel multiple times to demand the policy limit. Sentinel delayed in 17 responding, refused to further investigate the claim, instead referred to the equipment as 18 “obsolete,” and disparaged Digital.9 Digital thus incurred attorney’s fees, was unable to replace 19 the equipment, and lost work and income.10 20 Digital sued Sentinel in state court for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good 21

22 2 Notice of Removal – ECF No. 1 at 1 (¶ 1). 23 3 Mot. – ECF No. 11. 4 FAC, Ex. 2 to Notice of Removal – ECF No. 1-2 at 4 (¶ 10). 24 5 Id. at 3 (¶ 7). 25 6 Id. at 4 (¶ 10). 26 7 Id. (¶ 11). 8 Id. at 5 (¶ 12). 27 9 Id. (¶ 13). 1 faith and fair dealing.11 It asks for general damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and costs 2 of the lawsuit.12 Its claim for punitive damages is based on Sentinel’s allegedly oppressive, 3 fraudulent, and malicious conduct.13 4 Sentinel removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 5 1332(a)(1).14 In its notice of removal, it asserts that for the contested issue of punitive damages, a 6 conservative multiplier of 1x means that at least $59,404 in punitive damages are in controversy, for 7 a total of $118,808.15 In its opposition — based on the claim for breach of the implied covenant of 8 good faith and fair dealing and the resulting damages of attorney’s fees, the inability to replace 9 equipment, and the resulting loss of work and income — Sentinel’s declarant, who has forty-plus 10 years of experience litigating insurance bad-faith disputes, estimated the plaintiff’s fees through 11 summary judgment. Public-record billing submissions establish that about six years ago, lead counsel 12 — a principal of a “well-regarded policyholder firm” — billed clients $900 an hour, and his 13 associates billed $450. Using those rates, the parties’ correspondence in the claims files, and 14 estimates of hours of work with partner/associate splits, Sentinel estimated the following fees:16 15 Activity Hours Rate Fees 16 Initial Correspondence with Sentinel (reflected in the claims file) 4 $900 $3,600 17 Draft Complaint 1 $900 $900 18 1 $450 $450 19 Draft Motion to Remand 4 $450 $1,800 20 Draft Reply 3 $450 $1,350 21 Rule 26 Meeting 1.5 $900 $1,350 22 23 24 11 Compl., Ex. 1 to Notice of Removal – ECF No. 1-1; FAC, Ex. 2 to id. – ECF No. 1-2. 12 FAC, Ex. 2 to id. – ECF No. 1-2 at 7 (Prayer for Relief). 25 13 Id. at 5 (¶ 16). 26 14 Notice of Removal – ECF No. 1 at 1 (¶ 1). 27 15 Id. at 2 (¶ 5). 16 1 Draft Joint Case-Management Statement 2 $450 $900 2 Hearing on Motion to Remand 1 $900 $900 3 Appearance at Initial Case-Management Conference 1 $900 $900 4 Draft Initial Disclosures; Produce Discovery 5 $450 $2,250 5 Defend Deposition of Plaintiff’s Principal, Including Preparation 10 $900 $9,000 6 Depose Two Defense Witnesses, Including Preparation 10 $900 $9,000 7 Oppose Summary-Judgment Motion 3 $900 $2,700 8 12 $450 $5,400 9 Summary-Judgment Hearing 1 $900 $900 10 Total 60 $41,400 11 For punitive damages, Sentinel searched for verdicts (excluding health-insurance and disability 12 verdicts) and located one verdict from 2016 — Mazik v. Geico General Insurance Co. — where 13 the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages was 3.33:1.17 It searched Westlaw for 14 federal trial or appellate decisions and California appellate decisions and located two decisions in 15 a similar time period: Borjon Auto Center King City, Inc. v. Sentry Select Insurance Co., 2023 WL 16 3734982 (Cal. App. May 31, 2023) (ratio 3.99:1) and Victaulic Co. v. American Home Assurance 17 Co., 80 Cal. App. 5th 485, 490–91,496 (2022) (5:57:1, reversed on appeal).18 18 Digital Revolution moved to remand the case to state court based on Sentinel’s alleged failure 19 to satisfy the amount in controversy.19 The parties consented to magistrate-judge jurisdiction.20 28 20 U.S.C. § 636(c). The court held a hearing on December 5, 2024. 21

