NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 26 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-539

MIRIAM MARIBEL MONTUFAR-

AGUILAR; JOSUE DAVID CUCINATI-

Agency Nos. A240-765-686

MONTUFAR,

A240-765-687

Petitioners,

MEMORANDUM*

v.

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 24, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: NGUYEN and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges, and KERNODLE, District Judge.***

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Jeremy D. Kernodle, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation. 1 Petitioners are a family from Guatemala. Miriam Maribel Montufar-Aguilar

(“Montufar-Aguilar”) is the lead petitioner and Josue David Cucinati-Montufar is

her minor son. They petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.

“Where the BIA conducts its own review of the evidence and law, rather

than adopting the IJ’s decision, our review is limited to the BIA’s decision, except

to the extent the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d

1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Factual findings by

the BIA are reviewed for substantial evidence and “‘are conclusive unless any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Garcia

v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of asylum and

withholding of removal because Petitioners fail to establish a nexus between past

persecution or fear of persecution and a protected ground. To qualify for asylum, a

petitioner must “demonstrate a nexus between her past or feared harm and a

protected ground.” Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir. 2021).

“[T]he protected characteristic must be ‘a central reason’ for the past or feared

harm.” Id. Similarly, an applicant for withholding of removal must demonstrate

2 “that a cognizable protected ground is ‘a reason’ for future persecution.” Id. at

1146. Montufar-Aguilar argues that she was targeted by gangs in the past and will

be targeted again if she were to return to Guatemala, particularly because of her

status as a returning immigrant. There is no evidence, however, that she was

previously targeted before based on a protected ground. Rather, each incident

where Montufar-Aguilar was robbed by gang members appears to be isolated and

committed by different individuals who did not know Montufar-Aguilar.

Montufar-Aguilar cites country condition research that demonstrates general

violence throughout the country and anecdotal testimony about two individuals

who were harmed in Guatemala after returning from the United States, but this

does not compel a contrary finding. Her desire “to be free from harassment by

criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus

to a protected ground.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010).

2. Substantial evidence likewise supports the BIA’s determination that

Petitioners fail to establish a particularized risk of torture. To be eligible for CAT

protection, Montufar-Aguilar “must demonstrate that [she] would be subject to a

particularized threat of torture.” Lalayan v. Garland, 4 F.4th 822, 840 (9th Cir.

2021) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Montufar-Aguilar

relies on generalized country conditions, noting “pervasive societal violence.” See

Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)

3 (“Petitioners’ generalized evidence of violence and crime in Mexico is not

particular to Petitioners and is insufficient to meet this [CAT] standard.”). This is

not enough to compel a finding of CAT eligibility.

PETITION DENIED.

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