FILED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FEB 27 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOEL BALL, No. 23-15015

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-05815-SPL-DMF v.

CITY OF SCOTTSDALE; MEMORANDUM*

SCOTTSDALE CITY PROSECUTOR’S

OFFICE; CARON CLOSE;

SCOTTSDALE POLICE

DEPARTMENT; SEAN RYAN, Officer; SERBALIK, Officer; LEE, Officer; KANE, Officer; UNKNOWN PARTIES, named as other as-yet unknown Scottsdale Police Officers and John Does 1-50,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 27, 2025**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: S.R. THOMAS, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Joel Ball appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of the defendants in his action against the City of Scottsdale, Arizona, and its

employees. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review

discovery orders for an abuse of discretion and the grant of summary judgment de

novo. Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 1996);

Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly denied plaintiff’s request to conduct depositions

without a court reporter. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(5) (setting forth the

requirements); Fed. R. Civ. P. 28(c)) (providing that “[a] deposition must not be

taken before a person who is . . . financially interested in the action”); Orr v. Bank

of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764,774 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that an extract from a

deposition that lacks the reporter’s certification is inadmissible at summary

judgment).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff’s requests

for discovery while the first motion for summary judgment was pending. Plaintiff

failed to identify what evidence existed and how it would have prevented summary

judgment, see Nidds, 113 F.3d at 921 (setting forth the standard), and did not

2 demonstrate any prejudice from the district court’s denial of his requests, see

Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002).

Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by denying the untimely

motions for discovery while the second motion for summary judgment was

pending. Plaintiff’s lack of diligence in deposing the individuals justified denial of

the motion. See id. (finding no abuse of discretion where the party was given

additional time to take depositions and failed to take those depositions).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff’s request

to file a sur-reply, finding plaintiff had not shown good cause to file one. See SEC

v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1314 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the district

court has the discretion to reject supplementary material).

Summary judgment was proper on the state claims because plaintiff failed to

serve notice of claims on the individual defendants and the city clerk pursuant to

Arizona law. A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1; Crum v. Superior Ct.,

922 P.2d 316, 317 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (requiring that proper notice be served on

both the employee and employer where the employee’s conduct “was committed

within the course and scope of employment”). Plaintiff’s email did not satisfy the

statutory requirements. See Falcon ex rel. Sandoval v. Maricopa County, 144 P.3d

1254, 1256 (Ariz. 2006) (en banc) (“Actual notice and substantial compliance do

3 not excuse failure to comply with the statutory requirements of A.R.S. § 12-

821.01(A).”); Yahweh v. City of Phoenix, 400 P.3d 445, 447 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017)

(“[t]he claim is barred if the claimant fails to present a valid settlement offer” in

the notice of claim); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(c)(1)(A) (directing the plaintiff to send a

waiver of service request in writing “to the defendant and any other person

required in this rule to be served”).

Summary judgment was proper on the judicial deception claim alleged

against Detective Ryan because plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence to

establish that the warrant affidavit contained misrepresentations or omissions that

were material to probable cause. See Bravo, 665 F.3d at 1083 (setting forth the

standard). The detective could rely on information provided by other officers and

official reports when he obtained the warrant. United States v. Bernard, 623 F.2d

551, 560–62 (9th Cir. 1979).

Plaintiff’s assertion that the district court was biased is not supported by the

record. Bias does not exist merely because the district court rules against a party.

See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 1999).

Plaintiff waived the remaining claims by not discussing any error in the

body of his Opening Brief. Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir.

1996).

4 Appellant’s motion to strike the answering brief (Dkt. Entry No. 34) is

DENIED.

AFFIRMED.

5