1

2 O 3

4

5

6

7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

9

10 SHAHERYAR KHAN, Case No.: 2:22-cv-02333-MEMF-AS

11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 12 v. FOR RECONSIDERATION [ECF NO. 126];

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

13 GOOGLE, LLC; EVERLY WELL, INC.; DISMISS [ECF NOS. 37, 40]; REQUIRING

ET AL., PLAINTFF TO SHOW CAUSE WHY CASE

14 SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AGAINST 15 Defendants. REMAINING DEFENDANTS FOR LACK

OF PROSECUTION

16

17

18 19 20 Before the Court is (1) Plaintiff Shaheryar Khan’s (“Khan”) Motion for Reconsideration of 21 the Court’s Order of Denial1 (ECF No. 126); (2) Defendant Google, LLC’s (“Google”) Motion to 22 Dismiss (ECF No. 37); and Defendant Everly Well, Inc.’s (“Everlywell”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF 23 No. 40). For the reasons stated herein, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration and 24 GRANTS both Motions to Dismiss. On its own motion, the Court ORDERS Khan to show the 25 remaining Defendants have been properly and timely served. 26 27 1 Although Khan refers to this Motion as a motion to set aside, a motion to set aside applies to a default judgment, not an order. Here, the correct legal vehicle is a motion for reconsideration. Given Khan is pro se 28 and the type of motion does not affect the contents of his filing, the Court will simply treat the Motion as a 1 SUMMARY OF ORDER FOR PRO SE LITIGANT SHAHERYAR KHAN 2 The Court addresses three motions in this Order. 3 First, you requested that the Court reconsider its denial of your request to extend the amount 4 of time to file your First Amended Complaint. ECF No. 126. The Court DENIES that Motion; your 5 original Complaint (ECF No. 1) will be the operative complaint in this lawsuit. 6 Second, Defendant Google filed a Motion to Dismiss all claims you brought against Google. 7 ECF No. 37. The Court GRANTS that Motion because you have failed to state a valid claim against 8 Google, but will give you the opportunity to revise some of the claims within thirty (30) days. 9 Third, Defendant Everlywell filed a Motion to Dismiss all claims you brought against 10 Everlywell. ECF No. 40. The Court GRANTS that Motion because this Court does not have personal 11 jurisdiction over Everlywell, but will give you the opportunity to revise your complaint to show 12 personal jurisdiction within thirty (30) days. 13 Independent of the parties’ motions, the Court also uses this Order to direct you to either 14 (1) show the Court that you have already properly served the remaining Defendants in this lawsuit 15 by filing valid proofs of service or (2) properly serve the remaining Defendants within forty-five 16 (45) days of the issuance of this Order. If you do not serve the remaining Defendants within this 17 timeframe, your case will be dismissed against those Defendants for lack of prosecution. 18 Because you are proceeding without an attorney, the Court included a section at the end of 19 this Order with resources for self-represented litigants that you may find helpful. 20 BACKGROUND 21 I. Factual Background 22 All facts stated herein are taken from the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint unless 23 otherwise indicated. ECF No. 1. For the purposes of this Motion, the Court treats these factual 24 allegations as true, but at this stage of the litigation, the Court makes no finding on the truth of 25 these allegations and is therefore not—at this stage—finding that they are true. 26 Khan brings this action against 58 named defendants (as well as up to ten Doe and 10,000 27 Roe defendants) for harms stemming from intellectual property infringement. See generally ECF No. 28 1 1. Khan owned valuable intellectual property relating to computer software2 and Khan’s business 2 associates profited from this intellectual property without Khan’s knowledge or permission. Id. 3 Khan’s former associates contracted with various companies (also named as defendants) for use of 4 the intellectual property and Khan is owed more than 4 trillion dollars in damages. Id. at 11. The 5 infringement began as early as 2000, but due to Defendants’ efforts to conceal their activities, Khan 6 did not become aware of the misuse until around 2018 or 2019. Id. at 6 (“Since 2000 plaintiff has 7 engaged in business activities and has had them misappropriated without consent.”), 8 (“[I]n 2018 8 [April], plaintiff reasonabl[y] determine[d] that [Defendant Kraemer] had been stealing from [K]han 9 for a long period of time.” [sic]), 10 (“I did find out that there has been about 20 years of conspiracy 10 on or about June 22nd 2019.”). Defendants also employed illegal measures to cover up their theft of 11 the intellectual property, including hacking Khan’s personal devices to delete files, spying on him, 12 and involving themselves in the death of a person they employed as a spy. See, e.g., id. at 8 (“On or 13 about 6/29/2018 all of [K]han’s email[s] . . . and evidence was being deleted by [A]pple using 14 developers[’] access to [eliminate] the conversation and emails and digital evidence [K]han owned 15 and compiled from his phone and [laptop computer].”), 10 (“Plaintiff determined that defendants 16 were using . . . [victim] to conduct espionage and steal trade secrets . . . [victim] was found dead 17 approximately 6 days later.”). 18 II. Procedural History 19 On April 7, 2022, Khan initiated this legal action by filing his Complaint. ECF No. 1. 20 Khan brings the following nineteen3 causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) copyright 21 infringement; (3) mail fraud; (4) obstruction of justice; (5) spoliation of evidence; (6) conspiracy; 22 (7) corporate espionage; (8) conflict of interest; (9) insider trading; (10) violation of privacy laws; 23 (11) unfair competition; (12) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; 24 (13) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage; (14) intentional interference with a 25 contractual relationship; (15) negligent interference with a contractual relationship; (16) inducing 26

