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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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AHADI ABU-AL MUHAMMAD ) NO. EDCV 23-1260-VBF (KS)

11 also known as )

12 ONOFRE TOMMY SERRANO, ) M E M O R A N D U M A N D O R D E R 13 Plaintiff, ) DISMISSING THE FIRST AMENDED ) v. COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 14 ) ) 15 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE et al., ) 16 Defendants. ) 17 _________________________________ ) 18 19 INTRODUCTION 20 21 On June 23, 2023, Ahadi Abu-Al Muhammad (also known as Onofre Tommy Serrano) 22 (“Plaintiff”), who is currently in custody at North Kern State Prison and proceeding pro se, 23 filed a civil rights complaint alleging constitutional violations arising out of his 2018 arrest 24 (the “Complaint”). (Dkt. No. 1.) On March 14, 2024, the Court dismissed the Complaint and 25 granted Plaintiff thirty days leave to file First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (Dkt. No. 16.) 26 Because Plaintiff did not timely file his FAC, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause 27 (“OSC”) on April 29, 2024 directing Plaintiff to demonstrate why the Court should not 28 recommend that the action be dismissed under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b). (Dkt. 1 No. 18.) After multiple extensions (see Dkt. Nos. 22-23, 25-26, 27-28), Plaintiff filed a 2 deficient FAC on October 29, 2024. (Dkt. No. 29.) The Court ordered Plaintiff to re-file the 3 FAC correcting the deficiencies by November 11, 2024. (Dkt. No. 31.) When Plaintiff failed 4 to meet that deadline, the Court issued another OSC directing Plaintiff to demonstrate why the 5 Court should not recommend that the action be dismissed by December 26, 2024. (Dkt. No. 6 32.) Plaintiff filed the corrected FAC on December 6, 2024.1 (Dkt. No. 35.) 7 8 In the FAC, Plaintiff again sues the County of Riverside (“County”); City of Riverside 9 (“City”); Riverside Police Department (“RPD”); Riverside Community Hospital (“RCH”); 10 Riverside Police Personnel Officers M. Rardin (“Rardin”), V. Schmitz (“Schmitz”), C. 11 Carmona (“Carmona”), and W. Ruiz (“Ruiz”) and Sergeants Simmons (“Simmons”) and 12 Chinchilla (“Chinchilla”) (collectively “Officer Defendants”) in their official and individual 13 capacities; Riverside Community Hospital personnel, Dr. Christensen and Nurse Jane Roe 14 No.1 (collectively “Hospital Defendants”) in their official and individual capacities; and Doe 15 Nos. 1 through 10. (Dkt. No. 35 at 2-5.) Plaintiff also adds the Mayor, City Attorney, City 16 Manager, and Chief of Police for the City of Riverside and the Riverside County Sheriff. (Id. 17 at 2-3, 13.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his civil rights during the events 18 surrounding his arrest in April 2018. (See id. at 6-14.) 19 20 For the reasons outlined below, the Court finds that the FAC contains several fatal 21 defects and must be dismissed.2 However, because it does not appear that amendment would 22 be futile, the Court also concludes, in the interest of justice, that leave to amend is appropriate 23 for some of Plaintiff’s claims. 24 25

26 1 Plaintiff filed another document entitled “First Amended Complaint” on February 5, 2025. (Dkt. No. 40.) Because this document is virtually identical to Plaintiff’s earlier filed FAC, the Court maintains the FAC filed on December 6, 2024 27 (Dkt. No. 35) as the operative pleading. 2 Magistrate judges may dismiss a complaint with leave to amend without approval of the district judge. See McKeever v. 28 Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 1 STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 3 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), a trial court may dismiss a 4 claim sua sponte and without notice “where the claimant cannot possibly win relief.” Omar 5 v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Baker v. Director, U.S. 6 Parole Comm’n, 916 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (adopting Ninth Circuit’s position in 7 Omar and noting that in such circumstances, a sua sponte dismissal “is practical and fully 8 consistent with plaintiffs’ rights and the efficient use of judicial resources”). A court’s 9 authority in this regard includes sua sponte dismissal of claims against defendants who have 10 not been served and defendants who have not yet answered or appeared. See Abagnin v. 11 AMVAC Chemical Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 742-43 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Reunion, Inc. v. 12 F.A.A., 719 F. Supp. 2d 700, 701 n.1 (S.D. Miss. 2010) (“[T]he fact that [certain] defendants 13 have not appeared and filed a motion to dismiss is no bar to the court’s consideration of 14 dismissal of the claims against them for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 15 granted, given that a court may dismiss any complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim 16 for which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).”). 17 18 In determining whether a complaint should be dismissed at screening, the Court applies 19 the standard of Rule 12(b)(6): “A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 20 as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 21 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). Therefore, a plaintiff’s factual 22 allegations must be sufficient for the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 23 is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011) 24 (internal quotation omitted); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) 25 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on 26 the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true.”). 