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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 11 DANIEL CARLOS GARCIA, ) Case No. 5:23-cv-01950-SVW-JC 12 ) Petitioner, ) 13 ) v. ) ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, 14 ) CONCLUSIONS, AND ) RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED 15 CHAD BIANCO, RIVERSIDE ) STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

COUNTY SHERIFF, )

16 ) ) 17 Respondent. ) ____________________________ ) 18 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed Petitioner Daniel 19 Carlos Garcia’s operative First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 20 (“Petition”), the requests therein for the appointment of counsel and release on bail 21 pending final judgment (“Petitioner’s Requests”), the parties’ submissions in 22 connection with the Petition and Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, Miguel Adolfo 23 Bustamante’s Request for Joinder (“Joinder Request”), Petitioner’s Request for 24 Expansion of the Record (“Expansion Request”), Petitioner’s Motion for Entry of 25 Default (“Default Request”), and all of the records herein, including the 26 September 12, 2024 Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate 27 Judge (“Report and Recommendation” or “R&R”) and Petitioner’s Objections to 28 1 the Report and Recommendation. The Court approves and accepts the Report and 2 Recommendation, overrules the Objections in their entirety, and specifically 3 addresses below certain of the arguments raised in Petitioner’s Objections. 4 The Report and Recommendation recommends that this Court abstain under 5 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), from considering Petitioner’s challenges to 6 criminal proceedings now pending in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. 7 Younger abstention only applies if “(1) there is ‘an ongoing state judicial 8 proceeding’; (2) the proceeding ‘implicate[s] important state interests’; (3) there is 9 ‘an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional 10 challenges’; and (4) the requested relief ‘seek[s] to enjoin’ or has ‘the practical 11 effect of enjoining’ the ongoing state judicial proceeding.” Arevalo v. Hennessy, 12 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted); Betschart v. State of Or., 103 13 F.4th 607, 617 (9th Cir. 2024). 14 In his Objections, Petitioner contends the Report and Recommendation 15 fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the Petition. In particular, Petitioner 16 argues he did not receive all the relief he wanted when the Superior Court granted 17 habeas relief on his judicial bias claim, reversed his convictions, and transferred 18 the matter for retrial,1 and the Court should review the Superior Court’s decision 19 and order the Superior Court to dismiss the charges against Petitioner and 20 immediately release him from custody. (Objections at 4, 11-12, 16-19, 48-55). 21 22 1As the Report and Recommendation explains: Petitioner was convicted of murder, 23 conspiracy to commit murder, and various financial crimes and sentenced to life in prison 24 without the possibility of parole in 2012. On June 8, 2020, the Superior Court granted Petitioner habeas corpus relief on a judicial bias claim, reversed Petitioner’s foregoing convictions and 25 transferred the matter for retrial. On October 31, 2023, following retrial, Petitioner was again 26 convicted of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and various other crimes. (R&R at 3-6). Petitioner has not yet been resentenced following the retrial. (See 27 https://public-access.riverside.courts.ca.gov/OpenAccess/Criminal/CriminalCaseReport. asp?CourtCode=C&CaseNumber=INF064492&DefNbr=3613404&DefSeq=4&otnmseq=0&Riv 28 Ind=IND (last visited December 9, 2024)). 2 1 || But “[t]he federal habeas statute gives the United States district courts jurisdiction 2 || to entertain petitions for habeas relief only from persons who are ‘in custody in 3 || violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Maleng v. 4 || Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989) (per curiam) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); 5 || emphasis in original). The “in custody” requirement is jurisdictional, and 6 || “requir[es] that the habeas petitioner be ‘in custody’ under the conviction or 7 || sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed.” Id. at 490-91; Wright v. 8 || State, 47 F.4th 954, 958 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, as the Report and Recommendation 9 || explains, Petitioner is not and was not in custody pursuant to the initial, vacated 10 || judgment when he filed this action. (See R&R at 12-13 n.7) (“[S]ince the 11 || judgment in Petitioner’s first trial was vacated several years before he filed the 12 || pending action in this Court, he is not ‘in custody’ pursuant to that judgment and 13 || cannot directly attack it here either (though, of course, events related to Petitioner’s 14 || first trial might be relevant to claims challenging his current custody, such as, for 15 || instance, in the double jeopardy claim he raises).”); see also Stow v. Murashige, 16 | 389 F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir. 2004) (After the Hawaii Supreme Court reversed 17 || Stow’s conviction, “Stow’s judgment of conviction was vacated and Stow was no 18 || longer in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. Although Stow remained in 19 || custody after the court reversed his conviction, his status was that of a pretrial 20 || detainee — he was in custody pending his retrial on the counts of attempted second 21 || degree murder.”). 22 As to his current custody, Petitioner asserts there is no adequate forum to 23 || raise his constitutional claims because he has filed multiple state court petitions 24 || challenging aspects of his retrial that have been denied. (Objections at 35-37). But 25 || Petitioner’s “lack of success does not render the forum inadequate.” Baffert v. Cal. 26 || Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 621 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1075 27 || (2003). Rather, as the Report and Recommendation reflects, California state courts 28 || provide “an adequate state forum in which to pursue. . . federal claims.” H.C. ex

