BACKGROUND

In August 2022, the People filed a juvenile wardship petition against Gabriel,

which the People amended in December 2022. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a).)

The amended petition alleges that when Gabriel was 17 years old he committed one count

of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), one count of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), and

one count of active gang participation (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a)).1 At a detention

hearing in August 2022, the juvenile court ordered Gabriel detained in juvenile hall,

finding detention necessary to protect Gabriel and to protect others or their property.

(See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 628, subd. (a)(1).)

The prosecution moved under section 707 to transfer Gabriel to criminal court.

The juvenile court granted the motion at a hearing on May 15, 2024, when Gabriel was

19 years old.

At the same hearing, immediately after granting the People’s motion, the juvenile

court scheduled an arraignment for Gabriel in criminal court. Defense counsel interjected

and notified the court that Gabriel intended to appeal from the transfer order and that rule

5.770(e)(2) required the court to issue a stay of the criminal court proceedings until a

final determination of the appeal if the minor notifies the court of an intent to appeal the

order and requests a stay. Defense counsel asked “the Court to continue the matter for 30

1 We take judicial notice of the record on appeal in the pending appeal from the order transferring the matter to criminal court. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).) We provided the parties the requisite notice under Evidence Code section 459, subdivision (d), in a tentative opinion, and they did not oppose judicial notice of those materials.

3 days so I may seek that remedy.” The court asked the prosecutor if he wished “to be

heard on the request for the stay,” and he initially opposed the request, arguing that the

issue should be “dealt with” by the criminal court. The People eventually agreed to “the

Court ordering a stay today here and coming back in about 30 days to see what has

happened on the appeal that they intend to file.” The court “grant[ed] the request for the

stay” and “set this for 30 days” to “revisit the issue.” The court ordered Gabriel to

remain in the probation department’s custody with a no-bail hold. Gabriel filed a notice

of appeal from the transfer order nine days later, on May 24, 2024.

In June 2024, the juvenile court held a hearing concerning the status of the stay,

which the court described as “a stay of the proceedings after its ruling” on the transfer

order. Defense counsel informed the court about the notice of appeal and requested an

extension of “the stay” until July 22, 2024. The People agreed to the extension. The

court granted the request and extended “the stay” as requested, remarking, “I’ll put the

matter over one more time.” The court explained: “However because of the age of the

youth and the fact that I had made a prior ruling that his matter be transferred to adult

court, if we come in next time and the appeal is still pending, I may be inclined though

however to send him to adult court with the stay in place for an arraignment. And then at

the arraignment you can let the Court know about the stay. It’s just because of his age,

and he’s currently being housed with other juveniles, and his case is ordered transferred,

I’m just a little hesitant to keep him there for an extended period of time.”

4 The juvenile court held another hearing concerning the stay on July 22, 2024, one

week before Gabriel’s 20th birthday. At the beginning of the hearing, the court indicated

that it was tentatively inclined to lift the stay, which it described as the “stay pending an

appeal,” and to transfer the matter to adult criminal court, where the parties could request

a stay. The court also indicated that it planned to order Gabriel moved to county jail,

reasoning that “to have the minor continue to remain in juvenile hall with other juveniles

when he’s nearly 20 years of age and not receiving any programming is not the best thing

for us at this time.”

A probation officer agreed that Gabriel should be transferred to county jail. The

probation officer remarked that Gabriel was “not getting any benefits from

programming” and that Gabriel’s “behavior has slowly declined,” with Gabriel “feeling

very entitled and very comfortable in the juvenile setting which is very concerning for

other youth who are younger than him as he will be 20” soon.

The prosecution agreed with the court’s tentative rulings. Defense counsel

objected, arguing that rule 5.770(e)(2) authorized the juvenile court to lift the stay only

upon Gabriel’s request, which he had not made. Defense counsel also argued that

Gabriel could be transferred to an adult detention facility only if probation petitioned the

court for such a transfer under section 208.5, the court held an evidentiary hearing, and

the court evaluated certain statutory criteria. The prosecutor countered that section 208.5

did not apply, because the juvenile court had already ordered the matter transferred to

criminal court.

5 The juvenile court lifted the stay, scheduled an arraignment hearing in criminal

court on July 24, 2024, and dismissed the amended juvenile wardship petition “without

prejudice on the appearance date of July 24th, 2024.” The court ordered Gabriel detained

in county jail “based upon his current age” and set bail in the amount of $1 million. The

juvenile court concluded that section 208.5 did not apply, because the court had ordered

the matter transferred to adult criminal court, thus depriving the juvenile court of

jurisdiction over Gabriel. The court reasoned “that based on the minor’s age, based on

the seriousness of the charges and based upon the fact that the minor is not receiving any

services that I should lift the stay, allow the matter to proceed to adult court as previously

ordered, and then if the minor wants a stay in adult court, he can certainly make that

request and it can certainly be granted.”