27 2 The Complaint describes this property as “ideas, technology copyrights and trade secrets to develop 28 technology and copyrights and algorithms and used in loss mitigation and software . . . .” [sic] Id. at 6. 1 breach of contract; (17) misappropriation of trade secrets; (18) violation of the Defend Trade Secrets 2 Act; (19) tolling of a statute. 3 On July 11, 2022, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause as to why the action should not 4 be dismissed for lack of prosecution. ECF No. 14. Khan replied, indicating he was filing for 5 bankruptcy and facing serious medical issues. ECF No. 18. Khan also requested that the Court 6 extend his time to file a summons and to consent to proceed before a magistrate judge. ECF Nos. 16, 7 17, 18, 19. The Court granted these extensions. ECF No. 20. 8 On December 13, 2022, in response to Khan’s additional motions requesting the extension of 9 time to complete service on Defendants, the Court issued an Order explaining that Khan was ordered 10 to provide notice of the lawsuit and any requests for waivers of service to all Defendants within 11 thirty days. ECF No. 32 at 3. The proof of service documents Khan filed (both before and after the 12 December Order) are defective—they do not specify which Defendants Khan has served, nor do they 13 specify those Defendants’ addresses (many of the proof of service filings instead list this Court as 14 the recipient, see, e.g., ECF No. 25). It appears that Defendants Google and Everlywell were either 15 properly served or obtained actual notice of the lawsuit and waived the service requirements. Both 16 Google and Everlywell filed Motions to Dismiss Khan’s Complaint. ECF Nos. 37, 40. Google also 17 filed a Request for Judicial Notice in support of its Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 37-2. No other 18 Defendants filed responsive pleading. 19 In response to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Khan again filed for multiple extensions to 20 extend the time to file an opposition to the Motions and to extend the time to file an amended 21 complaint. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 51, 52, 56. The Court granted several of these extensions.4 However, 22 the Court ultimately denied the most recent Motion requesting an extension of time. See ECF No. 23 125. In response to this denial, Khan filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration. ECF No. 126. 24 The Court addresses all Motions, beginning with Khan’s Motion for Reconsideration and 25 then proceeding to Defendants Google’s and Everlywell’s Motions to Dismiss. 26 / / / 27

