facts are considered “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be

compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. at 748 (emphasis in original) (citation

omitted). We review questions of law de novo. Id. And in those circumstances

where the BIA “agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both decisions.” Garcia-

Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018).

Petitioners’ asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. “To be eligible

for asylum, a petitioner has the burden to demonstrate a likelihood of ‘persecution

or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’” Sharma v. Garland,

9 F.4th 1052, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Eligibility for withholding

of removal requires the petitioner “discharge this burden by a ‘clear probability.’”

Id. (citation omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). In certain instances,

“[p]roving past persecution can satisfy this burden, as it gives rise to a rebuttable

presumption of future persecution.” Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062, 1064

2 (9th Cir. 2020). But here the record does not compel a conclusion other than the

agency’s: that Petitioners failed to meet their burden.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Petitioners

failed to show they held an actual or imputed anti-gang political opinion. Apart from

refusing to pay extortion demands, there is no evidence that Petitioners took any

“concrete steps” against the gangs. See Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738,

746–47 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder,

707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Nor is there any evidence that the gangs

viewed Petitioners as holding a belief system in opposition to theirs. See Garcia-

Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2014). The record does not compel

a conclusion other than that reached by the agency: namely, that Petitioners were

“victimized for economic and personal reasons,” which does “not constitute

persecution on account of political opinion.” Santos-Lemus, 542 F.3d at 747.

Substantial evidence likewise supports the agency’s determination that

Petitioners failed to show that they were members of their proposed Particular Social

Groups (“PSGs”) of (i) “Guatemalans who take concrete steps in opposition to the

maras” or (ii) “opposition to the de facto government of Guatemala, the maras.” The

mere act of refusing to comply with the gang’s extortion demands is insufficient to

show that they took “concrete steps in opposition to the maras.” See id.

3 Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioners’

family-based PSGs were not socially distinct. Petitioners never presented any

country-specific evidence discussing Guatemalan society’s perception of familial

relationships or otherwise addressing what type of kinship ties Guatemalan society

recognizes as distinct. Accordingly, Petitioners did not satisfy their burden to show

that their proposed groups are socially distinct. See Nguyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099,

1103 (9th Cir. 2020).

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s finding that the female

Petitioner failed to establish an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution on

account of her membership in the PSG of “Guatemalan women.” She never

presented any evidence that she or her female family members had ever been harmed

in Guatemala. The country conditions evidence shows generalized violence against

women, but “in order to establish a well-founded fear, ‘[a petitioner] cannot simply

prove that there exists a generalized or random possibility of persecution; she must

show that she is at particular risk.’” Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998)

(citation and alterations omitted). Further, the BIA did not fail to consider the minor

Petitioner’s claim, nor did it err in declining to consider his newly-raised PSG. See

Honcharov v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1293, 1296 n.2 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).

The agency’s denial of Petitioners’ claim for CAT protection is likewise

supported by substantial evidence. The IJ noted that, other than generalized

4 evidence of violence and crime, there was no evidence Petitioners would be tortured

if returned to Guatemala. Without any risk that is particular to the applicant, general

evidence is insufficient to prove eligibility for CAT protection. Delgado-Ortiz v.

Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus the record does not compel the

conclusion that Petitioners are more likely than not to be tortured with the consent

of the government if returned to Guatemala.

PETITION DENIED. 1

1 The temporary stay of removal shall remain in effect until issuance of the mandate. The motion for a stay of removal (Dkt. No. 3) is otherwise denied. 5