The People filed a complaint against Gabriel in criminal court the next day, on

July 23, 2024. Early in the morning on July 24, 2024, Gabriel filed a petition for writ of

mandate in this court seeking review of the juvenile court’s rulings lifting the stay and

transferring him to an adult detention facility. Gabriel also requested an immediate stay

of the criminal court proceedings, which we granted pending a determination of the

merits of the petition or upon further order of this court. According to the criminal court

docket, at the arraignment on July 24, 2024, the court appointed counsel for Gabriel. The

docket entry for that hearing reads: “Court has received a stay from Court of Appeals.”

The criminal court continued the arraignment.

6 After we stayed the criminal court proceedings, the criminal court held a hearing

on the status of the stay on August 12, 2024. The minute order from that hearing reads:

“All parties agree the matter is stayed pursuant to CRC 5.770(e)(2) pending a decision

from the Court of Appeal regarding the transfer to adult court.” The criminal court

granted a stipulated motion to continue under Penal Code section 1050.

DISCUSSION

Gabriel contends that the juvenile court erred by lifting the “stay previously

granted under rule 5.770(e)(2)” and by transferring Gabriel to an adult detention facility

without following the procedures prescribed by section 208.5. We agree with Gabriel on

both points.

I. General principles of statutory interpretation

In interpreting a statute, our task is to determine the Legislature’s intent in order to

effectuate the statute’s purpose. (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032.) We

first examine the statute’s language, giving the words a commonsense and plain meaning.

(Ibid.) We apply the same principles to interpreting the California Rules of Court.

(Miszkewycz v. County of Placer (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 67, 75.)

We independently review questions of statutory interpretation. (Harrod v.

Country Oaks Partners, LLC (2024) 15 Cal.5th 939, 950-951.) We likewise

independently review questions of interpretation of the California Rules of Court.

(Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 81.)

7

II. The stay

Gabriel contends that the juvenile court erred by lifting the stay. We agree.

Section 801 provides that a juvenile court order transferring a minor to adult

criminal court is appealable within 30 days. (Id., subd. (a).) Section 801 also provides:

“Upon request of the minor, the superior court shall issue a stay of the criminal court

proceedings until a final determination of the appeal. The superior court shall retain

jurisdiction to modify or lift the stay upon request of the minor.” (Id., subd. (b).)

Rule 5.770 generally governs transfer hearings under section 707. Consistent with

section 801, rule 5.770(e)(2) provides that “[i]f the youth informs the court orally or in

writing that a notice of appeal of the court’s decision to transfer jurisdiction to the

criminal court will be filed and requests a stay, the court must issue a stay of the criminal

court proceedings until a final determination of the appeal. The court retains jurisdiction

to modify or lift the stay upon request of the youth.”

To summarize: If the juvenile court orders a minor transferred to adult criminal

court, section 801 requires either the juvenile court or the criminal court to stay

proceedings in the criminal court if the minor requests a stay. (§ 801, subd. (b).) Rule

5.770(e)(2) further provides that the juvenile court must stay the criminal court

proceedings if (1) the minor informs the juvenile court that they will be filing a notice of

appeal from the transfer order and (2) the minor requests a stay. If either the juvenile

court or the criminal court issues a stay of the criminal court proceedings, the stay shall

remain in effect until the final determination of the appeal from the transfer order, but the

8 stay can be lifted or modified upon request of the minor. (Rule 5.770(e)(2); § 801, subd.

(b).)

Under section 801 and rule 5.770(e)(2), the juvenile court was required to stay the

criminal court proceedings on May 15, 2024, when Gabriel informed the court that he

intended to appeal the transfer order and requested a stay. Moreover, the juvenile court

was required to stay the criminal court proceedings “until a final determination of the

appeal.” (§ 801, subd. (b); rule 5.770(e)(2).) The juvenile court could modify or lift the

stay only “upon request of the youth.” (Rule 5.770(e)(2); § 801, subd. (b).)

