1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 KENNETH C. SMITH, Case No. 20-cv-01968-AMO

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

9 v. DENYING IN PART MOTION TO

CERTIFY CLASS

10 9W HALO WESTERN OPCO L.P., et al., Re: Dkt. No. 130 Defendants. 11

12 13 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for class certification. ECF 130. The motion was 14 heard before this Court on December 12, 2024. Having read the papers filed by the parties and 15 carefully considered the arguments therein and those made at the hearing, as well as the relevant 16 legal authority, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART in part the motion for 17 the following reasons. 18 I. BACKGROUND1 19 From approximately November 9, 2017, to May 6, 2019, Plaintiff Kenneth Smith worked 20 as a non-exempt, hourly employee for Defendant 9W Halo Western OpCo L.P. dba Angelica 21 (“Angelica”). Fourth Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (ECF 114) ¶¶ 20, 22. Angelica maintained 22 seven locations in California, which operated as industrial linen facilities. Plaintiff’s 23 Compendium of Evidence (ECF 130-1). Smith avers Angelica maintained a policy or practice of 24 denying Smith and putative class members the full 30-minute meal breaks to which they are 25 entitled under California law. FAC ¶ 31. This policy or practice consisted primarily of two parts. 26 1 Courts “must take the substantive allegations of the complaint as true” but “need not accept 27 conclusory or generic allegations regarding the suitability of the litigation for resolution through 1 First, Angelica released all employees for meal periods at the same time, causing employees to 2 have to wait in lines in order to clock in and out. FAC ¶ 28. As a result, employees’ meal periods 3 were often shorter than 30 minutes. FAC ¶ 28. Second, Smith alleges Angelica’s machinery 4 would frequently malfunction and its generator would often fail, causing all operations to cease 5 until the problem was resolved. FAC ¶ 29. When this occurred, Angelica told Smith and putative 6 class members that the time spent waiting for the facility’s operations to resume counted as their 7 meal periods. FAC ¶ 29. Smith alleges Angelica had a policy of automatically deducting 30 8 minutes from its employees’ paychecks, regardless of whether the employees took a meal break or 9 not. FAC ¶ 32. 10 Smith also alleges that employees’ timesheets often did not reflect the actual amount of 11 time worked. FAC ¶¶ 35-36. The machines employees used to swipe their badges to clock in and 12 out of work regularly malfunctioned, requiring a manager to manually enter the time employees 13 arrived for work or ended their shift, which resulted in inaccurate timesheets. Id. Relatedly, when 14 the machinery would malfunction or the generator would shut down, Angelica would order Smith 15 and putative class members to wait for the facility to become operational again, and as a result 16 employees sometimes remained at the facility for eleven hours or more. FAC ¶ 41. In such 17 instances, employees were not compensated for the time spent waiting to return to work and their 18 timesheets did not reflect the interruptions, and they were entitled to, but did not receive, overtime 19 pay. FAC ¶¶ 41-42. Smith also alleges he regularly had so much work to complete that he was 20 unable to take a meal period of any length. Smith Decl. ¶ 10. 21 Smith filed this putative class action in Alameda County Superior Court on February 18, 22 2020, ECF 1-2 at 4, and Defendants removed the action on March 20, 2020, ECF 1 at 2. On May 23 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative fourth amended complaint, asserting claims under California 24 law for (1) failure to provide meal periods; (2) failure to provide rest periods; (3) failure to pay 25 hourly wages; (4) failure to pay vacation wages; (5) failure to provide accurate written wage 26 statements; (6) failure to timely pay all final wages; (7) unfair competition; and (8) civil penalties 27 under the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”). FAC ¶¶ 58-161. Plaintiff moved for class 1 ECF 132, Plaintiff replied on May 23, 2024, ECF 133, and the hearing was held on December 12, 2 2024. 3 II. DISCUSSION 4 Smith seeks certification of the following classes pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3): 5 Recordkeeping Meal Period Class: All non-exempt, hourly employees of Defendants who worked a shift in excess of five hours for the time period 6 beginning on September 26, 2017, through the date of final judgment, and whose 7 timekeeping records reflect a late, shortened, or missed meal period. 8 Auto-Deduct Class: All non-exempt, hourly employees of Defendants who worked a shift in excess of five hours for the time period beginning on September 26, 2017, 9 through the date of final judgment, and who had a half-hour of time deducted from their pay on each shift. 10 Second Meal Period Class: All non-exempt, hourly employees of Defendants who 11 worked a shift in excess of ten hours for the time period beginning on September 12 26, 2017, through the date of final judgment. 13 Overtime Class: All persons employed by Defendants in hourly or non-exempt positions in California who worked a shift greater than eight (8) hours, or who 14 worked more than forty (40) hours during a given workweek during the time period beginning on September 26, 2017, through the date of final judgment. 15 Off-the-Clock Class: All non-exempt, hourly employees of Defendants who 16 worked a shift during the time period beginning on September 26, 2017, through 17 the date of final judgment. 18 Mot. at 2.2 19 “Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs class certification.” White v. 20 Symetra Assigned Benefits Serv. Co., 104 F.4th 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2024). Class certification 21 under Rule 23 involves two steps. “[A] class action may be maintained if the four prerequisites of 22 Rule 23(a) are met, and the action meets one of the three kinds of actions listed in Rule 23(b).” 23 Van v. LLR, Inc., 61 F.4th 1053, 1062 (9th Cir. 2023). Rule 23(a) requires a showing that: (1) the 24

