facts in the light most favorable to Savage, WPD had blocked off Washington

Avenue to all non-caravan traffic, both pro-police and anti-police demonstrators

walked through the street, and the caravan cars traveled at extremely slow speeds

while frequently stopping. Savage’s version of the facts, moreover, is not

“blatantly contradicted” by the video evidence. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380

(2007). On these facts, there is no indication that Savage walking among the

caravan cars posed an immediate hazard or that she “unexpectedly assert[ed her]

right-of-way” such that it was “virtually impossible to avoid an accident.” Spann v.

Ballesty, 276 Cal. App. 2d 754, 761 (1969). Nor is there any indication that Savage

posed an immediate hazard to others based on these Vehicle Code provisions. See

People v. Ramirez, 140 Cal. App. 4th 849, 853–54 (2006).2 And Savage’s right to

be free of unlawful arrest was clearly established at the time of the incident, as she

was “unarmed, posed no threat to anyone, and w[as] not engaged in any criminal

activity.” Nicholson v. City of Los Angeles, 935 F.3d 685, 691 (9th Cir. 2019).

The WPD Officers also argue that Officers Przybyl, Zuhlke, and Robert

1 The WPD Officers forfeited any argument about California Penal Code Section 647c by failing to raise it properly before the district court. 2 The WPD Officers’ argument that they had probable cause to arrest Savage for violating California Penal Code Section 148(a)(1) fails because it is predicated on them having probable cause to arrest Savage for a violation of the California Vehicle Code or Section 647c of the California Penal Code.

3 cannot be held liable for any constitutional violation because they did not

physically arrest Savage. But “[a] police officer need not have been the sole party

responsible for a constitutional violation before liability may attach.” Id. Rather,

“[a]n officer’s liability under section 1983 is predicated on his ‘integral

participation’ in the alleged violation.” Id. (quoting Blankenhorn v. City of Orange,

485 F.3d 463, 481 n.12 (9th Cir. 2007)). As such, the district court did not err in

finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Officers Przybyl and Zuhlke

were integral participants in the unlawful arrest. We find, however, that Officer

Robert was not an integral participant in the unlawful arrest merely because he was

present on the WPD station’s roof during the arrest. Under the circumstances

presented here, his actions were more akin to a “mere bystander” who did not

demonstrate acquiescence in the arrest. Cf. Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773,

780 (9th Cir. 2004). We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of qualified

immunity as to Officer Robert.

2. We affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officers

Segura, Goodman, and Draper on Savage’s Fourth Amendment excessive force

claim. First, Savage has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the

officers used excessive force in arresting her. Viewing the disputed facts in the

light most favorable to Savage, Officers Goodman and Draper failed to give any

warnings; arrested her by surprise; grabbed her by the arms; dragged her to the

4 ground; pressed her face into the asphalt; placed a knee on her back hard enough to

affect her breathing; and handcuffed her so tightly that her arm bled. Savage

sustained multiple injuries from the incident and underwent surgery to release

nerve compression in her elbow. And Savage’s version of the facts is not “blatantly

contradicted” by the video evidence. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. We have found similar

conduct to constitute sufficient force to permit a jury to reasonably conclude it was

excessive. See, e.g., Rice v. Morehouse, 989 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir. 2021);

Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853–54 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds

by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009); LaLonde v. County of

Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2000).

Moreover, the severity of Savage’s alleged crimes was minimal, Savage

posed no immediate threat to anyone at the time of her arrest, and the officers

failed to warn Savage that she could be subject to arrest for standing in front of the

caravan cars. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). And whether

Savage resisted arrest by attempting to bite Officer Goodman is a question for the

jury. Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could conclude that the force

used by the officers was excessive.

Second, it was clearly established at the time of the arrest that using such

significant force on Savage, who was suspected of a minor crime and posed no

threat, was unconstitutional. See, e.g., Young v. County of Los Angeles, 655 F.3d

5 1156, 1168 (9th Cir. 2011); Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir.

2003); LaLonde, 204 F.3d at 952, 959. And even considering Savage’s attempted

bite while she was on the ground, an officer’s “non-trivial force [is] not justified in

the face of passive or even minimal resistance.” Rice, 989 F.3d at 1126; see also

Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 479 (“[A] person has the ‘limited right to offer

reasonable resistance to an arrest that is the product of an officer’s personal

frolic.’” (quoting United States v. Span, 970 F.2d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 1992))).

Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying qualified immunity to

Officers Segura, Goodman, and Draper.

3. We affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officers

Segura, Goodman, Draper, Przybyl, and Zuhlke on Savage’s First Amendment

retaliatory arrest claim.3 As discussed above, the officers did not prove that they

had probable cause to arrest Savage. Accordingly, a plaintiff bringing a First

Amendment retaliatory arrest claim under such circumstances must prove: “(1) he

engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) as a result, he was subjected to

adverse action by the defendant that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from

continuing to engage in the protected activity; and (3) there was a substantial

3 Because we reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officer Robert on Savage’s Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest claim, we also reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officer Robert on Savage’s First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim.

6 causal relationship between the constitutionally protected activity and the adverse

action.” Ballentine v. Tucker, 28 F.4th 54, 61 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, the First

Amendment protects Savage’s participation in the protest as an anti-police

demonstrator, see Index Newspapers LLC v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817,

830 (9th Cir. 2020), and her criticism of law enforcement, see Duran v. City of

Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990). Being arrested after voicing anti-

police views would chill a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in future

First Amendment activity.

Savage has also raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a

substantial causal relationship existed between her conduct and the arrest. See

Ballentine, 28 F.4th at 63 (“[T]he issue of causation ultimately should be

determined by a trier of fact.” (alteration in original)). It is undisputed that WPD

officers cheered, fist-bumped, hugged, and waved at pro-police demonstrators. No

pro-police demonstrators were arrested or cited during the event despite yelling

threats of violence and physically pushing anti-police demonstrators. Drivers in the

pro-police caravan also drove in the opposing lane of traffic, made U-turns in the

middle of the street, and blocked the intersection at the end of the street without

being arrested or cited for any California Vehicle Code violation. Savage’s right to

be free from retaliatory arrest under the factual circumstances of this case was

clearly established at the time of her arrest. See, e.g., Mackinney v. Nielsen, 69

7 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 1995); Duran, 904 F.2d at 1377; Ballentine, 28 F.4th at

67.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.4

4 The WPD Officers shall bear the costs associated with this appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 39(a)(4).

8