28 4 The Court granted Khan at least nine extensions over the course of this action. See ECF Nos. 12, 20, 24, 66, 1 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 2 I. Applicable Law 3 “[A] motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, 4 unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there 5 is an intervening change in the controlling law.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH 6 & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Under the Central District of California’s 7 Local Rules, a motion for reconsideration may be made only on the following grounds: 8 (a) a material difference in fact or law from that presented to the Court that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been known to the party moving for 9 reconsideration at the time the Order was entered, or 10 (b) the emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the Order 11 was entered, or 12 (c) a manifest showing of a failure to consider material facts presented to the Court before the Order was entered. 13 No motion for reconsideration may in any manner repeat any oral or written argument 14 made in support of, or in opposition to, the original motion. 15 C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-18. Furthermore, absent a showing of good cause, “any motion for 16 reconsideration must be filed no later than 14 days after entry of the Order that is the subject 17 of the motion or application.” Id. 18 “Unhappiness with the outcome is not included within the rule; unless the moving party 19 shows that one of the stated grounds for reconsideration exists, the Court will not grant a 20 reconsideration.” Gish v. Newsom, No. EDCV 20-755-JGB (KKx), 2020 WL 6054912, at *2 (C.D. 21 Cal. Oct. 9, 2020) (citation omitted). The moving party bears the burden of proving that 22 reconsideration is proper. White v. Seabrooks, No. CV 21-8528-MWF (JEMx), 2022 WL 2189629, 23 at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2022). 24

