1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 OKHTAY AZARMANESH, Case No. 23-cv-05210-LJC

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS FOR

9 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

10 PAMELA BONDI, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 33, 35 Defendants. 11

12 I. INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff Okhtay Azarmanesh, a lawful permanent resident (LPR), brings claims related to 14 the denial of his naturalization application to become a U.S. citizen. Defendants are several U.S. 15 government officials with responsibilities related to immigration and naturalization, some of 16 whom are automatically substituted under Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 17 On two occasions Azarmanesh has applied to adjust his status to legal permanent resident, 18 and both applications have been granted. After the first LPR application was granted in 2017, 19 Azarmanesh applied for naturalization as a citizen in 2021. Defendants denied that naturalization 20 application on the basis that the first LPR application was granted in error, and Azarmanesh is 21 therefore ineligible for citizenship, though he may eventually become eligible for citizenship 22 based on the subsequent approval of his second application for adjustment of status, which was 23 granted in 2023. Among the eligibility requirements that Azarmanesh needed to satisfy for 24 naturalization, Defendants contend he was required to show that he had been a lawfully admitted 25 1 Of particular note for the purpose of the case caption, Attorney General Pamela Bondi is 26 automatically substituted for former Attorney General Merrick Garland. The other substituted defendants are Kristi Noem (for Alejandro Mayorkas) and Kika Scott (for Ur Mendoza Jaddou). 27 As far as the Court is aware, Michael Valverde and James Wyrough remain in their roles and 1 permanent resident for at least five years immediately preceding the filing of his N-400 2 naturalization application. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). Through his First Amended Complaint, 3 Azarmanesh seeks to set aside Defendants’ denial of his naturalization application, to have this 4 Court conduct de novo review of the application, and to gain United States citizenship based on 5 the first grant of legal permanent residence, which has a 2016 effective date. 6 To resolve the claims, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment (Defendants 7 also move in the alternative for judgment on the pleadings), and the Court held a hearing. The 8 parties filed supplemental briefing and evidence after the hearing, as well as a notice of 9 supplemental authority. The competing motions turn primarily on the question of whether 10 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(3) requires a derivative spouse of an asylee to remain married to the asylee 11 through the date when the adjustment of status application is adjudicated to attain a lawful grant of 12 legal permanent residence. The Court holds that it does not. 13 For the reasons discussed below, Azarmanesh’s Motion is GRANTED, and Defendants’ 14 Motion is DENIED.2 15 II. BACKGROUND 16 A. The Relevant Statute 17 The Court begins with 8 U.S.C. § 1159, the relevant statute that is at the center of the 18 parties’ dispute regarding Azarmanesh’s eligibility for adjustment of status. In particular, the 19 parties dispute the meaning of subsection (b)(3). The parties address that provision in the context 20 of the broader subsection (b), which reads as follows:

21 (b) Requirements for adjustment The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General, in the 22 Secretary’s or the Attorney General’s discretion and under such regulations as the Secretary or the Attorney General may prescribe, 23 may adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence the status of any alien granted asylum who— 24 (1) applies for such adjustment, 25 (2) has been physically present in the United States for at least one 26 year after being granted asylum, 27 1 (3) continues to be a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title or a spouse or child of such a refugee, 2 (4) is not firmly resettled in any foreign country, and 3 (5) is admissible (except as otherwise provided under subsection (c)) 4 as an immigrant under this chapter at the time of examination for adjustment of such alien. 5 Upon approval of an application under this subsection, the Secretary 6 of Homeland Security or the Attorney General shall establish a record of the alien’s admission for lawful permanent residence as of the date 7 one year before the date of the approval of the application. 8 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (emphasis added). 9 As far as this Court is aware, only three other courts have considered the issues of whether 10 § 1159(b)(3) requires a derivative asylee’s marriage to continue through the date of adjudication of 11 an application to adjust status: the Western District of Wisconsin’s decision in Dormor v. United 12 States, cited extensively in the parties’ briefing here; the District of Maryland’s case Soumah v. 13 Collett, where the first of two decisions was identified in Plaintiffs’ Notice of Supplemental 14 Authority; and a very recent decision by the Eastern District of Virginia in Zalmai v. Josephs- 15 Conway. All of those courts held that a derivative asylee applying for adjustment need not remain 16 married to the principal asylee at the time of adjudication. See Dorbor v. United States, 379 F. 17 Supp. 3d 765 (W.D. Wis. 2019); Soumah v. Collett (Soumah I), 738 F. Supp. 3d 631 (D. Md. 18 2024) (denying the Government’s motion to dismiss); Soumah v. Collett (Soumah II), No. 23- 19 2473-TDC, 2025 WL 638472 (D. Md. Feb. 27, 2025) (granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary 20 judgment); Zalmai v. Josephs-Conway, No. 1:24-cv-497 (PTG/WBP), 2025 WL 938619 (E.D. Va. 21 Mar. 27, 2025). 22 B. Factual and Procedural History 23 Although the facts of this case are presented in a somewhat unusual manner, with 24 Azarmanesh offering no evidence to support his Motion for Summary Judgment, the parties agree 25 that the material facts are not in dispute. See ECF No. 35 at 10. Defendants further agreed on the 26 record at the hearing that all exhibits attached to Azarmanesh’s First Amended Complaint are 27 authentic. 1 No. 15) ¶ 22;3 ECF No. 35-2 at 4. Moadel Shahidi applied for asylum in the United States and 2 listed Azarmanesh as a derivative beneficiary on her application. U.S. Citizenship and 3 Immigration Services (USCIS) granted Azarmanesh and Moadel Shahidi asylum on November 10, 4 2015 based on Moadel Shahidi’s application. FAC ¶ 25 & Ex. A; ECF No. 35-1, ¶ 3. 5 On December 15, 2016, Azarmanesh filed a Form I-485 application to adjust status to 6 become an LPR as the spouse of an asylee. FAC ¶ 26; ECF No. 35-1, ¶ 6. On May 24, 2017, 7 while his application to adjust status was pending, a divorce judgment terminated Azarmanesh and 8 Moadel Shahidi’s marriage. FAC ¶ 27; ECF No. 35-2 at 2.4 Azarmanesh’s adjustment application 9 was granted without an interview on August 25, 2017, and he received a green card indicating that 10 he was an LPR as of August 25, 2016. FAC ¶¶ 28–29 & n.1; ECF No. 35-1, ¶ 8; see 8 C.F.R. 11 § 209.2(f) (“If the application is approved, USCIS will record the alien’s admission for lawful 12 permanent residence as of the date one year before the date of the approval of the 13 application . . . .”). 14 On May 27, 2021, Azarmanesh applied for naturalization to become a citizen. FAC ¶ 30. 15 He appeared for an interview to determine eligibility on May 21, 2022. ECF No. 15-3. USCIS 16 denied that application on July 14, 2022, solely on the basis that Azarmanesh had not lawfully 17 obtained LPR status because he was not married to an asylee at the time that his adjustment 18 application was granted. FAC ¶ 31 & Ex. C; ECF No. 35-1, ¶ 11. The denial letter informed him 19 that he could file a Form N-336 request for a hearing within thirty-three days, but he did not do so. 20 FAC Ex. C at 2; ECF No. 35-1, ¶ 11. 21 In the meantime, Azarmanesh had married Mahtab Ghazizadeh, a U.S. citizen, on March 3, 22 2022. FAC ¶ 32; ECF No. 35-1, ¶ 10; ECF No. 35-2. On August 8, 2022, Ghazizadeh filed a 23 petition to classify Azarmanesh as the spouse of a U.S. citizen, and Azarmanesh filed a new Form 24