22 23 24 25 17 Downs Decl. – ECF No. 12-1 at 3 (¶ 6) & Ex. 6 to id. – ECF No. 12-7 (head-on collision with uninsured driver; GEICO disputed the amount of plaintiff’s claimed injuries); Def.’s Suppl. Br. – ECF 26 No. 20 at 1. 18 Id. (¶ 7) (says that Borjon was reversed too, but the Court of Appeal affirmed). 27 19 Mot. – ECF No. 12. 1 ANALYSIS 2 A defendant may remove a case to federal court if the plaintiff could have filed the case here, 3 meaning, if the court has federal-question or diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); 4 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Because district courts are courts of 5 limited jurisdiction, courts construe the removal statute strictly and reject federal jurisdiction if 6 there is any doubt as to the right of removal. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 7 375, 377 (1994). The removing party has the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction. 8 Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988). 9 The basis for removal here is diversity jurisdiction. For diversity jurisdiction, the amount in 10 controversy must “exceed[] the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs,” and 11 there must be complete diversity of citizenship between opposing parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); 12 Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). The parties dispute only whether the amount-in- 13 controversy requirement has been satisfied. 14 “The amount in controversy includes claims for general and special damages (excluding costs 15 and interests), attorney’s fees if recoverable by statute or contract, and punitive damages if 16 recoverable as a matter of law.” J. Marymount, Inc. v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, No. C 09-03110 17 JSW, 2009 WL 4510126, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2009) (cleaned up). Where “it is unclear or 18 ambiguous from the face of a state-court complaint whether the requisite amount in controversy is 19 pled, the removing defendant bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the 20 evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Urbino v. Orkin 21 Servs. of Cal., Inc., 726 F.3d 1118, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). 22 When the plaintiff does not dispute the amount in controversy, “a defendant’s notice of 23 removal need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the 24 jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). 25 But if the plaintiff contests the amount in controversy, then “[e]vidence establishing the amount is 26 required,” and “both sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, 27 whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Id. at 87–89 (no need for 1 submit evidence outside the complaint, including affidavits or declarations, or other summary- 2 judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.” Ibarra v. 3 Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). 4 Sentinel’s burden is to show more than $75,000, inclusive of fees and costs. 5 A preliminary issue is the level of proof Sentinel needs to meet its burden: it says that it does 6 not need to submit evidence because Digital makes only a facial challenge.21 Digital counters that 7 Dart Cherokee rejected this argument: a plaintiff need not introduce evidence about the amount in 8 controversy to put Sentinel to its burden.22 A defendant’s notice of removal needs only to have 9 plausible allegations of jurisdictional elements. Salter v. Quality Carriers, Inc., 974 F.3d 959, 964 10 (9th Cir. 2020). This issue here is whether the allegations of damages are plausible. Given the 11 plaintiff’s challenge to its allegations in the notice of removal, Sentinel provided additional 12 evidence and information in its opposition to support its jurisdictional allegations. 13 There is undisputedly at least $59,404.62 in controversy, leaving an additional $15,595.39 to 14 reach $75,000.01. Sentinel contends that there are two grounds to plausibly reach this number: 15 damages attributable to the bad-faith claim and punitive damages.23 16 17 1. Damages for Bad-Faith Claim — Attorney’s Fees 18 A plaintiff can recover reasonable attorney’s fees that would not have been incurred but for the 19 defendant insurer’s tortious conduct or bad faith. Brandt v. Super. Ct., 37 Cal. 3d 813, 817 (1985) 20 (cleaned up) (“When an insurer’s tortious conduct reasonably compels the insured to retain an 21 attorney to obtain the benefits due under a policy, it follows that the insurer should be liable in a 22 tort action for that expense. . . . What we consider here is attorney’s fees that are recoverable as 23 damages resulting from a tort in the same way that medical fees would be part of the damages in a 24 personal injury action.”). Only attorney’s fees incurred in obtaining benefits under the insurance 25 26 21 Opp’n – ECF No. 12 at 4 27 22 Reply – ECF No.13 at 2. 