27 28 \\ 1 When a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights case, courts must construe the pleadings 2 liberally and afford the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 3 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro 4 se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be 5 held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”). However, in 6 giving liberal interpretation to a pro se complaint, the court may not supply essential elements 7 of a claim that were not initially pled, Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 8 1140 (9th Cir. 2011), and the court need not accept as true “allegations that are merely 9 conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences,” Sprewell v. Golden 10 State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 11 12 If the court finds that a pro se complaint fails to state a claim, the court must give the 13 pro se litigant leave to amend the complaint “unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies 14 of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Akhtar, 698 F.3d at 1212 (internal 15 quotation omitted). However, if amendment of the pleading would be futile, leave to amend 16 may be denied. See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood of Los Angeles, 759 F.3d 1112, 1116 17 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave 18 to amend, [a]nd the district court’s discretion in denying amendment is particularly broad when 19 it has previously given leave to amend.”). 20 21 THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 22 23 In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges as follows. On April 14, 2018, Plaintiff, a resident of Texas 24 and doing business in California, was approached by Officer Rardin in his patrol vehicle in a 25 strip mall located in Riverside, California. (Dkt. No. 35 at 5-6.) “Defendant Rardin parked, 26 exited, approached, and abruptly grabbed Plaintiff by the hand and arm, without cause or 27 warning, and began to twist and pull, inflicting unbearable pain and discomfort.” (Id. at 6.) 28 Plaintiff “peacefully left the scene, and Defendant Rardin gave chase.” (Id. at 7.) “Defendant 1 Rardin caught up with Plaintiff in the grocery store parking lot of Maxi Foods . . . [and] without 2 cause or warning wrapped both arms around Plaintiff’s upper torso and frantically hip tossed 3 Plaintiff, slamming him to the pavement thereafter jumping onto Plaintiff’s back and 4 pummeling about his head, neck, face, back, and ribs.” (Id. at 7-8.) “Defendant(s) Simmons 5 and Schmitz jumped onto Plaintiff’s back and pummel[]ed about his head, neck, face back and 6 ribs.” (Id. at 8.) “Subsequently, Plaintiff was placed in handcuffs.” (Id.) Defendant Schmitz 7 seized a firearm, jewelry, cellphones, identification, and other personal and business-related 8 items from Plaintiff. (Id.) 9 10 Following the arrest, Defendant officers transported Plaintiff to Riverside Community 11 Hospital for medical treatment. (Id. at 9.) While at RCH, “Plaintiff made aware his kidney 12 and neurological condition to Defendant nurse Jane Roe #1, and Dr. Christensen failed and 13 refused to provide Plaintiff with necessary medical equipment, inter alia, i.e., a urinal but 14 cleared Plaintiff medically.” (Id. at 10.) “Plaintiff also informed Defendant Rardin, Ruiz, 15 Carmona, Schmitz, and Chinchilla that he needed to use the restroom,” to which “Defendant 16 Chinchilla taunted Plaintiff in reply . . . to ‘piss your pants.’” (Id.) Defendant officers then 17 removed Plaintiff from the hospital and “violently knocked Plaintiff to the asphalt, where he 18 was kicked and struck with closed fist, while handcuffs was [sic] tighten around Plaintiff’s 19 wrist cutting off blood circulation, in addition to being placed in shackles around the ankles 20 also extremely tight, thereafter hog tied as the handcuffs and shackles was connected while 21 Plaintiff lay on his stomach.” (Id. (errors in original).) 22 23 On April 15, 2018, “Defendant Ruiz transported Plaintiff to the jail where he was 24 compelled to submit to fingerprinting and photographing of his person . . . [and] was thereafter 25 booked into Robert J. Presley detention center.” (Id. at 11.) ‘Defendants Rardin, Schmitz or 26 Simmons between 4/14/18 through 4/17/18 and during all the time intervening did not take 27 Plaintiff before any magistrate for a combined [probable cause determination] and arraignment 28 in the County in which he was so detained . . . .” (Id. at 12.) 1 Based on the facts alleged, Plaintiff asserts seven causes of action against Defendants: 2 3 1) Unnecessary and excessive use of force against the Officer Defendants; 4 2) Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against the Officer 5 Defendants and Hospital Defendants; 6 3) Denial of prompt judicial determination of probable cause against Officers 7 Rardin and Schmitz and Sergeants Simmons and Chinchilla; 8 4) Unlawful prosecution and/or arrest, search, detention in disregard of clear 9 legal standards against Officers Rardin and Schmitz; 10 5) Municipal liability for a policy, practice, or custom of excessive use of force 11 against the City and Officer Defendants; 12 6) Municipal liability for a policy, practice, or custom of failing to train and 13 supervise its personnel against the City, RCH, and the Hospital Defendants; 14 and 15 7) Municipal liability for policies, practices, and customs related to prompt 16 probable cause determinations and the training and supervision of personnel 17 against the City, the County, Officers Rardin and Schmitz, and Sergeants 18 Simmons and Chinchilla. 19 20 (See id. at 14-28.) 21 22 Lastly, Plaintiff requests the following relief: 23 24 1) A declaratory judgment that the policies, practices and acts complained of are 25 illegal and unconstitutional pursuant to 28 USC §§ 2201 and 2202, and Rule 26 57 of the Fed.R.Civ.Proc.; 27 2) A preliminary and permanent injunctive relief pursuant to 28 USC § 2283: 28 1. preventing Defendant City, RPD from employing the Defendant Officers’; 1 2. preventing Defendant City, RCH from employing Defendants RN Jane 2 Roe #1 and Dr. Christensen; and 3 3. ordering Defendant City, RPD to release and return Plaintiff’s personal 4 property seized during his arrest. 5 3) Attorney’s fees, costs and expenses pursuant to 42 USC § 1988 and 28 USC 6 § 2412; 7 4) Compensatory damages in the amount[t] of twenty one million 8 ($21,000,000.00) dollars; 9 5) Punitive or exemplary damages in the amount of ten million ($10,000,000.00) 10 dollars; and 11 6) Award such other and further relief as this Court may deem appropriate. 12 13 (Id. at 28-29.) 