25 3 Because a plaintiff’s mere allegations are not taken as true in the context of a motion for summary judgment, this Order cites only those allegations that Defendants admit in their Answer 26 (ECF No. 28). Other allegations—for example, the allegation that Azarmanesh lawfully entered the United States in 2006 and again in 2009 to complete a Ph.D. in electrical engineering, which 27 Defendants deny for lack of knowledge—are not relevant to the outcome of the present motion. 1 I-485 application to adjust status to be an LPR based on his marriage to Ghazizadeh. FAC ¶ 32 & 2 Ex. C; ECF No. 35-1, ¶ 12. 3 USCIS denied Azarmanesh’s second application to adjust status on February 15, 2023 4 because he had “already been granted LPR status on August 25, 2017.” FAC ¶ 33 & Ex. E; see 5 ECF No. 35-1, ¶ 13. Defendants now assert that although Azarmanesh’s LPR status was not 6 obtained lawfully as required for naturalization, he nevertheless had LPR status that had not been 7 “abandoned, rescinded, or terminated,” and thus could not adjust status to obtain such status again 8 under an unspecified then-existing policy. See ECF No. 35 at 16; ECF No. 35-1, ¶ 13. Contrary 9 to that assertion, Azarmanesh submits a 2013 USCIS legal memorandum concluding that 10 applicants who already have LPR status are allowed to seek adjustment of status again, ECF No. 11 37-2, and acknowledging that they might wish to do so if their original status had been granted in 12 error, id. at 3. 13 Azarmanesh apparently recognized that USCIS’s 2023 denial of his second application to 14 adjust status based on the grounds that he already had LPR status contradicted the reasoning for 15 the denial of his first naturalization application, and filed an untimely Form N-336 request for a 16 hearing on his naturalization decision. ECF No. 35-1, ¶ 15. USCIS accepted the late request for a 17 hearing on March 17, 2023, but never scheduled a hearing on that request. FAC ¶¶ 34, 37 & Ex. 18 F. Azarmanesh filed his original Complaint in this action on October 12, 2023, seeking a hearing 19 under 8 C.F.R. § 336.2, which requires USCIS to schedule a hearing within 180 days of a timely 20 N-336 request. ECF No. 1. 21 On November 8,5 2023, USCIS reopened sua sponte Azarmanesh’s second I-485 22 application to adjust status and granted that application, issuing Azarmanesh a second green card 23 showing that he was an LPR as of November 6, 2023. FAC ¶ 39 & Ex. G; ECF No. 35-1, ¶ 16. 24 Later that month, USCIS rejected Azarmanesh’s N-336 request for a hearing as untimely filed. 25

26 5 USCIS Acting Section Chief Aleksandra Shpolyanskaya states that the reopening occurred on November 6th, ECF No. 35-1, ¶ 16, which corresponds to the date on the second green card, but 27 Defendants admit in their Answer the allegation that they reopened the application on November 1 FAC Ex. I; ECF No. 35-1, ¶ 17. Azarmanesh alleges that USCIS also indicated through a notice 2 on its website that the request was denied for failure to pay the correct fee, FAC ¶ 44 & Ex. H, but 3 Defendants denied that allegation, Answer ¶ 44. That dispute is not relevant to the outcome of the 4 present Motions. 5 Azarmanesh filed his operative First Amended Complaint challenging the denial of his 6 naturalization application on December 18, 2023. He brings his first claim under the Immigration 7 and Nationality Act (INA) and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), asserting that the INA 8 only requires that he was married to an asylee at the time he applied to adjust status to be an LPR 9 not at the time that application was adjudicated, that USCIS failed to adjudicate his application for 10 adjustment of status in a reasonable amount of time, and that USCIS’s “repeatedly reversed . . . 11 positions” have been arbitrary and capricious. FAC ¶¶ 48–58. Azarmanesh’s second claim, 12 brought under the APA, asserts that Defendants violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process 13 by applying a fundamentally unfair date-of-adjudication approach to his marriage and adjustment 14 application. FAC ¶¶ 59–62. He asks the Court to approve his naturalization application and order 15 Defendants to produce a Certificate of Naturalization. FAC at 10 (Prayer for Relief). 16 After the parties stipulated multiple times to extend time for Defendants to respond to the 17 First Amended Complaint, Defendants brought a unilateral Administrative Motion for a further 18 extension on March 25, 2024 (then the deadline to respond), which Azarmanesh opposed and the 19 Court granted in part. ECF Nos. 25–27. Defendants answered, and the parties brought cross- 20 motions to resolve the case, with Azarmanesh’s Motion (ECF No. 33) captioned as a Motion for 21 Summary Judgment (but lacking any supporting evidence), and Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 35) 22 captioned as either a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or a Cross-Motion for Summary 23 Judgment, supported by the declaration of USCIS Acting Section Chief Aleksandra 24 Shpolyanskaya (ECF No. 35-1). 25 C. The Parties’ Arguments 26 1. Azarmanesh’s Motion 27 Azarmanesh argues that this case is properly before the Court because he exhausted 1 hearing, which USCIS initially accepted. ECF No. 33 at 10–11. He contends that the denial of his 2 second Form I-485 application to adjust status made clear that he received LPR status effective in 3 2016, contradicting the stated reason for denial of his naturalization application and establishing 4 that he was eligible for naturalization. Id. at 12–13. 5 Azarmanesh also contends that USCIS was correct to grant him LPR status on his first 6 application, because his marriage to an asylee at the time of his application satisfied the criteria for 7 eligibility, and—in his view—§ 1159(b)(3) does not require the marriage to continue through the 8 date of adjudication. Id. at 14. Azarmanesh asks this Court to follow the Western District of 9 Wisconsin’s decision in Dorbor, holding that an applicant seeking to adjust status under § 1159(b) 10 must be married to the principal asylee only at the time an application is submitted, and that 11 divorce while the application is pending does not require either denial of LPR status or denial of 12 naturalization if LPR status was granted after divorce. Id. at 21–22 (citing Dorbor, 379 F. Supp. 13 3d 765).6 He also cites circuit decisions holding that other immigration statutes based on familial 14 status are evaluated at the time of an application. Id. at 19–21 (citing Choin v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 15 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 2008); Carpio v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1091, 1092 (10th Cir. 2010)). 16 Azarmanesh contends that “there is nothing in 8 U.S.C. § 1159 that suggests” a different approach 17 is warranted here, and he argues that it would be absurd and unfair to condition a status adjustment 18 on the timing of USCIS’s decision, which is outside of an applicant’s control. Id. at 22–24. 19 Finally, Azarmanesh contends that USCIS’s conflicting positions and unreasonable delay 20 violated the Administrative Procedures Act. Id. at 24–25. 21 2. Defendants’ Motion 22 Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of 23 Civil Procedure, or in the alternative, for summary judgment under Rule 56. See generally ECF 24 No. 35. Because Defendants submit evidence with their Motion, see ECF No. 35-1, the Court 25 6 In response to Azarmanesh’s reliance on Dorbor, Defendants mischaracterize that case as 26 “unpublished,” ECF No. 38 at 2, despite using the published Federal Supplement citation for it in the same brief, id. at 5. The distinction is not important, however, because the question of whether 27 a district court decision is published generally has no significance in evaluating its persuasive 1 construes it as a motion for summary judgment, without reaching the question of whether judicial 2 notice might be appropriate if Defendants had moved only under Rule 12(c). Defendants’ Motion 3 also serves as their opposition to Azarmanesh’s Motion. 4 Defendants argue that although Azarmanesh was granted LPR status in 2017, such status 5 must have been lawfully granted, and it was not lawfully granted because he was no longer 6 married to the principal asylee at that time. ECF No. 35 at 12, 19–20 (citing, e.g., 8 U.S.C. 7 § 1429; Shin v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010)). In Defendants’ view, the text and 8 legislative history of § 1159 show that its conditions apply at the time of adjudication, which is 9 consistent with USCIS’s interpretation of that law in its policy manual. Id. at 21–24. 10 Defendants acknowledge that Dorbor appeared (at the time of briefing) to be the only 11 decision addressing the specific question at issue here, but they argue that it is not persuasive and 12 this Court should decline to follow it. Id. at 25–26. As for Azarmanesh’s APA claims, 13 Defendants argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review a denial of naturalization through the 14 lens of the APA because 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) provides a specific and exclusive procedure for such 15 review. Id. at 35. 16 3. Azarmanesh’s Opposition Brief 17 Azarmanesh argues that he now meets the naturalization requirement of having been 18 lawfully admitted for permanent residence because USCIS granted his second I-485 application to 19 adjust status based on his current marriage to a U.S. citizen. ECF No. 37 at 6–7. He suggests 20 (without explicitly arguing) that the Court could grant summary judgment in his favor on that 21 basis even if the Court disagrees with his interpretation of § 1159(b)(3) and finds that the initial 22 grant of LPR status was erroneous. Id. He also argues that the cases rejecting naturalization 23 where LPR status was erroneously granted are distinguishable because the applicants in those 24 cases were never eligible for adjustment of status, and many of them involved fraud or 25 misrepresentation. Id. at 12–14. 26 Azarmanesh contends that Defendants’ interpretation of the statute would render 27 § 1159(b)(2)—requiring presence in the United States for one year—superfluous, because 1 adjudicate the application would also require that the applicant not return to their home country. 2 Id. at 8. He argues that subsection (b)(5)’s specific condition of admissibility “at the time of 3 examination for adjustment” suggests that the same temporal condition should not attach to 4 subsection (b)(3), which does not include that language. Id. at 8–9. Azarmanesh also argues that 5 legislative history indicates Congress intended to condition LPR status on maintaining refugee 6 status for one year, not indefinitely through the date of adjudication. Id. at 9–10. 7 Azarmanesh argues that caselaw addressing other immigration statutes and USCIS’s 8 practices in other contexts favor a date-of-application approach and recognize that applicants 9 should not be punished for delays in USCIS processing their applications. Id. at 10–12. He 10 further argues that principles of equitable estoppel support his position because USCIS gave 11 shifting and contradictory reasons for its treatment of his various applications, but cites no legal 12 authority to support that argument. Id. at 14–16. 13 Azarmanesh does not appear to dispute that § 1421(c) is the exclusive means to review a 14 denial of naturalization and the APA does not allow for such review. Id. at 16. Instead, he argues 15 that the APA allows the Court to review USCIS’s delay in granting his latest I-485 application to 16 adjust status, and the Court should “order[] USCIS to issue a new LPR card backdated to February 17 15, 2023, the date USCIS denied his second LPR adjustment.” Id. 18 4. Defendants’ Reply 19 Defendants contend that Azarmanesh must have been lawfully granted LPR status and 20 have held that status for at least five years to naturalize, so neither his first erroneous LPR status 21 nor his more recent 2023 status establishes eligibility. ECF No. 38 at 2–4. Defendants argue that 22 although many cases discussing the requirement that LPR status must have been correctly granted 23 involved fraud, they did not turn on that issue. Id. at 3–4. According to Defendants, neither the 24 lack of any fraud by Azarmanesh nor the fact that his first LPR status was never rescinded excuses 25 the fact that it was not lawfully granted. Id. 26 Defendants reiterate their view that the plain language of § 1159(b)(3) requires marriage to 27 continue through the date of adjudication. ECF No. 38 at 4–5. They argue that § 1159(b)(2) only 1 adjudication, not the date of an application, contrary to Azarmanesh’s and Dorbor’s interpretation 2 of that subsection. Id. at 5–6. Defendants contend that the reference to the time of examination in 3 subsection (b)(5) addresses potential waivers of inadmissibility granted after an application is filed 4 but before it is adjudicated. Id. at 6. Defendants argue that applying Azarmanesh’s time-of- 5 application test to all subsections of § 1159(b) would have absurd results. Id. at 7. 6 Defendants contend that courts lack equitable authority to grant naturalization except under 7 the conditions where it is specifically allowed by law, that the APA does not provide for review of 8 naturalization decisions, and that this case concerns the denial of Azarmanesh’s naturalization 9 application, not his 2023 application to adjust status. Id. at 7–8. 10 5. Supplemental Briefing 11 At the Court’s request, Defendants filed a supplemental brief after the hearing arguing that 12 Azarmanesh had a duty to inform USCIS of changed circumstances while his application was 13 pending, ECF No. 42, and Azarmanesh filed a response arguing to the contrary, ECF No. 43. 14 Azarmanesh later filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority, citing the District of Maryland’s first 15 decision in Soumah holding that a derivative asylee married to the principal asylee as of the date 16 of an application for adjustment of status need not remain married through the date of 17 adjudication. ECF No. 44 (citing Soumah I, 738 F. Supp. 3d 631). 18 III. LEGAL STANDARD 19 To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a movant must “show[] that there is no 20 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