1 contract are recoverable, and “fees attributable to obtaining any portion of the plaintiff’s award 2 which exceeds the amount due under the policy are not recoverable.” Id. at 816–19 (cleaned up). 3 Attorney’s fees recoverable under Brandt count toward establishing the amount in 4 controversy. Conrad Assocs. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (N.D. 5 Cal. 1998) (“Since the amount in controversy may include attorney’s fees if recoverable by statute 6 or contract, attorney’s fees recoverable under Brandt may be considered in determining whether 7 the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional floor.”). 8 In calculating attorney’s fees for purposes of determining the amount in controversy, courts 9 require “the removing defendant to make a reasonably specific showing as to why the projected 10 fee award is appropriate.” Sley v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 5:16-cv-04882-HRL, 2017 WL 11 2114773, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2017). The calculation must be “reasonable, conservative, and 12 based upon evidence,” which can include “a survey of relevant decisions from other courts.” Id. 13 (cleaned up). “[W]hen a defendant’s allegations of removal jurisdiction are challenged, the 14 defendant’s showing on the amount in controversy may rely on reasonable assumptions.” Arias v. 15 Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 2019). 16 Sentinel points to the plaintiff’s claim for damages for the breach of the implied covenant of 17 good faith and fair dealing: attorney’s fees, inability to replace equipment, and the resulting loss of 18 work and income.24 It then estimates attorney’s fees. Public-record billing practices of the plaintiff’s 19 law firm, a “well-regarded policyholder firm,” show billing rates of $900 an hour for lead counsel 20 and $450 an hour for associates. Sentinel’s fees calculation (based on its declarant’s forty-plus years 21 litigating insurance bad-faith disputes) has conservative estimates of the time that will be spent by 22 partners and associates, totaling $41,400 through summary judgment. It applies a fifty-percent 23 discount to eliminate the fees that are not recoverable. Half of $41,400 is $20,700, which is an 24 amount in controversy of $80,104.62 (based on the undisputed $59,404.62).25 25 26

27 24 Id. at 4–5 (citing FAC, Ex. 2 to Notice of Removal – ECF No. 1-2 at 5 (¶ 15)). 1 The plaintiff counters that fees calculations are speculative for four reasons: (1) Sentinel has not 2 asked for discovery of the plaintiff’s fee agreement; (2) attorney’s fees are recoverable only for an 3 attorney’s work to recover contract benefits (and not for work to obtain extra-contractual damages); 4 (3) the fees estimate is not tied to any “specific factors” tied to this case (such as the factor that 5 summary-judgment motions often are brought only for claims of bad faith and punitive damages, 6 not for breach of contract); and (4) Sentinel has not cited relevant fee awards in other cases.26 7 One, as to the lack of discovery of the actual fee arrangement, fee agreements define the 8 plaintiff’s and counsel’s respective agreements and risks. That seemingly is a different issue than the 9 recovery of fees as damages for a failure to pay contract benefits. Then, the issue is the 10 reasonableness of the assumptions here. The hourly rates are based on counsel’s actual rates six years 11 ago. The estimates of hours reasonably expended are based on the defense declarant’s substantial 12 experience litigating similar cases. The plaintiff does not dispute the reasonableness of the hourly 13 rates or the time expended (and instead, as discussed in the next section, challenges the allocation of 14 hours between contract benefits and extra-contractual recovery). The estimated hours are 15 conservative and based on reasonably specific assumptions. 16 Two, turning to the reasonableness of the fees by category, enough fees are necessary for 17 recovery of contract benefits to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement. 