NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 17 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JESSE M. SKINNER, No. 22-55146 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 5:19-cv-01116 v.

MEMORANDUM*

R. LEE, et al.,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 6, 2025 Pasadena, California

Before: TALLMAN, IKUTA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Appellant Jesse Skinner, a federal inmate, appeals the dismissal of his Third

Amended Complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8 and failure to state a claim.

Skinner’s counseled briefs on appeal challenge the dismissal of his Eighth

Amendment excessive force claim alleging that federal corrections officers abused

and harassed Skinner and then retaliated against him for filing grievances. Skinner

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. concedes, however, that his argument on appeal is foreclosed by Chambers v.

Herrera, 78 F.4th 1100 (9th Cir. 2023), which barred extending a Bivens remedy to

Eighth Amendment excessive force claims. Skinner urges us to hear this case

initially en banc to reconsider and overrule Chambers. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291, decline the invitation, and affirm the district court’s dismissal

under Chambers.

1. The district court properly dismissed Skinner’s Eighth Amendment

excessive force claim after concluding it was not cognizable under Bivens. See

Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 496–98 (2022); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 135–

37 (2017). While this appeal was pending, we held that a Bivens remedy does not

extend to Eighth Amendment excessive force claims. Chambers, 78 F.4th at 1107–

08. Because Chambers expressly forecloses Skinner’s Eighth Amendment

excessive force claim, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of that claim. The

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Skinner leave to amend for a

fourth time given that further leave to amend would be futile in the face of

Chambers.1

2. We also reject Skinner’s request that we bypass the regular three-judge

panel and initially hear this case en banc. Ninth Cir. Gen. Ord. 5.2. Contrary to

1 We do not entertain Skinner’s attempt to challenge the dismissal of his remaining claims because they were not raised in his counseled brief and are thus waived.

2 22-55146 Skinner’s arguments, this case does not present a “question of exceptional

importance.” Fed. R. App. P. 40. Whether or not Chambers effectively insulates

federal officials who use excessive force against prisoners from civil liability is the

type of policy issue that the Supreme Court has counseled is reserved to Congress,

not the courts. See Egbert, 596 U.S. at 496; Chambers, 78 F.4th at 1108. For these

reasons, we deny Skinner’s petition for initial hearing en banc and his motion to file

an oversized petition.

3. We also deny Skinner’s pro se motion for injunctive relief, and his

motions to file pro se supplemental briefs in addition to his counseled briefs. Once

a party is appointed counsel, as Skinner was here, we decline to consider pro se

filings.

AFFIRMED.

3 22-55146