II. Discussion

25 Khan seeks reconsideration of the Court’s March 18, 2024, Order denying his Ex Parte 26 Motion for an Extension of Time to File a First Amended Complaint. ECF Nos. 125, 126. Khan’s 27 Motion fails to make the showing required for a reconsideration under the standards established in 28 1 First, Khan has not presented a “material difference in fact or law” that could not have been 2 known to him at the time the Order was entered. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-18(a). Nor have any new 3 material facts or changes in law emerged that would have impacted the Court’s previous decision to 4 deny the extension of time. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-18(b). Although Khan states in his Motion that he is 5 “supply[ing] new facts and new information,” (ECF No. 126 at 2) in reality, he does not present any 6 new material facts that would justify the grant of yet another extension. The ongoing health issues 7 and computer hacking are unfortunate, but Khan has been aware of these issues for the past several 8 months (if not years) and has shared his concerns with the Court multiple times. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 9 80, 85, 86, 90. As the Court stated in its March Order denying the extension, “the Court understands 10 that medical issues are beyond Khan’s control, [however] the deadline cannot be extended 11 indefinitely until Khan’s personal health issues are resolved.” ECF No. 125 at 2. 12 Finally, Khan has not shown (and cannot show) that the Court has failed to consider the 13 material facts at issue here. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-18(c). Rather, the Court thoroughly considered 14 Khan’s rationale behind the requests for additional time and relied on the facts Khan presented when 15 issuing the previous nine extensions. The Court appreciates Khan is in an extremely difficult 16 situation, but the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules” or “Rule”) oblige the Court to require an 17 expeditious resolution of this action. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 1 (stating courts should apply the Rules to 18 secure “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”); Dietz v. 19 Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 45 (2016) (describing Rule 1 as “paramount”). Defendants Google and 20 Everlywell have justifiably relied on Khan’s original Complaint and have responded to the 21 arguments Khan made in that filing. ECF Nos. 37, 40. Absent good cause, further extensions would 22 be inappropriate, as Khan has been given more than a year to prepare his materials, no new material 23 facts or changes in law have arisen, and further delay would run counter to the expeditious 24 administration of justice. 25 Accordingly, for the reasons stated on the record in the Court’s March Order denying the 26 extension, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 MOTIONS TO DISMISS 2 Defendants Google and Everlywell both filed Motions to Dismiss in this action. The Court 3 examines each Motion in turn. 4 I. Google’s Motion to Dismiss 5 Google moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a valid claim pursuant to Rule 6 12(b)(6). ECF No. 37 at 8. In support of its Motion, Google also asks the Court to take judicial 7 notice of the search results from the United States Copyright Office’s (“USCO”) Public Catalogue of 8 public copyright records. ECF No. 37-2. 9 A. Applicable Law 10 Rule 12(b)(6) allows an attack on the pleadings for “failure to state a claim upon which relief 11 can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 12 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 13 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 14 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 15 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 16 556 U.S. at 678. 17 The determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a “context- 18 specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 19 Id. at 679. Generally, a court must accept the factual allegations in the pleadings as true and view 20 them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Park v. Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 918 (9th Cir. 21 2017); Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001). But a court is “not bound to accept as 22 true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 23 550 U.S. at 555). 24 As a general rule, leave to amend a dismissed complaint should be freely granted unless it is 25 clear the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. 26 Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 B. Discussion 2 i. Request for Judicial Notice 3 “[A] court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: 4 (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and 5 readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 6 201(b). While “undisputed matters of public record” are judicially noticeable, a court may not take 7 notice of disputed facts in public records. Lee, 250 F.3d at 689; see also MGIC Indem. Corp. v. 8 Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986). Courts in this district have routinely granted requests 9 for judicial notice as to the U.S. Copyright Office’s Public Records Catalogue. See, e.g., Evans v. 10 NBCUniversal Media, LLC, No. CV 21-0984-CBM-PD(x), 2021 WL 4513624, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 11 July 23, 2021) (granting judicial notice of the presence of movie title in USCO Public Catalogue); 12 Fisher v. Nissel, No. CV 21-5839-CBM-(KSx), 2022 WL 16961479, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 13 2022) (granting judicial notice as to multiple printouts from the USCO’s Public Records Catalogue). 14 Here, Google introduces a screenshot of search results from the USCO’s Public Catalogue of 15 copyright records. ECF 37-2. The search indicates no results were found for copyright records 16 belonging to “Khan Shaheryar.” Id. at 2. Because the search results reflect the public records 17 maintained on a government agency website, the Court GRANTS judicial notice of the screenshot 18 depicting the USCO Public Catalogue search results. 19 ii. Analysis 20 Google argues that Khan fails to state a claim against Google. ECF No. 37 at 7 (“Google is 21 but a tangential inclusion in Khan’s complicated tale of fraud and conspiracy.”). Because Khan does 22 not clearly identify which Defendants are implicated in the acts giving rise to his claims, Google 23 responds to each of Khan’s nineteen causes of action. Id. The Court addresses each of the causes of 24 action as they pertain to Google: 25 1. Common Law Torts (Contract Claims) 26 Khan brings multiple tort claims relating to contracts and prospective economic advantage. 27 These claims are breach of contract, inducing breach of contract, interference with a contractual 28 relationship, and interference with prospective economic advantage. The Court first addresses 1 Khan’s claim for breach of contract. Google correctly identifies the elements of a breach of contract 2 claim as (1) the existence of a contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excused non-performance, (3) 3 defendant’s breach, and (4) resulting damages. Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 51 Cal. 4th 811, 4 821 (2011); Hamilton v. Exec. Process, LLC, No. 2:19-CV-00717-R-JPR, 2019 WL 6330678, at *4 5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2019). Here, although Khan’s allegations mention the existence of at least one 6 contract, it is not clear from the face of the pleadings that this contract involved Google; rather, it 7 appeared to involve Khan and his business partner, Defendant Kraemer and other “consultants.” See 8 ECF No. 1 at 7. Accordingly, having failed to plead any of the elements of breach of contract as they 9 pertain to Google, Khan has failed to plead a valid claim. 10 Khan also brings claims for intentional interference with a contractual relationship5 and 11 inducing breach of contract. ECF No. 1. In order to state a claim for intentional interference with a 12 contractual relationship, California law “requires that a plaintiff prove: (1) he had a valid and 13 existing contract with a third party; (2) defendant had knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant 14 committed intentional and unjustified acts designed to interfere with or disrupt the contract; (4) 15 actual interference with or disruption of the relationship; and (5) resulting damages.” X Corp. v. Ctr. 16 for Countering Digital Hate, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 3d 948, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (citing Shamblin v. 17 Berge, 166 Cal. App. 3d 118, 122 (1985)) (cleaned up). In order to state a claim for inducing breach 18 of contract, California law “requires that a plaintiff prove: (1) he had a valid and existing contract 19 with a third party; (2) defendant had knowledge of the contract and intended to induce its breach; (3) 20 the contract was in fact breached by the contracting party; (4) the breach was caused by defendant’s 21 unjustified or wrongful conduct; and (5) damages were suffered as a result.” Id. Here, Khan has not 22 pleaded any of the elements required by either cause of action, and, therefore, fails to plead a valid 23 claim. 24 Finally, Khan brings a claim for interference with prospective economic advantage. To state 25 a claim, Khan must allege: “(1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and a third party, with 26

