introduction. The court considered—and for the most part admitted—every piece

of evidence for which Sullivan Equity advanced specific arguments. “The fact that

[Sullivan Equity] failed to avail [it]self of the full procedures provided by state law

does not constitute a sign of their inadequacy.” Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp.,

456 U.S. 461, 485 (1982).

Moreover, Sullivan Equity has not shown that the additional evidence it

sought to admit “could readily cause a different result.” Collins v. D.R. Horton,

Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,

439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979)). Because Sullivan Equity has “fail[ed] to point to facts

that it was unable to present or how these facts would have affected the outcome,”

we conclude that it “had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue[]” of

fairness before the state court. Ross v. Alaska, 189 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir.

1999).

2. Sullivan Equity’s other arguments lack merit. It contends that its

reservation under England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375

U.S. 411 (1964), prohibits the application of issue preclusion, but England

reservations do not insulate parties from the preclusion of issues “necessarily

decided in state court,” even if the parties were required to “litigate in state court

pursuant to Pullman.” San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco City & County, 364

3 24-2893 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 545 U.S. 323 (2005). It argues that state

decisions should not preclude the litigation of constitutional rights in federal

§ 1983 suits, but “[s]tate court decisions” are “entitled to the same preclusive effect

in a § 1983 action as in any other action.” White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d

918, 927 (9th Cir. 2012).

Sullivan Equity further asserts that two cases—Jamgotchian v. Ferraro, 93

F.4th 1150 (9th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co.,

384 U.S. 394 (1966)—prevent issue preclusion from attaching to the state court

decision. Neither case governs here, however, because both cases involve the

preclusive effects of administrative decisions, not state court decisions, on

subsequent federal actions. See Jamgotchian, 93 F.4th at 1152 (considering

“whether a state agency decision precludes [a] § 1983 lawsuit”); Utah Constr., 384

U.S. at 422 (explaining when preclusive effects can attach to an agency’s

decision). Moreover, Sullivan Equity suggests that the district court prematurely

dismissed its Takings Clause argument without adequate consideration, but the

court had already considered and rejected that very argument in an earlier order.1

Finally, Sullivan Equity tries to reargue the merits, claiming that the

1 Because Sullivan Equity did not “specifically and distinctly” raise an argument regarding its other requests for declaratory relief in its opening brief, that issue has been forfeited. Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001).

4 24-2893 administrative proceeding was unfair and that the agency fabricated evidence. The

sole question before us is not whether the state court reached the right decision, but

whether issue preclusion applies. See Chen ex rel. Chen v. Albany Unified Sch.

Dist., 56 F.4th 708, 726 (9th Cir. 2022); Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Ct.,

954 P.2d 511, 516 (Cal. 1998) (“[U]nder the doctrines of res judicata and collateral

estoppel a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence

was falsified or destroyed.”). For the reasons discussed, we conclude that it does.

AFFIRMED.

5 24-2893