14 15 DISCUSSION 16 17 I. Claims Against Municipal Defendants 18 19 Plaintiff sues four municipal entities—the City of Riverside, the County of Riverside, 20 the Riverside Police Department, and Riverside Community Hospital—as well as each of the 21 individual defendants in their official capacities under Section 1983. (Dkt. No. 35 at 2-5.) 22 23 In Count Five, Plaintiff alleges: 24 25 Defendant City, under color of law, intentionally and with complete and 26 deliberate indifference for Plaintiff’s rights, authorized, permitted, and tolerated 27 a custom and practice of excessive use of force by members of the RPD . . . by: 28 1 a) inadequate supervision of the training and conduct of Defendant officers’; 2 b) failing to train Defendant officers’ in the disproportion to the amount of 3 force proper under the circumstances; 4 c) failing to properly discipline, restrict and control employees, including 5 Defendant officers’ and Doe/Roe, known to be irresponsible in their 6 dealings with citizens of the community; 7 d) failing to take adequate precaution in the hiring, promotion or retention of 8 police personnel, including Defendant officers’ and Doe/Roe; 9 e) failing to enforce the laws of the State of California and the provisions of 10 the Constitution of the USA concerning use of force by members of the 11 RPD while making an arrest; 12 f) issuance of vague, confusing and contradictory policies concerning the use 13 of force that are inconsistent with the requirements of the Fourth and 14 Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the USA; 15 g) failing to forward to the Office of the District Attorney of the Court 16 evidence of criminal acts committed by police personnel; 17 h) failing to establish and/or assure the functioning of a bona fide and 18 meaningful departmental system for dealing with complaints of police 19 misconduct, but instead responding to such complaints with bureaucratic 20 power and official denials calculated to mislead the public; 21 i) appoint, promote, train, and supervise a member of the RPD to enforce the 22 laws in the police manual, the State of California and who would protect 23 the Constitutional rights of the people of Defendant City; and 24 j) permitting the policy, practice and /or custom of using unreasonable force 25 to exist and to be followed by the RPD, and Defendant officers’, thereby 26 proximately causing the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth 27 and Fourteenth Amendments. 28 1 (See id. at 19-20.) 2 3 In Count Six, Plaintiff alleges: 4 5 Defendant RCH failed to train and supervise its personnel including the 6 individually named Defendants Nurse Jane Roe #1 and Dr, Christensen, so as to 7 prevent the deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and/or unreasonable 8 seizure upon patient/prisoner to whom they would come in contact during arrest. 9 . . . Defendant RCH, under color of law and the authority of municipality, 10 intentionally and with complete deliberate indifference for Plaintiff’s rights, 11 caused Plaintiff to be deprived of his Constitutional rights by: 12 13 a) inadequate supervision of the training and conduct of Defendant RCH 14 personnel; 15 b) failing to adhere to the laws of the State of California and the provisions of 16 the Constitution of the USA (i.e., providing care for serious medical needs, 17 personal safety while in joint care/custody with police officers, e.g., 18 unnecessary use of force by members of the police while on RCH property, 19 etc.)[;] 20 c) abdicating to promulgate rules and regulations specifically providing, e.g., 21 that RCH medical personnel professional ad ethical obligations to make 22 independent preparatory judgments supersede RPD directives of custody 23 and security, which must necessarily yield when in direct conflict of 24 treatment and/or an initial evaluation with care and skill[;] 25 d) failing to take adequate precautions in the hiring, promotion, and retention 26 of RCH personnel including specific Defendants Nurse Jane Roe #1 and 27 Dr. Christensen; and, 28 e) failing to properly discipline, restrict and control RCH personnel, including 1 Defendants Dr. Christensen and Nurse Jane Roe #1. 2 3 (See id. at 22-23.) 4 5 Lastly, in Count Seven, Plaintiff alleges: 6 7 Defendant City and County, under the color of law and the authority of 8 municipality intentionally and with complete and deliberate indifference for 9 Plaintiff’s rights, caused Plaintiff to be deprived of his Constitutional rights by: 10 11 a) failing to supervise properly the training and conduct of Defendant 12 Officers; 13 b) failing to enforce the laws of the State of California and the provisions 14 of the Constitution of the USA concerning prompt [probable cause 15 determinations] by members of the police force while making a 16 warrantless arrest; 17 c) failing to properly discipline, restrict and control employees, including 18 Defendant Officers and Doe/Roe, known to unlawfully detain, falsely 19 arrest or otherwise falsely imprison the citizens of the community; 20 d) abdicating to promulgate rules and regulations specifically providing 21 for immediate release from physical custody of the arrestee, such as 22 Plaintiff, in the event of a failure to promptly obtain a [probable cause 23 determination] within forty-eight (48) hours; 24 e) failing to take adequate precaution in the hiring, promotion or retention 25 of police personnel, including Defendant Officers ad Doe/Roe; and, 26 f) failing to forward to the Officer of the District Attorney of the County 27 evidence of false arrest/imprisonment or unlawful detention committed 28 by police personnel. 1 (See id. at 25-26.) 2 3 A. Legal Standards 4 5 A Section 1983 claim against a municipal entity requires the plaintiff to show that a 6 constitutional violation was committed pursuant to a “formal governmental policy or a 7 longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local 8 government entity.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal 9 quotation omitted); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); City of Canton v. 10 Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). The plaintiff must also show that the policy was “(1) the 11 cause in fact and (2) the proximate cause of the constitutional deprivation.” Trevino v. Gates, 12 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Further, an “official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than 13 name, to be treated as a suit against the entity” and not against the official personally. Kentucky 14 v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). “Because the real party in interest in an official-capacity 15 suit is the governmental entity and not the named official, the entity’s policy or custom must 16 have played a part in the violation of federal law.