1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 11 JAKOB P., ) Case No. 5:24-cv-00240-SP ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) 13 v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ) ORDER 14 LELAND DUDEK, Acting ) Commissioner of Social Security ) 15 Administration, ) ) 16 Defendant. ) ) 17 )

18 19 I. 20 INTRODUCTION 21 On February 1, 2024, plaintiff Jakob P. filed a complaint against defendant, the 22 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”), seeking a review 23 of a denial of supplemental security income (“SSI”). The parties have fully briefed the 24 issues in dispute, and the court deems the matter suitable for adjudication without oral 25 argument. 26 Plaintiff presents four disputed issues for decision: (1) whether the Administrative 27 Law Judge (“ALJ”) properly considered the medical evidence and opinions; (2) whether 28 the ALJ properly considered plaintiff’s subjective testimony; (3) whether the ALJ 1 properly considered lay evidence; and (4) whether the ALJ erred at step five.1 Plaintiff’s 2 Brief in Support of Complaint (“P. Mem.”) at 3-23; see Defendant’s Brief (“D. Mem.”) at 3 3-12. 4 Having carefully studied the parties’ memoranda, the Administrative Record 5 (“AR”), and the decision of the ALJ, the court concludes that, as detailed herein, the ALJ 6 properly considered the medical evidence, plaintiff’s subjective testimony, and the lay 7 evidence, and the ALJ’s step five analysis was supported by substantial evidence. 8 Consequently, the court affirms the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits. 9 II. 10 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 11 Plaintiff was 18 years old on his alleged September 21, 2020 onset date. AR at 54. 12 Plaintiff is a high school graduate and has no past relevant work. AR at 49, 60, 330. 13 On September 21, 2020, plaintiff filed an application for SSI due to autism. AR at 14 55. The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after which plaintiff 15 filed a request for a hearing. AR at 88-92, 97-101, 122-24. 16 On December 16, 2022, plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified at 17 a hearing before the ALJ. AR at 33-53. The ALJ also heard testimony from Sonia 18 Peterson, a vocational expert. AR at 49-52. On December 30, 2022, the ALJ denied 19 plaintiff’s claim for benefits. AR at 17-27. 20 Applying the well-known five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found, 21 at step one, that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 22 21, 2020, the application date. AR at 19. 23 At step two, the ALJ found plaintiff suffered from the following severe 24 impairments: autism spectrum disorder; major depressive disorder; and social anxiety 25 disorder. Id. 26 27

1 Although plaintiff only enumerates two issues in dispute, he raises three 28 separate issues under his second issue. See P. Mem. at 13-23. 1 At step three, the ALJ found plaintiff’s impairments, whether individually or in 2 combination, did not meet or medically equal one of the impairments set forth in 20 3 C.F.R. part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR at 20. 4 The ALJ then assessed plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), and 5 determined plaintiff had the RFC to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, 6 but was limited to: understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions; 7 occasional contact with the public, coworkers, and supervisors; and occasional changes in 8 a routine work setting. AR at 22. 9 The ALJ found, at step four, that plaintiff had no past relevant work. AR at 26. 10 At step five, the ALJ found there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in 11 the national economy that plaintiff could perform, including laundry worker II, hospital 12 cleaner, and industrial sweeper. AR at 26-27. Consequently, the ALJ concluded that 13 plaintiff did not suffer from a disability as defined by the Social Security Act. AR at 27. 14 Plaintiff filed a timely request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which the Appeals 15 Council denied. AR at 1-3. The ALJ’s decision stands as the final decision of the 16 Commissioner. 17 III. 18 STANDARD OF REVIEW 19 This court is empowered to review decisions by the Commissioner to deny 20 benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The findings and decision of the Social Security 21 Administration (“SSA”) must be upheld if they are free of legal error and supported by 22 substantial evidence. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001) (as 23 amended). But if the court determines the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are 24 not supported by substantial evidence in the record, the court may reject the findings and 25 set aside the decision to deny benefits. Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th 26 Cir. 2001); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001). 