25 2 Smith also seeks to certify a Wage Statement Penalties Class and Waiting Time Penalties Class, and asserts those classes are derivative of the five classes listed above. Mot. at 4 n.1. 26 Consequently, Smith asserts that if the Court certifies any of those five classes, it should also certify the Wage Statement Penalties Class and Waiting Time Penalties Class. Id. However, 27 Smith neither defined those classes nor has he otherwise explained why they pass muster under 1 class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or 2 fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the 3 claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect 4 the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Among the actions listed in Rule 23(b) are those 5 in which “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 6 affecting only individual members, and . . . a class action is superior to other available methods for 7 fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see Lytle v. 8 Nutramax Labs., Inc., --- F.4th ----, ----, 2024 WL 3915361, at *5 (9th Cir. Aug. 23, 2024). The 9 rule “mandates that district courts ‘rigorous[ly] analy[ze]’ whether a proposed class meets various 10 requirements.” Black Lives Matter Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, 113 F.4th 1249, 1258 (9th 11 Cir. 2024) (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013)) (modifications in 12 original). 13 The class certification analysis “may entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s 14 underlying claim,” but “Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries 15 at the certification stage.” Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 465-66 16 (2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “Merits questions may be considered to the 17 extent – but only to the extent – that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 18 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” Id. To that end, “plaintiffs must ‘affirmatively 19 demonstrate’ by a preponderance of actual evidence that they satisfy all the Rule 23 prerequisites.” 20 Black Lives Matter, 113 F.4th at 1258 (citing White, 104 F.4th at 1192). They “ ‘must actually 21 prove – not simply plead – that their proposed class satisfies each requirement of Rule 23.’ ” Id. 22 Smith argues he has satisfied Rule 23’s requirements. Angelica argues Plaintiff has not 23 shown commonality or predominance, typicality, Plaintiff’s adequacy, or superiority. See ECF 24 132. The Court considers each of Rule 23’s requirements in turn. 25 A. Numerosity 26 Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the proposed class be so numerous that joinder of all members 27 individually is impracticable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “Although there is no exact number, some 1 members.” Vizcarra v. Unilever United States, Inc., 339 F.R.D. 530, 543 (N.D. Cal. 2021) 2 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Here, there are 2,967 putative class members, and the 3 proposed class is sufficiently numerous. Angelica does not dispute this. 4 B. Commonality and Predominance 5 Next, the Court considers the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a) and the 6 predominance requirement of Rule 23(b). Because “[t]he requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) overlap 7 with the requirements of Rule 23(a),” Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods 8 LLC, 31 F.4th 651, 664 (9th Cir. 2022), the Court considers them together. 9 Rule 23(a)(3) requires that there be “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. 10 R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). To satisfy this requirement, the common question must be “capable of class- 11 wide resolution – which means that the determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue 12 that is central to the validity of each of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 13 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). “[F]or purposes of Rule 23(a)(2)[,] even a single common question will 14 do.” Id. at 359 (internal quotations omitted). “The requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) have “been 15 construed permissively,” and “[a]ll questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the 16 rule.” Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 981 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Dukes, 564 17 U.S. at 350). 18 Rule 23(b)(3) requires “that the questions of law or fact common to class members 19 predominate over any questions affecting only individual members . . . .” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 23(b)(3). “An individual question is one where ‘members of a proposed class will need to present 21 evidence that varies from member to member,’ while a common question is one where ‘the same 22 evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing [or] the issue is susceptible 23 to generalized, class-wide proof.’ ” Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 453 (2016) 24 (citation omitted). “The predominance inquiry asks whether the common, aggregation-enabling, 25 issues in the case are more prevalent or important than the non-common, aggregation-defeating, 26 individual issues.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). “When one or more of the 27 central issues in the action are common to the class and can be said to predominate, the action may 1 tried separately, such as damages or some affirmative defenses peculiar to some individual class 2 members.” Id. “Considering whether ‘questions of law or fact common to class members 3 predominate’ begins, of course, with the elements of the underlying cause of action.” Erica P. 4 John Fund, Inc., v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 809 (2011). 5 The Court first considers Plaintiff’s argument that commonality and predominance are 6 satisfied for the Recordkeeping Meal Period Class, Auto-Deduct Class, and Second Meal Period 7 Class (collectively, “Meal Period Classes”) because those classes require engaging the same legal 8 analysis. The Court then turns to the Overtime and Off-the-Clock Classes. 9 Smith alleges that, in violation of California Labor Code § 512, he and putative class 10 members were denied 30-minute meal breaks because they had to wait in lines while clocking in 11 or out, or because of demanding workloads. Smith also alleges that when employees were denied 12 an adequate meal break, a 30-minute meal break was deducted from the employees’ timesheets 13 nonetheless, in contravention of California Labor Code § 226.7(c). Defendants assert that 14 employees who did not take meal breaks waived those breaks, pointing to declarations by former 15 Angelica employees who attest that any meal period lasting fewer than 30 minutes was due to their 16 “voluntary choice.” ECF 132 at 17-18. 17 To establish commonality regarding the Meal Period Classes, Smith relies on a California 18 Supreme Court case, Donohue v. AMN Services, 11 Cal. 5th 58 (2021), which sets forth a 19 rebuttable presumption of meal period violations. ECF 130 at 22-24. Rather than requiring a 20 plaintiff to disprove that they waived a meal period, “the burden is on the employer, as the party 21 asserting waiver, to plead and prove it.” Donohue, 11 Cal. 5th at 75-76. A defendant may contest 22 the presumption by “presenting evidence that employees were compensated for noncompliant 23 meal periods or that they had in fact been provided compliant meal periods during which they 24 chose to work,” such as representative testimony, surveys, and statistical analysis. Id. at 77. 25 Here, Smith has established that the Donohue presumption applies. Smith’s expert, James 26 Toney, reviewed the timekeeping and payroll records Angelica produced and concluded that out of 27 the sampled shifts eligible for a meal break, 6.2% showed a missed first meal break, 8.9% showed 1 estimated 3.7% of shifts showed a missed second meal break. Id. Smith’s expert identified 2 presumptive meal break violations in more than half of the records examined, which suffices to 3 invoke the Donohue presumption. See Garcia v. Cent. Coast Restaurants, Inc., No. 18-CV- 4 02370-RS, 2022 WL 657972, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2022) (“[T]hat records show 17% of shifts 5 show a possible meal period violation is sufficient to invoke the presumption from Donohue.”). 6 Smith additionally presents ten declarations from former Angelica employees, who attest they 7 were at times unable to take a 30-minute meal break due to their workload. See ECF 130-1 8 (Exhibits 9-18). However, Smith has not sufficiently explained why the presumption applies for 9 the Second Meal Period Class, as Toney estimated under 4% possible second meal break 10 violations, and thus Smith has not satisfied his burden of showing the presumption applies for the 11 Second Meal Period claims. 12 Angelica has not rebutted the presumption as to Smith’s Recordkeeping Meal Period and 13 Auto-Deduct Classes. It has not put forth its own expert to provide another estimate of potential 14 meal break violations or contest Toney’s estimate, and instead presents eleven declarations from 15 former employees asserting that any meal period they skipped in the course of their employment 16 was skipped voluntarily. See ECF 132-1 at 84-180. However, Angelica has provided the Court 17 with no reason to conclude that these declarations are representative and thus cannot rebut the 18 presumption on their basis alone. See Garcia v. Cent. Coast Restaurants, Inc., No. 18-CV-02370- 19 RS, 2022 WL 657972, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2022) (finding five declarations, “when 20 considering the thousands of potential members of the proposed class, can hardly be considered 21 representative and are insufficient to rebut the Donohue presumption at this time”); see also 22 McCollum v. TGI Fridays Inc., No. 8:22-CV-00392-FWS-JDE, 2024 WL 5423064, at *12 (C.D. 23 Cal. Mar. 6, 2024) (finding twelve declarations from current employees and eight declarations of 24 managers insufficient to rebut