NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 20 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAUL BECERRA QUIROZ, No. 21-56044

Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-07826-JAK-GJS v.

CHRISTIAN PFEIFFER, Warden, Warden MEMORANDUM* of Kern Valley State Prison, Delano Substituted for Martin D Biter,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 6, 2024 Pasadena, California

Before: W. FLETCHER and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and MÁRQUEZ,** District Judge.

Petitioner Raul Quiroz appeals from the district court’s denial of his petition

for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his convictions for

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Rosemary Márquez, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation. first-degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm. We review the

district court’s denial of a § 2254 petition de novo. Bolin v. Davis, 13 F.4th 797,

804 (9th Cir. 2021). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and

we affirm.1

Because this petition is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), we may grant relief only if the state court’s

decision was (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” or (2) “was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. 86, 97-98 (2011).

Petitioner raises multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on his claims, Petitioner

must show that (1) his “counsel’s performance was deficient,” meaning that it “fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense” such that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Id. at 687–88, 694. When the AEDPA and Strickland standards are both

1 Because the facts and procedural history are well known to the parties, we recount them only as needed to explain our decision.

2 applicable, our review is “doubly deferential.” Lee v. Thornell, 108 F.4th 1148,

1157 (9th Cir. 2024).

Petitioner asserts six claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically,

Petitioner claims that counsel (1) failed to obtain testimony from alibi witness

Vanessa Brashear; (2) did not sufficiently investigate the audio recording of

monitored jailhouse conversations between Petitioner and informant Ismael Cano;

(3) neglected to investigate newspaper articles related to Brian Szostek’s murder;

(4) failed to object to Cano’s testimony regarding Petitioner’s alleged confessions

and admissions; (5) did not challenge the testimony of Detective Rachel Burr; and

(6) failed to move to exclude Ruben Gonzales’s purportedly coerced pretrial

statements or object to their introduction through the rebuttal testimony of

Detective Michael Palmieri.

However, the state court reasonably concluded that Petitioner failed to

establish that trial counsel’s performance was deficient or that any alleged

deficiencies caused prejudice. Counsel’s decisions were strategic and aimed at

advancing Petitioner’s defense. See Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir.

1984) (reasoned tactical decisions made to advance the defense, even if flawed in

hindsight, do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). Furthermore, given

the overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, there is no reason to believe that

any purported errors, individually or cumulatively, undermined confidence in the

3 verdict. See Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 928 (9th Cir. 2007) (cumulative

prejudice exists only where the aggregation of errors undermines confidence in the

verdict).

The state court’s adjudication was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law, and it was not based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, we

affirm the district court’s denial of the habeas petition.

AFFIRMED.

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