22 In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non- 23 moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). At the summary judgment stage, the court does not make 24 credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n., 809 F.2d 626, 630– 25 31 (9th Cir. 1987). However, once the moving party meets the requirements of Rule 56 by showing there is an absence of evidence 26 to support the non-moving party’s case, the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion, who “must set forth specific facts showing that 27 there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 1 Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 2005). 2 District courts may review the denial of a naturalization application de novo. 8 U.S.C. 3 § 1421(c).7 “[T]he burden is on the alien applicant to show his eligibility for citizenship in every 4 respect,” and as a general rule, “doubts should be resolved in favor of the United States and 5 against the claimant.” Berenyi v. Dist. Dir., I.N.S., 385 U.S. 630, 637 (1967); see also, e.g., 6 Orellana v. McAleenan, No. 19-cv-05759-DMR, 2020 WL 1904588, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 7 2020) (quoting Berenyi), aff’d sub nom. Orellana v. Mayorkas, 6 F.4th 1034 (9th Cir. 2021). 8 Because the “Constitution confers upon Congress exclusive authority to establish rules of 9 naturalization,” courts are bound by the terms Congress has set, and cannot confer citizenship “‘by 10 application of the doctrine of estoppel, nor by invocation of equitable powers, nor by any other 11 means . . . in violation of these limitations.’” Mustanich v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 1084, 1087–88 (9th 12 Cir. 2008) (quoting I.N.S. v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 885 (1988)). 13 IV. ANALYSIS 14 A. Threshold Issues and Arguments Not Reached 15 Subject to certain exceptions not at issue here, “no person shall be naturalized unless he 16 has been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence in accordance with all 17 applicable provisions of” Title 8, Chapter 12, of the U.S. Code. 8 U.S.C. § 1429. Section 1159 18 falls within that chapter. District courts have held that LPR status does not meet that standard if it 19 was not “lawfully” granted, or in other words, if it was erroneously granted to someone who did 20 not meet the criteria for it. E.g., Ratcher v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 5:19-cv-01945- 21 SB-SP, 2021 WL 8314612, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2021). This Court is aware of no decision to 22 the contrary, and assumes for the sake of argument that principle is correct. Because the Court 23 now determines that Azarmanesh’s first LPR status was lawfully granted, the Court need not 24 resolve the question of whether that is a precondition to naturalization. 25 Azarmanesh also suggests, without specifically arguing the point, that Defendants cannot 26