the Donohue presumption where 99.3% of employee shifts showed 25 a meal period violation and the proposed class consisted of over 3,000 employees). In sum, Smith 26 has established a presumption of meal break violations from Angelica employees’ records and 27 thus has demonstrated commonality and predominance as to the Recordkeeping Meal Period and 1 The Court next considers whether Smith has established commonality and predominance 2 as to the Overtime Class and Off-the-Clock Class. Smith alleges Angelica violated California 3 Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Order 6, which requires an employer to pay at 4 least minimum wage for all hours worked and to pay overtime rates for hours worked in excess of 5 eight hours in any workday or six days in any workweek. See IWC Wage Order 6 § 3(A)(1), 4. 6 Unlike with the meal period classes, where the employer must rebut the presumption of wage 7 violations, there is no presumptive violation regarding overtime pay. Smith must show more than 8 that the putative class members “suffered a violation of the same provision of law,” Dukes, 564 9 U.S. at 350 (internal quotations and citations omitted), but rather that Angelica “should have 10 known that its employees were regularly working off-the-clock as a result of its policies regarding 11 the reporting of overtime,” Williams v. Super. Ct., 221 Cal. App. 4th 1353, 1366 (Dec. 24, 2013). 12 Angelica argues there is no common question uniting the Overtime and Off-the-Clock Classes 13 because Smith has not shown why employees were not compensated proper overtime. ECF 132 at 14 21. Smith has alleged that he and the putative class members suffered violations of relevant law 15 governing overtime pay, but he has not established that Angelica had a policy of not paying its 16 employees overtime rates. Rather, Smith has presented “anecdotal evidence of a handful of 17 individual instances” of off-the clock work, Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Super. Ct., 53 Cal. 4th 18 1004, 1052 (2012) – i.e., declarations describing several varied reasons individuals worked 19 overtime or off the clock. This falls short of demonstrating a question that “could be shown 20 through common proof.” Id. 21 In sum, the Court concludes a common question predominates as to Smith’s 22 Recordkeeping Meal Period Class and Auto-Deduct Class. However, because it finds Smith has 23 failed to satisfy commonality or predominance as to the Second Meal Period, Overtime, and Off- 24 the-Clock Classes, the Court DENIES Smith’s motion to certify them and need not determine 25 whether Smith has shown typicality, adequacy, or superiority with regard to those classes. 26 C. Typicality and Adequacy 27 The Court must next determine whether Smith has demonstrated typicality and adequacy 1 two requirements together, so does the Court. Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses 2 of the representative parties [be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 23(a)(3). “The test for typicality is ‘whether other members have the same or similar injury, 4 whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether 5 other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.’ ” Krommenhock v. Post 6 Foods, LLC, 334 F.R.D. 552, 562 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting Ellis, 657 F.3d at 984). 7 “Typicality refers to the nature of the claim or defense of the class representative, and not to the 8 specific facts from which it arose or the relief sought.” Hanon v. Dataprods. Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 9 509 (9th Cir. 1992). “Typicality may be lacking if there is a danger that absent class members will 10 suffer [because] their representative is preoccupied with defenses unique to it.” Vizcarra, 339 11 F.R.D. at 550 (citation and internal quotations omitted; modification in original). Rule 23(a)(4) 12 requires a showing that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests 13 of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). “This requires inquiry into whether the plaintiff and its 14 counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members, and whether the plaintiff and its 15 counsel will prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class.”3 Vizcarra, 339 F.R.D. at 550 16 (citing Stanton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 957 (9th Cir. 2003)). 17 Smith argues he is typical of the other Recordkeeping Meal Period Class and Auto-Deduct 18 Class members because he worked a shift in excess of five hours after September 26, 2017 and 19 experienced a late, shortened, or missed meal period and he had time automatically deducted from 20 his timesheet despite not taking a meal period. ECF 130 at 20. Smith argues he is an adequate 21 class representative as he was subjected to the same policies and practices as putative class 22 members and thus was harmed by the same conduct and asserts the same claims for relief. ECF 23 130 at 26. Angelica argues Smith’s meal period claims are not typical of putative class members 24