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) 17 (internal quotation and citations omitted). 18 19 “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; 20 it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the 21 conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918; 22 Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended on denial of reh’g (Jan. 12, 23 1996) (“Proof of random acts or isolated events is insufficient to establish custom.”). “[P]roof 24 of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, 25 unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional 26 municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker.” Gant v. County 27 of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 618 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 28 993 F.3d 1134, 1154 (9th Cir. 2021) (finding that “one instance of County employees violating 1 the constitutional rights of parents and children is insufficient to demonstrate a custom 2 supporting Monell liability”). To be sufficient, Monell claims based on a custom or practice 3 must allege facts reflecting “repeated constitutional violations for which the errant municipal 4 officials were not discharged or reprimanded.” Navarro, 72 F.3d at 714. 5 6 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under Section 1983 for the actions of their 7 employees under a theory of respondeat superior unless a causal link between the supervisor 8 and the claimed constitutional violation is specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 9 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 10 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To show a prima facie case of supervisory liability, a plaintiff must allege 11 facts indicating that supervisory defendants either: (1) personally participated in the alleged 12 deprivation of constitutional rights; (2) knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; 13 or (3) promulgated or implemented a policy “so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation 14 of constitutional rights” and is “the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Hansen v. 15 Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 16 17 B. Analysis 18 19 1. Failure to Train 20 21 Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to raise a plausible inference that Plaintiff may 22 be entitled to relief on his allegations that the municipal defendants had unconstitutional 23 policies or customs regarding training. To hold the municipal defendants liable for the 24 underlying constitutional violation on a failure to train theory, Plaintiff must allege facts that 25 show that the municipal defendants chose a training policy that was inadequate to prevent the 26 constitutional violation and that in selecting this policy the municipal defendants were 27 deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of individual citizens. Benavidez, 993 F.3d 28 1134, 1153; Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1186 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 1 Canton, 489 U.S. at 388) (“Failure to train an employee who has caused a constitutional 2 violation can be the basis for § 1983 liability where the failure to train amounts to deliberate 3 indifference to the rights of persons with whom the employee comes into contact.”); Harris, 4 489 U.S. at 390 (finding Monell liability where “the need for more or different training is so 5 obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the 6 policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the 7 need”). 8 9 Here, Plaintiff offers no facts whatsoever about the municipal defendants’ training 10 programs, much less that any such programs were inadequate or deficient. In fact, the only 11 factual allegations Plaintiff includes concern acts of the individual Defendants towards 12 Plaintiff himself, which are insufficient to show any deliberate or conscious policy choice by 13 the municipal defendants in training the individual defendants. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 390- 14 91 (“That a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten 15 liability on the city, for the officer’s shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than 16 a faulty training program.”). 17 18 Additionally, Plaintiff’s factual allegations describe only single incidents with the 19 Officer Defendants and Hospital Defendants without identifying any purportedly deficient 20 training policy. Nelson v. City of Fairfield Police Dep't, No. 2:22-cv-01619-DJC-DB, 2024 21 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123030, at *9 (E.D. Cal. July 12, 2024) (“Without any facts supporting the 22 existence of an unconstitutional training program, the Court cannot infer from the single 23 instance of misconduct alleged in the [FAC] that such a policy exists, or that the policy could 24 be unconstitutional.”); Hyde v. City of Willcox, 23 F.4th 863, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding 25 that while a municipality’s deliberate indifference to the “obvious potential” for violation of 26 federal rights can be inferred from a single incident, a plaintiff must still make a factual 27 showing about the deficiencies in a local government’s training program because “an 28 inadequate training policy itself cannot be inferred from a single incident”). 1 Plaintiff also fails to articulate any factual allegations that support an inference that the 2 municipal defendants had actual or constructive notice that any alleged defect in training at 3 issue was substantially certain to result in the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional 4 rights. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 396 (stating that a Section 1983 complaint must include specific 5 factual allegations that support an inference that policymakers did not correct the deficiency 6 in training even though “the need for more or different training [was] obvious, and the 7 inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights”). 