27 “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” 28 Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035. Substantial evidence is such “relevant evidence which a 1 reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 2 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998); Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459. To determine whether 3 substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding, the reviewing court must review the 4 administrative record as a whole, “weighing both the evidence that supports and the 5 evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion.” Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459. The ALJ’s 6 decision “‘cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting 7 evidence.’” Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035 (quoting Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1243 8 (9th Cir. 1998)). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the 9 ALJ’s decision, the reviewing court “‘may not substitute its judgment for that of the 10 ALJ.’” Id. (quoting Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992)). 11 IV. 12 DISCUSSION 13 A. The ALJ Properly Considered the Medical Evidence 14 Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial 15 evidence because the ALJ failed to properly consider the medical evidence and 16 incorporate the medical opinions. P. Mem. at 3-13. Specifically, plaintiff contends the 17 ALJ failed to translate and incorporate the consultative examiner’s and state agency 18 physician’s opined moderate limitations, and also failed to consider a psychological 19 assessment. 20 Residual functional capacity is what one can “still do despite [his or her] 21 limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). The ALJ reaches an RFC determination by 22 reviewing and considering all of the relevant evidence, including non-severe 23 impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1)-(2); see Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p, 24 1996 WL 374184, at *2 (“In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must consider limitations 25 and restrictions imposed by all of an individual’s impairments, even those that are not 26 ‘severe.’”). 27 Among the evidence an ALJ relies on in an RFC assessment are medical evidence 28 and opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3). An ALJ considers the persuasiveness of the 1 medical opinions and findings based on five factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; 2 (3) relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors that tend to 3 support or contradict the medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)-(c); see Woods v. 4 Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2022). The most important of these factors are 5 supportability and consistency. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). The ALJ “must ‘articulate . 6 . . how persuasive’ [he or she] finds ‘all of the medical opinions’ from each doctor or 7 other source . . . and ‘explain how [he or she] considered the supportability and 8 consistency factors’ in reaching these findings.” Woods, 32 F.4th at 792 (quoting 20 9 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2)). The ALJ may, but is not required to, explain how she or he 10 considered the other three factors. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). But when two or more 11 medical opinions “about the same issue are both equally well-supported . . . and 12 consistent with the record . . . but are not exactly the same,” the ALJ is then required to 13 explain how “the other most persuasive factors in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5)” were 14 considered. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(3). 15 1. The Medical Opinions 16 a. Dr. Clifford Taylor 17 Dr. Clifford Taylor, a consultative psychologist, examined plaintiff on January 27, 18 2021. AR at 329-35. Dr. Taylor observed, among other things, that plaintiff: was very 19 anxious; had fair rapport; demonstrated deficits in language; had linear, logical, and 20 organized thought process; could repeat seven digits forwards, three digits backward, and 21 five digits sequenced in order; could add and subtract money; and had fair insight and 22 judgment. See AR at 331-32. Plaintiff scored primarily average on the Wechsler Adult 23 Intelligence Scale and Memory Scale. AR at 332-33. Taylor diagnosed plaintiff with 24 autism spectrum disorder with accompanying language disorder and without 25 accompanying intellectual disability. AR at 333. Based on the examination, plaintiff’s 26 reported history, and tests, Dr. Taylor opined plaintiff: could perform simple and 27 repetitive work and maintain regular work attendance; was mildly impaired in his ability 28 to perform detailed and complex work tasks; and moderately impaired in his ability to 1 perform work activities on a consistent basis, perform work activities without special or 2 additional supervision, complete a normal workday or workweek without interruptions 3 from a psychiatric condition, accept instructions from supervisors and authority figures, 4 interact with coworkers and the public, and deal with the usual stresses in competitive 5 work settings. AR at 334. 