NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 24 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PHILLIP LEE CARSON, No. 23-15410

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:20-cv-00196-ROS-CDB

v.

MEMORANDUM*

CHARLES L. RYAN, ADOC Director (Retired); et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Roslyn O. Silver, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 17, 2025**

Before: CANBY, R. NELSON, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

Arizona state prisoner Phillip Lee Carson appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment and dismissal orders in his action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Furnace v.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2013) (summary judgment and qualified

immunity determination); Rosebrock v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 970 n.8 (9th Cir.

2014) (mootness determination); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.

2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm in part, reverse in part,

vacate in part, and remand.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants Babeu,

Rice, and Willis on Carson’s deliberate indifference claims (Claim 5) because it

would not have been clear to every reasonable prison official that requiring Carson

to move his boxes and personal property out of his cell was unlawful under the

circumstances, and Carson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to

whether Willis was deliberately indifferent after Carson fell out of his bunk. See

Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778-79 (2014) (defendants sued under § 1983

are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violated a right that was clearly

established, meaning that “the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any

reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was

violating it”); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (to establish deliberate

indifference, a prison official must “be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . . must also

draw the inference”).

The district court properly dismissed as moot Carson’s Free Exercise Clause

2 23-15410 and RLUIPA claims regarding the all-vegan kosher diet (Claim 9) because the

prison amended its food services contract to restore meat and dairy to the kosher

diet. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.

167, 170 (2000) (“A case might become moot if subsequent events make it

absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be

expected to recur.”).

The district court properly dismissed Carson’s failure-to-protect; due

process; and deliberate indifference claims (Claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 7) because Carson

failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim, and the district court

properly dismissed Carson’s access-to-courts claim (Claim 3) because Carson

failed to allege facts sufficient to establish standing. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally

construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible

claim for relief); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-53 (1996) (explaining

that an access-to-courts claim requires a plaintiff to show that defendants’ conduct

caused an actual injury to a nonfrivolous legal claim).

However, dismissal without leave to amend of Claims 1, 4, 6, and 7 was

premature because it is not “absolutely clear” that any deficiencies could not be

cured by amendment. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that “a district court should

3 23-15410 grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other

facts” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d

245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure

the defect . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies

and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”). Because the

deficiencies in these claims may be cured by amendment, we vacate the judgment

and remand for the district court to provide Carson with an opportunity to file a

third amended complaint.

The district court erred in dismissing Carson’s Free Exercise Clause and

RLUIPA claims (Claims 8 and 10) because Carson alleged facts supporting the

reasonable inference that Defendants impinged his sincerely held religious beliefs

and substantially burdened his practice of religion when they “ruined” his Torah,

prohibited him from sounding the shofar, denied his request to grow a five-inch

beard, and denied his request to use a bowl of water and a washcloth when praying

over meals. See Fuqua v. Raak, 120 F.4th 1346 (9th Cir. 2024) (“An inmate

asserting a Free Exercise claim must . . . show that he or she has a sincerely held

religious belief that was impinged by government action.”); Walker v. Beard, 789

F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[t]o state a claim under RLUIPA, a prisoner

must show that (1) he takes part in a ‘religious exercise,’ and (2) the State’s actions

4 23-15410 have substantially burdened that exercise”). We reverse the district court’s

judgment as to these claims and remand for further proceedings.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Carson’s original

complaint and first amended complaint for failure to comply with local rules. See

Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth standard of

review and noting that “[b]road deference is given to a district court’s

interpretation of its local rules”).

In sum, we affirm the district court’s summary judgment with respect to

Claim 5 and affirm the judgment dismissing Claim 9 as moot. As to the district

court’s screening dismissal, we affirm dismissal of Claims 2 and 3; vacate

dismissal of Claims 1, 4, 6, and 7; reverse dismissal of Claims 8 and 10; and

remand for further proceedings.

All pending motions are denied.

The parties will bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, VACATED in part, and

REMANDED.

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