27 7 Although § 1421(c) contemplates review after an administrative hearing on a naturalization 1 rely on any defect in his first grant of LPR status when Defendants never took steps to rescind that 2 status. See ECF No. 27 at 6–7 (responding to Defendants’ argument that rescission is 3 unnecessary, and distinguishing cases that Defendants cited). Again, because the Court 4 determines below that USCIS properly granted Azarmanesh LPR status in 2017 (with an effective 5 date in 2016), the Court need not decide whether Defendants might be required to pursue 6 rescission under 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) before asserting that such status was not lawfully granted. 7 Azarmanesh devotes multiple pages of his opposition brief to an argument that “the 8 principle of equitable estoppel favors [him] because USCIS’s behavior towards him has been 9 egregious and unfair.” ECF No. 37 at 14–16 (heading capitalization altered). He cites no legal 10 authority in support of that argument. “Once it has been determined that a person does not qualify 11 for citizenship, the district court has no discretion to ignore the defect and grant citizenship.” 12 Pangilinan, 486 U.S. at 884. “Neither by application of the doctrine of estoppel, nor by 13 invocation of equitable powers, nor by any other means does a court have the power to confer 14 citizenship in violation of these limitations.” Id. at 885. If Azarmanesh was not eligible for 15 naturalization by statute, “[e]stoppel in these circumstances would amount to precisely the type of 16 equity-based departure from the requirements of the immigration statutes that Pangilinan 17 prohibits.” Mustanich, 518 F.3d at 1088. This Order therefore does not rely on that doctrine. 18 Courts have also held that the APA does not provide a separate path to review a denial of 19 naturalization when Congress has provided for such review under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). E.g., 20 Ngamfon v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 349 F. Supp. 3d 975, 983 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 2018). The 21 Court need not reach that question here. 22 Reviewing the denial of Azarmanesh’s naturalization application de novo pursuant to 23 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), the Court proceeds to address the merits of whether Azarmanesh was eligible 24 for LPR status when USCIS granted his application for it in 2017, and thus eligible for 25 naturalization five years after the effective date of that first LPR status. 26 B. Interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(3) 27 The primary dispute in this case is whether 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(3) requires that an applicant 1 adjustment of status is decided, or if it is enough for an applicant to have been married to the 2 asylee at the time that the application is submitted. For the reasons discussed below, this Court 3 agrees with the consensus of other district courts that have addressed the issue and held that 4 marriage is only required at the time of application. 5 When engaging in questions of statutory interpretation, courts “start, of course, with the 6 statutory text, and proceed from the understanding that unless otherwise defined, statutory terms 7 are generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning.” Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 8 369, 376 (2013) (cleaned up). The analysis “ends there . . . if the text is unambiguous.” BedRoc 9 Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004). On the other hand, if the text is ambiguous, 10 courts may consider interpretations rendered by the agencies responsible for implementing the 11 relevant statutes, among other relevant considerations. The parties dispute whether Section 12 1159(b)(3) is unambiguous, and the Court begins with that issue. 13 1. Ambiguity 14 The statutory text provides in relevant part that the Government “may adjust to the status 15 of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence the status of any alien granted asylum who 16 . . . continues to be a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title or a spouse 17 or child of such a refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(3). As Azarmanesh acknowledges, “[t]he word 18 ‘continues’ denotes the passage of time and that the derivative asylee must have a relationship 19 with the principal at an earlier point in time and a later point in time.” ECF No. 33 at 15. Yet, 20 nothing in this text of this subsection states precisely how long the marital relationship must 21 continue, and the duration is not obvious from reading the other subsections within 8 U.S.C. 22 § 1159(b). To the contrary, subsection (b)(5) of the statute specifically provides that a different 23 criterion, admissibility as an immigrant, is evaluated “at the time of examination for adjustment,” 24 which the parties appear to agree is equivalent to the time of adjustment. 25 Other courts considering this question have held that the “time of examination” language 26 in subsection (b)(5) and the lack of such language in subsection (b)(3), among other textual clues, 27 indicates that continued marriage under subsection (b)(3) is not evaluated at the time of 1 concede that “that is one plausible reading of the statute,” ECF No. 35 at 26, thus effectively 2 acknowledging that the statute is ambiguous. 3 While Defendants currently construe subsection (b)(2) as requiring one year of continuous 4 present in the United States only as of the date of adjudication, the USCIS policy manual 5 acknowledges that “USCIS’ practice and policy has varied with regard to whether the 1 year of 6 physical presence was required at the time of filing or at the time of adjudication of the 7 application,” further reinforcing that the temporal focus of these eligibility requirements is 8 ambiguous. USCIS Policy Manual, vol. 7, pt. M, ch. 2, § A n.2, https://www.uscis.gov/policy- 9 manual/volume-7-part-m-chapter-2 [https://perma.cc/86Z3-TDQJ] (emphasis added). 10 That three other federal courts have now disagreed with USCIS’s interpretation is itself 11 another indication that the statute does not unambiguously compel USCIS’s preferred reading of 12 it. And as noted by the Eastern District of Virginia in Zalmai, the fact that USCIS has sometimes 13 “granted [derivative asylees] LPR status, with clear knowledge of their divorce, [as] in Soumah 14 and Dorbor,” also tends to suggest ambiguity. Zalmai, 2025 WL 938619, at *5. If the statute 15 unambiguously required continued marriage at the time of adjudication, “surely USCIS would not 16 have granted” those applications. Id. 17 The Court therefore concludes that that § 1159(b)(3), including the meaning of the word 18 “continues” in that context, is ambiguous as to whether a derivative asylee must still be married to 19 a principal asylee at the time of adjudication. 20 2. Agency Interpretations 21 Courts determining the meaning of ambiguous statutory provisions may “seek aid from the 22 interpretations of those responsible for implementing particular statutes,” as “[s]uch interpretations 23 ‘constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 24 properly resort for guidance.’” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024) 25 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944)).8 26 8 Defendants’ briefing cited the doctrine of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 27 Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and at the time they filed their brief, Chevron remained good 1 Given that the meaning of § 1159(b)(3) is unclear, the Court considers whether it must 2 afford deference to USCIS’s reading of the provision. At the hearing, Defendants clarified that 3 they seek deference only towards, if anything, the implementing regulation for § 1159(b)(3). That 4 regulation largely repeats the language of the statute, except for adding the word “is” in relation to 5 spouses and children, which sheds little light on this inquiry. 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a)(1)(iii) 6 (“Continues to be a refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42) of the Act, or is the spouse 7 or child of a refugee” (emphasis added)). As defense counsel acknowledged at the hearing, the 8 regulation is virtually identical to the statute, “almost exactly word for word.” Nothing on the face 9 of the regulation purports to interpret the statute in the manner Defendants prefer, as requiring 10 marriage at the time of adjudication rather than merely at the time the application is submitted. 11 The Federal Register notice accompanying the original version of § 209.2 (which does not differ 12 materially from the current version) also does not address this issue. Aliens and Nationality; 13 Refugee and Asylum Procedures, 45 Fed. Reg. 37,392 (June 2, 1980). 14 In an abundance of caution, the Court also considers whether USCIS’s policy manual’s 15 discussion of the required continuation of a derivative asylee’s marriage warrants deference, 16 although Defendants disclaimed any intent to invoke deference to that document at the hearing. 17 “[I]nterpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all 18 of which lack the force of law—[did] not warrant Chevron-style deference,” Christensen v. Harris 19 County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000), even before the recent demise of the Chevron doctrine. 20 “Instead, [such] interpretations . . . are ‘entitled to respect’ under . . . Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 21 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), but only to the extent that those interpretations have the ‘power to persuade’ 22 . . . .” Id. As other courts have held, USCIS’s policy manual is therefore entitled to respect only if 23 warranted under the Skidmore doctrine. See, e.g., Rios v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 24 CV 20-2370-CBM-(PVCx), 2021 WL 4860686, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2021). 25 As Azarmanesh acknowledges in his Motion, the policy manual states that an applicant for 26 adjustment must still be married to any asylee spouse at the time of adjudication. The complete 27 1 relevant discussion of this issue in the policy manual reads as follows:

2 C. Derivative Asylee Continues to be the Spouse or Child of the Principal Asylee 3 A derivative asylee must continue to meet the definition of a spouse 4 or child of a refugee both at the time of filing and final adjudication of the adjustment application. A derivative asylee spouse fails to meet 5 this eligibility requirement if the marital relationship has ended. . . .

6 A derivative asylee who fails to meet this requirement does not lose his or her asylum status when the relationship to the principal asylee 7 ends or when the principal asylee naturalizes. A derivative asylee only loses the ability to adjust status as a derivative asylee, but may adjust 8 status under another category if he or she can establish eligibility.

9 . . .

