William Thornton v. Arnold Schwarzeneggar

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM CECIL THORNTON , No. 11-56146 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. v. 3:10-cv-01583-

RBB

EDMUND G. BROWN , JR.,* Governor of California; MATTHEW CATE , Secretary of Corrections; LEWIS, OPINION John Doe, Parole Unit Supervisor; MARK JOSEPH , Parole Agent; CHRISTINE CAVALIN , Parole Agent; JOHN DOE #1, Parole Agent, Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Ruben B. Brooks, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 9, 2012—Pasadena, California

Filed July 31, 2013

* The Honorable Edmund G. Brown, Jr., is substituted for his predecessor, The Honorable Arnold Schwarzenegger, as Governor of California. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2). THORNTON V . BROWN

Before: Myron H. Bright,** Susan P. Graber, and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Graber; Dissent by Judge Ikuta

SUMMARY***

Civil Rights

The panel reversed the district court’s order dismissing, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a civil rights action involving a constitutional…

Opinion by Judge GRABER; Dissent by Judge IKUTA.

OPINION

In this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , Plaintiff William Cecil Thornton brings a constitutional challenge to the imposition and enforcement of two conditions of his parole: a residency restriction and a requirement that he submit to electronic monitoring using a Global Positioning System (“GPS”) device. Citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 , 93 S.Ct. 1827 , 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 , 114 S.Ct. 2364 , 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), the district court concluded that habeas corpus provided the exclusive federal remedy for Plaintiffs claims and dismissed the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

The Supreme Court has not directly considered the application of the Heck doctrine to § 1983 actions that challenge conditions of parole. Among the courts of appeals, only the Seventh Circuit has done so, in Drollinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir.1977), and Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576 (7th Cir.2003). Consistent with Supreme Court precedent and that of our sister circuit, we hold that such an action is not barred by…

dissenting:

As a matter of California law, Thornton’s challenges, if successful, would necessarily demonstrate that a portion of his underlying sentence was invalid. Because the Supreme Court has held such challenges must be brought in a habeas petition, not under § 1983, I would affirm the district court. In holding otherwise, the majority misunderstands California law, misapplies Supreme Court precedent, and creates a circuit split with the Seventh Circuit.

I

In 2010, Thornton was convicted of robbery in California state court. He was sentenced under California’s determinate sentencing law, CaLPenal Code § 1170, to a two-year sentence for the robbery offense and a one-year consecutive term for a prior offense. See CaLPenal Code §§ 211, 213 (robbery), 667.5(b) (consecutive term). As required by California law, CaLPenal Code § 3000(b)(7), the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the CDCR) defined the term and conditions of Thornton’s parole, which included a GPS monitoring requirement and a residency restriction. Thornton challenged these conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that they violated his First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights,…