8 9 Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts for the Court to infer the municipal 10 defendants’ training was deficient based solely on the constitutional violation alleged. 11 Nevertheless, the Court will allow Plaintiff one further opportunity to amend this claim. 12 13 2. Remaining Policy, Practice, or Custom Claims 14 15 Plaintiff’s remaining allegations regarding the municipal defendants’ policies and 16 customs regarding supervision, hiring, promotion, and discipline are similarly deficient. To 17 start, Plaintiff fails to identify any specific policy or custom regarding supervision, hiring, 18 promotion, and discipline that would support his claims against the City, County, RPD, or 19 RCH. See Gordon v. County of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Adickes v. 20 S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)) (“An unconstitutional policy need not be 21 formal or written to create municipal liability under Section 1983; however, it must be ‘so 22 permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.’”). 23 Moreover, Plaintiff’s factual allegations all pertain to discrete events—Plaintiff’s arrest and 24 detention by the Officer Defendants and treatment by the Hospital Defendants—with no 25 mention of other events or allegations involving other individuals that could plausibly show a 26 policy or custom that is “permanent and well settled.” Adickes, 398 U.S. at 167-68; Gordon, 27 6 F.4th at 974 (finding that allegations of random acts or single instances of misconduct are 28 not enough to establish a municipal custom). 1 Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a Monell policy, practice, or custom claim against any of the 2 municipal defendants. Nonetheless, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend these claims. 3 4 3. Supervisory Liability 5 6 Lastly, Plaintiff has failed allege how “the Board of Supervisors, Sheriff, Mayor, City 7 Attorney, City Manager, and Chief of Police” (Dkt. No. 35 at 13) personally participated in the 8 alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, knew of the violations and failed to act 9 to prevent them, or promulgated or implemented a deficient policy that was the moving force 10 of the alleged constitutional violation. See Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646. Thus, any claims against 11 these supervisory defendants must be dismissed. Plaintiff is advised to exclude claims against 12 these supervisory defendants in any amended pleading. 13 14 II. Claims Against Individual Defendants 15 16 A. Excessive Force 17 18 In Count One, Plaintiff asserts that the Officer Defendants “knowingly inflicted 19 physical, emotional, and mental abuse upon Plaintiff when they twisted, pulled his arm, hip 20 tossed, pummel, kick, painfully handcuffed tights, shackled tight, hog tied, for a substantial 21 amount time” “under the circumstances which did not require the use of any force 22 whatsoever.” (Dkt. No. 35 at 14.) Plaintiff specifically alleges that during his April 14, 2018 23 arrest “Defendant Rardin . . . abruptly grabbed Plaintiff by the hand and arm, without cause or 24 warning, and began to twist and pull, inflicting unbearable pain and discomfort.” (Id. at 6.) 25 After a brief chase, “Defendant Rardin caught up with Plaintiff in the grocery store parking lot 26 of Maxi Foods . . . [and] without cause or warning wrapped both arms around Plaintiff’s upper 27 torso and frantically hip tossed Plaintiff, slamming him to the pavement thereafter jumping 28 onto Plaintiff’s back and pummeling about his head, neck, face, back, and ribs.” (Id. at 7-8.) 1 “Defendant(s) Simmons and Schmitz jumped onto Plaintiff’s back and pummelled about his 2 head, neck, face back and ribs” before handcuffing Plaintiff. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff further alleges 3 that he was then transported to RCH where he “informed Defendant Rardin, Ruiz, Carmona, 4 Schmitz, and Chinchilla that he needed to use the restroom,” to which “Defendant Chinchilla 5 taunted Plaintiff in reply . . . to ‘piss your pants.’” (Id. at 9-10.) According to Plaintiff, 6 Defendants Ruiz, Carmona, Schmitz, and Chinchilla subsequently removed Plaintiff from the 7 hospital and “violently knocked Plaintiff to the asphalt, where he was kicked and struck with 8 closed fist, while handcuffs was tighten around Plaintiff’s wrist cutting off blood circulation, 9 in addition to being placed in shackles around the ankles also extremely tight, thereafter hog 10 tied as the handcuffs and shackles was connected while Plaintiff lay on his stomach.” (Id.) 11 12 1. Legal Standards 13 14 “Where, as here, the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or 15 investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the 16 protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right ‘to be secure in their 17 persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures’ of the person.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 18 386, 394 (1989). Such excessive-force claims are “properly analyzed under the Fourth 19 Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard.” Id. at 388. “Determining whether the 20 force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires 21 a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 22 Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396 23 (internal quotation and citations omitted). Factors such as the relationship between the need 24 for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort 25 made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security 26 problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was 27 actively resisting may bear on the reasonableness (or unreasonableness) of the force used. Hyde 28 v. City of Willcox, 23 F.4th 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 1 U.S. 389, 397 (2015)). “The most important factor is whether the suspect posed an immediate 2 threat.” Id. (citing Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). This 3 analysis is not static, and the reasonableness of force may change as the circumstances evolve. 