27 5 Although Khan also brings a claim for “negligent interference with a contractual relationship,” there is no 28 cause of action for negligent interference with contractual relations under California law. See Davis v. 1 the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the 2 relationship; (3) the defendant’s intentional and wrongful conduct designed to interfere with or 3 disrupt this relationship; (4) interference with or disruption of this relationship; and (5) economic 4 harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the defendant’s wrongful conduct.” Sole Energy Co. v. 5 Petrominerals Corp., 128 Cal. App. 4th 212, 241 (2005). The same elements apply to a claim for 6 negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, but Khan must also allege that Google 7 owed him a duty of care. See N. Am. Chem. Co. v. Super. Ct., 59 Cal. App. 4th 764, 786 (1997); 8 LiMandri v. Judkins, 52 Cal. App. 4th 326, 348 (1997). Here, Khan has not pleaded any facts to 9 support that Google had knowledge of Khan’s economic relationships with any third parties. Khan 10 also failed to plead that Google somehow disrupted these relationships or that Google owned Khan a 11 duty of care. Therefore, Khan has failed to plead a valid claim for interference with prospective 12 economic advantage. 13 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES all common law tort claims against 14 Google. Because it is conceivable that Khan may present additional facts to support the elements of 15 these claims, the Court GRANTS Khan LEAVE TO AMEND. 16 2. Copyright Infringement 17 Khan brings his second claim for copyright infringement. To raise a claim for copyright 18 infringement, a plaintiff must establish two elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) 19 copying of constituent elements of the work that are original. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 20 Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). Here, Khan has not established ownership of a valid copyright, 21 and the Court takes judicial notice that a search for a valid copyright on the USCO’s Public 22 Catalogue did not yield any results. Khan has also failed to plead the originality of his work—the 23 pleadings as to the copyright material are too vague for the Court to determine what (if anything) 24 was stolen, and by whom. The Court therefore DISMISSES the copyright claims against Google. 25 Because it is conceivable that Khan may present additional facts to support the elements of these 26 claims, the Court GRANTS Khan LEAVE TO AMEND. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 3. Fraud 2 Khan brings his third cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, which governs mail fraud. The 3 Court agrees with Google that it appears Khan brings this claim as an attempt to hold Defendants 4 liable for alleged tampering Khan’s personal emails. See ECF No. 37 at 11. This is a criminal statute 5 without a private right of action. Further, because Khan attempts to apply this statute to electronic 6 mail, he has not pleaded any facts relating to “any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by 7 the Postal Service.” 18 U.S.C. § 1341. The Court therefore DISMISSES this claim as to Google. 8 Because this claim cannot be saved via any conceivable amendment, LEAVE TO AMEND is 9 DENIED. 10 4. Conspiracy 11 Khan brings his fourth cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 371, which outlaws conspiracy to 12 commit an offense against or defraud the United States. This statute does not address Khan’s 13 allegations: Khan alleges that he is the victim of a conspiracy, but the statute only applies to 14 conspiracies against the United States. The Court therefore DISMISSES the conspiracy claim 15 against Google. Because this claim cannot be saved via any conceivable amendment, LEAVE TO 16 AMEND is DENIED. 17 5. Obstruction of Justice & Spoliation of Evidence 18 Khan brings his fourth and fifth causes of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1519, which governs the 19 “destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy.” Khan 20 has not pleaded any facts related to tampering of records in other federal investigations or 21 bankruptcy proceedings, and, further, the claims are based on a criminal statute without a private 22 right of action. The Court therefore DISMISSES both claims as to Google. Because this claim 23 cannot be saved via any conceivable amendment, LEAVE TO AMEND is DENIED. 24 6. Corporate Espionage 25 Khan brings his seventh cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1831, which addresses espionage 26 to the benefit of a foreign government. This is a criminal statute without a private right of action. 27 Further, Khan has not pleaded any facts relating to foreign governments or their agents. The Court 28 1 therefore DISMISSES this claim as to Google. Because this claim cannot be saved via any 2 conceivable amendment, LEAVE TO AMEND is DENIED. 3 7. Conflict of Interest 4 Khan brings his eighth cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 208, which restricts federal 5 employees from engaging in proceedings where they have a conflicting economic interest. This is a 6 criminal statute without a private right of action. Further, Khan has not pleaded any facts relating to 7 federal employees and has not shown how any federal employees that could theoretically be 8 implicated in this case could also be employees of Google. The Court therefore DISMISSES this 9 claim as to Google. Because this claim cannot be saved via any conceivable amendment, LEAVE 10 TO AMEND is DENIED. 11 8. Insider Trading 12 Khan brings his ninth cause of action for insider trading pursuant to section 10(b) of the 13 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. Chpt. 2B. To bring a private cause of action for 14 securities fraud, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission of fact, (2) 15 scienter, (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security, (4) transaction and loss causation, 16 and (5) economic loss.” Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1061 17 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted). Khan has not pleaded any facts relating to securities. 18 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the insider trading claims as to Google. Because it is 19 conceivable that Khan may present additional facts to support the elements of these claims, the Court 20 GRANTS Khan LEAVE TO AMEND. 21 9. Unfair Competition 22 Khan brings his tenth cause of action under 15 U.S.C. § 1125, which governs unfair 23 competition between businesses. An unfair competition claim requires a plaintiff to plead:

24 (1) a false statement of fact by the defendant in a commercial advertisement about 25 its own or another’s product; (2) the statement actually deceived or has the tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its audience; (3) the deception is material, in 26 that it is likely to influence the purchasing decision; (4) the defendant caused its false statement to enter interstate commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is 27 likely to be injured as a result of the false statement, either by direct diversion of sales from itself to defendant or by a lessening of the goodwill associated with its 28 1 Meissner Filtration Prod., Inc. v. Sani-Tech W., Inc., No. LACV2201194JAKEX, 2022 WL 2 17190245, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2022) (internal citation omitted). Khan has failed to plead Google 3 has made a false statement of fact;6 therefore, his unfair competition claim must fail. The Court 4 therefore DISMISSES this claim as to Google. Because it is conceivable that Khan may present 5 additional facts to support the elements of these claims, the Court GRANTS Khan LEAVE TO 6 AMEND. 7 10. Federal Tort Claims Act7 8 Khan attempts to raise several claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, et seq., the Federal Torts 9 Claims Act (“FTCA”). There is no right of action for an individual to bring claims against a private 10 corporation under the FTCA—the statute was designed as a legal vehicle for private individuals to 11 sue for torts committed by the United States (by and through its agents, federal employees). 12 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES all FTCA claims against Google. Because this claim cannot be 13 saved via any conceivable amendment, LEAVE TO AMEND is DENIED. 14 11. Federal Trade Secrets Claims 15 Khan brings his seventeenth and eighteenth causes of action under the Defend Trade Secrets 16 Act. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–32. To state a claim for trade secret misappropriation under the Defend 17 Trade Secrets Act, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) the plaintiff owned a trade secret; (2) the 18 defendant misappropriated the trade secret; and (3) the defendant’s actions damaged the plaintiff.” 19 Versata Software, Inc. v. Configit A/S, No. LACV2009019JAKMRWX, 2021 WL 5536287, at *3 20 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2021). While Khan references his ownership of trade secrets, he fails to plead 21 any facts to support his claims. Khan’s allegations regarding his ownership of trade secrets and any 22 misappropriations or damages with regard to those secrets is therefore impermissibly speculative and 23 does not pass muster under the Twombly/Iqbal standard. The Court therefore DISMISSES the trade 24 25