6 b. State Agency Physicians 7 Two state agency physicians, Dr. Brady Dalton and Dr. R. Paxton, reviewed 8 plaintiff’s medical records and issued administrative medical findings. AR at 59-65, 76- 9 84. Dr. Dalton and Dr. Paxton both determined plaintiff had mild and moderate 10 limitations in the Paragraph B criteria. AR at 60, 78. The state agency physicians, 11 opined plaintiff was not significantly limited in his ability to carry out short and simple 12 instructions, accept instructions and respond appropriate to criticism from supervisors, 13 and maintain socially appropriate behavior; and was moderately limited in his ability to, 14 among other things carry out detailed instructions, maintain attention and concentration 15 for extended periods, perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, 16 sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision, work in coordination with or in 17 proximity to others, complete a normal workday/week, and respond appropriately to 18 changes. See AR at 62-65, 81-83. The state agency physicians opined plaintiff could: 19 carry out simple and detailed instructions; follow simple work-like procedures; make 20 simple work-related decisions; sustain attention throughout extended periods of time (up 21 to two hours at a time); perform at a consistent pace particularly if he is engaged in a 22 simple, repetitive task; maintain a regular schedule; maintain appropriate behavior in a 23 context of limited peer and public interaction; and accept simple instructions and respond 24 appropriately to feedback from supervisors. AR at 63-64, 82-83. The state agency 25 physicians further found plaintiff would work best in environments with predictable work 26 tasks and with minimal social contacts with others that do not require a great deal of 27 decision making or goal setting. AR at 65, 84. 28 1 2. Other Medical Evidence 2 On March 13, 2020, Dr. Sara deLeon, a psychologist, evaluated plaintiff to 3 determine his eligibility for services from the Inland Counties Regional Center, Inc.2 See 4 AR at 314. Dr. deLeon spoke to plaintiff and his grandmother, and performed cognitive, 5 social/emotional, and adaptive behavior tests. See AR at 312-18. Plaintiff scored in the 6 average to above average range for cognitive functioning. See AR at 315-16. Plaintiff’s 7 social/emotional functioning scores, which reflected some deficits in communication 8 skills and with reciprocal social interaction, fell in the mild to moderate symptoms for 9 autism range and classified him as in the autism spectrum. See AR at 316-17. The scores 10 from the adaptive functioning tests, which was based on information provided by plaintiff 11 and his grandmother, fell in the low range. See AR at 315-16, 318. Among the 12 information plaintiff and his grandmother provided was that plaintiff: could follow 13 directions with reminders but had difficulty following “if-then” instructions; was adept at 14 using electronic devices; could complete chores with a visual schedule; does not travel to 15 destinations independently; had fewer peer relationships than would be accepted for his 16 age and developmental level; struggled to respond appropriately to verbal and nonverbal 17 cues in groups; and had difficulty coping with reasonable changes in routine. AR at 318. 18 Based on the evaluation, Dr. deLeon opined plaintiff met the DMV-V criteria for a 19 diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder but not for intellectual disability, and was eligible 20 for services. See AR at 312. In addition to services, Dr. deLeon recommended plaintiff 21 explore vocational and independent living services and supports with consideration to her 22 report. See AR at 313. 23 // 24 25 2 Plaintiff does not argue that Dr. deLeon’s assessment constitutes a medical 26 opinion for which the ALJ must perform a persuasiveness evaluation. The Ninth Circuit 27 has held that claimants, when represented, “must raise all issues and evidence at their administrative hearings in order to preserve them on appeal.” Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 28 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) (as amended). As such, plaintiff has waived this argument. 1 3. The ALJ Findings 2 In reaching her RFC determination, the ALJ considered the medical evidence and 3 found Dr. Taylor’s opinion and the state agency physicians’ prior administrative findings 4 highly persuasive. AR at 25. 5 Plaintiff argues that despite finding Dr. Taylor’s opinion and the state agency 6 physicians’ prior administrative findings highly persuasive, the ALJ failed to adequately 7 incorporate all of their opined moderate limitations, including moderate limitations in his 8 ability to perform work activity on a consistent basis and within a schedule, perform 9 work activity without additional supervision, complete a normal workday and/or 10 workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, deal with the 11 usual stresses of competitive employment, maintain regular attendance, be punctual, be 12 aware of hazards, travel to unfamiliar places, use public transportation, set goals, and 13 make plans independent of others. P. Mem. at 9-11. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, 14 however, the ALJ’s RFC determination adequately incorporates the opined moderate 15 limitations. 