18 For example, four hours for drafting the actual initial correspondence with Sentinel ($3,600) is a 19 “reasonably specific showing,” even without the fee arrangement, of a recoverable fee necessarily 20 addressed to the recovery of contractual policy limits. See Sley, 2017 WL 2114773, at *2–3 (fees up 21 to the point of removal are recoverable); Sasser v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. C 08-3793 SI, 2008 WL 22 4532562, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2008) (same). A fifty-percent discount is reasonable, given the 23 nature of the claims process. Similarly, the fifty-percent discount that Sentinel applies is a 24 reasonably specific tethering of the tasks for the initial work to recovery of policy limits (as 25 opposed to extra-contractual damages). The court has the complaint, the motion to remand, and the 26 reply, and it held the hearing on the motion, which provides a record for this conclusion. Moving 27 1 the case forward also is equally necessary to recover contract benefits, including participating in the 2 Rule 26 conference, drafting the case-management statement, appearing at the case-management 3 conference, drafting the initial disclosures, and producing documents. These are routine tasks that 4 are not complicated. Applying the fifty-percent discount results in a reasonably specific showing of 5 the fees likely incurred. 6 The fees for these steps are $13,950. Discounted by fifty percent, they are $6,975, leaving 7 $8,620.39 needed to reach the amount in controversy. 8 The next categories are depositions and summary judgment. The plaintiff’s only challenge is to 9 summary judgment: it says that sixteen hours is excessive because time spent for this work often is 10 not recoverable because motions for summary judgment typically are brought only for claims for 11 bad faith and punitive damages, not breach of contract.27 But even taking the fees for summary 12 judgment entirely off the table, and discounting fees for depositions by fifty percent (again a 13 reasonably specific approach given the nature of the litigation), that yields $9,000, satisfying the 14 amount in controversy. 15 The plaintiff also contends that Sentinel did not cite fee awards in other cases.28 The defendant’s 16 showing about an appropriate award can include a survey of other decisions. Sley, 2017 WL 17 2114773, at *3. There are cases with surveys. Freeman v. Canseco Servs. LLC, No. C06-06019 18 MJJ, 2006 WL 8443468, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2006) (collecting jury verdicts that resulted in fee 19 awards, including (1) a 2005 award of $91,000 in Brandt fees for a claim for $47,962 in 20 compensatory damages under the policy and (2) a 1994 award of $28,199 in Brandt fees for a claim 21 of $46,642 in compensatory damages). The showing here is sufficient, even without citation to other 22 fee awards, because it is a conservative estimate based on the counsel’s own rates with a discount 23 reflecting an appropriate allocation — under the circumstances of this case — to Brandt fees. 24 25 26

27 27 Id. at 7. 1 The plaintiff cites cases where courts have dismissed valuations of attorney’s fees as speculative 2 and based on unsupported assumptions.29 The cases do not change the outcome: the fee estimates 3 there were proportionately larger than those here and were untethered to reasonable hourly rates and 4 approximations of the work needed for Brandt fees. 5 Elias v. Integon Preferred Insurance Co. was a case involving an insurance company’s bad-faith 6 refusal to pay uninsured motorist benefits. No. 2:24-cv-01981-WLH-RAOx, 2024 WL 2732228, at 7 *1 (C.D. Cal. May 28, 2024). The complaint did not specify damages. The estimated fees there 8 were $71,700 (for work through a seven-day trial) based on counsel’s “experience and specific 9 factors” in this case. The court dismissed this as speculative because counsel did not explain what 10 specific factors led him to make the estimates. Id. at *2. By contrast, here, there is undisputedly 11 $59,404.62 in controversy, leaving only $15,595.39 in fees to establish the amount in controversy. 12 The fees are calculated only to summary judgment. Cf. Sasser, 2008 WL 4532562, at *4 13 (characterizing estimate based on a four-day trial as “excessive”). The estimates here are based on 14 counsel’s actual rates (albeit six years ago, further suggesting their reasonableness). There are 15 conservative hourly estimates by task that the plaintiff has not challenged. And there is a fifty/fifty 16 allocation of the fees between contract benefits and extra-contractual recovery, an allocation that the 17 plaintiff contests specifically only with an argument that fees for summary judgment often are not 18 recoverable, an argument that the court credited fully by eliminating the fees for these tasks. 