1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THOMAS LANAGAN, Case No. 8:24-cv-02237-JWH-JDE 12 Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

13 v. MOTION TO REMAND [ECF No. 10] 14 WESTCLIFF PLAZA RETAIL LLC, and 15 DOES 1-10, inclusive, 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 Before the Court is the motion of Plaintiff Thomas Lanagan to remand 2 this action to Orange County Superior Court.1 The Court concludes that this 3 matter is appropriate for resolution without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; 4 L.R. 7-15. After considering the papers filed in support and opposition,2 the 5 Court DENIES Lanagan’s Motion. 6 I. BACKGROUND 7 Lanagan, who has disabilities that limit his mobility, commenced this 8 action against Defendant Westcliff Plaza Retail LLC in Orange County Superior 9 Court in September 2024.3 Lanagan asserted two claims for relief: (1) violation 10 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12189; 11 and (2) violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code. §§ 51-53.4 Both 12 of those claims arise from a visit that Lanagan made to Westcliff Plaza, at which 13 time Lanagan discovered “[a]n accessible parking area whose slope exceeds 14 [ADA] specifications.”5 15 In October 2024, Westcliff Plaza removed this action to this Court on the 16 basis of federal question jurisdiction.6 Lanagan then filed the instant Motion, in 17 which he argues that although the ADA claim arises under federal law, the 18 19 1 Pl.’s Motion to Remand Case to Orange County Superior Court (the 20 “Motion”) [ECF No. 10]. 21 2 The Court has considered the documents of record in this action, 22 including the following papers: (1) Notice of Removal (the “Notice”) [ECF No. 1]; (2) Compl. (the “Complaint”) [ECF No. 1-1]; (3) Motion; (4) Def.’s 23 Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion (the “Opposition”) [ECF No. 11]; 24 and (5) Pl.’s Reply in Support of the Motion (the “Reply”) [ECF No. 14]. 25 3 See Complaint. 26 4 See generally id. 27 5 Id. at ¶ 29. 1 action should be remanded to state court because Lanagan lacks Article III 2 standing.7 Westcliff Plaza opposes Lanagan’s Motion.8 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Accordingly, “[t]hey 5 possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. 6 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). In every federal case, the 7 basis for federal jurisdiction must appear affirmatively from the record. See 8 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006). “The right of 9 removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court 10 must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of 11 Congress.” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (internal 12 quotation marks omitted). When Congress has acted to create a right of 13 removal, those statutes, unless otherwise stated, are strictly construed against 14 removal jurisdiction. See id. 15 To remove an action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the 16 removing defendant “must demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction 17 lies in the federal courts.” Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 33. As such, a defendant may 18 remove civil actions in which either (1) a federal question exists; or (2) complete 19 diversity of citizenship between the parties exists and the amount in controversy 20 exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332. 21 The right to remove is not absolute, even when original jurisdiction exists. 22 The removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. 23 See Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) 24 (noting the “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on removal rests 25 with the removing defendant”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 26

27 7 See Motion. 1 1992) (“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the 2 defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”) 3 (quotation marks omitted). Any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter 4 jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remand. See id. at 566 (“Federal 5 jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the 6 first instance.”). 7 III. ANALYSIS 8 Lanagan argues that, although his ADA claim arises under federal law, 9 this action must be remanded to state court because Lanagan lacks Article III 10 standing to pursue the ADA claim in federal court.9 In opposition, Westcliff 11 Plaza argues that Lanagan has Article III standing and that remanding this action 12 would improperly allow Lanagan to circumvent federal jurisdiction.10 13 Before a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a claim, the plaintiff 14 must demonstrate that he or she has Article III standing. See Lujan v. Defenders 15 of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). To do so, a plaintiff must establish that he 16 or she has “suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest 17 which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not 18 conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 560 (internal citations and quotation marks 19 omitted). The burden to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement is particularly 20 demanding for plaintiffs who seek injunctive relief—those plaintiffs “must 21 demonstrate a ‘real and immediate threat of repeated injury’ in the future.” 22 Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011). 23 Additionally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury is traceable to the 24 defendant’s conduct and that it is “likely” that “the injury will be redressed by 25 a favorable decision.” Id. 26

27 9 See Motion. 1 Individual plaintiffs such as Lanagan may receive only injunctive relief 2 under the ADA, so, to pursue their claims in federal court, those plaintiffs must 3 demonstrate a “real and immediate” threat of future harm. Chapman, 631 F.3d 4 at 946. The Ninth Circuit has recognized two ways in which an ADA plaintiff 5 can satisfy that standard. First, a plaintiff can allege that he or she “intends to 6 return to a noncompliant accommodation and is therefore likely to reencounter a 7 discriminatory architectural barrier.” Id. at 950. Second, a plaintiff can allege 8 that “discriminatory architectural barriers deter him from returning to a 9 noncompliant accommodation.” Id. Either way, a plaintiff must also “identify[] 10 which barriers [he or she] had encountered” and explain how those barriers 11 “affected his specific disability.” Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 907 12 (9th Cir. 2011). 13 Here, Lanagan has not alleged that he intends to return to Westcliff 14 Plaza,11 and he asserts that the absence of that allegation deprives the Court of 15 subject-matter jurisdiction.12 But Lanagan also avers that he “is being deterred 16 from patronizing the accommodations provided for public use at [Westcliff 17 Plaza] due to [Lanagan’s] knowledge of the ongoing existence of discriminatory 18 ADA violations.”13 Lanagan further asserts that the noncompliant parking space 19 that he encountered at Westcliff Plaza affected Lanagan because he is 20 “substantially limited in the major life activities of walking, standing, 21 ambulating, and sitting” and “is the holder of a disabled parking placard.”14 At 22 this stage of the litigation, those allegations satisfy Lanagan’s burden to establish 23 that he has Article III standing. See Chapman, 631 F.3d at 950. 24

25 11 See Complaint. 26 12 See generally Motion. 27 13 Complaint ¶ 40. 1 IV. DISPOSITION 2 For those reasons, Lanagan’s instant Motion to remand [ECF No. 10] is 3|| DENIED. 4 IT ISSO ORDERED. Dated:__ February 18, 2025 \ LY, Ud — 7 SNITED STATES DISTRICT TUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28