16 It is an ALJ’s responsibility to translate medical opinions into concrete, functional 17 limitations. See Rounds v. Comm’r, 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he ALJ is 18 responsible for translating and incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC.”); 19 Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ translated 20 claimant’s condition into concrete restrictions). The translation of the limitations must be 21 consistent or supported by the evidence in the record. Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 22 1174 (“[A]n ALJ’s assessment of a claimant adequately captures restrictions related to 23 concentration, persistence, or pace where the assessment is consistent with restrictions 24 identified in the medical testimony.”). An ALJ errs when he fails to include all credible 25 limitations in an RFC assessment. See Bagby v. Comm’r, 606 F. App’x 888, 890 (9th 26 Cir. 2015). 27 As an initial matter, the SSA defines a “moderate” limitation to mean “[t]here is 28 more than a slight limitation in this area, but the individual can still function 1 satisfactorily.” Fergerson v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 5054690, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2 2017) (quoting Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, Social Security 3 Administration, Form HA-1152-UC, Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work- 4 Related Activities (Mental)). Dr. Taylor did not quantify any of his moderate limitations, 5 but because he is an SSA consultative examiner, presumably his use of “moderate” was 6 consistent with the SSA definition. See, e.g., see Alicia M. v. O’Malley, 2024 WL 7 3304519, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2024) (consultative examiner, who did not provide 8 another definition of “moderate,” presumably used the term consistent with the SSA’s 9 definition); Rose M. E. v. Saul, 2021 WL 1612091, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2021) 10 (same). Consequently, the ALJ could have reasonably understood Dr. Taylor’s opined 11 moderate limitations to mean that plaintiff could still function satisfactorily in those 12 areas.3 13 Like Dr. Taylor, the state agency physicians, whose findings the ALJ also found 14 highly persuasive, opined similar moderate limitations. The state agency physicians 15 further explained that despite these moderate limitations, plaintiff had sufficient ability 16 to, among other things: carry out simple and detailed instructions; sustain attention up to 17 two hours at a time; perform at a consistent pace, particularly if engaged in a simple, 18 repetitive task; and maintain a regular work schedule. See AR at 63-64, 82-83. The state 19 agency physicians additionally opined that given plaintiff’s moderate limitations, plaintiff 20 would “work best in environments with predictable work tasks and with minimal social 21 contacts with others that do not require a great deal of decision making or goal setting.” 22 AR at 65, 84. 23 The ALJ assessed plaintiff’s RFC consistent with the opined limitations, finding 24 plaintiff could: understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions; have occasional 25 contact with the public, coworkers, and supervisors; and deal with occasional changes in 26

27 3 Plaintiff also contends Dr. Taylor’s summary of plaintiff’s activities of daily living was inaccurate, but does not identify what was misstated or mischaracterized. P. 28 Mem. at 8. 1 a routine work setting. AR at 22. The ALJ’s RFC determination therefore adequately 2 captured all of the opined moderate limitations and was supported by substantial 3 evidence. See Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1174 (ALJ properly relied on state agency 4 physicians’ translations of mental limitations into concrete restrictions); see, e.g., French 5 v. Saul, 2020 WL 5249626, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2020) (the ALJ’s translation of 6 moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace into simple, routine work 7 was supported by substantial evidence as he relied on doctors’ opinions to reach that 8 conclusion); Jacque M. v. Saul, 2019 WL 6893965, at * (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2019) (RFC 9 determination consistent with consultative physician’s opinion that the plaintiff was 10 capable of completing a normal workday/workweek if limited to simple tasks); Needham 11 v. Berryhill, 2019 WL 5626641, at * 11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2019) (ALJ permissibly 12 relied on state agency physicians’ translation of moderate limitations in social 13 functioning, attendance, and ability to do work without special supervision to a restriction 14 to simple work). 15 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to consider other medical evidence, namely 16 Dr. deLeon’s statement that he “has difficulty coping with reasonable changes in 17 routine.” P. Mem. at 6; see AR at 318. Plaintiff asserts the ALJ’s limitation to 18 occasional changes in a routine work setting does not adequately incorporate Dr. 19 deLeon’s statement. P. Mem. at 6. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the ALJ engaged in 20 a lengthy discussion about Dr. deLeon’s assessment. See AR at 23. Notwithstanding the 21 fact that it is unclear whether Dr. deLeon’s statement was an assessment about plaintiff’s 22 capabilities or simply relaying what plaintiff and his grandmother told her, the ALJ 23 clearly considered plaintiff’s difficulties with changes in routine and incorporated it in the 24 RFC. Plaintiff’s argument that a limitation to occasional changes in a routine work 25 setting does not adequately encompass “difficulty coping with reasonable changes in 26 routine” is wholly unsupported. Indeed, plaintiff’s argument rests solely on his own 27 belief that he is incapable of handling occasional changes. 28 1 Accordingly, the ALJ properly considered all of the medical opinions and 2 evidence, and her RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence. 3 B. The ALJ Properly Considered Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom Testimony 4 Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to properly consider his subjective statements. P. 5 Mem. at 13-18. Specifically, plaintiff asserts the ALJ failed to consider all of his 6 statements in the record and then cited only the lack of supporting objective evidence as a 7 basis for discounting his testimony, which by itself was insufficient. See id. 8 The court looks to SSR 16-3p for guidance on evaluating plaintiff’s alleged 9 symptoms. In adopting SSR 16-3p, the Social Security Administration sought to “clarify 10 that subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual’s character.” 11 SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *2 (Oct. 25, 2017). 12 [SSR 16-3p] makes clear what our precedent already required: that 13 assessments of an individual’s testimony by an ALJ are designed to evaluate 14 the intensity and persistence of symptoms after the ALJ finds that the 15 individual has a medically determinable impairment(s) that could reasonably 16 be expected to produce those symptoms, and not to delve into wide-ranging 17 scrutiny of the claimant’s character and apparent truthfulness. 18 Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 n.5 (9th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). 19 To evaluate a claimant’s symptom testimony, the ALJ engages in a two-step 20 analysis. Christine G. v. Saul, 402 F. Supp. 3d 913, 921 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Trevizo, 21 871 F.3d at 678). First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant produced objective 22 medical evidence of an underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to 23 produce the symptoms alleged. Id. Second, if plaintiff satisfies the first step, and there is 24 no evidence of malingering, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity and persistence of the 25 claimant’s symptoms and determine the extent to which they limit his ability to perform 26 work-related activities. Id. 27 In assessing intensity and persistence, the ALJ may consider: the claimant’s daily 28 activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the symptoms; precipitating 1 and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication 2 taken to alleviate the symptoms; other treatment received; other measures used to relieve 3 the symptoms; and other factors concerning the claimant’s functional limitations and 4 restrictions due to the symptoms. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.929); SSR 16-3p at *7-*8; 5 Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996). To reject the claimant’s subjective 6 symptom statements at step two, the ALJ must provide “specific, clear, and convincing” 7 reasons, supported by substantial evidence in the record, for doing so. Burrell v. Colvin, 8 775 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2014); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281, 1283-84. 9 At the first step, the ALJ here found plaintiff’s medically determinable 10 impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms. AR at 24. At 11 the second step, because the ALJ did not find any evidence of malingering, the ALJ was 12 required to provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting plaintiff’s testimony. 13 The ALJ discounted plaintiff’s testimony because his statements were not entirely 14 consistent with the medical and non-medical evidence, specifically: (1) his statements 15 were not entirely consistent with his high level of intellectual ability; (2) medication 16 helped manage his anxiety; and (3) his alleged limitations were inconsistent with his 17 activities of daily living. See AR at 24-25; see also Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 18 856-57 (9th Cir. 2001) (lack of objective [findings] supporting symptoms is one factor in 19 evaluating testimony). 20 In an October 27, 2020 Function Report, plaintiff wrote his daily activities include: 21 doing household chores; talking to and playing games with friends; helping his sister with 22 schoolwork; and preparing meals and learning to cook. See AR at 243-47. Plaintiff 23 reported he was able to handle money and follow written and spoken directions. See AR 24 at 246, 248. 