NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 14 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MUHAMMAD ADOM, No. 23-55558

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:21-cv-00711-JFW-KES v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES; BRYAN MEMORANDUM*

TAHUITE, LAPD Officer,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 14, 2025**

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, KLEINFELD, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges

Muhammad Adom appeals pro se from the district court’s summary

judgment in his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law arising from a traffic

stop, the search of his car, and his arrest for a suspected violation of California

Penal Code § 25400(a)(1), which prohibits carrying a concealed firearm in a

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). vehicle. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Smith

v. Agdeppa, 81 F.4th 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2023). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Adom’s Fourth

Amendment claims against Officer Tahuite premised on the search of an unlocked

gun box, the car’s center console, and the rest of the car because Adom failed to

raise a triable dispute as to whether any part of the search was unlawful. See

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (“[T]he search of the passenger

compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be

placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief

based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational

inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the officers in believing that the

suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.”

(citation and footnote omitted)); United States v. Taylor, 60 F.4th 1233, 1242-43

(9th Cir. 2023) (explaining that police may search a car without a warrant when

they are given “voluntary, unequivocal, and specific consent” (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186, 1193

(9th Cir. 2010) (“Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement,

police may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to

believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.”).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Adom’s Fourth

2 Amendment claim against Officer Tahuite premised on the order to exit the car

because Adom failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether the order was

unlawful. See Taylor, 60 F.4th at 1240 (“[P]olice officers during a traffic stop may

ask the driver to step out of the vehicle. The rationale is officer safety[.]” (citation

omitted)).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Adom’s Fourth

Amendment claim against Officer Tahuite alleging excessive force because the

video evidence contradicts Adom’s contentions regarding this claim. See Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different

stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable

jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes

of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”); Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d

805, 823-24 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing requirements of an excessive force claim).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Adom’s Fourth

Amendment claim against Officer Tahuite premised on Adom’s arrest because he

failed to raise a triable dispute as to the absence of probable cause. See Atwater v.

City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (“If an officer has probable cause to

believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his

presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”).

The district court also properly rejected Adom’s contention that Officer Tahuite

3 arrested him when he handcuffed him during the investigatory stop. See Allen v.

City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that “whether a

seizure has ripened into a full-scale arrest” depends on the totality of the

circumstances, and that officers are entitled to take reasonable measures to protect

themselves during an investigatory stop).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Adom’s equal

protection claims against Officer Tahuite and the City of Los Angeles because

Adom failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether defendants acted with an intent

to discriminate based on his race. See Lockett v. County of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d

737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that municipal liability claims under § 1983

require a plaintiff to show an underlying constitutional violation); Furnace v.

Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that an equal protection

claim requires showing that defendants acted with an intent or purpose to

discriminate against plaintiff based on membership in a protected class).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Adom’s claim

against Officer Tahuite alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress

(“IIED”) because Officer Tahuite is entitled to state-law immunity for his

statements in the police report, and even if he were not, Adom failed to raise a

triable dispute as to whether any alleged conduct was extreme or outrageous. See

Cal. Gov’t Code § 822.2 (“A public employee acting in the scope of his

4 employment is not liable for an injury caused by his misrepresentation, whether or

not such misrepresentation be negligent or intentional, unless he is guilty of actual

fraud, corruption or actual malice.”); Hughes v. Pair, 209 P.3d 963, 976 (Cal.

2009) (describing requirements of an IIED claim under California law).

We do not address issues not raised and argued in the opening brief. See Orr

v. Plumb, 884 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that arguments omitted

from the opening brief are deemed forfeited).

AFFIRMED.

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