4 Id. (citing Jones v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 873 F.3d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 2017)). 5 6 2. Analysis 7 8 Liberally construing the allegations in the FAC and in light of the legal standard outlined 9 above, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a cognizable claim for excessive force. Plaintiff 10 alleges that each of the Officer Defendants was either actively involved in the use of force 11 against Plaintiff or failed to intervene during the use of force. See Said v. County of San Diego, 12 No. 12cv2437-GPC(RBB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7372, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014) 13 (finding that plaintiff stated a claim for excessive force by alleging that one officer “proceeded 14 to assist [the other officer] and both used excessive force to effectuate the arrest”). Thus, 15 Plaintiff’s claims against these individual officers may proceed. 16 17 B. Deliberate Indifference 18 19 In Count Two, Plaintiff asserts that the Officer Defendants and Hospital Defendants 20 “violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment(s) to be protected from unreasonable search 21 and seizure in the form of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs during arrest or the 22 detention.” (Dkt. No. 35 at 15.) Plaintiff alleges that he “made aware his kidney and 23 neurological condition to Defendant nurse Jane Roe #1, and Dr. Christensen failed and refused 24 to provide Plaintiff with necessary medical equipment, inter alia, i.e., a urinal but cleared 25 Plaintiff medically.” (Id. at 10.) “Plaintiff also informed Defendant Rardin, Ruiz, Carmona, 26 Schmitz, and Chinchilla that he needed to use the restroom,” to which “Defendant Chinchilla 27 taunted Plaintiff in reply . . . to ‘piss your pants.’” (Id.) 28 1 1. Legal Standards 2 3 “The Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement officers to provide objectively 4 reasonable post-arrest medical care to an arrestee.” Est. of Loflin v. City of Huntington Beach, 5 No. 8:24-cv-01075-JVS-JDE, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194643, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2024); 6 Est. of Cornejo ex rel. Solis v. City of Los Angeles, 618 F. App’x 917, 920 (9th Cir. 2015) 7 (quoting Tatum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006)) 8 (“[S]uspects have a Fourth Amendment right to ‘objectively reasonable post-arrest [medical] 9 care’ until the end of the seizure.”). This requires officers to “seek the necessary medical 10 attention for... [an arrestee] when he or she has been injured while being apprehended by either 11 promptly summoning the necessary medical help or by taking the injured detainee to a 12 hospital.” Tatum, 441 F.3d at 1099 (quoting Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 13 1415 (9th Cir. 1986)). They are not, however, “required to provide what hindsight reveals to 14 be the most effective medical care for an arrested suspect.” Tatum, 441 F.3d at 1098. 15 16 The Fourteenth Amendment provides arrestees with the right “to not have officials 17 remain deliberately indifferent to [their] serious medical needs.” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1187 18 (citation omitted). To prove that the response to an arrestee’s medical needs was 19 constitutionally deficient, the arrestee must establish: (1) a serious medical need; and (2) 20 deliberate indifference to that need by the officials. See id.; McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 21 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992). 22 23 To establish a serious medical need, a plaintiff must allege that “the failure to treat [the] 24 condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 25 pain.’” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). 26 Important factors include “[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would 27 find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that 28 significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial 1 pain. . . .” Id. at 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992). 2 3 To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating: “(a) a 4 purposeful act or failure to respond to [an arrestee’s] pain or possible medical need and (b) 5 harm caused by the indifference.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). A 6 complaint that alleges only “inadvertent [or negligent] failure to provide adequate medical 7 care” is insufficient to state a deliberate indifference claim under Section 1983. Id. (alteration 8 in original). 9 10 2. Analysis 11 12 At this juncture and despite the previous opportunity to amend his claims, Plaintiff has 13 still not alleged facts sufficient to support viable claims for deliberate indifference to a serious 14 medical need under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments. Based on the facts alleged, 15 Defendant Officers3 transported Plaintiff to Riverside Community Hospital for medical 16 treatment following his arrest, where Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Christensen and Nurse Jane Roe 17 #1. (See Dkt. No. 35 at 9-10.) Thus, on its face, the FAC alleges that Defendant officers did 18 promptly provide Plaintiff with medical care after his arrest. 19 20 As for his claims against Dr. Christensen and Nurse Jane Roe #1, Plaintiff only provides 21 conclusory allegations, with no supporting factual allegations demonstrating—or even 22 suggesting—that either or both of these defendants purposefully failed to respond to Plaintiff’s 23 medical needs or that Plaintiff experienced any harm because of any alleged indifference, both 24 of which are essential elements needed to state a cognizable deliberate indifference claim. 25

