1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 HOOPES VINEYARD LLC, et al., Case No. 24-cv-06256-CRB

9 Plaintiffs,

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR A

10 v.

PROTECTIVE ORDER TO STAY

DISCOVERY

11 COUNTY OF NAPA, 12 Defendant.

13 Defendant Napa County seeks a protective order to stay discovery pending the 14 resolution of its soon-to-be-filed motion attacking Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. 15 Mot. (dkt. 42). The court finds this matter suitable for resolution without a hearing 16 pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7-1(b) and DENIES Napa County’s motion. 17 The filing (or anticipated filing) of a motion to dismiss does not automatically stay 18 discovery. Tradebay, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 278 F.R.D. 597, 600 (D. Nev. 2011). Rather, 19 stays of discovery are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1), which 20 provides that a court may issue a protective order limiting discovery “for good cause … to 21 protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 22 expense.” The “party seeking a stay of discovery carries the heavy burden of making a 23 ‘strong showing’ why discovery should be denied.” Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 24 F.R.D. 39, 40 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (citing Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 25 (9th Cir. 1975). This requires that party to “show a particular and specific need for the 26 protective order, as opposed to making stereotyped or conclusory statements.” Id. 27 Where a party seeks a stay pending the resolution of a motion, two factors must be 1 dispositive of the entire case, or at least dispositive on the issue at which discovery is 2 directed.” Smith v. Levine Leichtman Cap. Partners, Inc., No. C 10-00010 JSW, 2011 WL 3 13153189, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2011). Second, the court must be able to decide the 4 pending motion without additional discovery. Id. The presence of these two factors 5 permits, but does not require, the court to stay discovery until the pending motion is 6 resolved. See id. (“If the two above questions are answered affirmatively, the court may 7 issue a protective order.” (emphasis in original)). 8 The parties spend significant time debating the likely merits of Napa County’s as- 9 yet unfiled motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. But Plaintiffs’ 10 allegations and Napa County’s potential defenses are complex and not suited for 11 abbreviated briefing in a motion to stay. See id. at *2 (“a stay of the type requested by 12 defendants, where a party asserts that dismissal is likely, … would circumvent the 13 procedures for resolution of [a motion to dismiss]”). Certainly the Court is unable to say 14 that it is “convinced that the plaintiff will be unable to state a claim for relief.” See 15 Werger v. Monroe, 282 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2022) (emphasis added) (citation 16 omitted). Moreover, Napa County fails to identify a particular or specific need for a 17 protective order, asserting only that a stay will promote efficiency for the Court and the 18 parties and conserve the parties’ resources. Mot. at 9–10. Such blanket concerns, which 19 are true in the mine run of litigation, do not establish good cause for a protective order. 20 See Smith, 2011 WL 13153189, at *2 (“The expense of discovery alone does not amount 21 to good cause to stay discovery based on Defendants’ argument that they are likely to 22 succeed on the pending motions and could therefore avoid unnecessary expenses.”). 23 The Court therefore finds that a stay of discovery would not be proper at this 24 juncture. Napa County’s motion is DENIED. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 Dated: January 6, 2025

CHARLES R. BREYER

27 United States District Judge