10 Divorced Spouse

11 A spouse who is divorced from the principal asylee is no longer a spouse of the principal and is no longer eligible to adjust status as a 12 derivative asylee. 13 USCIS Policy Manual, vol. 7, pt. M, ch. 2, § C, https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-7- 14 part-m-chapter-2 [https://perma.cc/86Z3-TDQJ]. 15 Opinions that are “conclusory and lack[] any meaningful analysis” warrant “no deference” 16 under the Skidmore doctrine. Shin v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1213, 1219 (9th Cir. 2010). This section of 17 the policy manual does not include any explanation or support for the particular durational 18 requirement that it imposes. In that regard, it does not evidence a thorough consideration by 19 USCIS of the matter, let alone a valid judgment as to what Congress intended. See id. (“[T]he 20 weight [to be afforded to an interpretation] depends on ‘the thoroughness evident in its 21 consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, 22 [among other] factors which give it power to persuade . . . .” (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140)). 23 Even if the policy manual were construed as an interpretation of the implementing 24 regulation, rather than of the statute itself, that would not change the outcome. Agency 25 interpretations of their own regulations are sometimes entitled to deference under the doctrine of 26 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and related cases. See generally Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 27 558, 568–80 (2019) (discussing the contours of Auer deference). Here, though, 8 C.F.R. 1 indication that it is intended to require marriage at the time of adjudication. “An agency does not 2 acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and 3 experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.” 4 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006). Defendants do not argue that Auer deference 5 applies to this provision of the policy manual, and the Court concludes that it does not. 6 The Court takes judicial notice of the policy manual (as a matter of public record) for the 7 purpose of showing how USCIS understands and applies § 1159(b)(3) but affords it no deference 8 in the Court’s interpretation of that statute. 9 3. Section 1159(b) Does Not Require that Marriage Continues Through Adjudication 10 11 Having found that text of § 1159(b)(3) is ambiguous, and USCIS’s accompanying 12 regulation and policy statement are not entitled to deference, the Court must endeavor to interpret 13 the provision. “In weighing the strength of the parties’ competing interpretation [of a statute], we 14 consider [its] meaning . . . in light of the purpose of the statute and its context in the statutory 15 scheme.” Choin v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2008). “Interpretation of a word or 16 phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the 17 statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis.” Dolan v. U.S. 18 Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006). The language, structure, purpose, and application of a 19 statute guide the courts’ interpretation of provisions in a regime for adjustment of status. See 20 Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1040 (9th Cir. 2006). 21 a. Refugees, Asylees, and the Structure of § 1159 Generally 22 To understand the context in which Section 1159(b) operates, the Court briefly reviews the 23 statutory scheme by which refugees, asylees,9 and their derivative spouses and children may seek 24 9 To clarify somewhat confusing terminology, asylees (who obtain such status after arriving in the 25 United States) are distinct from people admitted as refugees (who obtain such status before arriving in the United States), but a core requirement for asylum is that a principal applicant must 26 meet the statutory definition of a “refugee,” most notably a well-founded fear of persecution based on any of several enumerated grounds. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A), 1159(b)(3). 27 Strictly speaking, the INA treats asylees as a subset of refugees. See id. § 1158(b)(1)(A) 1 to adjust their status to legal permanent resident. 2 The statutory definition of the term “refugee” contained in § 101(a)(42) applies to two asylum provisions within the Immigration 3 and Nationality Act. Section 207 [of the INA], 8 U.S.C. § 1157, governs the admission of refugees who seek admission from foreign 4 countries. Section 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, sets out the process by which refugees currently in the United States may be granted asylum. Prior 5 to the 1980 amendments there was no statutory basis for granting asylum to aliens who applied from within the United States. 6 7 I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 433 (1987) (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, these two 8 categories of individuals who receive relief under the provisions of sections 207 and 208 of the 9 INA, are individuals admitted as refugees or granted asylee status, respectively. See 8 U.S.C. 10 §§ 1101(42), 1158(b)(1)(A). “[O]ne of the primary purposes of the Refugee Act of 1980 (of 11 which § 1159 is a part) [was] to put refugees on the same footing as other immigrants,” by 12 “‘repeal[ing] the [previous] immigration law’s discriminatory treatment of refugees’ and 13 ‘accord[ing] refugee admissions the same immigration status given all other immigrants.’” 14 Dorbor, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 770 (quoting S. Rep. 96-256, 1, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 142). 15 Section 1159, enacted by section 209 of the INA, establishes a process for refugees and 16 asylees to seek legal permanent residency after one year of physical presence in the United States. 17 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 209, 94 Stat. 102.10 Congress’s objective in adopting 18 the Refugee Act of 1980 was to “provide a permanent and systematic procedure for the admission 19 to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States, and to provide 20 comprehensive and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those 21 refugees who are admitted.” Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101. 22

23 to the United States as such under 8 U.S.C. § 1157, rather than individuals granted asylum to remain in the United States based on their refugee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1158. 24 10 Chapter 1 of the USCIS policy manual describes the following background: “Before the Refugee Act of 1980, refugee admission policy was reactive and piecemeal as it grew 25 in response to humanitarian crises and ethnic conflicts. The result was an assortment of laws and regulations that classified persons as refugees, conditional entrants, parolees, pre-parolees, 26 escapees, evacuees, or asylum grantees. In many cases, the long-term resolution of these classifications was unclear.” Volume 7, Part L, Chapter 1, https://www.uscis.gov/policy- 27 manual/volume-7-part-l-chapter-1 [https://perma.cc/JL2X-EDYT]. In addition to establishing “a 1 Avenues to obtain legal permanent residence vary depending on the category by which one 2 gains admission to the United States. “Admission” is defined by statute, as “the lawful entry of 3 the alien to the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” INA 4 § 101(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13), as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 5 Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 § 301(a). In general, a 6 citizen of a foreign country who seeks to travel to the United States must first secure a U.S. visa. 7 Young v. Trump, 506 F. Supp. 3d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2020). “A visa is a travel document that 8 confers upon its recipient the right to travel to a port of entry and apply for admissions to enter the 9 United States, but it does not guarantee a right of entry.” Id. These rules result in a double-check 10 admission system, whereby in general an individual must obtain a visa and then present at a U.S. 11 port of entry or border inspection station where they are subject to inspection by an officer for the 12 U.S. Department of Homeland Security to determine their admissibility. Charles Gordon, Stanley 13 Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr & Wada, 1 Immigration Law and Procedure § 103[2][c][i]. 14 Refugees are not required to present a visa, but they must apply for refugee status, and 15 approval of their application from abroad authorizes Customs and Border Patrol to admit the 16 applicant conditionally as a refugee upon arrival at a port of entry within four months of the date 17 the refugee application was approved.11 See Immigration Law and Procedure § 34.01[1], [5][a][i], 18 5[c][ii] (explaining that after receiving a referral from the U.S. refugee admissions program, each 19 person seeking entry as a refugee must execute an application on Form 1-590 with the help of a 20 program official); 8 U.S.C. § 1181(c); 8 C.F.R. § 207.4. A spouse of any refugee is generally 21 “entitled to the same admission status as such refugee if accompanying, or following to join, such 22 refugee” and if the spouse is admissible under the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(2)(A). To be eligible 23 for refugee status as a spouse, the spousal relationship must have existed at the time of filing of the 24 spouse’s application for “accompanying or following-to-join benefits” and at the time of the 25 11 Eligibility for refugee status is determined through an interview with a USCIS officer, who 26 examines all evidence and evaluates the applicant’s credibility to determine, among other things, whether the applicant meets the definition of a refugee. See Immigration Law and Procedure, 27 § 34.01[5][c][ii], [iii]; USCIS Refugee Eligibility Determination, 1 spouse’s subsequent admission to the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 207.7; USCIS Policy Manual, vol. 2 7, pt. L, ch. 2, § F.1, https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-7-part-l-chapter-2 3 [https://perma.cc/BT6P-PRBL] (“A derivative spouse (RE-2 classification) of a refugee who 4 divorces the principal refugee prior to seeking admission as a refugee to the United States is 5 ineligible for admission as a derivative refugee.”). 6 Upon entry to the United States, refugees are not admitted for legal permanent residence, 7 as family-based immigrants and those admitted through the diversity visa program are, for 8 example. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1). Similarly, asylees need not apply for a visa and, like 9 refugees, they are not immediately eligible for legal permanent residence. See 8 U.S.C. 10 § 1159(b)(2). Pursuant to § 1159, however, refugees and asylees may subsequently adjust their 11 status to lawful permanent resident. Subsections (a) and (b) set forth the eligibility requirements 12 that apply to refugee and asylee applications to adjust, respectively. The text of subsection (b) is 13 set forth at the beginning of this Order. Subsection (a) reads as follows:

14 (a) Inspection and examination by Department of Homeland Security 15 (1) Any alien who has been admitted to the United States under 16 section 1157 of this title—

17 (A) whose admission has not been terminated by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General pursuant to suc 18 regulations as the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may prescribe, 19 (B) who has been physically present in the United States for at 20 least one year, and

21 (C) who has not acquired permanent resident status,

22 shall, at the end of such year period, return or be returned to the custody of the Department of Homeland Security for inspection and 23 examination for admission to the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the provisions of section 1225, 1229a, and 1231 of 24 this title.