Despite those requirements, the juvenile court (1) issued a time-limited stay that

was not tied to this court’s determination of the appeal from the transfer order and (2)

lifted the stay without a request by Gabriel. Moreover, it is not clear what exactly the

juvenile court stayed—it is unclear whether the juvenile court intended to stay the

transfer order, the juvenile court proceedings, the criminal court proceedings, or some

combination thereof. Assuming for the sake of argument that the juvenile court stayed

the criminal court proceedings, the juvenile court still violated section 801 and rule

5.770(e)(2) by not staying those proceedings until the final determination of Gabriel’s

appeal from the transfer order. The court further violated section 801 and rule

5.770(e)(2) by lifting the stay in the absence of a request from Gabriel.

In opposing the writ petition, the People contend that Gabriel is not entitled to any

relief because the criminal court proceedings are already “stayed as required by rule

5.770(e).” To support that proposition, the People cite the criminal court’s docket entry

9 for the arraignment, which reads: “Court has received a stay from Court of Appeals.”

Thus, the current stay of the criminal court proceedings was imposed by this court and is

effective only pending determination of this writ petition. Our stay of the criminal court

proceedings was not imposed under rule 5.770(e)(2) or section 801 and will not remain in

effect until the final determination of Gabriel’s appeal from the transfer order, as required

by the rule and the statute.

The People also contend that the parties do not dispute that rule 5.770(e)(2)

applies to this case, and they cite the docket entry from the criminal court’s

postarraignment status hearing, which reflects the parties’ agreement in criminal court

that the matter was stayed under rule 5.770(e)(2). The parties’ agreement is not a court

order, and it was reached while the criminal court proceedings were stayed by this court

pending our decision on Gabriel’s petition.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the juvenile court erred both by not

imposing a stay of the criminal court proceedings under rule 5.770(e)(2) pending a final

determination of Gabriel’s appeal from the transfer order and by lifting the stay without a

request by Gabriel. We accordingly direct the juvenile court to vacate its order lifting the

stay and to amend its minute order of May 15, 2024, nunc pro tunc to impose a stay of

the criminal court proceedings under rule 5.770(e)(2) effective through the final

determination of Gabriel’s appeal from the transfer order, unless Gabriel moves to lift or

modify the stay. The stay of the criminal court proceedings will prohibit those

proceedings from moving forward but will not prevent the criminal court from acting on

10 ancillary matters such as a petition to detain Gabriel in an adult facility or a request by

Gabriel to modify or lift the stay. The transfer order itself is not stayed, and the section

602 petition as to Gabriel remains dismissed without prejudice. Thus, apart from any

orders that the juvenile court must enter to comply with our writ of mandate, all further

proceedings in this case will take place in the criminal court unless and until the matter is

returned to the juvenile court.

III. The transfer to county jail

Gabriel contends that the juvenile court erred by ordering Gabriel physically

transferred to county jail, because the court failed to follow the procedures set forth in

section 208.5. We agree.

In September 2020, the Legislature comprehensively revised the statutes

governing the housing of minors whose cases are transferred from juvenile court to adult

criminal court. Before that legislative overhaul, former section 207.6 provided: “A

minor may be detained in a jail or other secure facility for the confinement of adults

pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 207.1 or paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of

Section 707.1 only if the court makes its findings on the record and, in addition, finds that

the minor poses a danger” in specified ways. Subdivision (b) of former section 207.1

provided: “Any minor who is alleged to have committed [listed offenses under] Section

707 whose case is transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction pursuant to Section 707.1

after a finding is made that the minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under

the juvenile court law . . . may be detained in a jail or other secure facility for the

11 confinement of adults if” certain specified conditions were met. With respect to the same

minors, subdivision (b)(1) of former section 707.1 provided: The juvenile court “may

order the minor to be delivered to the custody of the sheriff upon a finding that the

presence of the minor in the juvenile hall would endanger the safety of the public or be

detrimental to the other inmates detained in the juvenile hall. Other minors declared not

fit and proper subjects to be dealt with under the juvenile court law, if detained, shall

remain in the juvenile hall pending final disposition by the criminal court or until they

attain the age of 18, whichever occurs first.” (Former § 707.1, subd. (b)(1).)

Effective September 30, 2020, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 823 (Reg.

Sess. 2019-2020) (Senate Bill 823), which repealed section 207.6 in its entirety and

revised sections 207.1 and 707.1 to eliminate all of their provisions concerning the

transfer of minors from juvenile facilities to adult facilities. (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, §§ 16,

18, 25, 53.) As revised, section 707.1 contains a provision concerning release with or

without bail for minors transferred from juvenile court to adult criminal court (§ 707.1,

subd. (b)), but it says nothing about moving minors from juvenile facilities to adult

facilities when their cases are transferred to adult criminal court. Similarly, section 207.1

as revised contains a general prohibition on detaining minors in adult facilities (§ 207.1,

subd. (a)) and provides a narrow exception for certain minors taken into temporary

custody without warrants (§ 207.1, subds. (b), (d); see § 625), but it says nothing about

moving minors from juvenile facilities to adult facilities when their cases are transferred

to adult criminal court.