26 6 As Google points out, Khan has failed to plead that Google has made statements of any kind—true or 27 untrue. See ECF No. 37 at 14. 7 The Court (and Google) infers from a liberal reading of Khan’s Complaint that he intended to bring his tort 28 claims under California common law. See ECF No. 37 at 15–18. The Court addresses those claims in 1 secrets claims as to Google. Because it is conceivable that Khan may present additional facts to 2 support the elements of these claims, the Court GRANTS Khan LEAVE TO AMEND. 3 12. Tolling of a Statute 4 Khan lists “tolling of a statute” as a cause of action, but he appears to be asking that the 5 Court consider tolling when evaluating whether his claims are timely. The Court will consider all 6 relevant statutes of limitation but reiterates that tolling is not a cause of action. 7 iii. Conclusion 8 For the reasons explained above, Google has sufficiently argued that Khan failed to meet the 9 basic pleading requirements under Rule 8(a). Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2) (requiring the plaintiff to 10 state “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). Absent 11 additional specificity, it is impossible for the Court (or Google) to know how Google has allegedly 12 harmed Khan. 13 Accordingly, given that the Complaint fails to plausibly allege any harmful conduct 14 attributable to Google, Google’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Because a possibility remains 15 that Khan may be able to marshal facts to support his claims against Google, the Court also 16 GRANTS LEAVE TO AMEND where indicated. 17 II. Everlywell’s Motion to Dismiss 18 Everlywell moves to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of 19 personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6). 20 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 21 “Congress has broadly authorized the federal courts to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction 22 over all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 23 Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 505 (2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331) (internal citations 24 omitted). “Dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction . . . is proper only when the claim is 25 so . . . ‘completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.’” Brownback v. King, 26 592 U.S. 209, 217 (2021) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 27 (1998).). However, a plaintiff must plausibly allege all jurisdictional elements. Id. (citing Dart 28 Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014).) 1 Everlywell argues that Khan has not adequately alleged the basis for the Court’s subject 2 matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 40 at 3. But as Everlywell admits, “the [C]ourt must construe pro se 3 pleadings liberally and afford Plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” Id.; see Bernhardt v. L.A. Cnty., 4 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Courts have a duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally 5 including pro se motions as well as complaints.”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) 6 (stating “[Pro se pleadings] . . . however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards 7 than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”). Here, Khan alleges his intellectual property has been 8 infringed. See generally ECF No. 1. The registration and management of intellectual property 9 (including copyright and trademark rights) is managed by the federal government (including 10 agencies such as the USCO and the U.S. Patent and Trademarks Office). The violation of any 11 intellectual property rights is likely to raise issues of federal law, thus placing the current dispute 12 squarely within this Court’s jurisdictional wheelhouse. Moreover, Khan alleges Defendants have 13 violated multiple federal statutes. See, e.g., id. at 12 (alleging violations of the Defend Trade Secrets 14 Act). The Court therefore finds Khan has sufficiently pleaded subject matter jurisdiction at this stage 15 in the proceedings. 16 B. Personal Jurisdiction 17 i. Applicable Law 18 “In evaluating the appropriateness of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, 19 [courts] ordinarily examine whether such jurisdiction satisfies the ‘requirements of the applicable 20 state long-arm statute’ and ‘comport[s] with federal due process.’” Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler 21 Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 919 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 22 1404–05 (9th Cir. 1994)). “Because California permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the 23 full extent permitted by due process, [courts] need only determine whether jurisdiction over [a 24 defendant] comports with due process.” Id. (cleaned up); see Cal. Civ. P. Code § 410.10 (“A court of 25 this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or 26 of the United States.”). “For due process to be satisfied, a defendant, if not present in the forum, 27 must have ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state such that the assertion of jurisdiction ‘does not 28 1 offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 2 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 3 “Applying the ‘minimum contacts’ analysis, a court may obtain either general or specific 4 jurisdiction over a defendant.” Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on 5 other grounds as discussed in Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1015, 1024 (9th Cir. 2017). 6 “If the defendant’s activities in the forum are substantial, continuous and systematic, general 7 jurisdiction is available; in other words, the foreign defendant is subject to suit even on matters 8 unrelated to his or her contacts to the forum.” Id. “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the 9 exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent 10 place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires 11 Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011). On the other hand, a court may exercise 12 specific jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if the plaintiff’s claims “‘arise out of or relate to the 13 defendant’s contacts’ with the forum.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 14 359 (2021) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017)). 15 The Ninth Circuit has established three requirements for a district court to exercise specific 16 personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: 17 (1) the defendant must either “purposefully direct his activities” toward the forum or “purposefully avail[ ] himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum”; 18 (2) “the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum- 19 related activities”; and (3) “the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, 20 i.e. it must be reasonable.” 21 Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Dole 22 Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002)). 23 “The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the test.” Schwarzenegger 24 v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004). “If the plaintiff succeeds in satisfying 25 both of the first two prongs, the burden then shifts to the defendant to ‘present a compelling case’ 26 that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. 27 Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)). “[I]n the absence of an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need 28 only make ‘a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss.’” 1 Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pebble 2 Beach, 453 F.3d at 1154). 3 ii. Discussion 4 Everlywell argues that Khan has not properly alleged personal jurisdiction. ECF No. 40 at 4– 5 5. “Everlywell is incorporated in Delaware with a principal place of business in Texas.” Id. As 6 established in Goodyear, a corporation is not generally considered to be “at home” outside of the 7 states where it is incorporated or headquartered. 564 U.S. at 924. Khan does not dispute that general 8 jurisdiction would be inappropriate over Everlywell. Therefore, the Court proceeds to analyzing 9 whether Everlywell has sufficient “minimum contacts” with the state of California such that specific 10 jurisdiction would be appropriate. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co, 582 U.S. at 262. 11 To establish the existence of specific personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must present facts to 12 support the allegations that: (1) the defendant purposefully directed its activities at the forum state or 13 somehow otherwise purposefully availed itself of the privileges of the forum state; and (2) the claims 14 at issue arose out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-state related activities. Axiom Foods, Inc., 15 874 F.3d at 1068. Here, Khan has not pleaded any facts to support either prong of this test. 16 Therefore, Khan fails to meet his burden to establish the existence of personal jurisdiction. 17 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Everlywell’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal 18 jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2).8 Because it remains possible that Khan may be able to plead 19 facts establishing specific jurisdiction, the Court also GRANTS LEAVE TO AMEND to remedy the 20 jurisdictional issues. 21 SERVICE ON REMAINING DEFENDANTS 22 Rule 4(m) provides that, “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is 23 filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action 24 without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.” Fed. 25 R. Civ. P. 4(m). Khan originally filed this lawsuit on April 7, 2022. ECF No. 1. After granting 26 multiple extensions to affect service, on December 13, 2022, this Court ordered Khan to serve all 27