25 (2) Any alien who is found upon inspection and examination by an immigration officer pursuant to paragraph (1) or after a hearing 26 before an immigration judge to be admissible (except as otherwise provided under subsection (c)) as an immigrant under this chapter 27 at the time of the alien’s inspection and examination shall, States for permanent residence as of the date of such alien’s 1 arrival into the United States. 2 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a). 3 Unlike asylees who apply for legal permanent residence, refugees are not required to 4 demonstrate that they continue to be a refugee within the meaning of the INA or a spouse or child 5 of such a refugee. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1) with § 1159(b)(3). A refugee is eligible for 6 adjustment of status if their “admission has not been terminated by the Secretary of Homeland 7 Security or the Attorney General,” they have been “physically present in the United States for at 8 least one year,” and they have not otherwise acquired permanent resident status. 8 U.S.C. 9 § 1159(a)(1). Thus, there is no requirement that refugee status continue through to the time that 10 the refugee seeks legal permanent residence. This means that a derivative spouse who secured 11 admission as a refugee based on a marriage to the principal refugee, need not remain married, and 12 thus a derivative beneficiary with refugee status, to be eligible for legal permanent residence. The 13 USCIS Policy Manual confirms that divorcees of principal refugees may be granted LPR status. 14 USCIS Policy Manual, vol. 7, pt. L, ch. 5, § F.1, https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-7- 15 part-l-chapter-5 [https://perma.cc/Y3AR-GMVE] (addressing the code of admission for an 16 applicant who was admitted as a spouse of a refugee but has since become a “former spouse of the 17 principal at time of adjustment”). 18 In subsection (b)(3), the word “continues” draws a distinction that the individual with 19 asylum status, in contrast to the person admitted as a refugee, must continue to meet the definition 20 of a refugee12 at the time that legal permanent residence is sought. When a refugee spouse 21 satisfies an eligibility requirement by remaining married merely at the time of the derivative’s 22 admission, Defendants’ reading that the word “continues” should require spouses of principal 23 asylees to remain married not only through when they apply for LPR status, but also through 24 adjudication, imposes a significant, relative burden on asylee spouses. This added burden is 25 contrary to the stated purpose of the Refugee Act, which seeks to integrate and resettle refugees 26 and asylees by allowing for adjustment to legal permanent residence after one year of physical 27 1 presence in the U.S. following the grant of either type of humanitarian relief. See 8 U.S.C. 2 § 1159(a)(1), (b)(2). Furthermore, for families that consist of married parents and their children 3 who obtained asylum status, under Defendants’ reading, if the marriage ends following the 4 application for legal permanent residence, the derivative children would remain eligible for 5 permanent residence, but their derivative parent would lack the stability of that permanent status. 6 This further undercuts the stated purpose of the Act, which is to stabilize and support the 7 resettlement and integration of refugees and asylees. Although § 1159 establishes some 8 distinctions between the criteria for adjustment of status of asylees as compared to refugees, 9 construing those distinctions narrowly better serves the purposes of the Refugee Act. 10 b. Text and Structure of § 1159(b) 11 Defendants contend that the statute requires marriage through the time of adjudication of 12 the derivative spouse’s application for legal permanent residence. The statute frames this marriage 13 requirement as a condition for the Government to “adjust . . . the status of [an] alien granted 14 asylum.” 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b). Defendants read that language in isolation as indicating that the 15 asylee must continue to be a spouse of a refugee when the status adjustment is made.13 16 The relevant text of the statute does not end, however, with the specific phrase at issue. “It 17 is necessary and required that an interpretation of a phrase of uncertain reach is not confined to a 18 single sentence when the text of the whole statute gives instruction as to its meaning.” Maracich 19 v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 65 (2013). Here, context shows that Defendants’ reading is not the only 20 reasonable way to understand § 1159(b), and that Azarmanesh’s interpretation better comports 21 with the statute as a whole. 22 As the Western District of Wisconsin noted in Dorbor, the use of the present tense rather 23 than past tense for the word “applies” in subsection (b)(1) suggests that the inquiry occurs at the 24

25 13 That reading is consistent with a decision by the Fifth Circuit, which considered the issue only in passing in a case holding that a refugee whose asylum status had been terminated could still 26 adjust to LPR status, but characterized § 1159(b)(3) as a “continuing-status requirement” distinguishable from the requirement to have been granted asylum. Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603, 27 609 (5th Cir. 2014). Siwe does not include any analysis of § 1159(b)(3), and its reference to that 1 time an application is submitted. Dorbor, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 770 (citing Carr v. United States, 2 560 U.S. 438, 448 (2010), addressing the significance of verb tense in statutory interpretation). If, 3 as Defendants contend, everything following subsection (b)’s introduction of criteria to “adjust” 4 LPR status were evaluated at the time of adjustment, the requirement that an asylee “applies for 5 such adjustment”—rather than the past tense “applied for such adjustment,” or perhaps present 6 perfect “has applied”—would be incongruous. Taking Defendants’ construction to an extreme, 7 subsection (b)(1)’s use of present tense might suggest that an asylee whose application had 8 previously been pending must somehow apply again at the time of adjustment. Defendants do not 9 dispute that an applicant’s previous submission of an application is sufficient to adjust status. In 10 other words, the requirement that an applicant “applies for such adjustment” is evaluated at the 11 time of the application. Listing that condition first further suggests that the subsections following 12 it should also be evaluated when the applicant “applies for such adjustment,” except as otherwise 13 specified. 14 One condition specifies a different timeframe: subsection (b)(5), which requires that an 15 applicant “is admissible (except as otherwise provided under subsection (c)) as an immigrant 16 under this chapter at the time of examination for adjustment of such alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(5) 17 (emphasis added). The parties appear to agree that the “time of examination” is functionally 18 equivalent to the time of adjudication. See, e.g., ECF No. 35 at 26 (Defendants’ Motion, equating 19 this language with “the time of adjustment”).14 “Where Congress includes particular language in 20 one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed 21 that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Dean v. 22 United States, 556 U.S. 568, 573 (2009) (cleaned up). The time-of-examination specification for 23 subsection (b)(5) thus implies that other provisions that are silent as to timeframe, like subsection 24