25 At the December 16, 2022 hearing, plaintiff testified that he did not think he could 26 perform full time work because he had difficulty understanding directions and suffered 27 from anxiety. AR at 40. Plaintiff testified that his anxiety manifested when his routine 28 changed because he was scared of what was going to happen, but it was “pretty 1 sporadic.” See AR at 40-41. Plaintiff specifically identified certain circumstances that 2 caused him anxiety, including when he is told he has to suddenly go somewhere, waiting 3 too long, interacting with strangers, or when items in the house are rearranged. See AR at 4 41, 44, 48-49. Plaintiff was scared of driving and living alone. See AR at 43-44, 47. 5 Plaintiff testified he goes places with his friends, could go to the store and purchase items 6 if he knows where everything is, has both school and online friends, and typically hung 7 out with friends in person or online. See AR at 44-47. Plaintiff had a coach who was 8 working with him to develop skills such as shopping, budgeting, and setting up 9 appointments. See AR at 43, 47. 10 As an initial matter, plaintiff argues the ALJ erred because she failed to consider 11 all of the subjective evidence. P. Mem. at 14. In the decision, the ALJ discussed 12 plaintiff’s hearing testimony and his statements to Dr. deLeon and Dr. Taylor, but not his 13 Function Report. See AR at 23-25. An ALJ is required to consider all relevant evidence 14 but is not required to discuss every piece of evidence in the record. See Kilpatrick v. 15 Kijakazi, 35 F.4th 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2022); Howard v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 16 (9th Cir. 2003). To the extent the ALJ was required to discuss the Function Report, any 17 failure to do so was harmless error since plaintiff’s statements in the Function Report are 18 similar to his hearing testimony and statements to the psychologists and arguably show a 19 greater level of functionality. Compare AR at 40-47 and 243-50. 20 Plaintiff also argues the ALJ’s sole reason for discounting his testimony was the 21 lack of supporting objective evidence.4 P. Mem. at 16. Plaintiff does not address or even 22 acknowledge the ALJ’s two other reasons for discounting his subjective symptoms, 23 which are which clearly provided in the ALJ’s decision. 24 The ALJ’s first reason for discounting plaintiff’s testimony is that it was 25 inconsistent with plaintiff’s intellectual ability. AR at 23, 25. Plaintiff’s cognitive 26 functioning test results ranged from low average to high average. See AR at 23, 25, 315- 27

4 Plaintiff writes that this was the ALJ’s “remaining reason,” but he did not 28 discuss any of the other reasons the ALJ cited. See P. Mem. at 16. 1 16, 332-33. Although plaintiff required some special education resources in high school, 2 there was no evidence of an intellectual disorder. See AR at 312, 330, 333. Plaintiff was 3 also enrolled in an online course so that he could learn a new skill set. See AR at 424. 4 The ALJ therefore properly noted that the plaintiff’s statements regarding understanding 5 were inconsistent with his intellectual ability. 6 Second, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s medication managed his anxiety to the 7 extent he could function at an independent level. See AR at 23, 25; see also Warre v. 8 Comm’r, 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Impairments that can be controlled 9 effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining SSI 10 benefits.”). The ALJ noted that plaintiff’s treatment notes indicated that after he began 11 taking medication, he reported feeling better and the medication was managing his 12 symptoms. See AR at 387-91. While on medication, plaintiff also presented with normal 13 mental status examination findings. See AR at 389, 391. Thus, the ALJ’s second reason 14 for discounting plaintiff’s subjective symptoms was clear and convincing and supported 15 by substantial evidence. 16 Finally, the ALJ discounted plaintiff’s testimony because his activities of daily 17 living reflected that he was able to function at an independent level. AR at 25; see 18 Valentine v. Comm’r, 574 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009) (the ALJ properly discounted 19 plaintiff’s testimony because his daily activities suggested his claims about the severity of 20 his limitations were exaggerated); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 21 2008) (inconsistency between a claimant’s alleged symptoms and his daily activities may 22 be a clear and convincing reason to find a claimant less credible). The ALJ noted that 23 plaintiff was able to bathe and dress himself, prepare snacks and meals, use the stove and 24 microwave, complete household chores, manage his own funds, and engage in social 25 activities. See AR at 25. Indeed, plaintiff reported that he was able to independently 26 perform his daily activities and testified he spent time with friends in person and online. 