28 1 | Defendants or receive waivers of service within sixty days. ECF No. 32. Although Khan continued 2 | to upload proofs of service, the docket indicates these filings remain defective—the Court cannot 3 | determine from the filings which Defendants were served and the method by which service occurred. 4 | (As the Court has previously admonished Khan, the requirements for service on individuals and 5 || corporations are enumerated in Rule 4(e), (h).) It is possible that Khan has properly served 6 || Defendants and simply failed to give proper notice to the Court. 7 Accordingly, Khan is ORDERED to file proof of adequate service as to all Defendants 8 || (except for Google and Everlywell) within forty-five (45) days of this Order. If Khan has not 9 || properly served Defendants or fails to file the valid proofs of service within the allotted time, all 10 || claims will be dismissed with prejudice as to the remaining Defendants. 11 RESOURCES FOR PRO SE LITIGANTS 12 Although Khan is proceeding pro se, i.e., without legal representation, he nonetheless is 13 || required to comply with Court orders, the Local Rules, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 14 | C.D. Cal. L.R. 83-2.2.3. The Local Rules are available on the Court’s website, 15 | http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/court-procedures/local-rules. 16 The Court cannot provide legal advice to any party, including pro se litigants. There is a free 17 || “Pro Se Clinic” that can provide information and guidance about many aspects of civil litigation in 18 || this Court. 19 e Public Counsel runs a free Federal Pro Se Clinic where pro se litigants can get information 20 and guidance. The Clinic is located at the Roybal Federal Building and Courthouse, 255 East 21 Temple Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012. Pro se litigants must call or submit an on-line 22 application to request services as follows: on-line applications can be submitted at 23 http://prose.cacd.uscourts.gov/los-angeles, or call (213) 385-2977, ext. 270. 24 e Public Counsel also has extensive resources for pro se litigants at its website located at 25 https://publiccounsel.org/services/federal-court/. 26 e The Court is also informed that the LA Law Library, located across the street from the First 27 Street Courthouse at 301 W. First Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, also has extensive 28

1 resources for pro se litigants. The LA Law Library can be reached via email at 2 reference@lalawlibrary.org, or via telephone at (213) 785-2513.

3 4 5 6 7

8

9

10

11 12 13 14 15

16

17

18 19 20 21 22

23

24

25

26 27 / / / / 28 / / / / 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 3 1. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 126) is DENIED; 4 2. Defendant Google’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 37) is GRANTED with leave to amend 5 the identified claims; 6 3. Defendant Everlywell’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 40) is GRANTED with leave to 7 amend the identified claims; 8 4. Plaintiffis ORDERED to file proof that he has properly served remaining Defendants. 9 | Khan shall have thirty (30) days from the date of this Order to amend his Complaint and forty-five 10 || (45) days from the date of this Order to upload a valid proof of service. 11 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 14 15 Dated: December 24, 2024 16 7 MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28