25 14 In Soumah II, the Government belatedly raised an argument in its reply brief that the “examination for adjustment” is distinct from “adjustment.” 2025 WL 638472, at *5. The court 26 found that argument unpersuasive, even assuming for the sake of argument it had not been waived. Id.; see also Zalmai, 2025 WL 938619, *6 (holding that “‘examination for adjustment’ must mean 27 adjudication,” because a contrary reading would negate the inadmissibility inquiry in cases where 1 (b)(3), apply at some other time. See Dorbor, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 770. “[T]his language 2 demonstrates that Congress knew how to require that a criterion be satisfied at the time of 3 adjustment of status, and where such language was not included in § 1159(b)(3), Congress did not 4 intend to require that status as a spouse of a refugee or asylee must continue through the date of 5 adjustment of status.” Soumah II, 2025 WL 638472, at *5 (citing Soumah I, 738 F. Supp. 3d at 6 639). 7 Courts also generally presume that Congress did not intend for statutory language to be 8 superfluous. Tulelake Irrigation Dist. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 40 F.4th 930, 936 (9th Cir. 9 2022). If, as Defendants contend, the overarching framing of § 1159(b) as eligibility to “adjust . . . 10 status” implies evaluation at the time of adjudication, then subsection (b)(5)’s specification that at 11 applies at that time would be superfluous. That remains true regardless of subsection (b)(5)’s 12 reference to the exceptions in subsection (c), which Defendants suggest is the purpose of 13 subsection (b)(5)’s time-of-adjudication language. See ECF No. 38 at 6. If all criteria of 14 § 1159(b) applied at the time of adjudication, then there would be no need for subsection (b)(5)— 15 and only subsection (b)(5)—to specify that inadmissibility, and exceptions thereto under 16 subsection (c), are assessed at that time. 17 Relative policy considerations support that distinction, because “[t]he reasons why an 18 applicant would become inadmissible are far more grave than if an applicant gets divorced.” 19 Zalmai, 2025 WL 938619, at *6. Reasons for inadmissibility “include criminal conduct, terrorist 20 activities, and affliction with a communicable disease. 8 U.S.C. § 1182. Unlike an applicant’s 21 divorce, these are issues that raise serious concerns about the applicant’s suitability for LPR status 22 regardless of when they occur.” Dorbor, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 770. In contrast to the inadmissibly 23 criteria at issue for subsection (b)(5), “none of [the other subsections] carry any potential national 24 security or public safety implications.” Soumah II, 2025 WL 638472, at *5. 25 Defendants argue that Congress might have had reasons to include that language in 26 subsection (b)(5) even if other subsections also applied at the time of adjudication. They assert 27 that admissibility would not have been evaluated previously because it is not a requirement for 1 admissibility (unlike marriage) is not a continuing requirement, such that an applicant who was 2 inadmissible at the time of an application may still be granted adjustment of status if a waiver of 3 inadmissibility is granted while the application is pending, ECF No. 38 at 6. 4 With respect to the former argument, that admissibility is not evaluated in granting asylum, 5 Defendants cite a decision by Judge Chen that does not, on review, support their position. Judge 6 Chen determined that the Government’s previous grant of asylum despite knowledge of the 7 applicant’s involvement in a particular group did not collaterally estop the Government from 8 denying adjustment of status based on terrorist activities, because the question of whether that 9 group was a terrorist organization was not “actually litigated” in the context of the asylum 10 application. See generally Janjua v. Neufeld, No. 15-cv-05475-EMC, 2017 WL 2876116 (N.D. 11 Cal. July 6, 2017), aff’d, 933 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2019). But in doing so, Judge Chen held that 12 issue of admissibility was “necessarily decided” in the asylum context (even though it did not 13 meet the separate test for collateral estoppel of having been “actually litigated”) because “both 14 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (the statute governing petitions for asylum) and 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (the statute 15 governing petitions for permanent resident status), look to 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (the statute governing 16 inadmissible aliens) to determine whether an alien is eligible for relief.” Id. at *2 (quoting 17 Amrollah v. Napolitano, 710 F.3d 568, 571 (5th Cir. 2013)); see id. at *9. At least some 18 admissibility criteria are evaluated in the context of an asylum application. See 8 U.S.C. 19 § 1158(b)(2). Even if that were not so, the Government does not explain why any lack of previous 20 consideration of admissibility criteria would guide whether they should be assessed at the time of 21 an application for adjustment or at the time of its adjudication—or more specifically, why that 22 would warrant a special note that admissibility should be assessed at the time of actual adjustment, 23 if that were redundant to the timing of all of the other criteria for adjustment identified in 24 § 1159(b). 25 Defendants’ other argument with respect to subsection (b)(5)—that the timing identified 26 therein is intended to account for waivers granted while an application is pending and to 27 distinguish it from “continuing” requirements under the other subsections—conflicts with 1 adjudication, and specifically with their current policy of assessing subsection (b)(2)’s one-year 2 presence requirement only at the time of adjudication. 3 The Dorbor decision found further support for a time-of-application reading of subsection 4 (b)(3) in subsection (b)(2), which that court understood as requiring an applicant to have been 5 present in the United States for at least one year at the time of an application. 379 F. Supp. 3d at 6 769–70 (reaching that conclusion based in part on the uncertainty of how long an application will 7 take to resolve). Azarmanesh raises a similar argument here, asserting that subsection (b)(2) 8 reflects a waiting period before an application can be submitted. ECF No. 37 at 8. Defendants 9 note that USCIS understands and applies subsection (b)(2) as requiring at least one year’s presence 10 only at the time of adjudication. ECF No. 35 at 25–26; USCIS Policy Manual, vol. 7, pt. M, ch. 2, 11 § A. As noted above in the context of ambiguity, however, USCIS’s policy manual acknowledges 12 that USCIS’s past practice and interpretation of that provision have differed. USCIS Policy 13 Manual, vol. 7, pt. M, ch. 2, § A n.2. It is not obvious that subsection (b)(2) provides any clearer 14 indication of a time-of-application or time-of-adjudication approach than subsection (b)(3), and 15 this Court does not follow Dorbor in finding that subsection inherently indicative of such a 16 framework. But neither does it support Defendants’ position that these provisions must be 17 evaluated at the time of adjudication. 18 As discussed above, Congress’s choice to specify an evaluation “at the time of 19 examination” only for subsection (b)(5) lends credence to Azarmanesh’s interpretation that 20 subsection (b)(3) does not apply at that time. And the first item in the adjustment eligibility 21 criteria, that an applicant “applies for such adjustment,” indicates that at least some of the criteria 22 apply at the time of application rather than adjudication. The statutory text is ambiguous, but on 23 balance, tends to support the conclusion that a derivative spouse need only be married to the 24 principal asylee at the time of submitting an application for adjustment. 25 c. Circuit Decisions Support the Time-of-Application Approach 26 Circuit court decisions addressing other immigration provisions pertaining to marriage 27 reinforce the conclusion that § 1159(b)(3) should not be construed restrictively. In Choin v. 1 visas” for fiancé(e)s of U.S. citizens. The relevant statute provided:

2 The Attorney General may not adjust ... the status of a [K visaholder] except to that of an alien lawfully admitted to the United States on a 3 conditional basis under section 1186a of this title as a result of the marriage of the nonimmigrant . . . to the citizen who filed the [K visa 4 petition]. 5 Id. at 1119 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1255(d)) (alterations in original). The court held that the statute 6 was ambiguous as to whether an applicant who had married but later divorced her U.S. citizen 7 husband could still adjust status. Relying on other provisions of law that allowed a divorced 8 spouse to remain in the country so long as the marriage was entered in good faith, even if the 9 marriage did not meet the default durational requirement, the court held as a textual matter that an 10 adjustment could still be considered a “result of the marriage” even if the marriage had ended 11 before the adjustment was adjudicated. Id. at 1120–21 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B)). Choin 12 also concluded that excluding all divorced spouses who arrived on K visas from adjustment, even 13 if a marriage was entered in good faith, would not serve the stated purpose of the statute, which 14 was to combat fraud. Id. at 1120. 15 Here, although the text of provision in dispute differs, the purpose of the Refugee Act is to 16 extend rather than restrict immigration benefits, suggesting that it should be read at least as 17 broadly as the marriage provision at issue in Choin. There, the Ninth Circuit rejected the 18 Government’s position that “an immigrant here on a K visa must stay married until the 19 government gets around to adjudicating her application for adjustment of status,” and declined 20 “impose [that] durational requirement . . . based only on the ambiguous language in the statute.” 21 Id. at 1121. The court noted its previous decision in Freeman v. Gonzalez. See id. In Freeman, 22 the Ninth Circuit held under a different statute that “an alien’s status as a qualified spouse should 23 not turn on whether DHS happens to reach a pending application before the citizen spouse 24 happens to die,” suggesting through a citation and parenthetical quotation that such an outcome 25 would be “‘an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended.’” Freeman, 444 26 F.3d 1031, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998)). Like 27 Choin, the Freeman case dealt with a different statute and different textual analysis, but its 1 adjudicating an application applies equally here. 2 In Carpio v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2010), another appellate decision on which 3 Dorbor relied, the Tenth Circuit considered a statute providing “K-2” visas to minor children of 4 the fiancé(e)s of U.S. citizens. Because the “statute . . . focuse[d] the inquiry on the age of the 5 minor child when his parent is engaged and when he or she ‘seeks to enter the United States’ on a 6 K–1 visa,” the court held that the minor child’s age should be considered at the time of an 7 application, not the time of adjudication. Id. at 1099. That language differs from § 1159(b)(3), 8 but the court also held that allowing the Government to effectively deny any minor’s application 9 by holding it until the minor aged out of eligibility would be fundamentally unfair. Id. at 1102. 10 Again, that principle weighs against construing § 1159(b)(3) such that the Government’s delay in 11 adjudicating Azarmanesh’s application for adjustment of status should have resulted in its denial, 12 when there is no dispute that Azarmanesh would have been entitled to adjustment had the 13 Government considered his application more quickly. 14 This is not to say that immigration statutes have never or should never be interpreted as 15 adopting a time-of-adjudication test. The Court is aware of at least one decision from the Ninth 16 Circuit so holding. In Mendez-Garcia v. Lynch, a case cited by Defendants, the Ninth Circuit 17 considered a test for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1)(B) that looked to 18 whether removal would result in hardship to the petitioner’s “child” who is a citizen or LPR, and 19 held that the child must be under the age of twenty-one at the time the petition is decided. 840 20 F.3d 655, 663 (9th Cir. 2016). To reach that conclusion, however, the Ninth Circuit deferred to an 21 interpretation of the statute by the Board of Immigration Appeals under the Chevron doctrine, 22 which is no longer good law. Id. The Court therefore finds Mendez-Garcia to be of limited 23 persuasive value in evaluating a different statute in the post-Chevron era. See also Soumah II, 24 2025 WL 638472, at *7 (holding that a time-of-adjudication approach to § 1229(b)(1)(B) “flows 25 from the specific language of the relevant statutory provision, which states that a petitioner must 26 show that the ‘removal’ would result in such hardship”). 27 Instead, this Court agrees with the consensus of other district courts that have addressed 1 Carpio apply in this case as well,” when “[t]he government hasn’t identified any legitimate 2 government interest that is served by construing § 1159(b)(3) to render an application invalid 3 simply because the applicant’s marital status changes after filing.” Dorbor, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 4 771; see also Soumah II, 2025 WL 638472, at *8 (noting “the absurd result that eligible applicants 5 receive disparate results based on the timing of when USCIS chooses to adjudicate their 6 applications,” and that “USCIS’s interpretation disincentivizes prompt adjudications and penalizes 7 applicants for delays entirely within the Government’s control”); Soumah I, 738 F. Supp. 3d at 8 639–41; Zalmai, 2025 WL 938619, at *8 (“If the only reason Ms. Zalmai’s application was denied 9 was because USCIS did not adjudicate her application soon enough, that is an arbitrary and 10 capricious result.”). 11 These concerns are exacerbated when Defendants have failed to identify any statute, 12 regulation, instruction, or other guidance requiring an applicant for adjustment of status to notify 13 USCIS if the applicant’s marital status changes while the application remains pending. After the 14 Court requested a supplemental brief on that issue, Defendants took the position that the oath 15 required for the Form I-485 application to adjust status—indicating that the applicant has provided 16 true and correct information—implicitly includes “the obligation to update USCIS of any 17 changes.” ECF No. 42 at 3. But that oath is required only at the time of the application, and says 18 nothing about proactively updating USCIS if the applicant gets divorced. See ECF No. 42-2 at 49. 19 Certifying that the applicant provided true information and “ha[s] not withheld information” when 20 an application is submitted is a far cry from committing to provide updated information 21 proactively in the future, much less the specific information at issue here. 22 Defendants suggest that interpreting § 1159(b)’s other requirements as applying only at the 23 time of an application would lead to absurd results, like requiring adjustment to LPR status for 24 applicants who had resettled in a foreign country after filing their applications. As the Soumah 25 court noted, “the Government . . . can avoid any adverse impacts by adjudicating applications in a 26 timely manner,” and the Government has also taken the position that “it maintains discretion over 27 whether to actually grant adjustment of status to an eligible applicant” such that it could avoid 1 event, such concerns are only an issue if the other requirements are also assessed only at the time 2 of application, an issue this Court need not resolve in the present case. There is certainly a textual 3 argument for consistency among those requirements, but when subsection (b)(1)’s requirement 4 that an application “applies for such adjustment” plainly looks to the time of application, the 5 options are either that all such requirements apply at that time (except subsection (b)(5), which 6 explicitly sets a different time), or that some apply at one time and others apply at others. Neither 7 supports Defendants’ position. 8 d. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1) Does Not Favor a Different Result 9 Defendants briefly invoke a regulation requiring generally that an “applicant or petitioner 10 must establish that he or she is eligible for the requested benefit at the time of filing the benefit 11 request and must continue to be eligible through adjudication.” 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1); see ECF 12 No. 35 at 24. That regulation does not appear to mean anything more than that applicants must 13 meet any eligibility requirements that apply at the time of submission when they apply, and must 14 continue to meet any eligibility requirements that apply at the time of adjudication when their 15 applications are decided. See Zalmai, 2025 WL 938619, at *9; Soumah I, 738 F. Supp. 3d at 642. 16 If the regulation required all conditions to be met at both submission and adjudication, that 17 would contradict statutory provisions conditioning certain criteria to a specific time. E.g., 18 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(3) (requiring an applicant for adjustment to be admissible “at the time of 19 examination”). It would also contradict USCIS’s practice of interpreting § 1159(b)(2) as requiring 20 one year of presence in the United States only at the time of adjudication, not at the time of 21 admission, see ECF No. 35 at 25–26, and binding circuit precedent interpreting other requirements 22 to apply either at the time of application or at the time of adjudication. E.g., Choin, 537 F.3d 23 1116. As other courts have noted, “a ‘valid statute always prevails over a conflicting regulation,’” 24 such that 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1) cannot alter the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(2). Soumah II, 25 2025 WL 638472, at *8 (quoting Texas v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 726 F.3d 180, 195 (D.C. Cir. 26 2013)); Zalmai, 2025 WL 938619, at *9. 27 This regulation does not alter the Court’s conclusion that the statute required continued 1 the later date that USCIS adjudicated it. 2 V. CONCLUSION 3 For the reasons discussed above, Azarmanesh’s first application for adjustment to LPR 4 status was lawfully granted, because Azarmanesh was married to a refugee (specifically, an 5 asylee) at the time he submitted that application, and he was not required to remain married when 6 USCIS later adjudicated it. Azarmanesh was therefore eligible for naturalization when he applied 7 for citizenship in 2021 and when Defendants wrongfully denied that application in 2022. 8 Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, and Azarmanesh’s Motion 9 for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 10 Azarmanesh seeks, among other relief, “a hearing de novo on [his] naturalization 11 application,” approval of that application, and administration of the oath of naturalization. FAC at 12 10 (Prayer for Relief). Defendants agree with Azarmanesh that the material facts are not in 13 dispute and assert that no evidentiary hearing is needed. ECF No. 35 at 10 n.4. It follows that 14 Defendants concede Azarmanesh’s eligibility for citizenship but for the disputed issue of law 15 regarding his original LPR status, as addressed in the parties’ briefs. Defendants have not 16 disputed that a court order approving a naturalization application and directing the administration 17 of the oath of naturalization to an applicant are remedies available pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). 18 Reviewing Azarmanesh’s naturalization application de novo pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), the 19 Court finds and concludes that Azarmanesh is eligible for naturalization, and GRANTS the 20 application. See Soumah II, 2025 WL 638472, at *9 (granting a naturalization application “where 21 the only basis for denying Soumah’s application for naturalization was the determination that he 22 had not met [the lawfully granted LPR status] requirement, the parties have stipulated that Soumah 23 met all other enumerated requirements for naturalization, and the parties waived a hearing on 24 Soumah’s naturalization application”). 25 Defendants are ORDERED to naturalize Azarmanesh no later than May 15, 2025. If 26 Defendants are unable to satisfy this deadline, the parties may request assistance from the Court 27 pursuant to the authorities granted in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421 and 1448(c). 1 The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Azarmanesh and close the case. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 Dated: March 31, 2025 4 5 Ys, | dari — ‘A J. CISNEROS 6 ited States Magistrate Judge 7 8 9 10 11 a 12

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