1 || rel. Gordon v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 2000); (see also R&R at 12); 2 || Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977) (“Here it is abundantly clear that 3 || appellees had an opportunity to present their federal claims in the state 4 || proceedings. No more is required to invoke Younger abstention.” (footnote 5 || omitted)). 6 Petitioner also objects to the Report and Recommendation’s conclusion that 7 || he has not shown he is entitled to proceed under the bad faith exception to Younger 8 || abstention. (Objections at 26-34). First, he complains the Report and 9 || Recommendation applied the incorrect standard by requiring him to show bad 10 || faith. (Objections at 26-29). But “a [party] who seeks to head off Younger 11 || abstention bears the burden of establishing that one of the exceptions applies.” 12 || Diamond “D” Const. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002); 13 || Baffert, 332 F.3d at 621; see also Juidice, 430 U.S. at 338 (the bad faith exception 14 “may not be utilized unless” petitioner can allege and prove that the state 15 || prosecution is “in bad faith or [is] motivated by a desire to harass.’’); Cornell v. 16 || Off. of Dist. Att’y, Cnty. of Riverside, 616 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1038 (C.D. Cal. 17 || 2022) (Plaintiffs “have failed to satisfy their burden, and the Court cannot conclude 18 || that the bad faith exception applies.”). 19 Second, Petitioner asserts he has shown bad faith for multiple reasons, 20 || including that his initial conviction was reversed for judicial bias, he was retried 21 || before a biased judge who “was close friends and colleagues with the original 22 || judge,” and the retrial reused fabricated evidence and perjured testimony from the 23 || first trial. (Objections at 30-34). But that Petitioner’s prior judgment was reversed 24 || for judicial bias does not mean the new trial was prosecuted in bad faith. 25 Moreover, while “abstention is inappropriate in the “extraordinary 26 || circumstance’ that the state tribunal is incompetent by reason of bias[,]” Hirsh v. 27 || Justices of Supreme Court of State of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 1995) (per 28 || curiam) (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577-79 (1973)), a party alleging

1 || bias “must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as 2 || adjudicators[.]” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 713; 3 || Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 4 || 1054 (1993). Petitioner has not done so. His argument that the judge who 5 || presided over his retrial was biased is conclusory and entirely unsupported. See 6 || Canatella v. Cal., 404 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005) (“With respect to bias, 7 || Bendel fails to offer any ‘actual evidence’ to overcome the ‘presumption of 8 || honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.’” (citations omitted); Collins 9 || v. Kendall Cnty., Ill., 807 F.2d 95, 98 (7th Cir. 1986) (“A plaintiff asserting bad 10 || faith prosecution as an exception to Younger abstention must allege specific facts 11 || to support an inference of bad faith. The Younger rule .. . requires more than a 12 || mere allegation and more than a conclusory finding to bring a case within the 13 | harassment exception.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. 14 || denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); Vargas v. Luna, 2023 WL 349937, *4 (C.D. Cal. 15 || 2023) (conclusory allegation of judicial bias does not establish bad faith). 16 Additionally, Petitioner’s fabricated evidence claim — and any similar 17 || challenge to retrial proceedings — can and should be exhausted in state court before 18 || being raised on federal habeas review. See, e.g., Serrato v. Baca, 2009 WL 19 | 1272093, *1-2 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (abstention appropriate where petitioner claimed 20 || he faced a prosecution based on false evidence); Honeycutt v. Lowery, 2014 WL 21 || 3784100, *1 (D. Nev. 2014) (“Plaintiff contends that abstention is not required 22 || because the State allegedly is prosecuting him in bad faith by using manufactured 23 || evidence to obtain an invalid conviction. This sort of in actuality garden variety 24 || allegation — a state criminal defendant alleging that he is being prosecuted on 25 || falsified evidence — does not present extraordinary circumstances in the sense 26 |} contemplated by the Younger abstention doctrine. The place for a state criminal 27 || defendant to challenge the evidence brought against him in an ongoing 28 || prosecution is in the prosecution itself and in any following direct and collateral

1 || review” before proceeding to federal court). 2 Petitioner further objects that the deprivation of his constitutional rights 3 || constitutes irreparable harm. (Objections at 34-35). However, as the Report and 4 || Recommendation points out, “merely alleging a constitutional violation is 5 || insufficient to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances.” (R&R at 14 n.9); see 6 || also New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 7 || 350, 365 (1989) (“[T]he mere assertion of a substantial constitutional challenge to 8 || state action will not alone compel the exercise of federal jurisdiction.”); Baffert, 9 || 332 F.3d at 621 (“[T]he constitutional dimension of the error claimed does not, by 10 || itself, constitute an exception to the application of Younger abstention.”’). 11 Petitioner’s remaining objections are without merit and do not warrant 12 || further discussion. 13 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: (1) Petitioner’s Requests, the Joinder Request, 14 || the Expansion Request, and the Default Request are denied; (2) Respondent’s 15 || Motion to Dismiss is granted; (3) the Petition and this action are dismissed without 16 || prejudice; and (4) Judgment shall be entered accordingly. 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk serve copies of this Order and 18 | the Judgment herein on Petitioner and counsel for Respondent. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 21 DATED: December 19, 2024

23 To 24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 27 28