27 See AR at 47-48, 244-48, 331. Plaintiff was also enrolled in an online course. See AR at 28 424. Plaintiff’s daily activities were inconsistent with the alleged severity of his mental 1 impairment. Contrary to plaintiff’s claims that he did not think he could work or live 2 independently due to his anxiety, plaintiff’s activities reflect his symptoms were not 3 disabling and he had a higher level of functioning than he asserts. 4 In sum, the ALJ cited clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial 5 evidence for discounting plaintiff’s subjective testimony. 6 C. The ALJ Properly Considered the Lay Evidence 7 Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to properly consider the Third Party Function 8 Report submitted by his grandmother, Jeanine Dill. See P. Mem. at 14-15, 18-19. 9 Specifically, plaintiff contends the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Dill’s statement “simply 10 make[] no sense whatsoever.” See id. at 15. 11 Lay witness testimony falls in the category of “evidence from nonmedical 12 sources,” which ALJs consider. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a)(4). Under the prior 13 regulations, ALJs could only discount the testimony of lay witnesses by providing 14 specific “reasons that are germane to each witness.” Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 15 (9th Cir. 1993). But the revised regulation for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017 16 changed this standard. The revised regulations require ALJs to consider lay evidence, but 17 do not require ALJs to articulate how they considered the evidence using the same 18 criteria as for medical sources. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(d) (“We are not required to 19 articulate how we considered evidence from nonmedical sources using the requirements 20 in paragraphs (a)-(c) in this section.”). 21 There has been disagreement as to how or whether the revised regulations affect an 22 ALJ’s obligation to consider and evaluate lay witness opinions. The Ninth Circuit has 23 now resolved this question in its recent decision in Hudnall v. Dudek, 130 F.4th 668 (9th 24 Cir. 2025). The Ninth Circuit examined the new regulations and concluded its “‘germane 25 reasons’ precedent no longer applies to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, and in 26 considering such claims, ALJs need not explain their reasons for discounting evidence 27 from nonmedical sources.” Id. at 671. In other words, an ALJ may reject testimony from 28 a lay witness “without explanation.” Id. 1 Here, even under the old standard, the ALJ did not err. The ALJ clearly 2 considered Dill’s statements and provided germane reasons for discounting them. See 3 AR at 26. Although the ALJ did not expressly state that she rejected or discounted Dill’s 4 Third Party Function Report, the implication was clear – she stated Dill’s statements 5 about plaintiff were similar to plaintiff’s own subjective testimony and contrary to the 6 medical evidence, including the opinions and findings of Dr. Taylor and the state agency 7 physicians. See id. Because the ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for discounting 8 plaintiff’s testimony and Dill’s statements were similar to plaintiff’s, then the ALJ’s 9 reasons apply equally to Dill’s report. See Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694. But again, it is 10 enough that the ALJ explicitly considered Dill’s statements. Under Hudnall, the ALJ 11 was not required to explain why she rejected Dill’s statements. 12 Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in considering and discounting Dill’s statements. 13 D. The ALJ’s Step Five Determination Is Supported by Substantial Evidence and 14 Plaintiff Waived Any Argument About the Jobs Numbers 15 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred at step five because: (1) the jobs identified by the 16 vocational expert (“VE”) exceeded his capabilities; and (2) the identified jobs exist in 17 much lower numbers than the vocational expert testified. P. Mem. at 20-23. 18 At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show the claimant retains the 19 ability to perform other gainful activity. Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 20 (9th Cir. 2006). To support a finding that a claimant is not disabled at step five, the 21 Commissioner must provide evidence demonstrating that other work exists in significant 22 numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform, given his or her age, 23 education, work experience, and RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(b)(3). 24 The Commissioner may meet his step five burden either by reference to the 25 Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 or by 26 relying on the testimony of a VE and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) “in 27 evaluating whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national 28 economy.” Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see 1 Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001); SSR 83-12, 1983 WL 31253, at 2 *2; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(d)(1) (DOT is a source of reliable job information). 3 The DOT is the rebuttable presumptive authority on job classifications. Johnson v. 4 Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995). 