19 Gonzalez v. General Insurance Co. of America involved an insurer’s failure to pay policy 20 benefits when a barn on the plaintiff’s property burned down. No. 1:18-cv-01531-DAD-BAM, 2019 21 WL 698057, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2019). The plaintiff’s claim was approximately $82,000, but 22 about one month before removal, the defendant insurer paid her $60,817.14, reducing the policy- 23 limit claim to about $21,000. Id. at *2. The defendant contended that through trial, the plaintiff 24 would spend more than $75,000, more than the roughly $54,000 needed to satisfy the amount in 25 controversy. Id. It predicated this on (1) the drafting counsel’s representation that he billed $500 an 26 hour and estimated ten hours of work on the motion to remand (for a total of $5,000), (2) the drafter 27 1 was not lead counsel, and it was reasonable to think that other billers would bill more, and (3) 2 assuming 500 hours to trial, fees would be $250,000. Discounting by seventy percent (to $75,000) 3 met the amount in controversy. Id. The plaintiff contended that this was “pure speculation,” both 4 about the billing rate and the hours attributable to the collection of policy benefits. The court 5 agreed: there was nothing supporting the reasonableness of the billing rate or the hours spent. Id. at 6 *3. Again, this case is different: only a small amount of fees is needed to reach the amount in 7 controversy. The plaintiff primarily challenges the allocation between policy-limits claims and 8 extra-contractual claims. As discussed above, the proxies applied here are reasonable. 9 Other cases in this district support this conclusion. In Smith-Dickerson v. State Farm Mutual Auto 10 Insurance. Co., the insured’s car was stolen and recovered, but with significant damage. No. 18-cv- 11 00189-EMC, 2018 WL 2193133, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2018). Compensatory damages for the 12 replacement value of the car “could be as much as $45,000.” Id. at *3. The defendant insurer 13 estimated that attorney’s fees would be at least $20,000 to $30,000 because hourly rates were at least 14 $200 to $300 at the low end and it would require at least one-hundred hours to take the case through 15 summary judgment. Id. at *4. Here, the estimated hours through summary judgment are sixty and the 16 hourly rate is not disputed. Under Smith-Dickerson, the estimates here support the conclusion that 17 Sentinel has met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in 18 controversy has been met. Id. (also relying on punitive damages — based on allegations that the 19 insurer misrepresented the cause of damages to avoid paying contract claims — to support the 20 amount in controversy); cf. Conrad Assocs., 94 F. Supp. at 1200 (no support for estimate of eighty 21 hours needed to get to summary judgment; no allocation of hours to Brandt fees; no support for 22 application of counsel’s billing rate to every hour billed in the litigation). 23 In sum, the policy limit and the Brandt attorney’s fees meet the amount in controversy. 24 25 2. Punitive Damages 26 A plaintiff can recover punitive damages for insurance bad-faith claims, and those damages are 27 included in calculating the jurisdictional amount in controversy. Sley, 2017 WL 2114773, at *3 1 cases involving analogous facts.”). The court’s inquiry is whether “there are allegations in the 2 complaint that would reasonably support a claim of oppression, fraud, or malice, not just a 3 standard denial of an insurance claim under the contract.” Smith-Dickerson, 2018 WL 2193133, at 4 *4 (cleaned up). On this record, the plaintiff’s allegations meet this standard. 5 Sentinel provided some comparators with the following ratios: 3.33:1, 3.99:1, and 5:57:1.30 It 6 points out that a ratio of 0.26:1 would meet the amount-in- controversy requirement. It 7 acknowledges that awards are “asked for quite frequently, but awarded less frequently.”31 8 Sentinel’s three cases are as follows.32 9 Mazik (ratio 3.33:1), a 2016 case, involved a motorist who made a claim for injuries suffered 10 in a head-on collision with an uninsured motorist. Geico admitted coverage under a policy with a 11 limit of $100,000, with an entitlement to $50,000 in underinsured motorist benefits but disputed 12 the extent of the injuries (a fracture with severe soft-tissue swelling). The uninsured driver settled 13 with the plaintiff for $50,000, and an arbitrator awarded the plaintiff $50,000 against Geico. The 14 total compensatory award for pain and suffering was $300,000, and the punitive damages award 15 was $4 million. Verdict & Settlement Summ., 2016 WL 5873376 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2016).33 16 Borjon (ratio 3.99:1) involved a car dealership destroyed by a fire. The jury award was (1) 17 $1,412,311 in contract damages, reduced by an offset to $1,269,726.14, and (2) for breach of the 18 covenant of good faith and fair dealing, an additional $152,750 plus punitive damages in the 19 amount of $6,240,000. 