12 The Legislature explained that its intent was to “revise and recast” prior statutory

provisions “and repeal specified provisions that authorize the detention of minors in an

adult facility.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, par. (3).) As revised by Senate Bill 823, the law

“would instead require any person whose case originated in juvenile court to remain in a

county juvenile facility until they turn 25 years of age, except as specified.” (Stats. 2020,

ch. 337, par. (3).)

In place of the repealed and revised provisions, Senate Bill 823 created section

208.5, which now governs the circumstances under which a person whose case originates

in juvenile court can be transferred from a juvenile facility to an adult detention facility.

(Stats. 2020, ch. 337, §§ 19-20.) Section 208.5 provides that “[n]otwithstanding any

other law, any person whose case originated in juvenile court shall remain, if the person

is held in secure detention, in a county juvenile facility until the person attains 25 years of

age,” except under certain specified circumstances not applicable here. (§ 208.5, subd.

(a); Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 20.) Under subdivision (b) of section 208.5, “[t]he probation

department may petition the court to house a person who is 19 years of age or older in an

adult facility, including a jail or other facility established for the purpose of confinement

of adults.” “Upon receipt of a petition to house a person who is 19 years of age or older

in an adult facility, the court shall hold a hearing” at which “[t]here shall be a rebuttable

presumption that the person will be retained in a juvenile facility.” (Id., subd. (c).) “At

the hearing, the court shall determine whether the person will be moved to an adult

13 facility, and make written findings of its decision based on the totality of” five listed

criteria. (Ibid.) Thus, the juvenile court is no longer permitted to move a person whose

case originated in the juvenile court to an adult detention facility unless the probation

department files a petition under section 208.5 and the court follows the procedures set

forth in section 208.5. (See Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure

(2024) § 3.61[15][d].)

For all of these reasons, we agree with Gabriel that the juvenile court erred by

transferring him to county jail in the absence of a petition by the probation department

under section 208.5 and without following the procedures required by section 208.5.

The People argue to the contrary, relying on section 707.1 and rule 5.770(d)(2),

which itself refers to section 707.1. The argument fails because, as we have explained,

section 707.1 as revised by Senate Bill 823 in September 2020 says nothing about

transferring minors from juvenile facilities to adult facilities. Unfortunately, it appears

that rule 5.770(d)(2) has not been updated to conform to the current statutory scheme—

the rule’s provision concerning transfers of minors to adult facilities refers to a statute

that no longer says anything about such transfers. Similarly, Judicial Council form JV-

710 (the optional form used for granting a motion to transfer a minor from juvenile court

to adult criminal court) has not been updated to conform to the current statutory

scheme—it refers to section 207.1, which no longer says anything about transferring

minors from juvenile facilities to adult facilities. Because rule 5.770(d)(2) is inconsistent

14 with the current statutory scheme, the People’s argument based on rule 5.770(d)(2) fails.

(Cal. Const. art. VI, § 6; California Court Reporters Assn. v. Judicial Council of

California (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 15, 22 [“[T]he Judicial Council may not adopt rules

that are inconsistent with governing statutes”].)

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the juvenile court erred by ordering

Gabriel transferred to county jail even though the probation department never filed a

petition under section 208.5 and without following the procedures required by section

208.5. Because there is a reasonable probability that Gabriel would not have been

transferred to an adult facility if the proper procedures had been followed, the order

transferring him to such a facility must be vacated. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d

818, 836.)

DISPOSITION

The petition for writ of mandate is granted. Let a peremptory writ of mandate

issue directing the juvenile court to (1) vacate its July 22, 2024, order lifting the stay; (2)

amend its minute order of May 15, 2024, nunc pro tunc to impose a stay of the criminal

court proceedings under rule 5.770(e)(2) pending a final determination by this court of

Gabriel’s appeal from the transfer order or until Gabriel moves to lift or modify the stay;

and (3) vacate the July 22, 2024, order remanding Gabriel to the custody of the Riverside

County Sheriff’s Department and detaining him in county jail. Once the juvenile court

has fully complied with the writ of mandate, the probation department may petition the

superior court under section 208.5 to move Gabriel to county jail. Our stay of

15 proceedings in the criminal court shall remain in effect until the juvenile court issues its

own stay of those proceedings and shall then be dissolved.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

MENETREZ

J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

McKINSTER J.

16