5 An ALJ may not rely on a VE’s testimony regarding the requirements of a 6 particular job without first inquiring whether the testimony conflicts with the DOT, and if 7 so, the reasons therefor. Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 2007) 8 (discussing SSR 00-4p). In order for an ALJ to accept a VE’s testimony that contradicts 9 the DOT, the record must contain “‘persuasive evidence to support the deviation.’” 10 Id. at 1153 (quoting Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1435). Evidence sufficient to permit such 11 a deviation may be either specific findings of fact regarding the claimant’s residual 12 functionality, or inferences drawn from the context of the expert’s testimony. Light v. 13 Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1997) (as amended). 14 The ALJ here relied on the testimony of the VE to determine whether plaintiff, 15 given his RFC, could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 16 economy. See AR at 26-27, 49-50. In response to a hypothetical with the ALJ’s RFC 17 determination, the VE testified plaintiff could perform the jobs of laundry work II, 18 hospital cleaner, and industrial sweeper. See id. at 49-50. The VE also affirmed her 19 testimony was consistent with the DOT. AR at 52. Accordingly, the ALJ found plaintiff 20 could perform the identified jobs. See Kilpatrick, 35 F.4th at 1192-93 (an ALJ may rely 21 on a VE’s testimony). 22 First, plaintiff contends he is unable to perform those jobs because they require 23 multiple steps and decision making beyond his capabilities. P. Mem. at 20. The 24 argument is without merit. Contrary to plaintiff’s implication, the ALJ restricted plaintiff 25 to simple instructions, not to one or two-step tasks. Reasoning level two jobs do not 26 conflict with a limitation to simple instructions. See, e.g., Davis v. Saul, 846 F. App’x 27 464, 466 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Simple work is consistent with positions requiring Reasoning 28 Level 2.”); Davis v. Berryhill, 743 F. App’x 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2018) (reasoning level two 1 jobs do not conflict with a limitation to simple tasks); Gill v. Comm’r, 2024 WL 2 1160500, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2024) (listing cases finding that Level 2 reasoning 3 jobs do not conflict with a restriction to simple work). Further, one of the jobs identified 4 by the VE – industrial sweeper – is a reasoning level one position. At bottom, plaintiff’s 5 arguments are wholly conclusory and rest entirely on his own interpretation of his 6 capabilities and the duties of the identified jobs. But as the court has found, the ALJ’s 7 RFC determination was based on substantial evidence and the VE testified plaintiff was 8 capable of performing the identified jobs. 9 Second, plaintiff asserts the VE’s job numbers are unreliable and were 10 substantially lower in SkillTRAN. See P. Mem. at 20-23. Defendant contends plaintiff 11 forfeited the argument because he failed to challenge the job numbers at the hearing. D. 12 Mem. at 12. “[W]hen a claimant fails entirely to challenge a vocational expert’s job 13 numbers during administrative proceedings before the agency, the claimant forfeits such 14 a challenge on appeal, at least when that claimant is represented by counsel.” Shaibi v. 15 Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Meanel, 172 F.3d 1111, which 16 it held that claimants who are represented by counsel “‘must raise all issues and evidence 17 at their administrative hearings in order to preserve them on appeal.’”). Here, all 18 plaintiff’s counsel had to do to preserve the issue was “raise the job-numbers issue in a 19 general sense before the ALJ,” such as by “inquiring as to the evidentiary basis for” the 20 estimated job numbers or whether the numbers were consistent with the SkillsTRAN. Id. 21 at 1110. Plaintiff’s counsel at the hearing before the ALJ here did none of this. Because 22 plaintiff did not challenge the job numbers at the hearing, he waived the challenge on 23 appeal. And even if the ALJ had not waived this issue, even by plaintiff’s own figures 24 the three occupations add up to 59,515 positions in the national economy. See P. Mem. at 25 20-22. The Ninth Circuit has stated that as few as 25,000 available jobs in the national 26 economy constitutes work existing in significant numbers. See Gutierrez v. Comm’r of 27 Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 528-29 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, even if not waived, any error in 28 the number of positions was harmless. 1 The court concludes, however, that the ALJ did not err at step five and plaintiff 2 || waived any challenge to the VE’s testimony regarding the jobs numbers. 3 V. 4 CONCLUSION 5 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered AFFIRMING the 6 || decision of the Commissioner denying benefits, and dismissing the complaint with 7 || prejudice. 8 9 || Dated: March 31, 2025 LRep 10 11 SHERI PYM United States Magistrate Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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