2023 WL 3734982, at *1. 20 Victaulic (ratio 5:57:1) involved pipe-coupling systems for industrial, commercial, and 21 institutional uses (heating, air conditioning, and mining, among other uses). 80 Cal. App. 5th at 22 491–92. 23 Digital counters that Sentinel has not carried its burden because it cites only one property case 24

25 30 See Statement. 26 31 Opp’n – ECF No. 12 at 8 (emphasis omitted). 27 32 See Statement (full case names and some context). 33 1 and makes no effort to analogize the facts there to the case here.34 It cites three cases to support the 2 conclusion that Sentinel’s failure to cite analogous cases means that its allegation of punitive 3 damages does not satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement.35 In Elias, the uninsured-motorist 4 case discussed above, the defendant offered a stolen-car case where the jury awarded $100,000 after 5 the defendant insurer denied the insured’s claim as fraudulent. The Elias court held that the 6 comparator was not analogous because the Elias insurer paid the claim. 2024 WL 2732228, at *3. In 7 Reyes v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC, a wrongful-termination case, the court distinguished two 8 employment-discrimination cases on the ground that they established only that punitive damages 9 could be recoverable but were not factually analogous. No. CV 19-07086-CJC (SKx), 2019 WL 10 4187847, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2019). In Hill v. Avis Budget Car Rental Car, LLC, the court held 11 that the mere possibility of punitive damages was not sufficient to prove the amount in controversy. 12 No. CV 14–1350 FMO (MANx), 2014 WL 1325556, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2014). 13 Digital is right: Sentinel does not analyze the three comps and instead cites them only to show 14 the potential for punitive damages. That said, the possibility of punitive damages at least supports 15 the court’s earlier determination that Sentinel has established the amount in controversy. In Smith- 16 Dickerson, the court considered “whether there were allegations in the complaint that would 17 reasonably support a claim of oppression, fraud, or malice, not just the standard denial of an 18 insurance claim under the contract.” 2018 WL 2193133, at *4 (cleaned up). It concluded that 19 because the plaintiff alleged that the insurer “misrepresented the cause of the damages to the car to 20 avoid providing covered claims under the policy, advised her not to obtain the services of an 21 attorney, and suspended coverage in retaliation for [her] asserting her legal rights . . . , there is a 22 reasonable basis for punitive damages.” Id. (cleaned up). Thus, it held that the punitive damages and 23 the attorney’s fees in combination could make up the gap between the value of the car and the 24 $75,000 threshold. Id. (did not quantify punitive damages). Here, as in Smith-Dickerson, there are 25 allegations that support a claim of oppression, fraud, or malice, not just the standard denial of the 26

27 34 Reply – ECF No. 13 at 8–9. ] claim under the contract: the insurer allegedly misrepresented damages to avoid paying contract 2 || claims by using the wrong metrics to calculate replacement value, depreciating the equipment, 3 delaying in its response, refusing to investigate the claim, and disparaging Digital. See id. That at 4 || least is relevant to the determination that the amount in controversy is satisfied and supports the 5 conclusion that the fifty-fifty allocation between contract-recovery and extra-contractual claims □□ 6 || reasonable assumption that supports the conclusion that Sentinel has proven the amount in 7 || controversy by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. 8 CONCLUSION 9 The court denies the motion to remand. This disposes of ECF No. 11. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 1] Dated: December 10, 2024 Let a (12

LAUREL BEELER

13 United States Magistrate Judge

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