26 3 Plaintiff did not include any facts demonstrating that Sergeant Simmons was involved in the alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. Thus, any deliberate indifference claim against Sergeant Simmons must be dismissed. See 27 Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481 n.12 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (stating that while “[i]ntegral participation does not require that each [defendant’s] actions themselves rise to the level of a 28 constitutional violation[,] . . . it does require some fundamental involvement in the conduct that allegedly caused the violation”). 1 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims against the individual defendants 2 must be dismissed. However, in the interest of justice, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend. 3 4 C. Prompt Probable Cause Determination 5 6 In Count Three, Plaintiff asserts that Officers Rardin and Schmitz and Sergeants 7 Simmons and Chinchilla violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to 8 bring Plaintiff “before a magistrate for a judicial determination of probable cause within forty- 9 eight (48) hours after arrest on [April 14, 2018].” (Dkt. No. 35 at 16-17.) 10 11 1. Legal Standards 12 13 “The Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a 14 prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 15 104 (1975). In the case of warrantless arrests, the government must obtain a judicial 16 determination of probable cause within forty-eight hours of the arrest. County of Riverside v. 17 McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991); United States v. Bueno-Vargas, 383 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th 18 Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court has held that “a jurisdiction that provides judicial 19 determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply 20 with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.” McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56. “[A]bsent 21 extraordinary circumstances, a longer delay violates the Fourth Amendment.” Powell v. 22 Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 80 (1994). “In evaluating allegations of unreasonable delay, courts must 23 allow ‘a substantial degree of flexibility,’ being mindful of practical realities, such as 24 unavoidable delays in transportation, handling late night bookings where no magistrate is 25 readily available, and obtaining the presence of an arresting officer who might have other 26 duties.” Brainerd v. County of Lake, No. C-07-02663 EDL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59681, at 27 *25 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2008) (quoting McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56). 28 1 2. Analysis 2 3 In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested without a warrant on April 14, 2018 4 and transported to a detention center on April 15, 2018. (Dkt. No. 35 at 6, 10.) Plaintiff alleges 5 that he was not brought before a magistrate for a probable cause determination until April 18, 6 2018, more than 48 hours after his arrest. (Id. at 12.) These allegations ostensibly support a 7 claim that Plaintiff’s probable cause determination before a magistrate was untimely. Thus, 8 for pleading purposes, Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for violation of his rights under 9 the Fourth Amendment to be timely brought before a magistrate for a probable cause 10 determination. 11 12 D. Unlawful Search, Arrest, Detention, and Prosecution 13 14 In Count Four, Plaintiff asserts that the Officers Rardin and Schmitz violated his Second 15 and Fourteenth Amendment rights because “[t]here was no proper legal basis for Plaintiff’s 16 arrest or prosecution for felony possession of a firearm and/or ammunition . . . .” (Dkt. No. 35 17 at 18.) 18 19 1. Malicious Prosecution 20 21 For malicious prosecution claims under Section 1983, courts borrow the elements from 22 state law. Mills v. City of Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Awabdy, 368 23 F.3d at 1066). Under California law, a malicious prosecution claim has three elements, “that 24 the prosecution: (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to 25 a legal termination in the plaintiff’s favor; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was 26 initiated with malice.” Id. In addition to these elements under State law, a malicious 27 prosecution claim under Section 1983 requires the intent to either “deprive a person of equal 28 1 protection of the laws” or “subject a person to a denial of constitutional rights.” Bretz v. 2 Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985). 3 4 Here, Plaintiff’s allegations do not meet these requirements. Plaintiff alleges that 5 “Defendants’ without cause or justification, wrongfully and/or maliciously prosecuted Plaintiff 6 by charging him with felony resisting arrest in an attempt to cover up their own wrongdoing.” 7 (Dkt. No. 35 at 17.) Plaintiff further alleges that the “aforesaid charge of felony resisting 8 obstructing governmental administration was terminated in favor of Plaintiff.” (Id.) These 9 allegations are wholly conclusory and do not offer any facts to support an inference that a 10 prosecution was brought without probable cause or that any of the defendants acted with the 11 requisite malice. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed with leave to amend. 12 13 2. Unlawful Search, Arrest, and Detention 14 15 The Fourth Amendment protects “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. 16 Const. amend. IV. To determine whether a plaintiff can maintain a claim for unreasonable 17 seizure, the Court must determine whether there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. See 18 Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 471 (9th Cir. 2007). “The test for whether 19 probable cause exists is whether at the moment of arrest the facts and circumstances within the 20 knowledge of the arresting officers and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information 21 were sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the petitioner had committed or 22 was committing an offense.” Id. (internal quotation and alterations omitted). 23 24 Plaintiff’s allegations supporting this claim are perplexing and contradictory. Plaintiff 25 avers that his stop and seizure by Officer Rardin was “without cause or warning” (see Dkt. No. 26 35 at 6) but later states his arrest was precipitated by a report that Plaintiff was trespassing and 27 loitering (see id. at 8-9) and that he fled from law enforcement after his initial stop, leading to 28 a pursuit before he was apprehended (id. at 7). Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that “[t]here was 1 no proper legal basis for Plaintiff’s arrest or prosecution for felony possession of a firearm 2 and/or ammunition” (id. at 18) but also states that “Plaintiff sought to avoid drawing his 3 weapon” as he fled the scene of his stop (id. at 7) and that “Defendant Schmitz seized a firearm 4 from about Plaintiff’s waist” during his arrest (id. at 8). 5 6 Plaintiff has not adequately stated a claim because the Court cannot deduce from the 7 facts alleged that Plaintiff’s search, arrest, and resulting detention were unlawful. Nevertheless, 8 because Plaintiff may be able to provide clarifying facts surrounding this claim, the Court 9 grants Plaintiff the opportunity to amend. 10 11 3. Heck Bar 12 13 “A civil rights complaint under § 1983 cannot proceed when ‘a judgment in favor of the 14 plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the 15 complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or 16 sentence has already been invalidated.’” Barber v. Bremerton Police Dep’t, No. 3:24-cv- 17 05618-BHS-DWC, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157989, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 3, 2024) (quoting 18 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)). “Even where a civil-rights plaintiff merely 19 wishes to pursue damages and does not seek to challenge the legality of his conviction, Heck 20 still requires the Court to consider whether a favorable decision would call into question the 21 validity of his state-court conviction.” Id. “The critical question under Heck is a simple one: 22 Would success on the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim ‘necessarily imply’ that his conviction was 23 invalid?” Byrd v. Phoenix Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Heck, 512 24 U.S. at 487). 25 26 Here, Plaintiff alludes to criminal proceedings following his arrest. (See Dkt. No. 35 at 27 17.) However, it is unclear from the facts alleged in the FAC whether Plaintiff has any 28 conviction associated with his allegedly unlawful arrest. If Plaintiff has such a conviction, 1 Plaintiff’s claim is likely barred by Heck and may not be pursued under Section 1983 unless 2 Plaintiff can demonstrate the conviction has been invalidated. See Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 3 697, 703-05 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that the plaintiff’s claims alleging wrongful arrest and 4 malicious prosecution could not be brought under Section 1983 because the claims rested on 5 the idea that the plaintiff was “innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted”). 6 7 In any amended pleading, Plaintiff must either omit this claim or provide factual 8 allegations addressing any criminal conviction resulting from the alleged arrest. 9 10 III. Leave to Amend 11 12 Although the Court has identified numerous deficiencies with the FAC, it is not 13 “absolutely clear” to the Court that further amendment of Plaintiff’s pleading would be futile. 14 See Akhtar, 698 F.3d at 1212 (finding that when a pro se complaint fails to state a claim, the 15 court must give the pro se litigant leave to amend the complaint “unless it is absolutely clear 16 that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment”). Thus, the Court 17 grants Plaintiff leave to amend. See Gonzalez, 759 F.3d at 1116 (“Futility of amendment can, 18 by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend, [a]nd the district court’s discretion 19 in denying amendment is particularly broad when it has previously given leave to amend.”). 20 Nevertheless, because Plaintiff has already had the opportunity to amend, and this matter has 21 been pending in the screening stage for almost two years, this will be Plaintiff’s final 22 opportunity to amend his pleading. 23 24 \\ 25 \\ 26 \\ 27 \\ 28 \\ 1 CONCLUSION 2 3 For the reasons stated above, the FAC is dismissed with leave to amend. If Plaintiff 4 still wishes to pursue this action, he is granted thirty (30) days from the date of this 5 Memorandum and Order within which to file a Second Amended Complaint. In any amended 6 complaint, Plaintiff shall cure the defects described above. 7 8 Plaintiff shall not include new defendants or new allegations that are not 9 reasonably related to the claims asserted in the original Complaint. Further, the Second 10 Amended Complaint, if any, shall be complete in itself and shall bear both the designation 11 “Second Amended Complaint” and the case number assigned to this action. It shall not refer 12 in any manner to Plaintiff’s earlier pleading, and claims that are not expressly included in 13 the Second Amended Complaint shall be deemed abandoned. Plaintiff is strongly encouraged 14 to utilize the Central District’s standard civil rights complaint form for any amended 15 complaint. 16 17 In any amended complaint, Plaintiff may not rely on conclusory allegations and 18 formulaic recitations of applicable law. Plaintiff shall also make clear the nature and 19 grounds for each claim, specifically identify the defendants he maintains are liable for that 20 claim, and clearly and concisely explain the factual and legal basis for their liability. 21 Additionally, any claim brought against municipalities or individual defendants in their 22 official capacities must allege that a constitutional violation was committed pursuant to a 23 specific policy or a longstanding practice or custom. 24 25 Plaintiff is admonished that his failure to timely comply with this Order will result 26 in a recommendation of dismissal. If Plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue this action, in 27 whole or in part, he may voluntarily dismiss it, or any portion of it, by filing a signed 28 1 || document entitled “Notice of Dismissal” in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil 2 || Procedure 41(a)(1). 3 4 5 || DATE: March 17, 2025 7 Jaren hei Kssnsrn 6 HON. KAREN L. STEVENSON

CHIEF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

8 THIS MEMORANDUM IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION NOR IS IT INTENDED 9 || TO BE INCLUDED IN OR SUBMITTED TO ANY ONLINE SERVICE SUCH AS 10 WESTLAW OR LEXIS. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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