25 3 Angelica does not dispute the adequacy of Smith’s counsel. Smith argues his chosen counsel is adequate because they do not have conflicts with members of the class and have been vigorously 26 prosecuting the action since the beginning. ECF 130 at 27. His counsel submit that they are experienced in litigating complex class actions, have dedicated resources to litigating this case on 27 behalf of Plaintiff and class members, and will continue to do so through trial and appeals. ECF 1 who were employed in different roles, worked at different locations, and had different schedules 2 from him. ECF 132 at 22-23. For example, Angelica argues Smith is the only declarant who 3 alleges having to wait in long lines to clock out and in for meal periods, and that his allegation that 4 he was forced to miss at least one period each week due to volume of work is unique because it 5 was Angelica’s practice to release all employees within a crew at the same time. Id. Angelica 6 further argues Smith did not allege that his meal periods were ever cut short due to interruptions. 7 Id. However, typical does not mean “substantially identical.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 8 1011, at 1020 (9th Cir. 1998). Because Smith’s claims about noncompliant meal periods are 9 “reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members,” id., the Court concludes they are 10 typical for the class. 11 Angelica also argues Smith cannot be an adequate representative because the putative class 12 includes supervisors, and Smith alleges supervisors prevented putative class members from taking 13 meal periods due to heavy workloads, thus certification is improper as members of the putative 14 class include supervisory personnel who implemented the allegedly unlawful practice. ECF 132 15 (citing Howard v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 13-cv-05758, 2014 WL 11497793, at *14 (C.D. Cal. 16 Dec. 19, 2014), aff’d, 628 F. App’x 537 (9th Cir. 2016)). Smith does not contest this, asserting 17 instead that this need not destroy adequacy and typicality for the entire class, and that the Court 18 can modify the class to exclude any non-exempt employees who held managerial or supervisory 19 roles, ECF 133 at 7-8; a point Smith reiterated at the hearing. Thus, the Court finds Smith has 20 shown typicality and adequacy except as to any putative class members who served in supervisory 21 or managerial roles, and consequently modifies the class definitions as set forth in the Conclusion. 22 D. Superiority 23 Finally, the Court must consider the question of superiority. Class certification under Rule 24 23(b)(3) requires a showing that “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly 25 and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). In deciding whether the 26 superiority requirement is met, courts consider: (A) the class members’ interests in individually 27 controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any 1 desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; 2 and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. Id. “Where classwide litigation of 3 common issues will reduce litigation costs and promote greater efficiency, a class action may be 4 superior to other methods of litigation.” Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d. 1227, 1235 5 (9th Cir. 1996). The parties’ engagement with the superiority factor is minimal, but the Court 6 nonetheless can find a class action is superior in this case. Angelica’s principal objection as to 7 superiority is about the fourth factor. It argues that individualized assessments as to liability and 8 damages would be required, which would make managing the class action difficult. ECF 132 at 9 24-25. However, because the superiority factor “overlaps with the Court’s commonality, 10 typicality, and predominance analysis,” Nucci v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 19-CV-01434-LHK, 2020 11 WL 3187335, at *20 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2020), as it depends largely on whether Smith’s case 12 “rises and falls [on] common evidence,” In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 985 F.Supp.2d 13 1167, 1228 (N.D. Cal. 2013), this factor weighs in favor of certification. 14 Angelica does not dispute the other superiority factors. The first factor weighs in favor of 15 certification, as the Ninth Circuit has noted that where, like here, “damages suffered by each 16 putative class member are not large,” the “interest of each member in individually controlling the 17 prosecution or defense of separate actions . . . weighs in favor of certifying a class action.” Zinser, 18 253 F.3d at 1190 (internal quotation marks omitted). The second factor weighs in favor of 19 certification as well, as “the Court is not aware of any other actions against Defendant related to 20 the claims at issue in the instant case.” In re Arris Cable Modem Consumer Litig., 327 F.R.D. at 21 374. Finally, as to the desirability of concentrating the litigation in a particular forum, the Court 22 concludes “there is no reason to believe that concentrating this action in this Court is undesirable, 23 especially considering that the challenge is under California law, and the proposed class is 24 composed of only hourly employees in California.” See McKenzie v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 275 F.R.D. 25 290, 302 (C.D. Cal. 2011). Therefore, having weighed the four factors, the Court determines the 26 superiority requirement is satisfied here. Thus, Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) have been satisfied 27 as to Smith’s Recordkeeping Meal Period Class and Auto-Deduct Class. 1 Wl. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART 3 Plaintiff's motion for class certification. The Court CERTIFIES the following Rule 23(b)(3) 4 || classes: 5 Recordkeeping Meal Period Class: All non-exempt, hourly employees of Defendants, 6 excluding those in supervisory or managerial roles, who worked a shift in excess of five hours for the time period beginning on September 26, 2017, through the date of final 7 judgment, and whose timekeeping records reflect a late, shortened, or missed meal period. 8 Auto-Deduct Class: All non-exempt, hourly employees of Defendants, excluding those in supervisory or managerial roles who worked a shift in excess of five hours for the time 9 period beginning on September 26, 2017, through the date of final judgment, and who had 10 a half-hour of time deducted from their pay on each shift. The Court DENIES Smith’s motion to certify a Second Meal Period Class, Overtime

D Class, and Off-the-Clock Class. The Court sets a further case management conference for May

B 15, 2025 at 10:00 a.m. The parties SHALL FILE a further case management conference

statement, compliant with Civil Local Rule 16-10(d), by noon on May 8, 2025. 14 15

IT IS SO ORDERED.

16 Dated: March 28, 2025 = 17 racel: Medel 19 ARACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN 20 United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28